American Meat Institute v. United States Department of Agriculture

496 F. Supp. 64, 1980 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 13360
CourtDistrict Court, E.D. Virginia
DecidedJuly 3, 1980
DocketCiv. A. 79-986-N
StatusPublished
Cited by2 cases

This text of 496 F. Supp. 64 (American Meat Institute v. United States Department of Agriculture) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, E.D. Virginia primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
American Meat Institute v. United States Department of Agriculture, 496 F. Supp. 64, 1980 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 13360 (E.D. Va. 1980).

Opinion

*66 MEMORANDUM OPINION

KELLAM, District Judge.

‘The time has come,’ the Walrus said, ‘To talk of many things:
Of shoes-and ships-and sealing wax-Of cabbages-and kings-
And why the sea is boiling hot-And whether pigs have wings.’

Lewis Carroll, Through the Looking Glass, Chapter IV

This matter comes before the Court on the cross motions for summary judgment filed by plaintiffs and defendant Department of Agriculture. 1 The plaintiffs in this case challenge the lawfulness of a final regulation of the USDA, alleging that its adoption was contrary to USDA’s authority and was arbitrary, capricious and an abuse of discretion. The plaintiffs ask the Court to declare the regulation unlawful and to permanently enjoin the USDA from issuing any approval for any poultry product label bearing the term “Turkey Ham.”

I.

The authority of this Court to set aside agency action is limited by the strictures of the Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. §§ 701-706. To be annulled by this Court, the USDA regulation at issue must be “arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law” or be “in excess of statutory jurisdiction, authority, or limitations, or short of statutory right.” Id. at § 706(2)(A), (C). While this Court cannot substitute its judgment for that of the agency, the agency must fully explicate its course of inquiry, its analysis, and its reasoning. Tanners Council of America, Inc. v. Train, 540 F.2d 1188, 1191 (4th Cir.1976). Furthermore, grounds relied upon by the agency must be clearly disclosed in and sustained by the record. Id.

The Court is and ought to be reluctant to review and interfere with the Secretary’s administration of the Act in question, but Congress has placed that burden on the courts. The courts must accept that duty and responsibility. The existence of a well explained administrative practice does not relieve the court of its “responsibility to determine whether that practice is consistent with the agency’s statutory authority.” Securities and Exchange Commission v. Sloan, 436 U.S. 103, 98 S.Ct. 1702, 1712, 56 L.Ed.2d 148 (1978). A part of the responsibility of the Court is to determine whether the construction has a reasonable basis in law. Sloan case, supra.

Substantial deference is to be accorded the determinations made by the agency charged with the administration of Acts of Congress. Querne v. Mandley, 436 U.S. 725, 98 S.Ct. 2068, 56 L.Ed.2d 658 (1978). But, in order for an agency interpretation of a statute being administered by it to be granted deference, it must be consistent with the constitutional purpose. Morton v. Ruiz, 415 U.S. 199, 94 S.Ct. 1055, 39 L.Ed.2d 270 (1974). Courts need not defer to the administrative construction or interpretation of a statute where there are compelling indications that such construction is wrong. Espinoza v. Farah Manufacturing Co., Inc., 414 U.S. 86, 94 S.Ct. 334, 38 L.Ed.2d 287. Courts are not bound to give effect to administrative regulations interpreting a statute, although varying degrees of deference are accorded to administrative interpretations, such as consistency of the agency’s position. Batterton v. Francis, 432 U.S. 416, 97 S.Ct. 2399, 53 L.Ed.2d 448 (1977). An administrative construction of the legislation governing the agency’s operation and authority “is only one input in the interpretational equation.” Sloan case, supra. On these terms, we now review the specific regulation which plaintiffs challenge.

II.

Since 1975, the Department of Agriculture has permitted certain cured poultry products, fabricated from turkey thigh meat, to be labeled as “Turkey Ham” with *67 out further qualification. These products are processed with the addition of curing ingredients, such as sodium nitrate, which may impute to them an appearance and taste resembling that of cured ham. The turkey products are shaped and packaged in a number of different ways, including those of customary ham rolls and ovals and of standard sandwich slices. 2 The USD A decision to permit the “Turkey Ham” labeling was apparently based on the opinion that the word “ham,” when prefixed by the species name of an animal, refers to the hind limb of that animal. The Poultry Products Inspection Act 3 does not define the word “ham.” Rather, the Department’s view of the meaning of that word has been based upon the following departmental regulation:

The word “ham,” without any prefix indicating the species of animal from which derived, shall be used in labeling only in connection with the hind legs of swine. 4

9 CFR 317.8(b)(13).

The American Meat Institute and the National Port Producers Council petitioned the Department of Agriculture to restrict the use of the word “ham” to the labeling of products prepared from the hind legs of swine. 5 The Department thereupon proposed that standards be adopted for products made from cured turkey thigh meat and that those products be labeled as “Turkey Ham,” with the contiguous qualifying statement “Cured Turkey Thigh Meat.” Following the submittal of various comments concerning the proposed labeling, the Secretary issued a Final Rule amending the poultry products regulations in accordance with the proposal. 9 CFR § 381.171 (1980), 44 Fed.Reg. 51190 (Aug. 31, 1979).

III.

In the Congressional statement of findings of the Poultry Products Inspection Act, 6 the Congress recognized that unwholesome, adulterated or misbranded poultry products are injurious to consumers, producers and processors of poultry products, and the public welfare. 21 U.S.C. § 451. The Congress therefore provided for the inspection and regulation of poultry products by the Department of Agriculture. For purposes of the Act, the term “misbranded” applies, among other circumstances:

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496 F. Supp. 64, 1980 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 13360, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/american-meat-institute-v-united-states-department-of-agriculture-vaed-1980.