Carrillo v. County of Santa Cruz

Opinion

GERMAN CARRILLO, et al., Case No. 20-cv-06973-BLF

Plaintiffs, ORDER DENYING MOTION TO STAY v. [Re: ECF 16] COUNTY OF SANTA CRUZ, et al.,

Defendants.

Before the Court is a motion to stay brought by Defendants County of Santa Cruz, James Hart, and Chris Clark (collectively, “the County”), which seeks to have this Court abstain from hearing this case under the doctrine of Younger abstention as articulated in Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971), and its progeny. See Mot., ECF 16. Plaintiffs Alma Carrillo and Francisco Santana, successors-in-interest to deceased plaintiff German Carrillo (collectively “Carrillo’s parents”) oppose this motion. See Opp’n, ECF 18. Pursuant to Civil Local Rule 7-1(b), this Court finds this motion suitable for decision without oral argument and hereby VACATES the hearing set for April 22, 2021. For the reasons set forth below, the Court DENIES the County’s motion. I. BACKGROUND On February 28, 2013, Carrillo, Oscar Vargas-Vaca, Reymundo Ayala, Eric Romero, and Andres Rocha were driving in a vehicle together when they noticed Felipe Reyes walking down the street. Compl. ¶ 23, ECF 1. Romero then allegedly called Reyes a “scrap,” a pejorative term used by Norteno gang members to refer to Sureno gang affiliates. Compl. ¶ 23. Ayala, who was driving, pulled over, and the other occupants approached Reyes and chased him to an apartment that he followed the group thinking there would be a fight, not a murder, and he had no role in the stabbing. Id. ¶ 25. Romero and Rocha were known gang members with extensive criminal records, but Carrillo had no known gang affiliation or criminal record. Id. ¶ 26. Carrillo had attended middle school with Vargas-Vaca, Ayala, and Romero, and Carrillo allegedly hung out with them to smoke marijuana. Id. ¶¶ 24, 26. At the time of his arrest, Carrillo was 17 years old and a junior at Renaissance High School. Compl. ¶¶ 29-30. Carrillo was initially placed at Santa Cruz Juvenile Detention Center, but on April 7, 2013, when he turned 18, he was transferred to Santa Cruz County Jail (“the jail”) as an adult and assigned to the “N-Unit,” which is a maximum-security unit reserved for gang members and affiliates within the jail. Id. ¶ 30. During his six years in jail, Carrillo obtained his high school diploma and never committed any major infractions. Id. ¶¶ 31-32. On October 14, 2019, employees of the County found Carrillo deceased in his jail cell. Compl. ¶ 19. An autopsy concluded Carrillo died by ligature strangulation approximately 24-36 hours earlier. Id. ¶ 20. On October 31, 2019, the Santa Cruz District Attorney charged Carrillo’s cellmates, Mario Lozano and Jason Cortez, with Carrillo’s murder. Compl. ¶¶ 21, 34. Carrillo’s parents allege that Carrillo’s death was attributable to the County’s negligence as well as intentional indifference because [1] the jail was overcrowded; [2] the County housed violent gang members with Carrillo, who was not violent or a gang member; and [3] the County allowed inmates to cover the windows of their cells, preventing required supervision. Compl. ¶¶ 35-36. In addition, Carrillo’s parents allege that the County knew the emergency buttons in the N- Unit cells were not working for a long period of time prior to Carrillo’s death. Id. ¶ 37. Carrillo’s parents allege that these factors were a substantial force in causing Carrillo’s death and that the County acted with deliberate indifference and recklessness to the welfare and safety of Carrillo. Id. ¶¶ 37-38. A. The Lozano Cortez Actions The State of California has charged Mario Lozano and Jason Cortez with the murder of Carrillo. The relevant cases are People v. Jason Cortez, Santa Cruz Superior Court Case No. 3. The criminal complaints contain identical counts against both defendants for [1] violation of California Penal Code section 187(a), felony murder, and [2] violation of California Penal Code section 186.22(a), participation in a criminal street gang. Id. There is currently a protective order in those cases regarding discovery. Id. B. The Instant Case On October 6, 2020, Carrillo’s parents filed a complaint against the County for: [1] violating Carrillo’s First, Fourth, and Fourteenth Amendments rights, as well as Carrillo’s parents’ loss of rights to familial association guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment, under 42 U.S.C. § 1983; [2] Monell and supervisory liability under 42 U.S.C. § 1983; [3] violating the California Bane Act, California Civil Code Section 52.1(b); and [4] negligence. Compl. ¶¶ 46-79. Carrillo’s parents are seeking equitable relief by asking for a declaratory judgment finding that Carrillo’s rights were violated and legal relief by requesting monetary damages. See Compl. The County filed this motion on November 24, 2020, asking the Court to abstain under the Younger abstention doctrine. See Mot. A. Younger Abstention Younger abstention arises out of the federal statute regarding a federal court’s ability to enjoin state court proceedings. Younger, 401 U.S. at 43. In addition, the principle of “Our Federalism” requires that “the National Government, anxious though it may be to vindicate and protect federal rights and federal interests, always endeavors to do so in ways that will not unduly interfere with the legitimate activities of the States.” Id. at 44. The Supreme Court extended Younger to declaratory judgments that have “the same practical effect on a state court proceeding as an injunction.” Samuels v. Mackell, 401 U.S. 66, 72 (1971). The Supreme Court further extended Younger to state proceedings when important state interests are involved. Middlesex Cty. Ethics Comm. v. Garden State Bar Ass’n, 457 U.S. 423, 432 (1982). The Ninth Circuit, using the test from Middlesex, has defined four factors that must be met for Younger abstention to apply: “(1) there is an ongoing state proceeding; (2) the proceeding raise constitutional challenges; and (4) the requested relief seeks to enjoin or has the practical effect of enjoining the ongoing state judicial proceeding.” Arevalo v. Hennessy, 882 F.3d 763, 765 (9th Cir. 2018). The Ninth Circuit has held that “Younger principles apply to actions at law as well as for injunctive or declaratory relief because a determination that the federal plaintiff’s constitutional rights have been violated would have the same practical effect as a declaration or injunction on pending state proceedings.” Gilbertson v. Albright, 381 F.3d 965, 968 (9th Cir. 2004). The County requests the Court judicially notice six documents filed in the Santa Cruz Superior Court: (1) criminal complaint filed against Jason Cortez; (1) criminal complaint filed against Mario Lozano; (3) protective order filed in Cortez case; (4) protective order filed in Lozano case; (5) docket of Cortez case; and (6) docket of Lozano case. See Request for Judicial Notice, Exs. 1-6, ECF 17. Courts may properly take judicial notice of other court filings and matters of public record. Reyn’s Pasta Bella, LLC v. Visa USA, Inc., 442 F.3d 741, 746 n.6 (9th Cir. 2006) (citing Burbank- Glendale-Pasadena Airport Auth. v. City of Burbank, 136 F.3d 1360, 1364 (9th Cir. 1998)). Carrillo’s parents have neither opposed the requests for judicial notice nor disputed the authenticity of the documents. The Court GRANTS both requests for judicial notice. “Younger abstention is only appropriate if the federal plaintiff is not barred from litigating federal constitutional issues in the state proceeding.” Cunio v. Brown, 692 F. App’x 464, 465 (9th Cir. 2017) (internal quotes omitted). “In addressing Younger abstention issues, district courts must exercise jurisdiction except when specific legal standards are met and may not exercise jurisdiction when those standards are met; there is no discretion vested in the district courts to do otherwise.” Vasquez v. Rackauckas, 734 F.3d 1025, 1035 (9th Cir. 2013) “[F]ederal plaintiffs who are also not parties to pending litigation in state court may proceed with their federal litigation without being barred under Younger.” Id. (internal quotations omitted). “Only under quite limited not a party to an ongoing state proceeding.” Id. (internal quotations omitted). “Such circumstances are present only when a federal plaintiff’s interests are so intertwined with those of the state court party that interference with the state court proceeding is inevitable.” Id. (internal quotations omitted). The County argues that Younger applies to this case under the Ninth Circuit’s ruling in Gilbertson, which extended Younger to suits for money damages. Mot. 4. The County then applies the Younger factors. Mot. 4. Under the County’s Younger factor analysis, it argues that [1] Carrillo’s Section 1983 claims implicate the ongoing criminal trials of Cortez and Lozano, [2] the criminal prosecution is an important state interest and [3] Carrillo’s parents can raise his constitutional claims in “state proceedings,” and [4] Carrillo’s parent’s claims have the effect of enjoining the Cortez and Lozano criminal trials. Mot. 5-7. Finally, the County argues that even though Carrillo’s parents cannot be a party to the criminal trial of their son’s accused murderers, their interest is intertwined with the state’s interest and therefore Younger abstention still applies. Mot. 7. Carrillo’s parents also apply the Younger factors but reach the opposite conclusion as to the application of Younger abstention. They argue that, while the murder trial is an important state interest, it will not be impacted by their Section 1983 civil action, and they will have no opportunity to raise their constitutional claims in the criminal case against Cortez and Lozano. Opp’n 3. Carrillo’s parents argue that Younger does not apply because they are not and cannot be involved in the state proceeding, which is a criminal trial against their son’s alleged murderers. Opp’n 4. Carrillo’s parents also argue that their Section 1983 action against the County would not enjoin the prosecution of Lozano and Cortez because they are not challenging the state’s right to prosecute their son’s alleged murderers. Opp’n 7. The first two Younger factors are not at issue in this case. The parties do not dispute that the Cortez and Lozano criminal trials are on-going state proceedings. Mot. 5; Opp’n 3-4. They do not dispute that a criminal prosecution represents an important state interest. Mot. 5-6; Opp’n 5. The remaining two Younger factors require a closer analysis. A. Adequate opportunity to raise constitutional challenges in state proceeding The County argues that Carrillo’s parents will have an adequate opportunity to raise constitutional issues in state court proceedings. Mot. 6. Carrillo’s parents argue that they have no standing to be a party to the state criminal case and therefore cannot raise their constitutional challenges in the state court proceedings. Opp’n 5. The Court agrees with Carrillo’s parents. Carrillo’s parents will not have an opportunity to raise their constitutional claims in state criminal proceedings against Cortez and Lozano because they are not parties to the case. In addition, Carrillo’s suspected murders are not capable of representing Carrillo’s parents’ interest in their criminal trial. To the extent the County is suggesting that Younger abstention applies because Carrillo’s parents may, hypothetically, initiate a new and separate civil proceeding in state court, that argument is not supported by any case law identified by the County or this Court. All of the cases cited by the County involve plaintiffs having the opportunity to raise their claims in the related state court actions, not a hypothetical separate one. See Pennzoil Co. v. Texaco, Inc. 481 U.S. 1, 3 (1987); Middlesex Cty. Ethics Comm, 457 U.S. 423, 425 (1982); Commc’ns Telesystems Int’l v. California Pub. Util. Comm’n, 196 F.3d 1011, 1104 (9th Cir. 1999); Dubinka v. Judges of Superior Court of State of Cal. for Cty. of Los Angeles, 23 F.3d 218, 221 (9th Cir. 1994). This factor is not met as Carrillo’s parents will not have any opportunity to raise their constitutional claims in Cortez and Lozano’s criminal trials. Failing to satisfy this factor for Younger abstention is sufficient reason to deny the County’s motion, but the Court will address the parties’ arguments regarding the final factor. B. The effect of enjoining state court trial The County argues that a federal court damages award “would case a negative light on the People’s prosecution of Cortez and Lozano for Decedent’s murder.” Mot. 6-7. The Court disagrees with the County that this would have the effect of enjoining the state court trial. The County cites the Ninth Circuit’s decision in Gilbertson to support its position. Mot. 7. In Gilbertson, the Oregon State Board of Examiners for Engineering and Land Surveying (“the Board”) had revoked and declined to reinstate Gilbertson’s license to survey in a state administrative proceeding. Gilbertson, 381 F.3d at 968. Gilbertson appealed the decision in state court and also filed a Section 1983 claim against the Board for money damages alleging violations of his Fourteenth Amendment rights to due process and equal protection. Id. The Ninth Circuit concluded that Gilbertson’s request for money damages would have the effect of rendering moot the Board’s adverse decision against Gilbertson as well as Gilbertson’s appeal in the Oregon state court. Id. Gilbertson does not resemble Carrillo’s parents’ Section 1983 action against the County because Carrillo’s parents are not subject to any state proceedings. Carrillo’s parents are not attempting to avoid an unfavorable state court ruling by seeking a parallel action in federal court as Carrillo’s parents are not a party to any state proceeding, criminal or noncriminal. The County’s argument that awarding damages to Carrillo’s parents in this federal case would “cast a negative light on the People’s prosecution of Cortez and Lozano for Decedent’s murder” is not supported by case law and not enough to establish that this case would have the effect of enjoining the state court criminal proceeding. The County has failed to establish how this lawsuit would impact the County’s ability to go forward with its criminal prosecution. The County also cites Green v. City of Tucson for the proposition that “[A] party whose interest is so intertwined with those of a state court party that direct interference with the state court proceeding is inevitable may, under Younger, not proceed.” 255 F.3d 1086, 1100 (9th Cir. 2001). The County argues that, “[t]he crux of Plaintiffs’ lawsuit against the County Defendants rests on the allegations that the Decedent was improperly classified as a member of a gang and therefore wrongly housed in a cell with two known gang members.” Reply 2, ECF 19. However, the Court finds that Vasquez, a later-decided Ninth Circuit case, compels a different conclusion. When evaluating whether interests were “intertwined,” Vasquez found that Younger abstention was not appropriate when “the relief sought in federal court would not disturb the validity of the [state court] Order as to any of the parties against whom it issued.” 734 F.3d at 1035-36. The Court finds the situation to be the same here: finding the County liable for constitutional violations related to jail overcrowding, housing decisions, and inmate supervision “would not disturb the validity” of the state court murder prosecutions. Finally, the County argues for the first time in its reply brief that a Wallace stay is 1 claim before he has been convicted, it is within the power of the district court, and in accord with 2 common practice, to stay the civil action until the criminal case or the likelihood of a criminal case 3 is ended.” Wallace v. Kato, 549 U.S. 384, 393-94 (2007) (parenthetical omitted). A Wallace stay 4 is not applicable here because Carrillo’s parents, as the plaintiffs in this case, are not subject to a 5 criminal case nor have they made any allegations of false arrest. 6 For the foregoing reason, the Court finds Younger abstention not appropriate to Carrillo’s parent’s claims. The Court DENIES the County’s Motion to Stay. 9 10 Dated: March 2, 2021 kom Low herman! BETH LABSON FREEMAN United States District Judge

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