Tanners' Council of America, Inc. v. Russell E. Train, as Administrator, Environmental Protection Agency

540 F.2d 1188, 6 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. Law Inst.) 20379, 8 ERC (BNA) 1881, 1976 U.S. App. LEXIS 12454
CourtCourt of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit
DecidedMarch 10, 1976
Docket74-1740, 74-1753
StatusPublished
Cited by43 cases

This text of 540 F.2d 1188 (Tanners' Council of America, Inc. v. Russell E. Train, as Administrator, Environmental Protection Agency) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Tanners' Council of America, Inc. v. Russell E. Train, as Administrator, Environmental Protection Agency, 540 F.2d 1188, 6 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. Law Inst.) 20379, 8 ERC (BNA) 1881, 1976 U.S. App. LEXIS 12454 (4th Cir. 1976).

Opinion

RIVES, Circuit Judge:

These actions are brought by Tanners’ Council of America, Inc., a trade association for the leather tanning and finishing industry, to set aside regulations establishing “effluent limitations guidelines” and “standards of performance” for the “Leather Tanning and Finishing Industry Point Source Category.” These regulations were issued by the Administrator of the Environmental Protection Agency (hereinafter “the Administrator”) on April 9, 1974 (39 Fed. Reg. 12958, et seq., 40 C.F.R. Part 425), under the authority of sections 301, 304, 306, 307, 316 and 402 of the Federal Water Pollution Control Act, as amended (hereinafter “the Act”). 1 Under § 509(b)(1), review of these regulations lies in the United States Court of Appeals, du Pont v. Train, 528 F.2d 1136 (4th Cir. 1976) [filed 1975].

The “standards of performance” established by these regulations set pollution limits which must be achieved by “new sources,” defined in the statute as a source of pollution discharge, “the construction of which is commenced after the publication of proposed regulations prescribing a standard of performance under this section which will be applicable to such source.” § 306(a)(2). “Effluent limitations guidelines” 2 prescribe the amount of pollution discharge permitted by existing plants and are divided into two phases — a 1977 stage and a 1983 stage. In promulgating the regulations, the EPA divided the leather tanning and finishing industry into six major subcategories, derived principally from similarities in processes and waste loads. 3 For each subcategory, the 1977 and new source regulations set a single-number effluent limitation for five pollution parameters — 5-day biological oxygen demand (BOD5), 4 total suspended solids (TSS), 5 chrome, oil and grease, and pH. 6 For exist *1191 ing sources, 1983 stage, specific limitations were set for these same five pollution parameters and additionally for sulfide, total kjeldahl nitrogen (TKN), 7 and fecal coliform. 8

Petitioner first challenges these regulations on the ground that they are not in accord with the Act. This contention is founded on petitioner’s view that §§ 301 and 304 of the Act do not authorize the Administrator to set effluent limitations (as opposed to guidelines that are merely informational to the permit writers). This Court rejected this interpretation in du Pont v. Train, 541 F.2d 1018 (4th Cir. 1976), and a re-examination of this question is unnecessary here. Petitioner’s second line of attack is that these regulations are arbitrary and capricious due to alleged technical errors made by the Administrator in the rule-making process.

STANDARDS OF REVIEW

The applicable standard of review has been stated by this Court in du Pont v. Train, supra, at 1026. Briefly stated, the authority of this Court to set aside agency action is limited by the strictures of The Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A). To be judicially annulled, agency action must be “arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law.” While this Court cannot substitute its judgment for that of the agency, the agency must fully explicate its course of inquiry, its analysis, and its reasoning. Furthermore, grounds relied upon by the Agency must be clearly disclosed in and sustained by the record. See cases cited in du Pont v. Train, supra, at 1026. On these terms, we now review the specific regulations that are challenged.

1977 LIMITATIONS

The statutory specification for effluent limitations for existing sources 1977 stage is the application of “the best practical control technology currently available (BPCTCA).” § 301(b)(1)(A). In establishing BPCTCA standards, § 304(b)(1)(B) of the Act requires the Administrator to consider the following: (1) the total cost of application of technology in relation to the effluent reduction benefits to be achieved from such application; (2) the age of equipment and facilities involved; (3) the processes employed; (4) the engineering aspects of application .of various types of control techniques; (5) process changes; (6) non-water quality environmental impact (including energy requirements). Furthermore, BPCTCA effluent standards are to rely primarily on end-of-manufacturing treatment facilities but may include control technologies within the process if these measures are considered normal practice within the industry. 9

Normally, EPA should establish BPCTCA standards on the basis of the average performance of the best existing plants in the subeategory. The Agency may, however, look to the results achieved by plants in other industries if it finds that the level of achievement in a subcategory is *1192 uniformly inadequate. This transfer of technology is permissible only “if he [the Administrator] determines the technology to achieve those higher levels can be practicably applied.” S.Rep.No.92-414, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. (1971), A Legislative History of the Water Pollution Control Act Amendments of 1972, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. 1468 (Jan. 1973) [hereinafter cited as Leg. Hist.]. See also Senate Consideration of the Report of the Conference Committee, October 4, 1972, Leg.Hist. 169-170. The Eighth Circuit in CPC International, Inc. v. Train, 515 F.2d 1032, 1048 (8th Cir. 1975), has held that before EPA can make a determination that a technology can be practicably applied, the Agency must: (1) show that the transfer technology is available outside the industry; (2) determine that the technology is transferable to the industry; (3) make a reasonable prediction that the technology if used in the industry will be capable of removing the increment required by the effluent standards. 10

In establishing the 1977 limitations, EPA concluded that there were no exemplary plants in the tannery industry, not because the industry had failed to employ primary and secondary treatment facilities, but because the Administrator was dissatisfied with the degree of removal obtained. See Dev.Doc. 129. Due to this finding, BPCTCA standards were not set on the basis of the average result of the best tanneries but on the transfer of technology 11 and performance data from the meat-packing industry.

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540 F.2d 1188, 6 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. Law Inst.) 20379, 8 ERC (BNA) 1881, 1976 U.S. App. LEXIS 12454, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/tanners-council-of-america-inc-v-russell-e-train-as-administrator-ca4-1976.