Railroad 1900, LLC v. City of Sacramento

• Court: District Court, E.D. California
• Decided: May 26, 2022
• Docket: 2:21-cv-01673
• Status: Unknown

Opinion

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 ----oo0oo---- 11 12 RAILROAD 1900, LLC, a Delaware No. 2:21-cv-01673-WBS-DB limited liability company, 13 Plaintiff, 14 ORDER RE: MOTION TO DISMISS v. 15 CITY OF SACRAMENTO, a municipal 16 entity, 17 Defendant. 18 19 ----oo0oo---- 20 This action brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 challenges 21 the City of Sacramento’s alleged failure to enforce anti-camping 22 and other ordinances against homeless individuals in the area 23 surrounding plaintiff’s property. (Compl. (Docket No. 1).) 24 Plaintiff brings federal claims alleging violation of due process 25 (count one), violation of equal protection (count two), state- 26 created danger (count three), uncompensated taking (count four), 27 and municipal liability (count five), in addition to five causes 28 1 of action under California law. (Id.)1 2 I. Due Process Claim 3 “Article III of the [United States] Constitution 4 confines the federal courts to adjudicating actual ‘cases’ and 5 ‘controversies.’” Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 750 (1984), 6 abrogated on other grounds, Lexmark Int’l, Inc. v. Static Control 7 Components, Inc., 572 U.S. 118, 128 (2014). “The Art. III 8 doctrine that requires a litigant to have ‘standing’ to invoke 9 the power of a federal court is perhaps the most important” 10 aspect of the case-or-controversy limitation. Id. “In essence 11 the question of standing is whether the litigant is entitled to 12 have the court decide the merits of the dispute or of particular 13 issues.” Id. at 750-51 (quoting Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 14 498 (1975)).2 15 Pursuant to the standing requirement, the Supreme Court 16 “has repeatedly held that an asserted right to have the 17 Government act in accordance with law is not sufficient, standing 18 alone, to confer jurisdiction on a federal court.” Allen, 468 19 1 At oral argument, counsel for plaintiff stated that 20 plaintiff had agreed to dismiss its fourth and tenth causes of action -- alleging an unlawful taking under the Fifth Amendment 21 and inverse condemnation under the California Constitution, 22 respectively -- because it had determined that those claims lack merit. Thus, counsel stated, plaintiff no longer intends to 23 prosecute them. Accordingly, the court will grant defendant’s motion to dismiss those claims. 24 2 Although the question of standing is not expressly 25 raised in the City’s motion to dismiss, standing is essential to the existence of subject matter jurisdiction, an issue which may 26 be raised sua sponte. Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(h)(3) (“If the court 27 determines at any time that it lacks subject-matter jurisdiction, the court must dismiss the action.”); Snell v. Cleveland, Inc., 28 316 F.3d 822, 826 (9th Cir. 2002). 1 U.S. at 754 (citing Schlesinger v. Reservists Comm. to Stop the 2 War, 418 U.S. 208 (1974); Valley Forge Christian Coll. v. Ams. 3 United for Separation of Church and State, Inc., 454 U.S. 464 4 (1982)). This follows from the fact that, as the Supreme Court 5 has consistently held, “a private citizen lacks a judicially 6 cognizable interest in the prosecution or nonprosecution of 7 another.” Linda R.S. v. Richard D., 410 U.S. 614, 619 (1973) 8 (citing Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 42 (1971); Bailey v. 9 Patterson, 369 U.S. 31, 33 (1962); Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497, 10 501 (1961)); see Lefebure v. D’Aquilla, 15 F.4th 650, 654 (5th 11 Cir. 2021) (“It is a bedrock principle of our system of 12 government that the decision to prosecute is made, not by judges 13 or crime victims, but by officials in the executive branch. And 14 so it is not the province of the judiciary to dictate to 15 executive branch officials who shall be subject to investigation 16 or prosecution.”) (citing Linda R.S., 410 U.S. at 617, 619; 17 United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 693 (1974)). 18 This principle extends not only to criminal 19 prosecution, but to civil enforcement as well. Doe ex rel. Doe 20 v. Darien Bd. of Educ., 3:11-cv-1581 (JBA), 2012 WL 4092662, at 21 *3 (D. Conn. Sept. 17, 2012); Gutierrez v. City of Carson, LA 10- 22 cv-7627 JAK (CWx), 2011 WL 7129239, at *7 (C.D. Cal. Dec. 16, 23 2011); see, e.g., Allen, 468 U.S. at 739-40 (parents lacked 24 standing to sue IRS for failure to “adopt[ ] sufficient standards 25 and procedures to fulfill its obligation to deny tax-exempt 26 status to racially discriminatory private schools”); In re Att’y 27 Disciplinary Appeal, 650 F.3d 202, 203-04 (2d Cir. 2011) (client 28 lacked standing to challenge decision not to discipline client’s 1 former attorney) (citing Linda R.S., 410 U.S. at 619); White v. 2 City of Toledo, 217 F. Supp. 2d 838, 840 (N.D. Ohio 2002) (“The 3 law is well established that a city’s alleged failure, even if 4 intentional, to enforce [a] speed limit does not state a § 1983 5 [claim] against a municipality.”) (citation omitted). § 1983 6 plaintiffs therefore “lack standing to seek judicial review of 7 . . . executive decisions” not to enforce laws against other 8 individuals. Lefebure, 15 F.4th at 655; see id. (collecting 9 cases); Allen, 468 U.S. at 754. Because this is precisely what 10 plaintiff seeks to do through this action, it lacks Article III 11 standing to pursue its constitutional claims. 12 Plaintiff alleges it has been injured by the 13 development of homeless encampments near its property and by the 14 conduct of individuals living there. (Compl. at ¶¶ 15-21.) 15 However, the specific conduct by the City that plaintiff 16 challenges is the City’s “fail[ure] and refus[al] to enforce 17 [state and local] laws” and to “clear the homeless out of this de 18 facto containment zone.” (Id. at ¶ 16.) Stated more directly, 19 plaintiff challenges the City’s failure to enforce its laws 20 against homeless individuals living near plaintiff’s property, 21 and apparently seeks an injunction compelling the City to do so. 22 (See Opp. at 1 (plaintiff challenges “Defendant’s refusal to 23 enforce its own laws and those of the state that prohibit 24 homeless persons from loitering, vandalizing, and otherwise 25 inhabiting and destroying Plaintiff’s private property and the 26 surrounding public property”) (Docket No. 17); Compl., Prayer 27 (seeking “[i]njunctive/equitable relief in a manner to be 28 determined by law”).) As explained, however, plaintiff lacks 1 standing to sue the City for failing to enforce the law against 2 others because it has no judicially cognizable interest in such 3 enforcement. See Allen, 468 U.S. at 754; Linda R.S., 410 U.S. at 4 619; Att’y Disciplinary Appeal, 650 F.3d at 203-04. 5 Plaintiff relies heavily upon the district court’s 6 decision in Hunters Capital LLC v. City of Seattle, 499 F. Supp. 7 3d 888 (W.D. Wash. 2020). The plaintiffs in that case, a group 8 of business and property owners, brought civil rights claims 9 against the city challenging its allowance of and support for the 10 “Capitol Hill Occupying Protest” (“CHOP”), a barricaded area 11 encompassing the plaintiffs’ properties in which the City of 12 Seattle did not enforce local or state laws against occupying 13 protestors. See id. at 893-99. While the court declined to 14 dismiss most of the plaintiffs’ constitutional claims, including 15 multiple claims alleging violation of due process, it did not 16 address the issue of standing. See id. at 899-906. 17 Moreover, the plaintiffs’ claims in Hunters Capital 18 were based not only on the city’s alleged non-enforcement of the 19 laws, but also on the city’s substantial, affirmative provision 20 of material support to the occupying protestors in establishing 21 the so-called “Autonomous Zone.” Id. at 893. In particular, the 22 city “allegedly provided CHOP participants with medical 23 equipment, washing/sanitation facilities, portable toilets, 24 nighttime lighting, and other material support” and “fortified 25 . . . CHOP by providing participants with sturdier concrete 26 barriers” with which to block people and vehicles from entering. 27 Id. at 894-95 (internal quotation marks omitted). The mayor also 28 “allegedly issued a statement indicating that the City . . . had 1 no plans to cease supporting CHOP and that the City was instead 2 acting to work with and preserve CHOP.” Id. at 896 (internal 3 quotation marks omitted). The court relied on these allegations 4 in concluding that the plaintiffs had “plausibly allege[d] . . . 5 that the City’s affirmative actions in support of CHOP” caused a 6 deprivation of the plaintiffs’ constitutionally protected 7 property interests and thus sufficiently alleged a violation of 8 due process. See id. at 900-01. 9 In contrast, plaintiff in the present case does not 10 allege that the City engaged in any affirmative conduct to 11 support the development of the homeless encampments beyond the 12 alleged non-enforcement decision itself. (See Compl. at ¶¶ 14- 13 25)3; White v. City of Minneapolis, 21-cv-371 (WMW/KMM), 2021 WL 14 5964554, at *1-2 & n.1 (D. Minn. Dec. 16, 2021) (distinguishing 15 Hunters Capital, in due process § 1983 action challenging city’s 16 failure to provide police protection during protest, leading to 17 burning of plaintiff’s business, on ground that plaintiffs did 18 not allege city “actively supported any third-party agitators[,] 19 whether by providing resources . . . or by issuing public 20 statements in which they expressed a desire to preserve the 21 unrest”). This alone is insufficient to demonstrate a judicially 22 cognizable interest, which is necessary to confer standing upon 23 plaintiff. See Allen, 468 U.S. at 750-51, 754; Linda R.S., 410 24 U.S. at 619; Lefebure, 15 F.4th at 655. 25 II. State-Created Danger Claim 26 Plaintiff also brings a separate claim alleging state- 27 3 Indeed, plaintiff acknowledges that the City cleared 28 the area on at least one occasion. (Id. at ¶ 22.) 1 created danger, a type of due process violation. See Martinez v. 2 City of Clovis, 943 F.3d 1260, 1271 (9th Cir. 2019). Like 3 plaintiff’s first due process claim, the crux of the state- 4 created danger claim is that the City has created dangerous 5 conditions, to which plaintiff has been exposed, by failing to 6 enforce its laws against homeless individuals residing near 7 plaintiff’s property. (See Compl. at ¶¶ 14-21, 29-31.) Thus, 8 this claim likewise directly challenges the City’s failure to 9 enforce the law against others, and therefore plaintiff also 10 lacks standing to pursue it. 11 This claim fails for other reasons as well. Under the 12 state-created danger rule, “the state may be constitutionally 13 required to protect a plaintiff that it ‘affirmatively places in 14 danger by acting with deliberate indifference to a known or 15 obvious danger.’” Martinez, 943 F.3d at 1271 (quoting Patel v. 16 Kent Sch. Dist., 648 F.3d 965, 971-72 (9th Cir. 2011)). To 17 succeed on a state-created danger claim, a plaintiff must show, 18 inter alia, that “the [defendant’s] affirmative actions created 19 or exposed [the plaintiff] to an actual, particularized danger 20 that [the plaintiff] would not otherwise have faced” and that the 21 danger resulted in a foreseeable injury to the plaintiff. See 22 id. (citing Hernandez v. City of San Jose, 897 F.3d 1125, 1133 23 (9th Cir. 2018)). Whether the defendant created a new danger or 24 enhanced an existing one is not material; the focus is on whether 25 there was “state action [versus] inaction in placing an 26 individual at risk.” See Hernandez, 897 F.3d at 1134-35 (quoting 27 Penilla v. City of Huntington Park, 115 F.3d 707, 710 (9th Cir. 28 1997)); Kennedy v. City of Ridgefield, 439 F.3d 1055, 1063 n.4 1 (9th Cir. 2006). 2 According to plaintiff’s Complaint, the affirmative 3 action which caused the danger to plaintiff was the City’s 4 “decision to treat the area surrounding [plaintiff’s] Property as 5 a containment zone” and its “fail[ure] and refus[al] to enforce” 6 state and local laws; and the “danger” created thereby consisted 7 of public health and safety hazards, harmful environmental 8 conditions and increased crime and risk of property damage. 9 (Compl. at ¶¶ 15-20.) Specifically, plaintiff alleges that, due 10 to this danger, it was injured when “[t]he homeless . . . lit the 11 Property on fire and vandalized it in a variety of other ways,” 12 when its “tenants and their patrons [were made] to fear for their 13 safety” due to drug use and odors, and when it was “forced to 14 expend additional monetary resources on third-party security and 15 cleanup crews” to “repair[ ] fire damage and other vandalism 16 carried out by the homeless population.” (Compl. at ¶¶ 18-20.)4 17 As an initial matter, it is not clear that the term 18 “danger” may, within the meaning of the state-created danger 19 doctrine, be validly construed to include risks of purely 20 economic injury to a corporation. Every Ninth Circuit decision 21 of which this court is aware in which the court recognized a 22 claim for state-created danger involved risks of bodily harm to 23 individuals. See Hernandez, 897 F.3d at 1133-39 (noting focus of 24 analysis is whether “state action . . . placed an individual at 25

26 4 Plaintiff also alleges that, because of the City’s failures, it has been “threaten[ed]” with “an increased risk of 27 infection of COVID-19” and “loss of business and other opportunities,” though it does not allege that these threatened 28 harms have yet been realized. (See id. at ¶ 21.) 1 risk) (emphasis added); Henry A. v. Willden, 678 F.3d 991, 1002- 2 1003 (9th Cir. 2012); Kennedy, 439 F.3d at 1061-67; Munger v. 3 City of Glasgow Police Dep’t, 227 F.3d 1082, 1086-88 (9th Cir. 4 2000); Penilla, 115 F.3d at 709-10; L.W. v. Grubbs, 974 F.2d 119, 5 120-23 (9th Cir. 1992); Wood v. Ostrander, 879 F.2d 583, 587-96 6 (9th Cir. 1989); see also Martinez, 943 F.3d at 1271-77 (holding 7 individual plaintiff had demonstrated a valid claim for state- 8 created danger based on physical injury, but ruling for 9 defendants based on qualified immunity where relevant law was not 10 clearly established); Pauluk v. Savage, 836 F.3d 1117, 1121-26 11 (9th Cir. 2016) (same). 12 It is also doubtful that the Supreme Court in DeShaney 13 v. Winnebago County Social Services Department, 489 U.S. 189 14 (1989) -- the progenitor of the state-created danger doctrine, 15 see id. at 201 -- intended to allow § 1983 liability based on 16 economic harms to non-individual plaintiffs, given that that case 17 involved the infliction of bodily harm to a child. Id. at 192; 18 see Cnty. of Sacramento v. Lewis, 523 U.S. 833, 842 (1998) 19 (noting that the Court “ha[s] always been reluctant to expand the 20 concept of substantive due process”) (quoting Collins v. City of 21 Harker Heights, 503 U.S. 115, 125 (1992)). The only decision 22 plaintiff identifies to have done so, Hunters Capital, is not 23 binding and, more importantly, did not address this issue. (Opp. 24 at 6-7); see 499 F. Supp. 3d at 901-03. 25 More importantly, plaintiff fails to plausibly allege 26 that any danger it faced was caused by an “affirmative action[ ]” 27 by the City, as that term has been defined by the courts. 28 Plaintiff describes the City’s non-enforcement as a “decision,” 1 which it argues amounts to “affirmatively treating the area 2 surrounding [plaintiff’s] property as a containment zone” and 3 “affirmatively refus[ing] to enforce its own laws and those of 4 the state.” (Compl. at ¶ 15; Opp. at 7.) That the City may have 5 knowingly declined to enforce the law does not transform its non- 6 enforcement from inaction into an affirmative act, nor does 7 merely labeling such inaction “affirmative[ ].” See Lamberth v. 8 Clark Cnty. Sch. Dist., 2:14-cv-2044-APG, 2015 WL 4760696, at *5 9 (D. Nev. Aug. 12, 2015) (“[Defendants’ alleged] omissions do not 10 qualify as affirmative acts. Regardless of how it is phrased, 11 the substance of these claims is that the defendants failed to 12 render aid.”), aff’d, 698 F. App’x 387 (9th Cir. 2017); Estate of 13 Gonzales v. Hickman, ED 05-cv-660 MMM (RCx), 2006 WL 4959780, at 14 *14 (C.D. Cal. Jan. 30, 2006) (“Inserting the word ‘refusal’ 15 . . . does not transform an omission into an affirmative act.”); 16 Johnson v. City of Seattle, 385 F. Supp. 2d 1091, 1097 (W.D. 17 Wash. 2005), aff’d, 474 F.3d 634 (9th Cir. 2007). 18 Municipalities and the officials who enforce their laws 19 are routinely required to make decisions about whether and when 20 to do so. However, to hold that decisions not to enforce laws 21 constitute “affirmative action” for purposes of state-created 22 danger claims would impermissibly expand the scope of due process 23 liability by allowing any mere omission to be reframed as 24 actionable affirmative conduct. Ninth Circuit precedent 25 recognizing claims for state-created danger makes clear that the 26 official conduct in question must be affirmative in a more 27 literal sense. See, e.g., Hernandez, 897 F.3d at 1133-35 28 (directing rally attendees toward violent crowd and blocking them 1 from exiting through other routes); Kennedy, 439 F.3d at 1063 2 (verbally disclosing child molestation allegations to accused 3 individual’s parent); Munger, 227 F.3d at 1087 (ejecting patron 4 from bar); Penilla, 115 F.3d at 708, 710 (canceling paramedic 5 request, breaking lock on door of plaintiff’s home, and placing 6 plaintiff inside). Because allegations of actual affirmative 7 conduct are absent from plaintiff’s complaint, it fails to state 8 a claim for state-created danger. That claim will accordingly be 9 dismissed. 10 III. Equal Protection Claim 11 In certain circumstances, an exception to the rule 12 prohibiting constitutional challenges to lack of enforcement of 13 the law may exist for equal protection claims alleging that 14 enforcement of the law is done selectively for a discriminatory 15 purpose and with a discriminatory effect. See Lacey v. Maricopa 16 Cnty., 693 F.3d 896, 920 (9th Cir. 2012); Rosenbaum v. City & 17 Cnty. of San Francisco, 484 F.3d 1142, 1152 (9th Cir. 2007). 18 Such claims may proceed where a plaintiff alleges that a law was 19 enforced against the plaintiff, but not against other similarly 20 situated individuals, and that the defendant “decided to enforce 21 the law against [the plaintiff] ‘on the basis of an impermissible 22 ground such as race, religion or exercise of constitutional 23 rights.’” See Lacey, 693 F.3d at 922 (quoting United States v. 24 Kidder, 869 F.2d 1328, 1336 (9th Cir. 1989)) (alteration 25 adopted); United States v. Armstrong, 517 U.S. 456, 464-65 (1996) 26 (“A [litigant] may demonstrate that the administration of a . . . 27 law is ‘directed so exclusively against a particular class of 28 persons . . . with a mind so unequal and oppressive’ that the 1 system of [enforcement] amounts to ‘a practical denial’ of equal 2 protection of the law.”) (quoting Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 3 356, 373 (1886)). 4 Here, however, the basis of plaintiff’s equal 5 protection claim is not that any law was enforced against it. 6 Rather, it alleges that the City enforces certain ordinances 7 against some homeless individuals but not against others. 8 Crucially, plaintiff is part of neither group, and it has 9 identified no authority establishing that it may bring a 10 selective enforcement claim without alleging that it has itself 11 been the subject of the challenged enforcement. See Lacey, 693 12 F.3d at 922; Allen, 468 U.S. 755 (“Our cases make clear . . . 13 that . . . injury [resulting from discrimination] accords a basis 14 for standing only to ‘those persons who are personally denied 15 equal treatment’ by the challenged discriminatory conduct.”) 16 (quoting Heckler v. Mathews, 465 U.S. 728, 739-40 (1984)); cf. 17 Warth, 422 U.S. at 499 (“[E]ven when the plaintiff has alleged 18 injury sufficient to meet the ‘case or controversy’ requirement, 19 this Court has held that the plaintiff generally must assert his 20 own legal rights and interests, and cannot rest his claim to 21 relief on the legal rights or interests of third parties.”).5 22 5 Even if plaintiff could make out a claim that it has 23 itself been the target of unlawful selective enforcement of the law, plaintiff also has not alleged that the non-enforcement 24 decision was made “on the basis of an impermissible ground such as race, religion or exercise of constitutional rights.” Kidder, 25 869 F.2d at 1136 (citation omitted, alteration adopted); (see Opp. at 5-6 (quoting J.D.H. v. Las Vegas Metro Police Dep’t, 26 2:13-cv-1300 APG NJK, 2014 WL 3809131, at *4 (D. Nev. Aug. 1, 27 2014))). Nor does plaintiff appear to assert an equal protection 28 claim as a “class of one.” Such a claim may lie “where the 1 Nor has plaintiff identified any authority establishing 2 that cities are required, as a matter of equal protection law, to 3 treat all areas of the city alike. While it may be unfair for a 4 city to afford businesses and residents in certain areas the 5 benefit of enforcing local laws while denying that benefit to 6 those in other areas, as plaintiff argues, it does not amount to 7 a violation of equal protection. The court is aware of, and 8 plaintiff has identified, no precedent demonstrating that it 9 does, and to hold otherwise would expand the scope of the Equal 10 Protection Clause in ways this court lacks the authority to 11 extend it. Accordingly, plaintiff’s equal protection claim must 12 also be dismissed.6 13

14 plaintiff alleges that [the plaintiff] has been intentionally treated differently from others similarly situated and that there 15 is no rational basis for the difference in treatment.” Vill. of Willowbrook v. Olech, 528 U.S. 562, 564 (2000). “Where a 16 plaintiff is making a class-of-one claim, the essence of the claim is that only the plaintiff has been discriminated against, 17 and therefore the basis for the differential treatment might well 18 have been because the plaintiff was unique . . . .” Scocca v. Smith, 11-cv-1318 EMC, 2012 WL 2375203, at *5 (N.D. Cal. June 22, 19 2012). Here, plaintiff does not allege that it has been 20 singled out for differential treatment, but rather that the City has, on a city-wide scale, “arbitrarily determined where homeless 21 encampments may or may not be located and what communities should 22 be affected,” thereby “plac[ing] a disproportionate burden on some persons, communities, and businesses over others.” (Compl. 23 at ¶ 27.) Such allegations cannot support a class-of-one claim. Cf. Thornton v. City of St. Helens, 425 F.3d 1158, 1167 (9th Cir. 24 2005) (“An equal protection claim will not lie by conflating all persons not injured into a preferred class receiving better 25 treatment than the plaintiff.”) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). 26

27 6 Plaintiff also asserts a claim for municipal liability premised upon an unconstitutional custom or policy. (Compl. at 28 ¶¶ 35-38.) However, municipal liability under § 1983, recognized 1 IV. State Law Claims 2 Because the court will dismiss plaintiff’s federal 3 claims, it no longer has federal question jurisdiction.7 Federal 4 courts have “supplemental jurisdiction over all other claims that 5 are so related to claims in the action within such original 6 jurisdiction that they form part of the same case or controversy 7 under Article III of the United States Constitution.” 28 U.S.C. 8 § 1367(a). A district court “may decline to exercise 9 supplemental jurisdiction . . . [if] the district court has 10 dismissed all claims over which it has original jurisdiction.” 11 Id. at § 1367(c); see also Acri v. Varian Assocs., Inc., 114 F.3d 12 999, 1001 n.3 (9th Cir. 1997) (en banc) (district courts may 13 decline sua sponte to exercise supplemental jurisdiction). 14 “[I]n the usual case in which all federal-law claims 15 are eliminated before trial, the balance of factors to be 16 considered under the pendent jurisdiction doctrine -- judicial 17 economy, convenience, fairness and comity -- will point toward 18 declining to exercise jurisdiction over the remaining state-law 19 claims.” Carnegie-Mellon Univ. v. Cohill, 484 U.S. 343, 350 n.7 20 (1988). Here, comity strongly weighs in favor of declining to

21 in Monell v. Department of Social Services of City of New York, 22 436 U.S. 658 (1978), is simply a means of suing a municipality for violations of constitutional rights, not an independent claim 23 of its own. Because all of plaintiff’s constitutional claims are asserted against the City -- the only defendant in this action -– 24 the claim for municipal liability is redundant of the others, and will thus be dismissed for the same reasons. 25

26 7 There is no diversity jurisdiction in this case. Although plaintiff is a Delaware corporation, and thus the 27 parties are of diverse citizenship, neither party alleges that the amount in controversy exceeds $75,000. (Prayer (Docket No. 28 1)); see 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a). 1 exercise supplemental jurisdiction over plaintiff’s state law 2 claims. The state courts are fully competent to adjudicate such 3 claims. Some of plaintiff’s claims raise complex questions of 4 state law, such as the right to “pursuing and obtaining safety 5 [and] happiness” under the California Constitution, which are 6 better left for California courts to resolve. 7 As for judicial economy, plaintiff’s state law claims 8 have not been the subject of any significant litigation in this 9 case, as this is the first instance in which the merits of 10 plaintiff’s claims are being considered. Judicial economy does 11 not weigh in favor of exercising supplemental jurisdiction. 12 Finally, convenience and fairness do not weigh in favor 13 of exercising supplemental jurisdiction over plaintiff’s 14 remaining state law claims. The federal and state fora are 15 equally convenient for the parties. There is no reason to doubt 16 that the state court will provide an equally fair adjudication of 17 the issues. There is nothing to prevent plaintiff from refiling 18 its state law claims against the City in state court, and any 19 additional cost or delay resulting therefrom should be minimal. 20 Accordingly, the court declines to exercise 21 supplemental jurisdiction and will dismiss plaintiff’s remaining 22 state law claims. In so doing, this court passes no judgment on 23 the merits of plaintiff’s state law claims. Not all wrongs can 24 be remedied by resort to the federal courts. Plaintiff is still 25 free to seek accountability for harms arising from the City’s 26 alleged non-enforcement of its laws through plaintiff’s state law 27 claims or through the democratic process. As Chief Justice 28 Rehnquist observed in DeShaney: nn ne nnn enn ee nn nn nn nn nn nn nn nn nnn eo nD ae

1 The people . . . may well prefer a system of liability which would place upon the State and its officials the 2 responsibility for failure to act in situations such as the present one. They may create such a system, if 3 they do not have it already, by changing the tort law of the State in accordance with the regular lawmaking 4 process. But they should not have it thrust upon them by this Court’s expansion of . . . the Fourteenth 5 Amendment. 6 489 U.S. at 203. 7 IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that defendant’s motion to 8 dismiss (Docket No. 11-1) be, and the same hereby is, GRANTED. 9 | Plaintiff has twenty days from the date of this Order to file an 10 amended complaint, if it can do so consistent with this Order. 11 If plaintiff should elect not to file an amended complaint by 12 that date the Clerk shall enter final judgment of dismissal on 13 this Order. □ - ak. 14 Dated: May 26, 2022 WILLIAM B. SHUBB 15 UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 16