Tuck v. Portfolio Recovery Associates, L.L.C.

• Court: District Court, S.D. California
• Decided: October 16, 2019
• Docket: 3:19-cv-01270
• Status: Unknown

Opinion

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 8 SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 9 10 11 ZACH TUCK, Case No.: 19-CV-1270-CAB-AHG

12 Plaintiff, ORDER ON MOTIONS TO DISMISS 13 v. 14 PORTFOLIO RECOVERY [Doc. Nos. 21, 23, 27, 30, 45] ASSOCIATES, L.L.C. et al., 15 Defendants. 16 17 18 19 Before the Court are Defendants Portfolio Recovery Associates L.L.C., Diversified 20 Consultants, Inc., Collection at Law, Inc., and Experian Information Solutions Inc.’s 21 (collectively “Defendants”) motions to dismiss Plaintiff’s complaint. [Doc. Nos. 21, 23, 22 27, 30, 45.] The Court deems the motions suitable for determination on the papers 23 submitted and without oral argument. See S.D. Cal. CivLR 7.1(d)(1). For the reasons set 24 forth below, Plaintiff’s complaint is dismissed with leave to amend. 25 I. BACKGROUND 26 On July 10, 2019, Plaintiff Zach Tuck proceeding pro se, filed his complaint against 27 nineteen different business entities. [Doc. No. 1.] The pending motions to dismiss 28 Plaintiff’s complaint are made on the same or similar grounds. The complaint alleges 1 violations under the Telephone Consumer Protection Act, 47 U.S.C. § 227, et seq. 2 (“TCPA”); the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1692, et seq. (“FDCPA”); 3 the Fair Credit Reporting Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1681, et seq. (“FCRA”); the California 4 Consumer Credit Reporting Agencies Act, Cal. Civ. Code § 1785, et seq. (“CCRAA”); and 5 the California Rosenthal Fair Debt Collection Practices Act, Cal. Civ. Code § 1788, et seq. 6 (“Rosenthal Act” or “RFDCPA”). 7 A. Factual Allegations as to the “Credit Bureau Defendants” 8 Plaintiff categorizes Defendants Portfolio Recovery Associates L.L.C., Diversified 9 Consultants, Inc., and Collection at Law, Inc. as the “credit bureau defendants.” [Doc. No. 10 1 at ¶ 54.] According to the complaint, the credit bureau defendants called Plaintiff’s 11 emergency cell phone number more than twenty times, many times before 8:00 a.m. and 12 after 9:00 p.m. between the dates of August 20, 2015, and July 10, 2019, often on the same 13 business day. [Id. at ¶¶ 58–60.] Plaintiff alleges that none of these calls were made for 14 emergency purposes and were made by using automatic telephone dialing system 15 capabilities or artificial or prerecorded messages or voices. [Id. at ¶¶ 61, 63.] Plaintiff also 16 states that some of the named credit bureau defendants called Plaintiff more than one 17 hundred and fifty times at all hours of the day often on the same day, attempting to assert 18 a right to enforce a consumer debt allegedly owed by Plaintiff. [Id. at ¶¶ 62, 64.] Further, 19 Plaintiff alleges that on numerous occasions he demanded in writing that the credit bureau 20 defendants provide him with written “verification” and consumer debt “validation” as it 21 pertained to any alleged consumer debt, which the credit bureau defendants have ignored. 22 [Id. at ¶ 66.] Plaintiff alleges he has no business debt, and therefore the alleged debt could 23 only have been used for personal, family, or household purposes. [Id. at ¶ 72.] Plaintiff 24 also states the “alleged debt is not [his] consumer debt” [Id. at ¶ 116], and “an alleged non- 25 existent consumer debt he never owed.” [Id. at ¶ 138]. 26 B. Factual Allegations as to the “Credit Reporting Agency Defendants” 27 Plaintiff categorizes Defendant Experian Information Solutions Inc. as one of the 28 “credit reporting agency defendants.” [Id. at ¶ 55.] According to the complaint, around 1 January 2016, Plaintiff checked his consumer credit report from the credit reporting agency 2 defendants and discovered several negative consumer credit accounts reported by the credit 3 bureau defendants named above as well as from the credit reporting agency defendants. 4 [Id. at ¶ 156.] Plaintiff states all of these negative accounts were unfamiliar to him and he 5 was never informed by any of the furnishers or the credit reporting agency defendants of 6 their negative credit reporting activities. [Id.] Plaintiff contacted all of the Defendants 7 disputing the negative accounts and requested an investigation of such. [Id. at ¶ 157.] After 8 further requests for investigation, the Defendants continued to report the negative accounts 9 on his credit report and failed to provide him the requested “verification” and “validation.” 10 [Id. at ¶¶ 158–160.] Plaintiff alleges he has never had any business dealings or had any 11 accounts with any of the Defendants. [Id. at ¶ 172.] 12 II. LEGAL STANDARD 13 Under Rule 12(b)(6), a party may bring a motion to dismiss based on the failure to 14 state a claim upon which relief may be granted. A Rule 12(b)(6) motion challenges the 15 sufficiency of a complaint as failing to allege “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is 16 plausible on its face.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). For purposes 17 of ruling on a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, the court “accept[s] factual allegations in the complaint 18 as true and construe[s] the pleadings in the light most favorable to the non-moving party.” 19 Manzarek v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 519 F.3d 1025, 1031 (9th Cir. 2008). 20 Even under the liberal pleading standard of Rule 8(a)(2), which requires only that a 21 party make “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to 22 relief,” a “pleading that offers ‘labels and conclusions’ or ‘a formulaic recitation of the 23 elements of a cause of action will not do.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) 24 (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555). “[C]onclusory allegations of law and unwarranted 25 inferences are insufficient to defeat a motion to dismiss.” Adams v. Johnson, 355 F.3d 26 1179, 1183 (9th Cir. 2004); see also Starr v. Baca, 652 F.3d 1202, 1216 (9th Cir. 2011) 27 (“[A]llegations in a complaint or counterclaim may not simply recite the elements of a 28 cause of action, but must contain sufficient allegations of underlying facts to give fair 1 notice and to enable the opposing party to defend itself effectively.”). “Determining 2 whether a complaint states a plausible claim for relief . . . [is] a context-specific task that 3 requires the reviewing court to draw on its judicial experience and common sense.” Iqbal, 4 556 U.S. at 679. 5 III. DISCUSSION 6 Initially, each Defendant contends that Plaintiff’s claims fail as a matter of law 7 because Plaintiff improperly asserts sweeping allegations against all named Defendants 8 without specifying which Defendants committed which act, thereby failing to give proper 9 notice. The Court agrees with Defendants that Plaintiff has failed to comply with Rule 8’s 10 pleading standards. Plaintiff’s complaint is replete with broad conclusory allegations 11 towards all named Defendants generally and fails to identify which Defendant is 12 responsible for which alleged wrongful act. Moreover, Plaintiff’s allegations of any 13 wrongful acts consist primarily of copying the statutory language under each of his claims 14 with little to no facts offered in support. Plaintiff categorizes the Defendants and then 15 proceeds to refer to all Defendants throughout the complaint with abbreviations. 16 Thereafter, Plaintiff groups all of the Defendants together throughout the complaint. In 17 some instances, Plaintiff refers to the abbreviated entities “CPS, PR, HH, MAB, ANSI, 18 MBLLC” which do not appear to be in reference to any parties in this case. [Doc. No. 1 19 at ¶¶ 150, 159.] 20 Plaintiff’s generalized allegations do not provide the Defendants with fair notice as 21 to the basis of Plaintiff’s claims because Defendants and the Court cannot determine which 22 Defendants are responsible for which act. “Experience teaches that, unless cases are pled 23 clearly and precisely, issues are not joined, discovery is not controlled, the trial court’s 24 docket becomes unmanageable, the litigants suffer, and society loses confidence in the 25 court’s ability to administer justice.” Bautista v. Los Angeles County, 216 F.3d 837, 841 26 (9th Cir. 2000) (citations and quotations omitted). 27 By submitting imprecise and sprawling claims, Plaintiff effectively “calls on the 28 court to disentangle and interpret his allegations.” Kuzmicki v. Hanrahan, No. 3:17-CV- 1 00342-RCJ-VPC, 2018 WL 2088745, at *6 (D. Nev. May 4, 2018), report and 2 recommendation adopted, No. 3:17-CV-00342-RCJ-VPC, 2018 WL 3577246 (D. Nev. 3 July 25, 2018). The Court is reluctant to do so. See Jacobson v. Schwartzenegger, 226 4 F.R.D. 395, 397 (C.D. Cal. 2005) (“[N]either the Court nor opposing counsel should be 5 required to expend time and effort searching through large masses of conclusory, 6 argumentative, evidentiary and other extraneous allegations in order to discover whether 7 the essentials of claims asserted can be found in such a melange.” (Silver v. Queen’s Hosp., 8 53 F.R.D. 223, 226–27 (D. Haw. 1971)). Accordingly, Plaintiff’s complaint is 9 DISMISSED with leave to amend to plead more precisely and coherently which 10 Defendants committed which acts that Plaintiff alleges were violations and sufficient facts 11 in support of such allegations. 12 The Court reiterates that the purpose of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8, and its 13 requirements that allegations be pled with sufficient specificity, is to put the opposing party 14 on notice of the wrong they allegedly committed so that they can adequately defend 15 themselves. FED. R. CIV. P. 8; see Gauvin v. Trombatore, 682 F. Supp. 1067, 1071 (N.D. 16 Cal. 1988) (lumping together of multiple defendants in one broad allegation fails to satisfy 17 notice requirement of Rule 8(a)(2)). Even if the Court were to “disentangle and interpret 18 [Plaintiff’s] allegations,” Kuzmicki, 2018 WL 2088745, at *6, Plaintiff’s allegations 19 nevertheless fail under Rule 12(b)(6) as discussed below. 20 A. The TCPA Violations 21 Plaintiff alleges violations of the TCPA against all of the credit bureau defendants. 22 [Doc. No. 1 at 20–27.] Plaintiff mostly repeats statutory language under the TCPA and 23 refers to the credit bureau defendants’ alleged actions against all consumers seemingly 24 nationwide. The Court finds such portions of the complaint largely unnecessary and futile. 25 As far as Plaintiff’s allegations pertaining to him, as stated above, Plaintiff merely repeats 26 the language under the TCPA and alleges the violations were committed by all of the credit 27 bureau defendants generally. Plaintiff’s complaint lacks any facts pertaining to the conduct 28 of any specific credit bureau defendant and their actions against him which could result in 1 a sufficient TCPA claim. 2 To successfully plead a TCPA claim, a plaintiff must allege defendant (1) called a 3 cellular telephone number; (2) using an ATDS or an artificial or prerecorded voice; (3) 4 without the recipient’s prior express consent. 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(1); Los Angeles Lakers, 5 Inc. v. Fed. Ins. Co., 869 F.3d 795, 804 (9th Cir. 2017) (quoting Meyer v. Portfolio 6 Recovery Assocs., LLC, 707 F.3d 1036, 1043 (9th Cir. 2012). 7 To “make” a call under the TCPA the person must either (1) directly make the call, 8 or (2) have an agency relationship with the person who made the call. See Gomez v. 9 Campbell-Ewald, Co., 768 F.3d 871, 877–79 (9th Cir. 2014). An ATDS is “equipment 10 which has the capacity to store or produce telephone numbers to be called, using a random 11 or sequential number generator.” Satterfield v. Simon & Schuster, Inc., 569 F.3d 946, 954 12 (9th Cir. 2009). Under 47 U.S.C. § 227(a)(1), an ATDS is defined as “equipment which 13 has the capacity—(A) to store or produce telephone numbers to be called, using a random 14 or sequential number generator; and (B) to dial such numbers.” An ATDS “need not 15 actually store, produce, or, call randomly or sequentially generated telephone numbers, it 16 need only have the capacity to do it.” Satterfield, 569 F.3d at 951. Courts in this district 17 have taken two approaches when facing a motion to dismiss on the grounds that the 18 allegations of use of an ATDS are insufficient. See Maier v. J.C. Penney Corp., No. 13- 19 CV-0163–IEG (DHB), 2013 WL 3006415 at *3 (S.D. Cal. June 13, 2013). Under the first 20 approach, courts permit a plaintiff to make minimal allegations at the complaint stage, 21 permitting discovery to proceed on the issue of ATDS, because the information is in the 22 sole possession of the defendant. Id., citing In re Jiffy Lube Int’l Inc., Text Spam Litig., 23 847 F.Supp.2d 1253, 1260 (S.D. Cal. 2012). Under the second approach, factual 24 allegations beyond mere statutory language are required which may lead to the inference 25 that an ATDS was used. See Maier, 2013 WL 3006415 at *3. 26 Plaintiff has failed to sufficiently allege that an ATDS was used or that there was a 27 TCPA violation under either approach. Plaintiff’s complaint simply parrots the statutory 28 definition of an ATDS and other provisions of the TCPA, but the Defendants would have 1 no way of determining if they have any information in their possession with respect to such 2 calls with Plaintiff’s conclusory and sweeping allegations. Plaintiff does not allege the 3 phone number belonging to any of the credit bureau defendants was used to make the calls 4 to him, the content of such calls, or any circumstances that could support an inference that 5 the calls were placed with an ATDS or an artificial or prerecorded voice. Plaintiff’s 6 conclusory allegations fall short of what is required for plausibility. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. 7 Accordingly, Plaintiff’s claims under the TCPA are DISMISSED with leave to amend 8 for failure to state a claim. 9 B. The FDCPA and Rosenthal Act Violations 10 Plaintiff alleges several violations of the FDCPA against all of the credit bureau 11 defendants and violations of the Rosenthal Act against all of the Defendants. [Doc. No. 1 12 at 28–35, 42–44.] 13 The FDCPA prohibits debt collectors from engaging in abusive, deceptive, and 14 unfair practices in the collection of consumer debts. See 15 U.S.C. § 1692. “In order to 15 state a claim under the FDCPA, a plaintiff must show: 1) that he is a consumer; 2) that the 16 debt arises out of a transaction entered into for personal purposes; 3) that the defendant is 17 a debt collector; and 4) that the defendant violated one of the provisions of the FDCPA.” 18 Freeman v. ABC Legal Servs. Inc., 827 F.Supp.2d 1065, 1071 (N.D. Cal. 2011). 19 The Rosenthal Act is the California state equivalent of the Fair Debt Collection 20 Practices Act. See Cal. Civ. Code § 1788 et seq. The RFDCPA “mimics or incorporates 21 by reference the FDCPA’s requirements . . . and makes available the FDCPA’s remedies 22 for violations.” Riggs v. Prober & Raphel, 681 F.3d 1097, 1100 (9th Cir. 2012). The 23 RFDCPA states that “every debt collector collecting or attempting to collect a consumer 24 debt shall comply with the provisions of Sections 1692b to 1692j” of the FDCPA. Cal. 25 Civ. Code § 1788.17. To establish a violation of the RFDCPA, a plaintiff must show (1) 26 the defendant was attempting to collect a “consumer debt,” (2) the defendant was a “debt 27 collector,” (3) the plaintiff was a “debtor,” and (4) the defendant’s collection activities 28 violated the FDCPA and thus the RFDCPA. See Cal. Civ. Code § 1788.17. 1 Plaintiff’s FDCPA and Rosenthal Act claims fail for several reasons. First, Plaintiff 2 states all Defendants are debt collectors, but fails to allege any facts to support such a 3 conclusion. A “debt collector” is “any person who uses any instrumentality of interstate 4 commerce or the mails in any business the principal purpose of which is the collection of 5 any debts, or who regularly collects or attempts to collect, directly or indirectly, debts owed 6 or due or asserted to be owed or due another.” 15 U.S.C. § 1692a(6). Plaintiff fails to 7 provide any factual basis from which the Court could plausibly infer that the Defendants’ 8 principal purpose is the collection of debts or that either Defendant regularly collects or 9 attempts to collect debts owed or due to another. Nor does Plaintiff provide facts to infer 10 the alleged debt at issue was owed or due to another. 11 Plaintiff also fails to set forth any factual allegations to suggest that any Defendant 12 engaged in conduct prohibited by the FDCPA or Rosenthal Act beyond mere conclusory 13 allegations repeating the provisions under each statute. Again, because Plaintiff fails to 14 identify which Defendants made which calls or any factual content of such calls the 15 Defendants in this case would be unable to defend themselves as to Plaintiff’s conclusory 16 allegations. Defendants would be unable to determine whether or not calls were made at 17 any unusual time or place, whether calls were made with the intent to annoy, abuse, or 18 harass, or whether calls were made without meaningful disclosure of identity. Further, 19 Plaintiff has not alleged any false, deceptive, or misleading representation was made by 20 any of the Defendants in such calls. 21 Lastly, Plaintiff’s allegations regarding the debt at issue are insufficient. A “debt” 22 is defined as “any obligation or alleged obligation of a consumer to pay money arising out 23 of a transaction in which the money, property, insurance, or services which are the subject 24 of the transaction are primarily for personal, family, or household purposes, whether or not 25 such obligation has been reduced to judgment.” 15 U.S.C. § 1692a(5). Proving the 26 existence of a “debt” is a “threshold” issue in every FDCPA action. Turner v. Cook, 362 27 F.3d 1219, 1226–27 (9th Cir. 2004). Here, Plaintiff first states that “[t]he same consumer 28 business debt[s] allegedly owed to all of the defendant’s [sic] herein arose out of a 1 transaction that was primarily for personal, family, or household purposes.” [Doc. No. 1 2 at ¶ 71.] Then, Plaintiff states the “alleged debt is not [his] consumer debt” [Id. at ¶ 116], 3 and “an alleged non-existent consumer debt he never owed.” [Id. at ¶ 138]. Plaintiff’s 4 allegations are contradictory and provide no factual basis to infer that the debt at issue was 5 indeed an obligation arising out of a transaction primarily for personal, family, or 6 household purposes as required under the FDCPA and Rosenthal Act. 7 Accordingly, Plaintiff’s claims under the FDCPA and Rosenthal Act are 8 DISMISSED with leave to amend for failure to state a claim. 9 C. The FCRA Violations 10 Plaintiff alleges violations of the FCRA pursuant to 15 U.S.C. § 1681 against all of 11 the Defendants except counts X and XI which he alleges against only the credit reporting 12 agency defendants. [Doc. No. 1 at 35–40, 44–46.] 13 1. § 1681s-2 14 The FCRA aims to “ensure fair and accurate credit reporting, promote efficiency in 15 the banking system, and protect consumer privacy.” Safeco Ins. Co. of Am. v. Burr, 551 16 U.S. 47, 52 (2007). The FCRA imposes duties on “furnishers” as well as imposing 17 responsibilities on the consumer reporting agencies. See 15 U.S.C. § 1681s-2; Gorman v. 18 Wolpoff & Abramson, LLP, 584 F.3d 1147, 1154 (9th Cir. 2009) (“Section 1681s-2 sets 19 forth ‘[r]esponsibilities of furnishers of information to consumer reporting agencies.’”). 20 Section 1681s-2(b) imposes obligations on furnishers that are “triggered ‘upon notice of 21 dispute’ – that is, when a person who furnished information to a [consumer reporting 22 agency] receives notice from the [consumer reporting agency] that the consumer disputes 23 the information.” Gorman, 584 F.3d at 1154. Pursuant to section 1681s-2(b)(1), after 24 receiving notice of a dispute, a furnisher must “conduct an investigation with respect to the 25 disputed information” among other responsibilities. 15 U.S.C. § 1681s-2(b)(1)(A). 26 “[T]hese duties arise only after the furnisher receives notice of dispute from a [consumer 27 reporting agency]; notice of dispute received directly from the consumer does not trigger 28 furnishers’ duties under subsection (b).” Gorman, 584 F.3d at 1154. 1 The credit reporting agency defendants are not furnishers of information; rather, they 2 are consumer reporting agencies as defined by § 1681a(f) of the FCRA. Accordingly, 3 Plaintiff’s claims under § 1681s-2 of the FCRA as to the credit reporting agency defendants 4 Trans Union, LLC and Experian Information Solutions Inc. are DISMISSED with 5 prejudice. As to the credit bureau defendants, Plaintiff alleges he sent notices of disputes 6 to all of the named Defendants but does not allege sufficient facts to support an inference 7 that any of the Defendants received a notice of dispute from a credit reporting agency as 8 required. Accordingly, Plaintiff’s claims under § 1681s-2(b) are DISMISSED with leave 9 to amend for failure to state a claim. Section 1681s-2(a) also imposes duties upon 10 furnishers of information. However, there is no private right of action under section 1681s- 11 2(a); a violation of this section can be pursued only by federal or state officials, and not by 12 a private party. See 15 U.S.C. § 1681s-2(c)(1); Gorman, 584 F.3d at 1162. Accordingly, 13 Plaintiff’s claims under 15 U.S.C. § 1681s-2(a) are DISMISSED with prejudice. 14 2. § 1681b 15 “The FCRA imposes civil liability on any person who obtains a consumer report for 16 an impermissible purpose.” Thomas v. Fin. Recovery Servs., No. EDCV 12-1339 PSG 17 (Opx), 2013 WL 387968, at *3 (C.D. Cal. Jan. 31, 2013); see also 15 U.S.C. § 1681b. 18 Thus, to survive a motion to dismiss on a section 1681b claim, “the plaintiff must allege 19 facts that, if proven, would establish that the defendant did not have a permissible purpose 20 for obtaining the credit report at issue.” Thomas, 2013 WL 387968 at *4. “[B]are 21 allegations that the defendant did not have a permissible purpose for obtaining a credit 22 report, without more, are insufficient.” Id. “Merely reciting each of the permissible 23 circumstances and denying that they apply is similarly inadequate.” Id. 24 Here, Plaintiff fails to allege sufficient facts to support a reasonable inference that 25 any Defendant obtained his consumer report for an impermissible purpose. Plaintiff merely 26 alleges the Defendants did not have a permissible purpose because he never had any 27 business dealings or accounts with defendants. “However, a credit report can be accessed 28 without a consumer’s permission for other ‘permissible purposes’ under the FCRA.” Jones 1 v. Best Serv. Co., No. CV 14-9872 SS, 2017 WL 490902, at *8 (C.D. Cal. Feb. 6, 2017); 2 see also Perretta v. Capital Acquisitions & Mgmt. Co., No. C-02-05561 RMW, 2003 WL 3 21383757, at *5 n.7 (N.D. Cal. May 5, 2003) (noting that “section 1681b does not appear 4 to require the existence of a debtor-creditor relationship for a party to lawfully acquire a 5 consumer report”). Plaintiff’s complaint “offers no factual basis to infer what purpose— 6 permissible or impermissible—[defendants] had in making” inquiries on his credit report, 7 and therefore it does not allege a plausible claim that defendants’ purposes for obtaining 8 his credit report were impermissible. Perez v. Portfolio Recovery Assocs., LLC, No. CIV. 9 12-1603 JAG, 2012 WL 5373448, at *2 (D.P.R. Oct. 30, 2012); see also Twombly, 550 10 U.S. at 570. Accordingly, Plaintiff’s claims under § 1681b are DISMISSED with leave 11 to amend for failure to state a claim. 12 3. §§ 1681e and 1681i 13 15 U.S.C. § 1681e provides that “[w]henever a consumer reporting agency prepares 14 a consumer report it shall follow reasonable procedures to assure maximum possible 15 accuracy of the information concerning the individual about whom the report relates.” 15 16 U.S.C. § 1681e(b). Pursuant to 15 U.S.C. § 1681i, if the completeness or accuracy of any 17 item of information contained in a consumer’s file at a consumer reporting agency is 18 disputed by the consumer and the consumer notifies the agency directly, or indirectly 19 through a reseller, of such dispute, the agency shall, free of charge, conduct a reasonable 20 reinvestigation to determine whether the disputed information is inaccurate and record the 21 current status of the disputed information . . . before the end of the 30-day period beginning 22 on the date on which the agency receives the notice of the dispute from the consumer or 23 reseller. 15 U.S.C. § 1681i(a)(1)(A). 24 Both provisions require Plaintiff to make a prima facie showing of inaccurate 25 reporting. See Carvalho v. Equifax Info. Servs., LLC, 629 F.3d 876, 890 (9th Cir. 2010) 26 (quoting Dennis v. BEH-1, LLC, 520 F.3d 1066, 1069 (9th Cir. 2008)) (addressing § 1681i); 27 Guimond v. Trans Union Credit Info. Co., 45 F.3d 1329, 1333 (9th Cir. 1995) (citing 28 Cahlin v. Gen. Motors Acceptance Corp., 936 F.2d 1151, 1156 (11th Cir. 1991)) 1 (addressing §1681e(b)). “[A]n item on a credit report can be ‘incomplete or inaccurate’ . . 2 . ‘because it is patently incorrect, or because it is misleading in such a way and to such an 3 extent that it can be expected to adversely affect credit decisions.’” Carvalho, 629 F.3d at 4 890 (quoting Gorman, 584 F.3d at 1163 (9th Cir. 2009)). 5 Plaintiff vaguely alleges that the credit reporting agency defendants failed to delete 6 inaccurate information on his credit report but fails to allege what account(s) or what 7 information was inaccurate. Plaintiff also fails to allege when and how he notified the 8 credit reporting agency defendants of any specific inaccuracy. Plaintiff’s allegations are 9 devoid of any factual basis to support an inference that the credit reporting agency 10 defendants reported any specific inaccurate information or failed to use reasonable 11 procedures to assure the accuracy of information contained in his credit report. 12 Accordingly, Plaintiff’s claims under §§ 1681e and 1681i are DISMISSED with leave to 13 amend for failure to state a claim. 14 D. The CCRAA Violations 15 Plaintiff alleges violations of the CCRAA against all of the Defendants but fails to 16 cite to any specific provision under the CCRAA. [Doc. No. 1 at 40–42.] 17 The CCRAA provides that “[a] person shall not furnish information on a specific 18 transaction or experience to any consumer credit reporting agency if the person knows or 19 should know the information is incomplete or inaccurate.” Cal. Civ. Code § 1785.25(a). 20 In order to state a claim for violation of the CCRAA, the plaintiff must demonstrate “that 21 an actual inaccuracy exist[s].” Carvalho, 629 F.3d at 890. Information is inaccurate if it 22 is “patently incorrect” or “misleading in such a way and to such an extent that it can be 23 expected to adversely affect credit decisions.” Id. at 891. Because the CCRAA is 24 “substantially based on the federal Fair Credit Reporting Act (“FCRA”), judicial 25 interpretation of the federal provisions is persuasive authority and entitled to substantial 26 weight when interpreting the California provisions. Id. at 889 (citations omitted). 27 As discussed above, Plaintiff fails to allege what account(s) or what information, if 28 any, was inaccurate. Plaintiff presents no facts alleging when and how he notified each of 1 || the Defendants or what if any specific inaccuracy. Plaintiffs allegations are devoid of any 2 factual basis to support an inference that the Defendants reported any specific inaccurate 3 ||information or failed to use reasonable procedures to assure the accuracy of information 4 ||contained in his credit report. Accordingly, Plaintiff's claims under the CCRAA are 5 || DISMISSED with leave to amend for failure to state a claim. 6 IV. CONCLUSION 7 For the foregoing reasons, the Court GRANTS Defendants’ motions to dismiss 8 Plaintiff's complaint. Plaintiff's claims under § 1681s-2 of the FCRA as to the credit 9 |/reporting agency defendants and Plaintiff's claims under 15 U.S.C. § 1681s-2(a) are 10 || DISMISSED with prejudice. Plaintiff's remaining claims are DISMISSED with leave 11 |/to amend. Plaintiff is cautioned that if his First Amended Complaint does not cure the 12 || deficiencies identified in this Order, his claims may be dismissed with prejudice and 13 || without leave to amend. The First Amended Complaint shall be filed within thirty (30) 14 || days of this Order. 15 It is SO ORDERED. 16 ||Dated: October 16, 2019 € 17 Hon. Cathy Ann Bencivengo 18 United States District Judge 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28