Texas Boll Weevil Eradication Foundation, Inc. v. Lewellen

952 S.W.2d 454

• Court: Texas Supreme Court
• Decided: October 9, 1997
• Docket: 96-0745, 96-0839
• Status: Published

Opinions

PHILLIPS, Chief Justice,

delivered the opinion of the Court as to Parts I, II, IV, and V,

in which OWEN, Justice, joins. GONZALEZ and BAKER, Justices, join in Parts I, IV, and V of the Court’s opinion and in the judgment. HECHT, Justice, joins in Parts IV and V of the Court’s opinion and in the judgment. CORNYN, ENOCH, SPECTOR and ABBOTT, Justices, join in Parts I, II, and IV of the Court’s opinion.

Subchapter 74D of the Texas Agriculture Code (the Act) provides for the creation and operation of an “Official Cotton Growers’ Boll Weevil Eradication Foundation.” Subject to referendum approval from the affected cotton growers, this Foundation is authorized to operate boll weevil eradication programs and assess the growers for the cost. Appellees in these consolidated direct appeals, who are cotton growers subject to the Foundation’s jurisdiction, filed declaratory judgment actions challenging the Foundation’s assessments on a variety of constitutional and statutory grounds. The trial court in each case invalidated the assessments and enjoined their collection.

We hold that the assessments levied by the Foundation constitute regulatory fees, rather than taxes, and thus are not taxes on an agricultural pursuit in violation of Article VIII, Section 1(c) of the Texas Constitution. We further hold that the Act, on its face and as applied to appellees, does not violate the right to equal protection under the United States or Texas Constitutions.

We do conclude, however, that the Legislature made an unconstitutionally broad delegation of authority to the Foundation, a private entity, thereby violating Article' II, Section 1 of the Texas Constitution. For this reason, without reaching all the other constitutional and statutory arguments raised by appellees, we affirm the judgments of the trial courts.

I

A

There is no dispute among the parties to these appeals or the numerous amici curiae that the Anthonomus grandis Boheman, an insect commonly known as the boll weevil, presents a major economic threat to the Texas cotton industry. See Tex. Agric. Code § 74.001. This pest, which entered Texas from Mexico in 1892, causes an estimated $20 million in crop loss in Texas every year. See House Researoh Organization Bill Analysis of SB 30 at 5 (Feb. 24, 1993). To aid in the ongoing battle against the boll weevil, the Legislature in 1993 authorized the creation of the Official Cotton Growers’ Boll Weevil Eradication Foundation. See Tex. Agric. Code §§ 74.101-74.127.¹ Instead of directly creating the Foundation, however, the Legislature merely authorized the Commissioner of Agriculture to certify some nonprofit organization representing cotton growers to create the Foundation and propose geographic eradication zones. See Tex. Agric. Code § 74.103(a). The Act authorizes the creating organization or the Foundation to conduct referenda in each proposed eradication zone (“zone referenda”) to determine whether those cotton growers desire to establish an official boll weevil eradication zone. See id. § 74.105. Contemporaneous with the zone referendum, the growers ai’e also to elect a member to represent them on the Foundation’s board. See id. § 74.106. If the growers vote not to establish a zone, their board selection is without effect. Id. § 74.105(d).

Under the Act, once the initial zone has been created and the first board member elected, the growers of that zone must approve the assessment to fund the eradication at a subsequent referendum. Thereafter, the board is authorized to determine the assessment needed for each additional participating zone, which must be approved by the growers at a referendum. See id. § 74.113; 4 Tex. Admin. Code § 3.3(e). The Foundation may collect the assessment only if the assessment referendum passes. See Tex. Agric. Code § 74.113(e). Approval of a zone and of the assessment each requires a vote of either two-thirds of the cotton growers in the zone or of those who farm more than one-half of the cotton acreage in the zone. See id. §§ 74.113(d), 74.114(g). The election of board members, on the other hand, requires only a plurality vote. See id. § 74.114(c)(2); 4 Tex. Admin. Code § 3.6(c).

The Foundation exercises broad governmental powers. Besides being authorized to conduct elections in proposed eradication zones, Tex. Agric. Code § 74.108(a)(1), (2), the board may add an area to a zone under certain circumstances if approved by a referendum of cotton growers in the area. Id. § 74.108(b). The board determines what eradication programs to conduct. Id. § 74.108(a)(4). The Foundation may impose penalties for late payment of assessments. Id. § 74.115(a). A cotton grower who fails to pay an assessment within ten days of its due date must destroy his cotton crop. Id. § 74.115(b). If the grower fails to do so, his crop is automatically declared a public nuisance. Id. On the Foundation’s recommendation, and after notice, the Department of Agriculture must destroy it, even if not infested with boll weevils, at the owner’s cost. Id. In addition, a cotton grower who violates the statute (including, presumably, by failing to pay an assessment or failing to destroy his own crop if payment is more than ten days late) is guilty of a Class C misdemeanor. Id. § 74.126(b). Cotton which a delinquent grower has already produced and harvested is subject to a lien. Id. § 74.115(c). Representatives of the Foundation may enter private property which is subject to eradication without the owner’s permission for any purpose under the Act, including “the treatment, monitoring, and destruction of growing cotton or other host plants.” Id. § 74.117. Finally, the Commissioner and the Foundation may adopt rules necessary to carry out the purposes of the Act. Id. § 74.120(c).

While growers in a zone must approve their assessments, they do not approve the type of eradication program or the amount of debt incurred by the Foundation to finance it. These matters are left to the Foundation’s discretion. If the eradication program is discontinued for any reason, the Foundation may continue collecting assessments “as necessary to pay the financial obligations of the foundation.”. Id. § 74.127(c).

Under the Act, some power is retained by the Commissioner of Agriculture. For example, the Foundation can change the number of board positions or the eradication zone representation on the board only with the Commissioner’s approval. Id. § 74.107(b). The Commissioner must also make rules to protect life and property from pesticides and other aspects of eradication programs. Id. § 74.120. See 4 Tex. Admin. Code §§ 3.20-3.24. The Commissioner may prohibit planting cotton in zones when it would jeopardize the success of an eradication program. Id. § 74.118. See 4 Tex. Admin. Code §§ 3.50-3.57. The Commissioner may exempt a cotton grower from payment of the Foundation’s assessment penalties if payment would leave the grower with less than $15,000 taxable income. Id. § 74.116. See 4 Tex. Admin. Code §§ 3.70-3.81. The Foundation may expend revenue only on “programs approved by the commissioner as consistent with this subchapter and applicable provisions of the constitution.” Tex. Agric. Code § 74.109(h). Finally, the Commissioner must determine when elimination of boll weevils is no longer necessary to prevent economic loss to cotton growers. Id. §§ 74.102(6), 74.112.

After a referendum has passed, the cotton growers in the zone must be allowed to conduct referenda “periodically” under the terms prescribed in the initial referendum to determine whether to continue their assessments, id. § 74.105(f), although the Act says nothing about how often these referenda must occur. In addition, the Foundation must conduct a referendum on whether to discontinue the program on the petition of at least forty percent of the cotton growers in the zone. Id. § 74.112(f)—(i). As noted, however, the Foundation may continue to collect assessments previously approved to pay its financial obligations. Id. § 74.127(c).

B

Because the Texas Constitution prohibits occupation taxes on agricultural pursuits, see Tex. Const, art. VIII, § 1(c), lawmakers focused on the constitutionality of the Act when considering its passage. See Senate Debate on SB 30 (Feb. 3, 1993) (tape 1); House Reseaech ORGANIZATION Bill Analysis of SB 30 at 9 (Feb. 24, 1993); Senate Natural Resouroes Committee Publio Hearing on SB 30 (Jan. 25, 1993); Senate Subcommittee on Agriculture Hearing on SB 30 (Jan. 27, 1993). In an apparent attempt to preempt any constitutional problems, the Legislature included several references to Article XVI, Section 68 of the Texas Constitution. That section, which creates a limited exception to the ban on agricultural occupation taxes, provides:

The legislature may provide for the advancement of food and fiber in this state by providing representative associations of agricultural producers with authority to collect such refundable assessments on their product sales as may be approved by referenda of producers. All revenue collected shall be used solely to finance programs of marketing, promotion, research, and education relating to that commodity.

Tex. Const, art. XVI, § 68 (emphasis added).² The parties do not dispute that the primary purpose of the Act is pest eradication, which is not one of the purposes expressly listed in Section 68. The Legislature nonetheless declared in the statute:

The creation and use of a boll weevil eradication foundation as a vehicle to provide for assessments and governing boards and to establish eradication zones in order to suppress and eradicate boll weevils and other cotton pests are consistent with the goals and uses of revenue established under Article XVI, Section 68, of the Texas Constitution.

Tex Ageic. Code § 74.101(c). In its “Findings and Declaration of Policy,” the Legislature further declared that

there exists a need to develop, carry out, and participate in programs of research such as disease and insect control; marketing to show low risk of pests in interstate and intrastate movement of cotton commodities; promotion of pest-free cotton commodities which increase market demand; and education of cotton raisers, cotton users, regulators, policymakers, and the general public on the effect of pests on cotton, its utility, its marketing, its yield, and its promotion....

Tex AgeiC. Code § 74.101(a)(2) (emphasis added). Also, the statute requires the Foundation to recommend assessments in an amount sufficient to “finance programs of marketing, promotion, research, and education calculated to increase the production and use of cotton.” Tex. Ageic. Code § 74.113(a) (emphasis added). Although, as discussed in part II below, the Foundation does not now rely on Article XVI, Section 68 to support the eradication programs, it appears that the Legislature attempted to mold the language of the Act to fit within that constitutional provision.

C

In May 1993, Texas Cotton Producers, Inc., a nonprofit organization representing cotton growers, petitioned the Commissioner for authority to create the Foundation. In its petition, Texas Cotton Producers proposed nine eradication zones around the state and provided that the Foundation board would consist of a corresponding nine members. Texas Cotton Producers further provided that “[o]n creation of the proposed official cotton growers’ boll weevil eradication foundation by TCP the initial board will be appointed by the board of TCP pending conduct of the board election.”

While the nine-member board is consistent with the requirements of section 74.103(b)(2), which permits a six, nine, twelve, or fifteen person board, the statute never authorizes the creating organization to appoint the initial Foundation board. Despite this flaw, the Commissioner certified Texas Cotton Producers to create the Foundation. In September 1993, Texas Cotton Producers incorporated the Foundation as a Texas nonprofit corporation, appointing nine members to the board who purportedly represented each of the nine proposed eradication districts. The Foundation has since conducted six zone re-ferenda, and in each instance the growers elected as their board representative the person previously appointed by Texas Cotton Producers to represent that proposed zone. In the meantime, the remaining appointed members apparently voted on all Foundation matters, including the setting of assessments and expenditure of funds.

In April 1995, the Foundation conducted a referendum in the proposed High Plains Eradication Zone, which comprises all or parts of thirty West Texas counties. The cotton growers approved creation of the zone, and also approved the following maximum assessments:

A maximum of $1.25 per planted cotton acre in Armstrong, Bailey, Castro, Cochran, Deaf Smith, Lamb, Parmer, Randall and Swisher Counties, and

A maximum of $1.25 per planted cotton acre and $0.0075 per pound of CFSA [Consolidated Farm Service Agency] established yield per planted cotton acre in Briscoe, Crosby, Floyd, Hale, Hockley, Lubbock, Lynn, Terry and Yoakum counties, and

A maximum of $1.25 per planted cotton acre and $0.0125 per pound of CFSA established yield per planted cotton acre in Andrews, Borden, Dickens, Ector, Gaines, Garza, Howard, Kent, Martin, Midland and Motley Counties.

The following September, ten cotton growers from the High Plains Zone sued the Foundation in district court in Hale County, challenging the validity of the referendum and assessments. The plaintiffs contended that the assessments were an occupation tax on an agricultural pursuit, that the assessments further violated their right to equal protection under the United States and Texas Constitutions, that the penalty provisions of the act violated the right to due process under the United States Constitution and the right to open courts under the Texas Constitution, and that the Legislature improperly delegated authority to the Foundation in violation of the Texas Constitution’s separation of powers mandate. The plaintiffs also alleged that, even if the statute is constitutional, the Foundation violated the statute by improperly defining the High Plains Zone, by proposing a nonuniform assessment, and by not providing for subsequent referenda on the referendum ballot. Plaintiffs finally alleged that the Foundation did not comply with the Open Meetings Act.

After discovery, the trial court granted summary judgment for the plaintiffs, without stating specific grounds. The court’s final judgment awarded plaintiffs the assessments they had paid, together with their attorneys’ fees, and permanently enjoined the Foundation from levying further assessments against the plaintiffs. The Foundation appealed directly to this Court, and we accepted jurisdiction. See Tex. Gov’t Code § 22.001(c); Tex.R.App. P. 140.

D

In April 1994, the Foundation conducted a referendum in the proposed Lower Rio Grande Valley Eradication Zone, which comprises nine South Texas counties. The cotton growers approved creation of the zone, and the following October they approved an assessment of $18 per acre on irrigated land and $12 per acre on unirrigated land. One year later, however, the growers petitioned for another referendum to cancel the program. See Tex. Agrio. Code § 74.112(f). This referendum passed in January 1996, thus terminating the eradication program in the Lower Rio Grande Valley Zone. The Foundation, however, continued billing growers for the assessments, solely to retire the $9 million debt already incurred for eradication.

In July 1996, thirty-one Lower Rio Grande Valley cotton growers sued the Foundation to enjoin collection of the assessments.³ The plaintiffs contended that the assessments were occupation taxes on an agricultural pursuit, violating both procedural and substantive due process under the United States Constitution and procedural and substantive due course of law under the Texas Constitution, and that the statute vested unreasonable and excessive power in the Foundation. After an evidentiary hearing, the trial court rendered a temporary injunction enjoining collection of the assessments, which the Foundation also appealed directly to this Court. We accepted jurisdiction and consolidated the two appeals.

II

The growers⁴ argue that the Act, on its face and as applied to them,⁵ violates Article VIII, Section 1(c) of the Texas Constitution, which provides that “[p]ersons engaged in mechanical and agricultural pursuits shall never be required to pay an occupation tax.” The growers contend that the assessments do not fall under the exception in Article XVI, Section 68 because, among other reasons, the assessments are not refundable as required by that provision.

Because the Foundation concedes that the assessments are not refundable, it does not attempt to support them under Article XVI, Section 68.⁶ Instead, the Foundation argues that the assessments are regulatory fees imposed under the State’s police power, rather than occupation taxes.

As noted, the Legislature referenced Article XVI, Section 68 several times in the Act. However, we reject the growers’ argument that an assessment not comporting with Article XVI, Section 68 is automatically void. That the Legislature may have relied primarily on that constitutional provision does not preclude us from considering whether it is valid on another basis. See Cain v. City of Tyler, 261 S.W. 1018, 1021 (Tex. Com. App.1924, judgm’t adopted); Bullock v. Texas Skating Ass’n, 583 S.W.2d 888, 893 (Tex.Civ.App.—Austin 1979, writ ref'd n.r.e.). The Legislature has broad discretion to legislate under its police power, and we must uphold such legislation as long as it is justified by a rational legislative purpose and does not violate a specific constitutional provision. See State v. Project Principle, Inc., 724 S.W.2d 387, 391 (Tex.1987). Fees that are imposed against persons in an industry, when only in an amount reasonably necessary to fund the State’s regulation of that industry, are not occupation taxes. See, e.g., City of Fort Worth v. Gulf Refining Co., 125 Tex. 512, 83 S.W.2d 610, 617-618 (1935). Thus, if the assessments are merely regulatory fees, as the Foundation contends, they are not prohibited by Article VTII, Section 1(c), and the applicability of the restriction in Article XVI, Section 68 is immaterial.

We have articulated a “primary purpose” test for determining whether an assessment is an occupation tax or a regulatory fee:

The principle of distinction generally recognized is that when, from a consideration of the statute as a whole, the primary purpose of the fees provided therein is the raising of revenue, then such fees are in fact occupation taxes, and this regardless of the name by which they are designated. On the other hand, if its primary purpose appears to be that of regulation, then the fees levied are license fees and not taxes.

H. Rouw Co. v. Texas Citrus Comm’n, 151 Tex. 182, 247 S.W.2d 231, 234 (1952). See also Hurt v. Cooper, 130 Tex. 433, 110 S.W.2d 896, 899 (1937). Because money is fungible, this determination is not controlled by whether the assessments go into a special fimd or into the State’s general revenue. See Brown v. City of Galveston, 97 Tex. 1, 75 S.W. 488, 496-497 (1903).

Of course, almost all fees or assessments are intended to raise revenue. The critical issue is whether the assessment is intended to raise revenue in excess of that reasonably needed for regulation. See City of Fort Worth, 83 S.W.2d at 618; Producers Ass’n of San Antonio v. City of San Antonio, 326 S.W.2d 222, 224 (Tex.Civ.App.—San Antonio 1959, writ ref'd n.r.e.). For example, in Producers Association, the court held that an inspection fee imposed against milk producers was a regulatory fee, not an occupation tax. 326 S.W.2d at 324. The undisputed evidence reflected that the annual cost of inspecting dairies was $38,000, while the inspection fee generated only about $30,000 annually. Id. On the other hand, the court in City of Houston v. Harris County Outdoor Advertising Ass’n, 879 S.W.2d 322 (Tex.App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 1994, writ denied), cert. denied, — U.S. -, 116 S.Ct. 85, 133 L.Ed.2d 42 (1995), held that permit fees levied against billboard owners constituted an occupation tax.⁷ The evidence, in the form of a detailed accounting study, reflected that the fees generated revenues equaling from four to ten times the cost of regulation, and thus were intended primarily to raise revenue. 879 S.W.2d at 329.

Here, the growers do not argue that the Foundation’s assessments exceed the amount needed for eradication. Rather, they argue that eradication of the boll weevil does not constitute “regulation of the cotton industry” for purposes of applying the primary purpose test. We disagree.

Texas is and has long been the nation’s leading cotton producer. See United States Dep’t OF AGRICULTURE, NATIONAL AGRICULTURAL STATISTICAL Service (1994); Texas Almanac 1996-1997, 600 (The Dallas Morning News 1995). In 1994, the value of the Texas crop exceeded $1.6 billion, accounting for about one-fourth of the nation’s total cotton production. Texas Almanac 1996-1997 at 600. The House Research Organization concluded when considering the Act that, despite annual expenditures of $23 million for boll weevil control, the pest still causes over $20 million per year in crop losses. See House Research Organization Bill Analysis of SB 30 at 5 (Feb. 24, 1993). None of the parties or amici disputes the Legislature’s characterization of the boll weevil as a “public nuisance.” Tex. Agrio. Code § 74.001.

The abatement of nuisances is within the regulatory power of the State. See Pope v. City of Houston, 559 S.W.2d 905, 907-908 (Tex.Civ.App.—Waco 1977, writ ref'd n.r.e.). In Williams v. State, 146 Tex.Crim. 430, 176 S.W.2d 177 (App.1943), the Court of Criminal Appeals, in reviewing the validity of planting restrictions aimed at controlling the pink bollworm, noted the extreme economic importance of cotton to this State’s economy. See 176 S.W.2d at 182. The Court accordingly concluded that

[t]he preservation and protection of [the cotton] industry from destruction or serious injury was a subject properly within the police power of the Legislature of this State.

Id. See also Kilpatrick v. Compensation Claim Bd., 259 S.W. 164, 167 (Tex.Civ.App.—El Paso 1924, no writ) (holding that Pink Bollworm Act was a necessary exercise of the State’s police power).

We hold that eradication of the boll weevil is a proper subject for regulation by the State pursuant to its police power. Because the Foundation’s assessments are levied in an amount needed to fund the eradication programs, and are used for that purpose, we hold that they are regulatory fees, not occupation taxes.

Our decisions in H. Rouw Co. v. Texas Citrus Commission, 151 Tex. 182, 247 S.W.2d 231 (1952), and Conlen Grain and Mercantile, Inc. v. Texas Grain Sorghum Producers Board, 519 S.W.2d 620 (Tex.1975), are not to the contrary. In Rouw, the Court concluded that assessments levied against citrus growers were taxes, rather than regulatory fees. The assessments were to be used for

education and research for the purpose of increasing knowledge with respect to Texas citrus fruits and by-products, and protecting Texas citrus fruits from pests and diseases and of finding new uses for Texas citrus fruits and by-products and of improving the quality and yield of such fruit and by-products.

247 S.W.2d at 232. Although some of these uses (i.e., protection from pests and diseases) may be comparable to eradication, the Court in Rouw did not specifically focus on whether pest control alone might constitute appropriate police power regulation. Indeed, the Court drew no distinction among the various programs allowed under the statute, presumably because there was no evidence as to how the assessments were being allocated among them. Instead, the Court viewed the statute as having two overriding purposes: 1) advertising and enlarging the markets for Texas citrus fruit; and 2) funding research beneficial to the citrus industry. See 247 S.W.2d at 234. Considering these purposes, the Court concluded that the statute was intended primarily to raise revenue rather than to regulate the citrus industry. Id.

In Conlen, the Court invalidated assessments levied against grain sorghum producers, concluding that they were agricultural occupation taxes. The Grain Sorghum Board was required to use the assessments for

developing, carrying out, and participating in programs of research, disease and insect control, predator control, education, and promotion, designed to encourage the production, marketing, and use of [grain sorghum].

519 S.W.2d at 621-22. As in Rouw, the Court did not specifically consider whether “disease and insect control” standing alone might be considered a regulatory function. Instead, the Court viewed the statute as primarily intended to promote the grain sorghum industry, analogizing it to the statute invalidated in Rouw. Id. at 623-24. Accordingly, neither Rouw nor Conlen stand for the proposition that assessments levied solely to eradicate a public nuisance constitute occupation taxes.

The growers point out that the Act is not confined to eradication. Rather, the Foundation is also authorized to use the funds for “other programs consistent with the declaration of policy stated in Section 74.101 of this code.” Tex. Agmc. Code § 74.113(f)(3). Section 74.101 appears to contemplate promotion and marketing programs like the ones at issue in Conlen and Rouw. We need not decide today, however, whether the Foundation’s implementation of marketing or promotional programs would violate the Texas Constitution.⁸ The undisputed evidence reflects that, except for a small percentage for overhead, all assessments are spent on eradication. We may not hold the statute facially invalid simply because it may be unconstitutionally applied under hypothetical facts which have not yet arisen. See Texas Workers’ Compensation Comm’n v. Garcia, 893 S.W.2d 504, 518 (Tex.1995).

The growers also argue that the Act cannot be considered regulatory because the assessments are levied uniformly against all cotton producers in a zone, regardless of whether that producer’s crop is actually infested with boll weevils. We disagree. Several cotton growers’ associations assert in amicus briefs that, because the boll weevil may migrate from field to field, a successful eradication program must be coordinated on a regional basis without regard to individual infestation. This proposition, which the growers do not dispute, is reflected in the legislative scheme.

We note that the Lower Rio Grande Valley case is factually distinguishable in that the assessments there are being used to retire a bank loan, rather than to fund ongoing eradication. However, this does not negate the regulatory character of the assessments. There is no dispute that the money which the Foundation borrowed for the Lower Rio Grande Valley Zone was used for eradication. That funds for the program were advanced by a lending institution, rather than paid for directly from the assessments, does not change the essential purpose of the assessments.

For the foregoing reasons, we hold that the assessments levied in the High Plains Zone and in the Lower Rio Grande Valley Zone are regulatory fees, rather than occupation taxes. The Act thus does not violate Article VIII, Section 1(c) of the Texas Constitution, either facially or as applied to the growers.

Ill

The growers also argue that the Act, on its face and as applied to them, violates their right to procedural due process under the United States Constitution and their right to open courts under the Texas Constitution because it does not adequately allow them to challenge the Foundation’s assessments.

The Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution prohibits states from “depriv[ing] any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law.” U.S. Const., amend. XIV, § 1. This due process guarantee requires states to provide a meaningful postdeprivation remedy, and in some instances a predeprivation remedy, to a person challenging the validity of a fee or assessment. See LauRence H. TRibe, American Constitutional Law § 10-14 at 720-21 (2d ed. 1988). The Texas Constitution guarantees that “[a]ll courts shall be open, and every person for an injury done him, in his lands, goods, person or reputation, shall have remedy by due course of law.” Tex. Const. art. I, § 18. This guarantee ensures citizens access to courts “unimpeded by unreasonable financial barriers.” Texas Ass’n of Bus. v. Texas Air Control Bd., 852 S.W.2d 440, 448 (Tex.1993). Thus, the Legislature may not require a taxpayer to prepay a tax before challenging its validity. Id. at 449-450.

The Act provides that “[a] cotton grower who fails to pay an assessment levied under this subchapter when due may be subject, after reasonable notice, to a penalty set by the board.” Tex. Agric. Code § 74.115(a). “A cotton grower who fails to pay all assessments and penalties before the 10th day after receiving notice of the delinquency shall destroy any cotton growing on the grower’s acreage that is subject to the assessment.” Id. § 74.115(b). Cotton plants that are not destroyed are declared to be a “public nuisance,” and the Department of Agriculture may apply to a district court to have them destroyed. Id. Moreover, the statute appears to require the Department, on the Foundation’s recommendation and after seven days’ notice, to enter a grower’s premises and destroy the crop- even without a court order. See id. §§ 74.004(e), 74.115(b). Although the Commissioner’s regulations provide a procedure for challenging a penalty, see 4 Tex. Admin. Code § 3.57, neither the Act nor the regulations provide a method for a grower to challenge the underlying assessments or the destruction of his or her crop. The statute also allows the Department to perfect a lien on a delinquent grower’s harvested cotton. See id. § 74.115(c).

While the growers raise a serious question as to whether the Act violates their constitutional rights to open courts and procedural due process, I do not attempt to resolve this issue because the Court holds the Act unconstitutional on other grounds.

IV

The growers also complain that the Act, on its face and as applied to them, violates their right to equal protection under Article I, Section 3 of the Texas Constitution and the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution. Under the Act, producers in a participating zone may be assessed even though they have no actual boll weevil infestation, while producers in another zone with infestation may pay no assessment because that zone elected not to participate. Also, the producers in different zones may pay different levels of assessments.

The Legislature has broad discretion in enacting social or economic legislation that does not classify on suspect categories, such as race, or impinge on fundamental rights. Under both federal and state equal protection analysis, such legislation is valid as long as it is rationally related to a legitimate state interest. See City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center, 473 U.S. 432, 440, 105 S.Ct. 3249, 3254-3255, 87 L.Ed.2d 313 (1985); Richards v. League of United Latin American Citizens, 868 S.W.2d 306, 310-311 (Tex.1993). No party contends that more heightened scrutiny is appropriate.

The Act satisfies these requirements. As discussed previously, the Legislature could have reasonably concluded that eradication, to be effective, should be conducted uniformly over a broad area without regard to individual infestation. Also, the referendum system which the Legislature adopted is not irrational, as it allows those persons most familiar with the boll weevil problem in eaeh area—the cotton producers—to decide whether to participate in the eradication program. The equal protection clause is not, without more, violated merely because a law treats different geographic regions or political subdivisions differently, or because it allows political subdivisions the discretion to adopt or reject a statutory scheme. See Richards, 868 S.W.2d at 311-312. We thus hold that the Act, on its face and as applied to the growers, does not violate their right to equal protection.

Next, the growers assert that the categories drawn by the Legislature violate substantive due process under the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution. As they do not offer a substantive due process analysis that differs from, or affords greater relief than, their equal protection argument, we also reject this claim.⁹

Moreover, the growers contend that, because of the statute’s classifications, it is a local or special law in violation of Article III, Section 56 of the Texas Constitution. A local law is limited to a specific geographic region of the State, while a special law is limited to a particular class of persons distinguished by some characteristic other than geography. See Maple Run at Austin Munic. Utility Dist. v. Monaghan, 931 S.W.2d 941, 945 (Tex.1996). Legislation does not violate Article III, Section 56, however, as long as there is a reasonable basis for its classifications. Id. As explained above, the Act satisfies this test.

V

Finally, we turn to the growers’ argument that the Legislature violated Article II, Section 1 of the Texas Constitution, requiring the separation of powers between the legislative, executive, and judicial branches, by improperly delegating governmental authority to the Foundation. In particular, the growers contend that the Foundation is a private entity whose directors are neither constrained before they act by meaningful standards nor made accountable after they act by administrative, judicial, or popular review. In response, the Foundation contends that both the Legislature’s guidelines and the Commissioner of Agriculture’s supervisory authority are constitutionally adequate.

“The delegation of legislative power is an old concern_” Peter H. Aranson et al., A Theory of Legislative Delegation, 68 CORNELL L.Rev. 1, 4 (1982). A century before American independence, John Locke articulated the theoretical imperative for preserving legislative power in the legislative branch:

The Legislative cannot transfer the Power of Making Laws to any other hands. For it being but a delegated Power from the People, they, who have it, cannot pass it over to others.... And when the people have said, We will submit to rules, and be govern’d by Laws made by such Men, and in such Forms, no Body else can say other Men shall make Laws for them; nor can the people be bound by any Laws but such as are Enacted by those, whom they have Chosen, and Authorized to make Laws for them. The power of the Legislative being derived from the People by a positive voluntary Grant and Institution, can be no other, than what the positive Grant conveyed, which being only to make Laws, and not to make Legislators, the Legislative can have no power to transfer their Authority of making laws, and place it in other hands.

John Locke, Second TREatise of Government 380-381 (2d Treatise) (Cambridge University Press 1960). The prohibition on unwarranted delegation of lawmaking power is “rooted in the principle of separation of powers that underlies our tripartite system of Government.” Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 371, 109 S.Ct. 647, 654, 102 L.Ed.2d 714 (1989). The United States Constitution expressly vests legislative power in the Congress, see U.S. Const. art. I, § 1, and the Texas Constitution similarly vests legislative power in our Legislature. See Tex. Const. art. II, § 1; art. Ill, § 1. Thus, “Congress is not permitted to abdicate or to transfer to others the essential legislative functions with which it is vested.” A.LA. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 , 55 S.Ct. 837, 843, 79 L.Ed. 1570 (1935). Likewise, in our State “[t]he power to pass laws rests with the Legislature, and that power cannot be delegated to some commission or other tribunal.” Brown v. Humble Oil & Refining Co., 126 Tex. 296, 83 S.W.2d 935, 941 (1935).

Yet, like many truisms, these blanket pronouncements should not be read too literally. Even in a simple society, a legislative body would be hard put to contend with every detail involved in carrying out its laws; in a complex society it is absolutely impossible to do so. Hence, legislative delegation of power to enforce and apply law is both necessary and proper. E.g., Field v. Clark, 143 U.S. 649, 693-694, 12 S.Ct. 495, 504-505, 36 L.Ed. 294 (1892). Such power must almost always be exercised with a certain amount of discretion, and at times the line between making laws and enforcing them may blur. As Justice Scalia has observed:

Once it is conceded, as it must be, that no statute can be entirely precise, and that some judgments, even some judgments involving policy considerations, must be left to the officers executing the law and to the judges applying it, the debate over unconstitutional delegation becomes a debate not over a point of principle but over a question of degree. As Chief Justice Taft expressed the point for the Court in the landmark case of J.W. Hampton, Jr. & Co. v. United States, 276 U.S. 394, 406, 48 S.Ct. 348, 351, 72 L.Ed. 624 (1928), the limits of delegation “must be fixed according to common sense and the inherent necessities of the governmental co-ordination.” Since Congress is no less endowed with common sense than we are, and better equipped to inform itself of the “necessities” of government; and since the factors bearing upon those necessities are both multifarious and (in the nonpartisan sense) highly political ... it is small wonder that we have almost never felt qualified to second-guess Congress regarding the permissible degree of policy judgments that can be left to those executing or applying the law.

Mistretta, 488 U.S. at 415-416, 109 S.Ct. at 677 (Scalia, J., dissenting). While warning against “allowing delegation of power to exercise unguided discretion in individual cases,” Professor Davis points out that “the kind óf government we have developed could not operate without” allowing legislatures to delegate rulemaking authority to administrative bodies. Kenneth Culp Davis, 1 Administrative Law Treatise § 3.1, at 150 (2d ed. 1978). And at the height of the New Deal, a young Louis Jaffe asserted:

It was said by the courts for many years that Congress could not “delegate” its powers to administrative officers, though it could give them power “to fill up the details”. But that use of language has worn thin and become rather preposterous, and it is now admitted that Congress may “delegate” power to public officers, since there is no specific constitutional prohibition against delegation as such, provided the delegation is properly prescribed and is felt to be necessary to the operation of government. In the same way we may restate the question in this field as one of “proper delegation” or “reasonable delegation”, or we might drop the word “delegation” completely, at least as indicating a constitutional category, and regard the question simply as one of reasonableness within the due process clause.

Louis L. Jaffe, Law Making by Private Groups, 51 HaRV. L. Rev. 201, 248 (1937).¹⁰ Even before the Depression, one state court noted: “It only leads to confiision and error to say that the power to fill up the details and promulgate rules and regulations is not legislative power.” State ex rel. Wisconsin Inspection Bureau v. Whitman, 196 Wis. 472, 220 N.W. 929, 941 (1928).

Even in its heyday, the nondelegation doctrine was sparingly applied, having been used by the United States Supreme Court to strike down a federal statute only three times. See Panama Refining Co. v. Ryan, 293 U.S. 388, 55 S.Ct. 241, 79 L.Ed. 446 (1935); A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495, 55 S.Ct. 837, 79 L.Ed. 1570 (1935); Carter v. Carter Coal Co., 298 U.S. 238, 56 S.Ct. 855, 80 L.Ed. 1160 (1936). Since the Court retreated from its opposition to New Deal initiatives, it has consistently upheld congressional delegations. See, e.g., Currin v. Wallace, 306 U.S. 1, 59 S.Ct. 379, 83 L.Ed. 441 (1939); National Broad. Co. v. United States, 319 U.S. 190, 63 S.Ct. 997, 87 L.Ed. 1344 (1943); Yakus v. United States, 321 U.S. 414, 64 S.Ct. 660, 88 L.Ed. 834 (1944); United States v. Robel, 389 U.S. 258, 88 S.Ct. 419, 19 L.Ed.2d 508 (1967); American Textile Mfrs. Inst. v. Donovan, 452 U.S. 490, 101 S.Ct. 2478, 69 L.Ed.2d 185 (1981); Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 109 S.Ct. 647, 102 L.Ed.2d 714 (1989), Skinner v. Mid-America Pipeline Co., 490 U.S. 212, 109 S.Ct. 1726, 104 L.Ed.2d 250 (1989); Touby v. United States, 500 U.S. 160, 111 S.Ct. 1752, 114 L.Ed.2d 219 (1991).

Texas courts have also generally upheld legislative delegations to state or municipal agencies. We most recently did so in Edgewood Independent School District v. Meno, 917 S.W.2d 717, 740-741 (Tex.1995), where we said:

The Texas Legislature may delegate its powers to agencies established to carry out legislative purposes, as long as it establishes “reasonable standards to guide the entity to which the powers are delegated.” Railroad Comm’n v. Lone Star Gas Co., 844 S.W.2d 679, 689 (Tex.1992) (quoting State v. Texas Mun. Power Agency, 565 S.W.2d 258, 273 (Tex.Civ.App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1978, writ dism’d)). “Requiring the legislature to include every detail and anticipate unforeseen circumstances would ... defeat the purpose of delegating legislative authority.” Id.

* * * * * *

The separation of powers clause [Tex. Const, art. II, § 1] requires that the standards of delegation be “reasonably clear and hence acceptable as a standard of measurement.” Jordan v. State Bd. of Ins., 160 Tex. 506, 334 S.W.2d [278,] 280 [(1960)].

See also Railroad Comm’n v. Lone Star Gas Co., 844 S.W.2d 679 (Tex.1992); Jordan v. State Board of Ins., 160 Tex. 506, 334 S.W.2d 278 (1960); Southwestern Sav. & Loan Ass’n v. Falkner, 160 Tex. 417, 331 S.W.2d 917 (1960); Railroad Comm’n v. Houston Natural Gas Corp., 155 Tex. 502, 289 S.W.2d 559 (1956); Texas Turnpike Auth. v. Shepperd, 154 Tex. 357, 279 S.W.2d 302 (1955); Parker v. San Jacinto County Water Control and Improv. Dist, 154 Tex. 15, 273 S.W.2d 586 (1954); Gillaspie v. Department of Pub. Safety, 152 Tex. 459, 259 S.W.2d 177 (1953), cert. denied, 347 U.S. 933, 74 S.Ct. 625, 98 L.Ed. 1084 (1954); Trapp v. Shell Oil Co., 145 Tex. 323, 198 S.W.2d 424 (1946); Texas National Guard Armory Bd. v. McCraw, 132 Tex. 613, 126 S.W.2d 627 (1939); Brown v. Humble Oil & Refining Co., 126 Tex. 296, 83 S.W.2d 935 (1935); Housing Auth. v. Higginbotham, 135 Tex. 158, 143 S.W.2d 79 (1940). Many decisions of our Court of Criminal Appeals and courts of appeals have also upheld such delegations. See, e.g., Masquelette v. State, 579 S.W.2d 478 (Tex.Crim.App.), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 986, 100 S.Ct. 515, 62 L.Ed.2d 416 (1979); Ex parte Granviel, 561 S.W.2d 503 (Tex.Crim.App.1978); Office of Pub. Ins. Counsel v. Texas Auto. Ins. Plan, 860 S.W.2d 231 (Tex.App.-Austin 1993, writ denied); Med-Safe Inc. v. State, 752 S.W.2d 638 (Tex.App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1988, no writ); Public Util. Comm’n v. City of Austin, 728 S.W.2d 907 (Tex.App.—Austin 1987, writ ref'd n.r.e.); Oxford v. Hill, 558 S.W.2d 557 (Tex.Civ.App.—Austin 1977, writ ref'd); Williams v. State, 514 S.W.2d 772, 774 (Tex.Civ.App.—Beaumont 1974, writ ref'd n.r.e.); Martinez v. State Bd. of Med. Examiners, 476 S.W.2d 400 (Tex.Civ.App.—San Antonio, writ ref'd n.r.e.), cert. dismissed, 409 U.S. 1020, 93 S.Ct. 463, 34 L.Ed.2d 312 (1972); Commissioners Court of Lubbock County v. Martin, 471 S.W.2d 100 (Tex.Civ.App.—Amarillo 1971, writ ref'd n.r.e.); Beall Med. Surgical Clinic & Hosp. v. Texas State Bd. of Health, 364 S.W.2d 755 (Tex.Civ.App.—Dallas 1963, no writ).

But there are some indications that extreme judicial deference to legislative delegation may be declining. A number of Supreme Court justices have emphasized the need for adequate legislative standards. For example, Justice Brennan has cautioned: “Formulation of policy is a legislature’s primary responsibility, entrusted to it by the electorate, and to the extent Congress delegates authority under indefinite standards, this policy-making function is passed on to other agencies, often not answerable or responsive in the same degree to the people.” United States v. Robel, 389 U.S. at 276, 88 S.Ct. at 430 (Brennan, J., concurring). See also American Textile Mfrs. Inst., Inc. v. Donovan, 452 U.S. 490, 543-548, 101 S.Ct. 2478, 2507-2510, 69 L.Ed.2d 185 (1981) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting); Arizona v. California, 373 U.S. 546, 624-627, 83 S.Ct. 1468, 1510-1512, 10 L.Ed.2d 542 (1963) (Harlan, J., dissenting in part). Moreover, “[m]any distinguished scholars and judges [have become] so concerned about the enormous discretionary power of agencies that they [have] urged reinvigoration of the doctrine.” Kenneth Culp Davis & Richard J. Pierce, Jr., 1 Administrative Law Treatise § 2.6, at 74 (3d ed. 1994) (citing Aranson et al., supra at 7-17; J. Ely, Democracy and Distrust 132-134 (1980); J. Freedman, Crisis and Legitimacy: The Administrative Process and American Government 93-94 (1978); McGowan, Congress, Court, and Control of Delegated Power, 77 Colum. L.Rev. 1119 (1977); T. Lowi, The End of Liberalism: The Second Republic of the United States 93 (1969)). See also Book Note, Delegation Without Accountability, 108 Harv. L.Rev. 751 (1995); Marci A. Hamilton, Power, Responsibility, and Republican Democracy, 93 Mich. L.Rev. 1539 (1995) (Book Review); Harold J. Krent, Delegation and Its Discontents, Power Without Responsibility, David Schoenbrod, 94 Colum. L.Rev. 710 (1994); David Schoenbrod, The Delegation Doctrine: Could the Court Give It Substance ?, 83 Mich. L.Rev. 1223 (1985).

State courts may have less need to reinvigorate the doctrine, since they have historically been more comfortable with striking down state laws on this basis than their federal counterparts. See Davis § 3.14, at 204 (2d ed. 1978). Texas courts are no exception. In particular, this Court has been especially willing to strike down delegations of legislative authority to the judicial department. See, e.g., Chemical Bank & Trust Co. v. Falkner, 369 S.W.2d 427 (Tex.1963); Davis v. City of Lubbock, 160 Tex. 38, 326 S.W.2d 699 (1959); Daniel v. Tyrrell & Garth Inv. Co., 127 Tex. 213, 93 S.W.2d 372 (1936). And in Texas Antiquities Committee v. Dallas County Community College District, 554 S.W.2d 924 (Tex.1977), a plurality of four justices would also have struck down a delegation to an administrative agency. They believed that the Antiquities Committee’s charge to prevent demolition of “[a]ll buildings ... and locations of historical ... interest,” see Tex.Rev.Civ. Stat. art. 6145-9, § 6 (repealed by Acts 1977, 65th Leg., eh. 871, art. I, § 2(a)(4)) was so vague that it failed to provide reasonable standards to support the delegation. 554 S.W.2d at 927. A fifth justice joined only in the judgment on the alternative ground that no substantial evidence supported the Committee’s action, thus avoiding the constitutional issue. 554 S.W.2d at 981 (Greenhill, C.J., concurring). In Bullock v. Calvert, 480 S.W.2d 367 (Tex.1972), the Court refused to read a statute as allowing the Secretary of State to decide whether state funds should be used for a political party’s primary elections, because such unbridled discretion would violate the delegation doctrine. As Justice Reavley explained for a unanimous Court:

[T]he effect of this degree of implied authority would be to give the Secretary of State the decision on whether or not state funds should be used for party primary elections and, if so, for what particular expenses and to what extent. This would be an unconstitutional delegation of legislative power in violation of the separation of powers section (Art. 2, § 1) of the Constitution.

480 S.W.2d at 372. In Ex parte Leslie, 87 Tex.Crim. 476, 223 S.W. 227 (1920), the Court of Criminal Appeals invalidated a statute empowering the Live Stock Commission to create a penal offense for failing to dip cattle for fever ticks, holding that the law failed to reasonably guide the Commissioner in defining the elements of the offense. See also Ex parte Maynard, 101 Tex.Crim. 256, 275 S.W. 1070 (1924); Ex parte Humphrey, 92 Tex.Crim. 501, 244 S.W. 822 (1922); International Ass’n of Firefighters v. City of Kingsville, 568 S.W.2d 391 (Tex.Civ.App.—Corpus Christi 1978, writ ref'd n.r.e.); In re Johnson, 554 S.W.2d 775 (Tex.Civ.App.—Corpus Christi 1977), writ ref'd n.r.e., 569 S.W.2d 882 (Tex.1978) (per curiam).

As difficult as the issue of proper legislative delegation may be, the considerations are even more complex when the delegation is made not to another department or agency of government, but to a private individual or group. While at first blush such delegations might seem manifestly unconstitutional, further reflection demonstrates that they also are frequently necessary and desirable. Presumably no one would argue that the state should not accord the full benefits and responsibilities of a marital union to a couple who was married by a minister, priest, or rabbi rather than a judge. See Tex. Fam. Code § 1.83(a). Also, the delegation of authority to private associations to promulgate certain industrial and professional standards has been of immense benefit to the public. For example, a number of states have adopted existing or future versions of the National Electrical Code, promulgated by an industry association, “turning a technical and complex task often quite beyond the competence of many city councils or even state legislatures over to a specialized private group.” David M. Lawrence, Private Exercise of Governmental Power, 61 Ind. L.J. 647, 689 (1986).

Still, private delegations clearly raise even more troubling constitutional issues than their public counterparts. On a practical basis, the private delegate may have a personal or pecuniary interest which is inconsistent with or repugnant to the public interest to be served. More fundamentally, the basic concept of democratic rule under a republican form of government is compromised when public powers are abandoned to those who are neither elected by the people, appointed by a public official or entity, nor employed by the government. Thus, we believe it axiomatic that courts should subject private delegations to a more searching scrutiny than their public counterparts. See George W. Liebmann, Delegation to Private Parties in American Constitutional Law, 50 Ind. L.J. 650, 659 (1975) (‘Where a delegation by virtue of its content or breadth calls into question the future operation of the political process, judicial scrutiny seems warranted.”).

While the United States Supreme Court has upheld many statutes involving some degree of private delegation, see, e.g., City of Eastlake v. Forest City Enterprises, 426 U.S. 668, 96 S.Ct. 2358, 49 L.Ed.2d 132 (1976); Sunshine Anthracite Coal Co. v. Adkins, 310 , 60 S.Ct. 907, 84 L.Ed. 1263 (1940); United States v. Rock Royal Co-op., Inc., 307 U.S. 533, 59 S.Ct. 993, 83 L.Ed. 1446 (1939); Currin v. Wallace, 306 U.S. 1, 59 S.Ct. 379, 83 L.Ed. 441 (1939), state courts have frequently invalidated such provisions. See, e.g., Sedlak v. Dick, 256 Kan. 779, 887 P.2d 1119, 1134-35 (1995) (striking down statute allowing committee of union and business representatives to select Workers’ Compensation Board members); City of Chamberlain v. R.E. Lien, Inc., 521 N.W.2d 130, 132-133 (S.D.1994) (striking down statute requiring city to incorporate American Institute of Architects’ standard form as part of municipal contracts); Stewart v. Utah Public Serv. Comm’n, 885 P.2d 759, 775-776 (Utah 1994) (striking down statute allowing public utility to veto rate regulation plan adopted by Public Service Commission). Unfortunately, scholars have concluded that these cases do not yet, when taken together, evince a coherent constitutional standard. When Professor Davis issued the second edition of his treatise, for example, he abandoned his earlier effort to analyze the state law on private delegations “because identifiable principles do not emerge.” Davis § 3.12, at 196 (2d ed. 1978). See also Lawrence, supra at 650. We thus begin our analysis with full recognition that, if the delegation at issue is to a private entity, we must craft our own criteria to judge its constitutionality.

We first address whether the Foundation is a public or private entity for purposes of the nondelegation doctrine. Before ever being subject to its authority, any grower will already have had the right to participate in one or more referenda deciding whether to ratify the zone, who to elect to the board, and what amount is to be assessed on the grower’s acreage. These referenda are not purely private affairs, being conducted according to state law, see Tex. Agric. Code §§ 74.105, 74.106, 74.113, under rather extensive regulations promulgated by the Commissioner of Agriculture. See 4 Tex. Admin. Code §§ 3.1-3.6. For example, the Commissioner approves the ballots, id. § 3.4(a), verifies the results, id. § 3.5(b), and issues certificates of election to the prevailing board candidates. Id. § 3.6(d). Yet they are not popular elections either, as the suffrage is strictly limited to eligible growers. Id. § 3.1.

Similarly, the statutory provisions as to governmental powers suggest both public and private attributes. The Act exempts the Foundation from taxation and affords state indemnification to its board members. See Tex. Agric. Code § 74.109(d). The Foundation’s board members, officers, and employees have official immunity except for gross negligence, criminal conduct, or dishonesty. See id. § 74.110. The Foundation must adopt and publish its rules in accordance with state requirements, see id. § 74.120(c), it may be dissolved by the Commissioner when its purpose has been fulfilled, see id. § 74.127, and it (or at least its board) is subject to Chapter 325 of the Texas Government Code, the Texas Sunset Act. Id. The Legislature specifically denominates the Foundation a “governmental unit” for purposes of immunity from suit under the Tort Claims Act. Id. § 74.109(f). Finally, the Foundation does not dispute that it is a “governmental body” subject to the Texas Open Meetings Act. See Tex. Gov’t Code § 551.001(3).

For many purposes, however, the Foundation is not a state agency. See Tex. AgRIC. Code § 74.109(d). Thus, the funds the Foundation collects are expressly “not state funds and are not required to be deposited in the state treasury.” Id. § 74.109(e). The Act also does not subject the Foundation to state purchasing or audit requirements, and its board members are not required to take oaths of office. Finally, there is no provision for administrative appeal from Foundation decisions, except as to penalties imposed for nonpayment of assessments. See 4 Tex. Admin. Code § 3.57.

In sum, we do not find it easy to categorize the Foundation as either a public or private agency, a difficulty that- may exist with many contemporary bodies. Cf. American Home Assurance v. Texas Dep’t of Ins., 907 S.W.2d 90, 95 and n. 8 (Tex.App.—Austin 1995, writ denied) (Texas Workers’ Compensation Insurance Fund a state agency despite various private attributes). However, courts have universally treated a delegation as private where “interested groups have been given authoritative powers of determination, usually in conjunction with a public administrative agency.” Jaffe, supra at 234, and eases cited therein at 234-253. See also Lawrence, supra at 648 n. 4 (“Difficulties in distinguishing between public and private actors have rarely arisen in the cases and need not long detain us.”). That the decisionmak-ers are elected, that their decisions affect only those they represent, that they exercise poliee power, or that the government constrains their power by advance restriction or subsequent review may all, as we shall see, be relevant in assessing the validity of the private delegation; but they do not keep it from being considered private in nature. Because the Act delegates authoritative power to private interested parties, we conclude that it is a private entity for purposes of applying the nondelegation doctrine.

Now we must determine what standard to apply in determining whether the private delegation was appropriate. Because of the additional risks posed by such delegations to the proper separation of governmental powers, a number of factors should be considered by a reviewing court. Among those suggested by Professor Jaffe are these:

* Must the consent of an administrative officer be secured at some point in the process?

* Is the action of the delegates reasonable?

* Do all the persons to be affected by an action participate in its determination?

* Could a statutory standard be articulated which “would improve the result or lay the basis for judicial control?”

* Are democratic procedures available to provide “unorganized groups—who may even be a majority—with an opportunity” to prevent oppression by an organized interest group?

See Jaffe, supra at 247-53.

Forty years after Jaffe, attorney George Liebmann suggested weighing these factors regarding a private delegation:

Does the statute confer upon private delegates the power not only to make rules but to apply the law to particular individuals? Are the actions of private delegates subject to no further public or judicial review, or to review only upon attenuated standards such as the substantial evidence rule?

Are the private delegates chosen by a process involving public consent, as by nomination or confirmation by elected officials? Are the private delegates sworn to oaths of office?

Do the private delegates have pecuniary interests in the determinations to be made?

Is a power to define criminal acts or impose penal sanctions delegated?

Is the delegation one of powers threatening the state’s monopoly of violence, or one of a breadth and scope threatening the ultimate corrective powers of the legislature?

Is the delegation, if one of administrative powers or financial resources, one in which the delegates and their powers are defined according to a limited number of objective standards, or is it rather one which accords the government broad powers to pick and choose among prospective delegates?

Liebmann, supra at 717-18.

Even more recently, Professor Lawrence proposed a similar list of “mechanisms that might be used to minimize the possibility that a private delegate’s private interest will overwhelm decisionmaking.” Lawrence, supra at 686. If these considerations are transformed into questions, they would roughly be as follows:

* Are the private delegates largely disinterested, like most arbitrators and some scientific consultants, or do they have a private interest in the results of their decisions?

* Are the interests of the private delegates largely parallel to those of an alternate public actor, as in prevailing wage rate laws, or do they diverge?

* Do the private delegations incorporate all viewpoints into their structure, as with the National Electrical Code of the National Fire Protection Association, whose members include “electrical contractors, inspectors, manufacturers, utilities, testing laboratories, regulatory agencies, insurance organizations, organized labor, and consumer groups”?

* Do the private delegations include all affected groups in their structure, as did the early twentieth century fire loss salvage corps or the nineteenth century frontier mining camp claim procedures?

* May the determinations of private delegates be appealed to or reviewed by the state?

* Is one who is harmed by the actions of a private delegate entitled to sue a fiscally responsible person or entity, as in laws making private employers liable for the acts of off-duty policemen they employ?

* Are the state’s standards sufficient “to guide the delegate in his work and perhaps permit judicial review of his actions”?

* Do the private delegates afford those affected by their decisions the same types of process guarantees as a state actor would provide?

* Do the private delegates possess special qualifications or training for the tasks delegated to them?

See Lawrence, supra at 686-94.

From his generally fruitless examination of private delegation eases in state courts, Professor Davis concludes: “The one generalization that may be worthy of repetition is this simple one: Much more likely to be sustained than statutes conferring the power of choice upon private parties are statutes whose operation depends upon private action which is taken for purposes which are independent of the statute.” Davis § 3.12, at 196 (2d ed.1978).

The only test that has been articulated by a Texas court in assessing the validity of a private delegation is this: “The delegation of authority to private entities may be lawful if the legislative purpose is discernible and there is protection against the arbitrary exercise of power.” Office of Public Ins. Counsel v. Texas Auto. Ins. Plan, 860 S.W.2d 231, 237 (Tex.App.—Austin 1993, writ denied). See also Central Power and Light Co. v. Sharp, 919 S.W.2d 485, 492 (Tex.App.—Austin 1996), writ denied per curiam, WL 126855, — S.W.2d - (Tex.1997). This language, which is paraphrased from Professor Davis’ explanation of one part of a proposed five-part test for a new public delegation standard, Davis § 3.15, at 208 (2d ed. 1978), is not incorrect, but seems too conclu-sory to give much assistance in striking the proper balance between important but competing interests and principles. Therefore, we prefer to condense the various inquiries posed by scholars and courts to these eight factors:

1. Are the private delegate’s actions subject to meaningful review by a state agency or other branch of state government?

2. Are the persons affected by the private delegate’s actions adequately represented in the decisionmaking process?

3. Is the private delegate’s power limited to making rules, or does the delegate also apply the law to particular individuals?

4. Does the private delegate have a pecuniary or other personal interest that may conflict with his or her public function?

5. Is the private delegate empowered to define criminal acts or impose criminal sanctions?

6. Is the delegation narrow in duration, extent, and subject matter?

7. Does the private delegate possess special qualifications or training for the task delegated to it?

8. Has the Legislature provided sufficient standards to guide the private delegate in its work?

We emphasize at the outset that these standards apply only to private delegations, not to the usual delegation by the Legislature to an agency or another department of government. In reviewing a public delegation, we adhere to those factors set forth by this Court in Housing Authority of City of Dallas v. Higginbotham, 135 Tex. 158, 143 S.W.2d 79, 87 (1940), and its progeny. Furthermore, nothing in our analysis should be read as suggesting what provisions of the Act would or would not pass muster were this a public delegation. Likewise, we express no opinion as to whether any of the other statutory enactments cited by the dissenting justices would or would not pass constitutional muster. Thus, in no way does our opinion, as the dissenting justices fear, “ultimately threaten the heretofore established role of quasi-governmental entities under Texas law.” 952 S.W.2d at 491.

Before applying these factors, we also note that the growers have not expressly categorized their nondelegation argument as either a facial challenge or an “as applied” challenge. We conclude that it is a facial challenge. The growers argue that, based on the overall statutory structure, the Foundation’s assessment, collection, and expenditure of funds for eradication violates the separation of powers mandate of our Constitution. Thus, under the growers’ argument, the Foundation lacks authority to perform its core function—collecting assessments and conducting mandatory eradication programs—as to any cotton producer, regardless of that producer’s particular circumstances. We will thus facially review the legislative delegation before us in light of the above eight factors.

First, while the Foundation is subject to some oversight by the Commissioner of Agriculture, the review is uneven and incomplete. The Legislature did direct the Commissioner to promulgate rules regarding certain areas of the Foundation’s operations. The Commissioner is required to adopt rules for the zone referenda and board elections, see Tex. Agric. Code § 74.114(c), rules specifying hardship exemptions from assessment penalties, see id. § 74.116(a), and rules “to protect individuals, livestock, wildlife, and honeybee colonies” in eradication areas. Id. § 74.120. The Commissioner has complied with these directives. See 4 Tex. Admin. Code §§ 3.1-3.6, 3.20-3.24, 3.70-3.71. Indeed, the Commissioner’s regulations relating to the protection of human life and the environment are fairly extensive. See id. § 3.24. The Act also provides that the Commissioner may adopt rules regulating cotton planting in eradication zones and adopting a schedule of penalty fees, see id. § 74.118, which he has also done. See 4 Tex. Admin. Code §§ 3.50-3.57.

The Commissioner could not, however, adopt any procedure for reviewing such critical decisions as the amount of assessments adopted by the growers, the total amount of funds expended on eradication, the amount of debt incurred by the Foundation, or the repayment terms for such debts. Nor has the Commissioner attempted to do so, either at the Act’s inception or after the increase in his rulemaking authority in 1995. See Tex. AgRIC. Code § 74.120(c) (amended by Acts 1995, 74th Leg., ch. 76, § 11.02). The dissenting justices rely on the proviso that the Foundation must expend revenue only on “programs approved by the commissioner as consistent with this subchapter,” Tex. AgRIC. Code § 74.109(h), but “programs” cannot be stretched to include these critical factors. These determinations are left exclusively to the growers and the board, excluding the Commissioner or any state agency from meaningful review.

Finally, contrary to the dissenting justices’ conclusion, the Commissioner has no general authority to “revoke the Foundation’s certification” if it fails to comply with the procedural provisions of the Act. 952 S.W.2d at 496. The Act provides that “[t]he commissioner shall certify the petitioning organization selected under Section 74.103 of this code as the organization authorized to create an official boll weevil eradication foundation.... The commissioner may revoke the organization’s certification on 60 days written notice if the organization fails to meet the requirements of this subchapter.” Tex. AgRIC. Code § 74.104(a), (b). It is clear that this section authorizes the Commissioner to revoke only the authority of the creating organization. Once the Foundation is created as an independent entity, the Commissioner has no authority to dissolve it, except when its eradication purpose has been fulfilled or it has become inoperative and abandoned. Id. § 74.127. Thus, the first factor weighs against the delegation.

Judging the statute as it is written, rather than as it operated in practice, the second factor militates in favor of the private delegation. The growers in each zone are allowed to vote on whether to participate in the eradication program, and thereby subject themselves to the Foundation’s jurisdiction, and are allowed to approve or reject any proposed assessment. Although the Foundation in actuality operated for nineteen months with a board controlled by Texas Cotton Producers’ appointees, this process was inconsistent with the statutory contemplation that the Foundation should at all times by governed by the elected board. We thus do not consider that actual operation in reviewing the constitutionality of the Act.¹¹

The third factor weighs against the delegation. Far from merely devising eradication guidelines, the Foundation actually applied the programs it devised to all growers in zones where the program was approved. In accordance with its statutory authority, the Foundation collected assessments from individual growers and entered those growers’ property to carry out its eradication programs. See Tex Ageic. Code § 74.117.

The fourth factor also weighs against the delegation. The Foundation board members are cotton growers who have a direct pecuniary interest in the eradication programs implemented by the Foundation.

Under the circumstances of this ease, the fifth factor does not weigh in our consideration of whether the statute as a whole is an unconstitutional delegation of authority to the Foundation. The Foundation is vested with authority to impose monetary penalties for late payment of the assessments and to direct the Department to destroy a delinquent growers’ crops, and it is further empowered to adopt rules, a violation of which is a criminal offense. See Tex AgRIC. Code §§ 74.120(c), 74.126(a). While this authority to impose penal sanctions strongly suggests an improper private delegation, principles of severability would allow us to strike down this power and still uphold the Act. Although the Act contains no express sever-ability clause, the Texas Government Code provides that “[ujnless expressly provided otherwise, if any provision of a statute or its application to any person or circumstance is held invalid, the invalidity does not affect other provisions or applications of the statute that can be given effect without the invalid provision or application, and to this end the provisions of the statute are severa-ble.” Tex. Gov’t Code § 312.013(a). Here, the assessment and expenditure provisions of the Act could be implemented without the penalty provisions. Thus, even though the penalty provisions seem to represent an unconstitutional delegation of authority to the Foundation, this should not weigh in judging the validity of the Foundation’s core function under the Act, ie., the levying and collecting of assessments and the expenditure of those assessments on eradication programs.

The sixth factor is inconclusive under the circumstances of this case. While the statute pertains to a specific, narrow purpose—eradication of the boll weevil and other cotton pests—it does not limit the program’s cost and duration, other than to provide that the program is subject to the Sunset Act and that it should be discontinued once the boll weevil is eradicated. See Tex. Agrxc. Code § 74.127.

The seventh factor, on its face, weighs against the delegation. While the Act is designed to allow those with firsthand experience in the cotton industry to lead the eradication effort, there is no assurance that those elected will actually have special qualifications or training regarding eradication of boll weevils, and there is absolutely no evidence that board actions were “taken for purposes which are independent of the statute,” Professor Davis’ salient test. Davis § 3.12, at 196 (2d ed.1978). The facts are thus quite distinct from a private delegation, say, for the promulgation of a municipal electrical code by an industry association consisting of electrical contractors, inspectors, and manufacturers. See Lawrence, supra at 689. There is,. of course, some tension between this factor and the second factor. It would ordinarily be difficult for a private delegation both to guarantee adequate representation of those affected by the delegation and to vest decisionmaking authority in a group of experts. There is no evidence in the record of a disinterested and yet eminent pre-existing entity to which the devising and implementing of a boll weevil eradication program could have been delegated. Thus, while the Act fails to meet the seventh factor, this failure is excused by the satisfaction of the second factor.

Finally, the eighth factor weighs against the delegation. The Legislature has provided very few statutory standards to guide the Foundation. While the Act provides the procedures for zone referenda and specifies the powers and duties of the board, it provides no guidance as to how assessments are to be set or the amount of debt that the Foundation may incur. Thus, in practice, the Foundation had free rein to incur over $9 million in debt in the Lower Rio Grande Valley Zone to be repaid by the growers there through several years of assessments, even though those growers voted within 21 months to discontinue their eradication program.

We recognize that the judicial branch should defer to the judgment of the people’s elected representatives whenever possible, and we by no means suggest that a private delegation must satisfy all eight of these factors. We recognize also that courts should, when possible, read delegations narrowly to uphold their validity. Thus, in Edgewood, we accepted the State’s restricted reading of a statute giving the Commissioner of Education rulemaking authority, to hold that, as limited, no authority was conveyed in violation of the nondelegation doctrine. See 917 S.W.2d at 740-41. See also Kent v. Dulles, 357 U.S. 116, 78 S.Ct. 1113, 2 L.Ed.2d 1204 (1958). Here, however, the invalidity of the delegation does not hinge on any one provision of the Act that might be narrowly interpreted; rather, the Act as a whole represents an overly broad delegation of legislative authority to a private entity, violating a majority of the eight factors we have set forth.¹² Therefore, the Act cannot stand.

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The nondelegation doctrine should be used sparingly, when there is, in Justice Cardozo’s memorable phrase, “delegation running riot.” A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495, 553, 55 S.Ct. 837, 853, 79 L.Ed. 1570 (1935) (Cardozo, J., concurring). Because we believe this is an extraordinary case, we affirm the judgments of the trial courts.

PHILLIPS, Chief Justice, delivered an opinion as to Part III, in which GONZALEZ, OWEN and BAKER, Justices, join. GONZALEZ, Justice, filed an opinion concurring in part and dissenting in part, and concurring in the judgment, in which BAKER, Justice, joins and in Parts I, II, and III of which HECHT, Justice, joins.

HECHT, Justice, filed an opinion concurring in part and dissenting in part, and concurring in the judgment.

CORNYN, Justice, filed an opinion concurring in part and dissenting in part, and dissenting from the judgment, in which ENOCH, SPECTOR and ABBOTT, Justices, join.

1 . In 1995, the Legislature extended the Foundation's jurisdiction to include eradication of the "pectinophora gossypiella,” or pink bollworm, another cotton pest. See Act of May 8, 1995, 74th Leg., R.S., ch. 227, § 2, 1995 Tex. Gen. Laws 1976.

2 . This provision was adopted in 1983 in response to Conlen Grain and Mercantile, Inc. v. Texas Grain Sorghum Producers Bd., 519 S.W.2d 620 (1975). In Conten, we reviewed the constitutionality of assessments levied against grain sorghum producers to fund research and marketing programs. The Court held that the assessments, even though refundable, constituted a prohibited occupation tax on an agricultural pursuit.

3 . Eighty-five additional growers subsequently joined the suit as plaintiffs.

4 . "Growers” refers to the High Plains and Lower Rio Grande Valley plaintiffs, unless otherwise indicated.

5 . Under a facial challenge, the challenging party contends that the statute, by its terms, always operates unconstitutionally. See Texas Workers' Compensation Comm'n v. Garcia, 893 S.W.2d 504, 518 (Tex.1995). Under an "as applied” challenge, the challenging party contends that the statute, although generally constitutional, operates unconstitutionally as to him or her because of the challenging party’s particular circumstances. Id. at 518 n. 16.

6 . One amicus curiae, Farm Credit Bank of Texas, argues that the assessments are refundable, and thus qualify under Article XVI, Section 68, because producers may discontinue the eradication program by referendum and recover, on a pro rata basis, any suiplus funds. See Tex. Agric. Code § 74.112(e). Because we conclude that the assessments constitute regulatory fees, we do not address this argument.

7 . A county, city or town may not levy an occupation tax exceeding one-half of the tax levied by the State on that occupation. See Tex Const, art. VIII, § 1(f). Because the State had not taxed billboard owners, the City was prohibited from levying any occupation tax against them.

8 . The Foundation concedes that programs other than eradication "arguably” would have to comply with Article XVI, Section 68.

9 . The Lower Rio Grande Valley growers also argue that the Legislature violated federal substantive due process by delegating overly broad authority to the Foundation. The growers' delegation argument is discussed in Part V of this opinion.

10 . Delegations have sometimes been attacked on substantive due process or due course grounds, rather than under separation of powers, on the theory that the statute or ordinance allows the delegate, whether it be an administrative agency or a segment of the population, to exercise governmental power arbitrarily. See, e.g., City of Eastlake v. Forest City Enter., 426 U.S. 668, 96 S.Ct. 2358, 49 L.Ed.2d 132 (1976); Washington ex rel. Seattle Title Trust Co. v. Roberge, 278 U.S. 116, 49 S.Ct. 50, 73 L.Ed. 210 (1928); Eubank v. City of Richmond, 226 U.S. 137, 33 S.Ct. 76, 57 L.Ed. 156 (1912); Jordan v. State Bd. of Ins., 160 Tex. 506, 334 S.W.2d 278 (1960); Spann v. City of Dallas, 111 Tex. 350, 235 S.W. 513 (1921).

For example, the ordinance at issue in Roberge prohibited operation of a philanthropic home for the elderly unless two-thirds of the property owners within 400 feet of the proposed home consented. Because the neighbors were "free to withhold consent for selfish reasons or arbitrarily and [could] subject the [applicant] to their will or caprice,” the Court concluded that the delegation of power violated due process. 278 U.S. at 122, 49 S.Ct. at 52. Similarly, this Court in Spann invalidated a Dallas city ordinance prohibiting business use of property in a residential district unless the owner obtained consent from three-fourths of the district property owners. The Court concluded that the true purpose of the ordinance "is not to protect the public health, safety or welfare from any threatening injury from a store, but to satisfy a sentiment against the mere presence of a store in a residence part of the City.” 235 S.W. at 516. In Jordan, the Court rejected a due course of law challenge to a statute allowing the State Board of Insurance to prohibit carriers from doing business if their officers were "not worthy of the public confidence.” 334 S.W.2d at 279. The Court concluded that "the idea embodied within the phrase is reasonably clear and hence acceptable as a standard of measurement.” Id. at 280.

More commonly, however, Texas has rooted its delegation jurisprudence only in the principle of separation of powers. See, e.g., Edgewood Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Meno, 917 S.W.2d 717 (Tex.1995); Housing Auth. v. Higginbotham, 135 Tex. 158, 143 S.W.2d 79 (1940); Texas Nat. Guard Armory Bd. v. McCraw, 132 Tex. 613, 126 S.W.2d 627 (1939); Brown v. Humble Oil & Refining Co., 126 Tex. 296, 83 S.W.2d 935 (1935). Because we find that the delegation of authority to the Foundation violates the principle of separation of powers, we do not reach the question of whether it may also violate federal substantive due process.

11 . The dissenting justices’ conclusion that we have based our decision in part on the Commissioner’s approval of an appointed board, 952 S.W.2d at 499 n .4, is thus erroneous.

12 . We thus disagree with the dissent’s conclusion that we have not accorded the Act a presumption of constitutionality.