Railroad 1900, LLC v. City of Sacramento

Opinion

----oo0oo---- RAILROAD 1900, LLC, a Delaware No. 2:21-cv-01673 WBS DB limited liability company, Plaintiff, ORDER RE: DEFENDANT’S MOTION v. FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT CITY OF SACRAMENTO, a municipal entity, Defendant. ----oo0oo---- Plaintiff Railroad 1900, LLC (“Railroad 1900”) brings this action against defendant the City of Sacramento (“City”), alleging violations of due process (Claims 1-2), municipal liability for unconstitutional customs and policies (Claim 3), and various state law claims (Claims 4-7). The core of plaintiff’s claims challenges the City’s alleged failure to enforce anti-camping and other ordinances against homeless individuals in the area surrounding plaintiff’s property. (Second Am. Compl. (“SAC”) (Docket No. 34).) The City now moves for summary judgment. (Mot. for Summ. J. (“MSJ”) (Docket No. 47).) I. Factual Background Plaintiff owns commercial real estate at 1900, 1955, and 1957 Railroad Drive in Sacramento, California, which plaintiff acquired in May 2018. (Eaton Decl. (Docket No. 55-6) ¶ 2.) In December 2017, shortly before plaintiff purchased the property, the City opened an emergency homeless shelter on Railroad Drive. (Id. ¶ 3.) The City closed it around April 2019. (Id.) At around the time the shelter closed, Railroad Drive experienced a surge in homeless encampments and abandoned vehicles. (Id. ¶ 6 and Ex. 1.) Plaintiff has since suffered extensive property damage and economic loss, inflicted principally by the homeless population encamped in Railroad Drive. (Id. ¶ 15.) From 2019 to the present, plaintiff has contacted the City hundreds of times, repeatedly requesting that the City enforce its laws and ordinances on Railroad Drive. (Id. ¶ 10 and Ex. 4.) A significant portion of plaintiff’s requests concerned vehicles on Railroad Drive that were either wrecked or being used as shelter by homeless individuals. (Mendez Decl. (Docket No. 47-4) Ex. C.) The City has various units and divisions that process complaints and concerns about Sacramento’s homeless population. One is the Sacramento Police Department’s Impact Unit. (Heinlein Decl. (Docket No. 47-6) ¶ 2.) The Impact Unit responds to complaints of illegal activity in and around encampments. (Id.) It is also responsible for enforcing Sacramento’s Critical Infrastructure Ordinance (S.C.C. c. 8.140) and the Sidewalk Obstructions and Pedestrian Interference Ordinance (id. c. 12.24), which prohibit camping on or otherwise obstructing sidewalks and critical city infrastructure. (Id. ¶¶ 3-6.) In that capacity, the Impact Unit seeks voluntary removal of encampments in violation of city ordinances; as a second resort, it will move individuals and their possessions forcibly. (Id.) Another City entity that interacts with the homeless population is the Department of Community Response (“DCR”). DCR employees are trained to answer various emergency calls, including those regarding homeless encampments. (Worrall Decl. (Docket No. 47-5) ¶ 3.) DCR does not provide sterile needles for homeless individuals to use. (Id. ¶ 5.) DCR provides trash bags to homeless individuals when they indicate they want to clean their area. (Id.) During high temperatures, DCR will hand out individual water bottles to homeless individuals, but not as a regular service or at large scale. (Id.) Another City entity is the Community Development Department, which has a Code Compliance Division (“Code Compliance”). (Mendez Decl. ¶¶ 1-2.) Code Compliance administers a vehicle abatement program. This program seeks to tow and dispose of vehicles that are a public nuisance. (Id. ¶ 3.) Nuisance vehicles include those vehicles are abandoned, wrecked, dismantled, or otherwise illegally parked. (Id.) If Code Compliance receives a complaint about an unmoved vehicle, Code Compliance tags it, then tows it 72 hours later if it remains unmoved. (Id. ¶ 4.) In the past five years, Code Compliance has received around 20,000 abandoned vehicle complaints per year. (Mendez Decl. ¶ 6.) Around 10% of complaints ultimately ended in vehicle abatement. (Id. ¶ 5.) Code Compliance employs around 12 to 15 enforcement officers. (Id. ¶ 6.) Due to the sheer volume of complaints and abandoned vehicles, Code Compliance utilizes a triage system that prioritizes complaints posing possible life and safety concerns. (Id. ¶ 7.) On March 19, 2020, Sacramento County’s Public Health Officer issued a stay-at-home order due to the arrival of the COVID-19 pandemic. (Mendez Decl. ¶ 8 and Ex. A.) The order did not prevent the performance of “Essential Governmental Functions” as determined by each governmental entity. (Id. Ex. A § 10(e).) On June 1, 2021, the Public Health Officer issued another order, this time advising local governments against citing homeless individuals living in vehicles during community spread of COVID-19, except where encampments pose a public safety hazard or threaten critical infrastructure. (Id. Ex. B ¶ 6.) The order expired two weeks later, on June 15, 2021. (Id. Ex. B ¶ 7.) In response to these two orders, Code Compliance did not tow any nuisance vehicles being used as shelter between March 19, 2020 and June 15, 2021, except in cases involving public safety concerns. (Id. ¶ 10.) Notwithstanding the orders, Code Compliance responded to complaints about nuisance vehicles not used for shelter. (Id. ¶¶ 12-13.) Code Compliance specifically responded to complaints from plaintiff about nuisance vehicles on Railroad Drive on thirteen occasions between January and September of 2021.1 (Id. ¶ 12.) II. Legal Standard Summary judgment is proper “if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). A material fact is one that could affect the outcome of the suit, and a genuine issue is one that could permit a reasonable trier of fact to enter a verdict in the non-moving party's favor. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). The movant bears the initial burden of demonstrating the absence of a genuine issue of material fact as to the basis for the motion. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986). The moving party can satisfy its burden by presenting evidence that negates an essential element of the nonmoving party's case. Celotex Corp, 477 U.S. at 322–23. Alternatively, the movant can demonstrate that the non-moving party cannot provide evidence to support an essential element upon which it will bear the burden of proof at trial. Id. The burden then shifts to the non-moving party to set forth specific facts to show that there is a genuine issue for trial. See id. at 324. Any inferences drawn from the underlying facts must, however, be viewed in the light most favorable to the non-moving party. See Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587 (1986).

1 What constituted a “response,” and whether it involved towing any vehicles, is left unclear. (See Eaton Decl. ¶ 12.) III. Evidentiary Objections Plaintiff and the City assert various evidentiary objections against each other’s statements of material facts. (Docket Nos. 55-3, 56-2.) As a preliminary matter, the court will disregard any objections that are duplicative of the summary judgment standard. Under Federal Rule of Evidence 401, evidence is relevant if it “has any tendency to make a fact more or less probable” and that fact “is of consequence in determining the action.” Fed. R. Evid. 401. The action before the court now is a motion for summary judgment. On summary judgment, the court determines whether the evidence presented, viewed in the light most favorable to the non-moving party, creates a “genuine dispute as to any material fact” that must be resolved at trial. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). The court must therefore consider, and only consider, evidence bearing on (1) facts that are (2) material. If the evidence offered does not bear on a material fact (e.g., comprises baseless speculation, bears on a legal conclusion, or bears on a fact not necessary to dispose of any claim), it is by definition not relevant to the present action for summary judgment. Sandoval v. Cnty. of San Diego, 985 F.3d 657, 665 (9th Cir. 2021) (“[O]bjections for relevance are generally unnecessary on summary judgment because they are “‘duplicative of the summary judgment standard itself.’ . . . [P]arties briefing summary judgment motions would be better served to ‘simply argue’ the import of the facts reflected in the evidence rather than expending time and resources compiling laundry lists of relevance objections.”) (citing Burch v. Regents of Univ. of Cal., 433 F. Supp. 2d 1110, 1119 (E.D. Cal. 2006) (Shubb, J.)). Additionally, “if the contents of a document can be presented in a form that would be admissible at trial -- for example, through live testimony by the author of the document -- the mere fact that the document itself might be excludable hearsay provides no basis for refusing to consider it on summary judgment.” Id. at 666. Accordingly, the court will overrule plaintiff’s objections to portions of the City’s declarations and exhibits attached to them.2 Every declarant represents that they have personal knowledge of the facts stated within their declaration and that they are able to competently testify to them at trial. (See Mendez Decl. ¶ 1; Worrall Decl. ¶ 1; Heinlein Decl. ¶ 1.) Further, every declarant is employed in a managerial/oversight capacity at their respective organizations, and on this basis attests to their organization’s policies, reports, and data. (Id.) Absent any challenges to the substantive authenticity or reliability of these declarations, the court will not exclude them from its analysis of plaintiff’s claims. Plaintiff would be better served if its counsel centered on meaningful problems with the content of the evidence and allowed the court to focus on the merits of its arguments. IV. Discussion Plaintiff brings federal and state claims against the City. The federal claims (Claims 1-3) are brought under Section 2 The City’s evidentiary objections to plaintiff’s declaration and exhibits bear on facts that are not material to the court’s disposition of plaintiff’s claims. 1983 and allege substantive due process violations. The court previously dismissed these claims with leave to amend because plaintiff failed to allege any affirmative acts by the City that could confer plaintiff with standing to sue.3 (See Order (Docket No. 27).) A. Due Process (Claim 1) It is well established that, as a general principle, plaintiffs cannot sue the government for failing to enforce its laws. Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 754 (1984) (“[The Supreme Court] has repeatedly held that an asserted right to have the Government act in accordance with law is not sufficient, standing alone, to confer jurisdiction on a federal court.”); see also Linda R.S. v. Richard D., 410 U.S. 614, 619 (1973) (“[A] private citizen lacks a judicially cognizable interest in the prosecution or nonprosecution of another.”) (citing Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 42 (1971)). The court previously dismissed this claim with leave to amend for lack of a cognizable judicial controversy. (See Order at 2-6.) To the extent that plaintiff’s due process claim is still predicated on the City’s alleged failure to perform any 3 Previously, the court dismissed the federal claims in the initial complaint with leave to amend. Those federal claims were all brought under Section 1983, alleging violations of Due Process (Claims 1, 3), Equal Protection (Claim 2), Uncompensated Taking (Claim 4) and Monell (Claim 5). (Docket No. 1.) The court declined supplemental jurisdiction over the state law claims. (Order.) Plaintiff then amended its complaint. (Docket No. 30.) Thereafter, the parties stipulated to a second amended complaint, which dropped the Equal Protection and Uncompensated Taking claims. (SAC.) The second amended complaint is the operative complaint. The City did not move to dismiss the second amended complaint. affirmative act, the court still lacks jurisdiction to adjudicate it.4 Accordingly, the court will dismiss plaintiff’s Due Process claim. B. State-Created Danger (Claim 2) Plaintiff also alleges that the City committed affirmative acts that placed plaintiff at risk of danger, and accordingly invokes the state-created danger doctrine. The state-created danger doctrine provides an exception to the general rule denying plaintiffs standing to sue the government for failure to act against third parties. Specifically, it opens the government to liability for a failure to act against a third party if the plaintiff can show that (1) the government, by some affirmative conduct, exposed the plaintiff to danger from that third party, and (2) the affirmative conduct was with “deliberate indifference to a known or obvious danger.” Murguia v. Langdon, 61 F.4th 1096, 1111 (9th Cir. 2023); Patel v. Kent Sch. Dist., 648 F.3d 965, 974 (9th Cir. 2011)). 1. Applicability of State-Created Danger Doctrine Before challenging the merits of plaintiff’s state- created danger argument, the City argues that there is no triable issue as to a state-created danger because neither party is an individual. (MSJ at 9.) This argument lacks merit. First, “[a] corporation has rights under the Fourteenth Amendment and may bring § 1983 claims when its rights are violated.” SOC, Inc. v.

4 Any allegations of affirmative acts or concerted policies of inaction are properly raised under plaintiff’s state- created danger and Monell claims, respectively, and are addressed below. Las Vegas Metro. Police Dep’t, 319 F. App’x 488, 489–90 (9th Cir. 2009) (recognizing corporate right to occupational liberty). See also Grosjean v. Am. Press Co., 297 U.S. 233, 244 (1936) (“[A] corporation is a ‘person’ within the meaning of the equal protection and due process of law clauses [of the Fourteenth Amendment] . . . .”). The court is not aware of, and the City fails to provide, any authority that suspends these rights upon invocation of the state-created danger doctrine. Second, “municipalities and other local government units . . . [are] among those persons to whom § 1983 applies.” Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 690 (1978); see also Bd. of Cnty. Comm’rs v. Brown, 520 U.S. 397, 403 (1997); Hyun Ju Park v. City & Cnty. of Honolulu, 952 F.3d 1136, 1141 (9th Cir. 2020) (“A municipality may be held liable as a ‘person’ under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 when it maintains a policy or custom that causes the deprivation of a plaintiff’s federally protected rights.”). The City offers no arguments why an application of the state-created danger doctrine exempts state entities from the class of persons to whom § 1983 applies. See also Sinclair v. City of Seattle, 61 F.4th 674 (9th Cir. 2023) (affirming recognition and denial on merits of plaintiff’s claim against city under state-created danger doctrine); Reed v. City of Emeryville, 568 F. Supp. 3d 1029 (N.D. Cal. 2021) (recognizing and denying on merits the same). Accordingly, the court will proceed to the merits of plaintiff’s state-created danger claim. 2. Affirmative Acts Plaintiff alleges that the City placed plaintiff in a more dangerous position than it otherwise would have faced by the following affirmative acts: (1) opening and then closing a homeless shelter along Railroad Drive; (2) providing sustenance and support to homeless individuals residing near Railroad Drive; and (3) affirmatively refusing to enforce laws along Railroad Drive, essentially designating it a “containment zone.” (See generally Opp’n (Docket No. 5).) The court addresses each in turn. i. Homeless Shelter Plaintiff fails to show that there is a triable issue on whether the City closed the homeless shelter with deliberate indifference to a known or obvious danger to plaintiff. Deliberate indifference is “a stringent standard of fault, requiring proof that a municipal actor disregarded a known or obvious consequence of his action.” Bryan Cnty. v. Brown, 520 U.S. 397, 410 (1997). See also Patel v. Kent Sch. Dist., 648 F.3d 965, 974 (9th Cir. 2011) (“deliberate indifference requires a culpable mental state.”) (citing L.W. v. Grubbs, 92 F.3d 894, 898–900 (9th Cir. 1996)). The state actor must “actually intend[ ] to expose the plaintiff to such risks without regard to the consequences to the plaintiff.” Grubbs, 92 F.3d at 899 (internal quotation marks omitted). In this case, even assuming the City’s actual knowledge of the condition that would befall Railroad Drive upon the shelter’s closure, plaintiff fails to establish a genuine issue of deliberate indifference because it introduces no evidence probative of the City’s “culpable mental state” regarding the shelter’s closure. See Patel, 638 F.3d at 974. In fact, plaintiff offers no evidence at all even bearing on the question of why the City closed the shelter. See Hunters Cap., LLC v. City of Seattle, 650 F. Supp. 3d 1187 (W.D. Wash. 2023) (granting summary judgment in part because “Plaintiffs have presented no evidence from which a reasonable jury could conclude that the City acted with deliberate indifference to expose Plaintiffs to certain unreasonable risks, and actually intended to expose them to such risks, without regard to the consequences to them.”). Accordingly, the City’s closing of the shelter cannot serve as the factual predicate for plaintiff’s state-created danger claim. ii. Sustenance/Support No reasonable trier of fact could conclude that DCR’s provision of trash bags and water bottles to the homeless placed plaintiff in greater danger. Providing trash bags to homeless individuals who express a desire to clean up after themselves in fact implies the mitigation of the precise kind of danger for which plaintiff seeks to hold the City accountable. Even if the court were to construe this form of aid as a danger to plaintiff, plaintiff submits no evidence that the City’s policy of providing trash bags and water bottles and allowing non-profit private entities to give homeless individuals food and other comfort is anything other than a generalized policy applicable across Sacramento, as opposed to applicable specifically to the homeless population around plaintiff’s property. See Sinclair v. City of Seattle, 61 F.4th 674, 682 (9th Cir. 2023) (“[A]ny danger the City created or contributed to . . . affected all [] visitors [to city precinct] equally; the danger was not specifically directed at [plaintiffs]” and claim therefore dismissed). Accordingly, there is no genuine issue as to whether such generalized, rudimentary aid can ground a successful state- created danger claim. iii. Affirmative Non-Enforcement As the court previously explained in its order dismissing the original complaint, “[i]nserting the word ‘refusal’ . . . does not transform an omission into an affirmative act.” Estate of Gonzales v. Hickman, ED 05-cv-660 MMM (RCx), 2006 WL 4959780, at *14 (C.D. Cal. Jan. 30, 2006). Ninth Circuit precedent recognizing claims for state-created danger makes clear that the official conduct in question must be affirmative in a more literal sense. See, e.g., Hernandez v. City of San Jose, 897 F.3d 1125, 1133-35 (9th Cir. 2018) (directing rally attendees toward violent crowd and then physically blocking them). To the extent that plaintiff shows instances of the City refusing or failing to respond to its requests for code enforcement, they cannot support a state- created danger claim as a matter of law.5

5 Such a showing would also preclude standing to sue, as discussed in the standing analysis regarding plaintiff’s first claim, supra, at § IV.A. However, a concerted policy or custom of inaction may be an affirmative act for which the City may be liable. See Brown v. Lynch, 831 F.3d 1146, 1152 (9th Cir. 2016) (“A ‘policy’ is a deliberate choice to follow a course of action . . . . A plaintiff can prevail by pointing to both policies of ‘action’ and of ‘inaction.’”) (citations omitted); Horton by Horton v. City of Santa Maria, 915 F.3d 592, 604 (9th Cir. 2019) (“[C]onstitutional deprivations may occur not . . . as a result of actions of the individual officers, but as a result of the collective inaction of the municipal defendant.”) (citations omitted). To the extent that plaintiff alleges a sustained, Accordingly, the court will grant summary judgment on this claim. C. Municipal Liability for Custom or Practice (Claim 3) “In order to establish municipal liability, a plaintiff must show that a ‘policy or custom’ led to the plaintiff’s injury.” Castro v. Cnty. of Los Angeles, 833 F.3d 1060, 1073 (9th Cir. 2016) (en banc) (quoting Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 694 (1978)). See also Gordon v. Cnty. of Orange, 6 F.4th 961, 974 (9th Cir. 2021) (“An unconstitutional policy need not be formal or written to create municipal liability under Section 1983; however, it must be so permanent and well settled as to constitute a custom or usage with the force of law.”) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). Plaintiff alleges that the City adopted a policy of non-enforcement around plaintiff’s property, compelled by the City’s interpretation of the Ninth Circuit case Martin v. City of Boise, 902 F.3d 1031 (9th Cir. 2018), opinion amended and superseded on denial of reh'g, 920 F.3d 584 (9th Cir. 2019).6 (Opp’n at 8.) However, the undisputed facts do not permit a reasonable factfinder to conclude that the City adopted a policy to categorically “preclude[] it from prosecuting any homeless persons or even being able to relocate the homeless persons affirmative policy or custom of inaction, the court addresses it in its discussion of plaintiff’s Monell claim below. 6 The Ninth Circuit in Martin held, in relevant part, that “the Eighth Amendment prohibits the imposition of criminal penalties for sitting, sleeping, or lying outside on public property for homeless individuals who cannot obtain shelter.” Id. at 1048. outside of the area surrounding Railroad Drive or to clean up the debris, including abandoned and burned vehicles, left in their wake.”7 (See Eaton Decl. ¶ 8.) While the City might not be doing as much as plaintiff would reasonably expect it to do in prosecuting crimes committed by homeless persons, the undisputed facts show that the City has in place official policies for triaging and prioritizing the countless complaints it receives from its citizens stemming from the homelessness crisis, with resolutions up to and including clearing encampments and towing vehicles deemed to be a nuisance.8 (See Worrall Decl. ¶¶ 7-8 and 7 Plaintiff also cites to its correspondence with Sacramento Police Sergeant William Wann for the proposition that the City, pursuant to Martin, directed all of its enforcement agencies “to stop policing and enforcing the laws around Plaintiff’s Property.” (Opp’n at 15 (Wann writing “Soon, I think we will be sending social workers out to try to connect the campers with services and my team will only be needed when there is a nexus to some criminal activity. We are pretty much there now.”).) In context, Wann merely informs plaintiff of the Police Department’s shrinking purview (“Code Enforcement, Parking Enforcement, Animal Control, Arson Investigations and probably more stuff is not part of the Police Department”) and explains that “I think the days are gone in which we consider tents to be a police problem if they are only an eye sore.” (Eaton Decl. Ex. 4, 1900RR_000900 (emphasis added).) He further explains that if tents are on plaintiff’s private property, then the Police Department will help remove them. (Id.) 8 At best, plaintiff’s evidence shows that Sacramento politicians use Martin to deflect complaints from its constituents about inadequate code enforcement. (See Eaton Decl. Ex. 2, RR1900_000184 (email from mayor’s office stating “Martin V. Boise[] places restrictions on moving people experiencing homelessness, which includes people living in their vehicles, unless there is adequate shelter space available . . . . There are exceptions to this which include updates to essential infrastructure as well as public safety concerns.”), RR1900_000186 (email from councilmember’s office stating “we are still subject to the Martin v. Boise decision, which limits our ability to enforce anticamping ordinances without providing Exs. B, C.) Neither do the undisputed facts permit the conclusion that the City maintained a municipal custom of inaction that rises to the level of a constitutional violation. Instead, the record shows the City taking at least some affirmative actions to respond to plaintiff’s complaints. For example, Code Compliance responded to complaints from plaintiff about Railroad Drive on 13 occasions in 2021. (See Mendez Decl. ¶¶ 12-13.) The record also shows, for instance, that the City conducted a vehicle sweep of Railroad Drive on January 2021, during which several vehicles were either towed, marked for tow, or voluntarily removed (see Eaton Decl. Ex. 4, 1900RR_000420); removed an abandoned vehicle from the Railroad Drive cul-de-sac on December 2020 (see id., 1900RR_000490); and had Jose Mendez, Code Enforcement Manager for the City of Sacramento, respond personally to plaintiff’s complaints and promise to send code enforcement officers out to Railroad Drive (see id., 1900RR_000545; see also Mendez Decl. ¶ 13). These responses may be far from what plaintiff had a right to expect from the City for its tax dollars, but they negate any contention that the City was accustomed to inaction “so permanent and well settled as to constitute a custom or usage with the force of law.” Gordon, 6 F.4th at 974. Accordingly, there is no triable issue on whether the City implemented an unconstitutional policy or custom of non-enforcement pursuant to Monell, and the court will grant summary judgment on this claim. shelter options for the unhoused population.”).) ene IE OI NIE IE ROE IIR OOO OE ESE OU ESE EO NOD

D. State Law Claims (Claims 4-7) After initially dismissing plaintiff’s federal claims, the court concluded that the balance of judicial economy, convenience, fairness, and comity factors weighed strongly in favor of declining supplemental jurisdiction over plaintiff’s state law claims. (See Order at 14-15; see also Carnegie-Mellon Univ. v. Cohill, 484 U.S. 343, 350 n.7 (1988).) Nothing since has changed significantly to disturb this analysis, including the still-predominant comity interest in referring decisions on complex questions of California statutory and constitutional law to California courts.’ Accordingly, the court will again decline supplemental jurisdiction over plaintiff’s state law claims pursuant to 28 U.S.C. $ 1367 (c). IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that the City’s motion for summary judgment be, and the same hereby is, GRANTED on its federal claims brought under Section 1983 (Claims 1-3). Claims 4-7 are DISMISSED pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 1367 (c), without prejudice to plaintiff’s right to refile its remaining state law claims in state court. Dated: November 14, 2023 dete, . 4h. UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

9 See also California v. Sacramento, No. 23-cv-8658 (Sacramento Super. Ct. Sept. 19, 2023), filed by the Sacramento County District Attorney against the City and bringing similar 38 state law claims in response to Sacramento’s homelessness crisis. 17