DIES, Chief Justice.
This is a workmen’s compensation case. Plaintiff C. A. McMahon received judgment from Texas Employers’ Insurance Association, defendant, for the total loss of use of the left hand, from which insurer brings this appeal.
Appellant’s first three points attack the jury’s finding (S.I. 9) that another employee of the same class as plaintiff worked at least 210 days of the year immediately preceding plaintiff’s injury, because plaintiff had purposely limited himself to earning not more than $1,680 per year to protect his Social Security benefits. Plaintiff at the time of injury was hauling pulpwood, and the evidence of these workers’ wages as a “class” was general. Defendant’s contention is that plaintiff’s situation of intentional limitation in earnings to protect his Social Security was unique and took him out of the “class” of pulpwooders not so confined. We disagree and follow the holding of Traders & General Insurance Company v. Nored, 341 S.W.2d 492 (Tex.Civ.App., Fort Worth, 1960, error ref. n.r.e.).
Defendant urges that the distinction in the Nored case is that plaintiff there testified he was willing to and would accept employment if it was available even though it would deprive him of Social Security benefits.
In our case, plaintiff stated he didn’t work 210 days in the year preceding his injury because, “I didn’t want to bother my social security.”
We are unwilling to make this distinction. To do so would open up a new “class” of seasonal employees, such as summer students, whose wage rates would not only be difficult to determine, but would put them in an inferior category even though they were performing identical duties of non-seasonal employees. These points of error are overruled.
Appellant’s points four, five, six, seven, eight, nine, and ten attack the sufficiency [667]*667of the evidence to support the wage finding (S.I. No. 9). The contention is that plaintiff was paid by the load, and Cobb’s testimony concerned employees who were paid by the hour. Hence, this testimony concerned employees of a different “class” than plaintiff.
Special Issues Nos. 9 and 10 and their answers follow:
“Do you find from a preponderance of the evidence that there was another employee of the same class as the plaintiff, C. A. McMahon, who worked at least 210 days during the year immediately preceding plaintiff’s injury, if any, in the same or similar employment in the same or a neighboring place?
“Answer: ‘Another employee had so worked.’
“What do you find from a preponderance of the evidence to be the average daily wage earned by such employee, if any, in such employement during the days actually worked?
“Anwer: ‘$16.00.’”
Plaintiff was asked:
“Q Do you know that there were people who worked in the woods for Everett Cobb and for other employers in Newton County doing the same kind of work you were doing for at least 210 days during the year preceding May 3, 1972 ?
“A Yes, sir.
“Q All right, sir. Now then, was there a going pay that you and these other men received for working out there? Did you receive so much a load or how were you paid ?
“A I was paid by the load.
“Q How much a load ?
“A I was paid eight dollars.
"Q All right. And were there other employees out in the woods who received the same kind of pay, eight dollars a load?
“A Yes, sir.
“Q And these — these employees that you say that you knew there were some who worked at least 210 days, do you know some of those who were paid eight dollars a load ?
“A Yes, sir, I believe so.
⅝ ⅜ ⅝ ⅜ ‡ ⅝
“Q [B]ut I’m talking about in a day, give me an average that you’d make in a day? We’ve got to pin it down to a daily average, Mr. McMahon ?
“A Well, we could go — I believe I’d be safe to say make a average of sixteen dollars.
“Q All right. And — and then a person who worked however many days he worked, you say it would be safe to say that that man would average sixteen dollars a day doing the same type of work you were doing?
“A Uh Huh.”
The pulpwood producer, Everett Cobb, gave the following testimony:
“Q Well, if they just averaged four days a week, they’d work 210. You certainly can say that you had some at least who did that well ?
“A I had some to do better than that, some do worse than that.
“Q That’s fine. You did have some that did better than that ?
“A That’s right.
* * * * * *
“Q You pay yours two-and-a-quarter to two-and-a-half an hour ?
[668]*668“A That’s right. That’s exactly right. Got to. This day and time.
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DIES, Chief Justice.
This is a workmen’s compensation case. Plaintiff C. A. McMahon received judgment from Texas Employers’ Insurance Association, defendant, for the total loss of use of the left hand, from which insurer brings this appeal.
Appellant’s first three points attack the jury’s finding (S.I. 9) that another employee of the same class as plaintiff worked at least 210 days of the year immediately preceding plaintiff’s injury, because plaintiff had purposely limited himself to earning not more than $1,680 per year to protect his Social Security benefits. Plaintiff at the time of injury was hauling pulpwood, and the evidence of these workers’ wages as a “class” was general. Defendant’s contention is that plaintiff’s situation of intentional limitation in earnings to protect his Social Security was unique and took him out of the “class” of pulpwooders not so confined. We disagree and follow the holding of Traders & General Insurance Company v. Nored, 341 S.W.2d 492 (Tex.Civ.App., Fort Worth, 1960, error ref. n.r.e.).
Defendant urges that the distinction in the Nored case is that plaintiff there testified he was willing to and would accept employment if it was available even though it would deprive him of Social Security benefits.
In our case, plaintiff stated he didn’t work 210 days in the year preceding his injury because, “I didn’t want to bother my social security.”
We are unwilling to make this distinction. To do so would open up a new “class” of seasonal employees, such as summer students, whose wage rates would not only be difficult to determine, but would put them in an inferior category even though they were performing identical duties of non-seasonal employees. These points of error are overruled.
Appellant’s points four, five, six, seven, eight, nine, and ten attack the sufficiency [667]*667of the evidence to support the wage finding (S.I. No. 9). The contention is that plaintiff was paid by the load, and Cobb’s testimony concerned employees who were paid by the hour. Hence, this testimony concerned employees of a different “class” than plaintiff.
Special Issues Nos. 9 and 10 and their answers follow:
“Do you find from a preponderance of the evidence that there was another employee of the same class as the plaintiff, C. A. McMahon, who worked at least 210 days during the year immediately preceding plaintiff’s injury, if any, in the same or similar employment in the same or a neighboring place?
“Answer: ‘Another employee had so worked.’
“What do you find from a preponderance of the evidence to be the average daily wage earned by such employee, if any, in such employement during the days actually worked?
“Anwer: ‘$16.00.’”
Plaintiff was asked:
“Q Do you know that there were people who worked in the woods for Everett Cobb and for other employers in Newton County doing the same kind of work you were doing for at least 210 days during the year preceding May 3, 1972 ?
“A Yes, sir.
“Q All right, sir. Now then, was there a going pay that you and these other men received for working out there? Did you receive so much a load or how were you paid ?
“A I was paid by the load.
“Q How much a load ?
“A I was paid eight dollars.
"Q All right. And were there other employees out in the woods who received the same kind of pay, eight dollars a load?
“A Yes, sir.
“Q And these — these employees that you say that you knew there were some who worked at least 210 days, do you know some of those who were paid eight dollars a load ?
“A Yes, sir, I believe so.
⅝ ⅜ ⅝ ⅜ ‡ ⅝
“Q [B]ut I’m talking about in a day, give me an average that you’d make in a day? We’ve got to pin it down to a daily average, Mr. McMahon ?
“A Well, we could go — I believe I’d be safe to say make a average of sixteen dollars.
“Q All right. And — and then a person who worked however many days he worked, you say it would be safe to say that that man would average sixteen dollars a day doing the same type of work you were doing?
“A Uh Huh.”
The pulpwood producer, Everett Cobb, gave the following testimony:
“Q Well, if they just averaged four days a week, they’d work 210. You certainly can say that you had some at least who did that well ?
“A I had some to do better than that, some do worse than that.
“Q That’s fine. You did have some that did better than that ?
“A That’s right.
* * * * * *
“Q You pay yours two-and-a-quarter to two-and-a-half an hour ?
[668]*668“A That’s right. That’s exactly right. Got to. This day and time.
“Q. And two years ago you worked five days a week ?
“A Right. That’s right.
“Q Regularly ?
“A Yes sir. Tried to.
“Q But what I’m saying is a man who is helping a subcontractor was opposed to a man doing for you, if they’re both skidding or if they’re both hooking tongs, they were doing the same work, it was just that you paid one of them directly and in the other case it’s up to the subcontractor to pay them ?
“A That’s right.”
“One of the underlying purposes of our compensation statutes is to compensate an injured employee, not -merely for loss of earnings, but for loss of earning capacity, at a wage rate based on his capacity to earn when employed on a full-time basis.” Texas Employers Ins. Ass’n v. Clack, 134 Tex. 151, 132 S.W.2d 399, 401 (1939).
Under subsection 2 of Art. 8309, § 1, Vernon’s Ann.Civ.St, the criterion is the wage of “an employee of the same class.” 63 Tex.Jur.2d, Workmen’s Compensation, § 172, p. 80 (1965). We believe “class” refers to the type of employment, not the manner of wage computation. Cobb’s testimony clearly establishes that there were other employees doing the same manner of work as plaintiff, who made at least a daily wage equivalent to the jury’s finding. We believe this to be sufficient. These points are overruled.
Appellant’s points eleven, twelve, and thirteen complain of the jury’s findings of “permanent” to S.I. No. 3 as being unsupported or insufficiently supported by the evidence. Appellant urges that plaintiff’s medical witness opined such loss of use to be ten percent.
The plaintiff testified he couldn’t do pulpwood work because of his injury; that he was unable to hold things; that he had lost considerable movement of the wrist and his hand was numb.
The jury was not bound by the doctor’s opinion of disability and could base it on plaintiff’s testimony. Great American Indemnity Co. v. Beaupre, 191 S.W.2d 883, 887 (Tex.Civ.App., Dallas, 1945, error ref. n.r.e.); Southern Underwriters v. Sanders, 110 S.W.2d 1258, 1260 (Tex.Civ.App., Amarillo, 1937, error dism.). These points are overruled.
The judgment of the trial court is affirmed.