HOLOHAN, Chief Justice.
This special action arises out of the award of a contract by the City of Phoenix to Robert Rein (Rein) and Rein, Schultz & Dahl of Illinois, Inc. (Dahl), a joint venture, for the construction of a highway. The superior court upheld the contract award following a challenge by Tanner Companies (Tanner). A special action by Tanner was filed in this court. We accepted jurisdiction, vacated the judgment of the superior court, and issued an order directing that the contract be awarded to the petitioner, Tanner, with a written opinion to follow.
The essential facts are that pursuant to a Notice to Contractors by the City of Phoenix inviting bids for construction of a certain roadway within the city, Rein and Dahl submitted the low bid of $733,961. Tanner submitted the next lowest bid, $753,881, which was less than five percent higher than Rein and Dahl’s. Each bidder claimed the five percent resident contractor taxpayer preference pursuant to A.R.S. § 34-241(A).1 Tanner then filed a bid protest with the City alleging, inter alia, that Rein and Dahl had not paid taxes during the preceding two years sufficient to qualify for the five percent statutory preference. On April 4, 1984, Tanner’s protest was considered in an administrative hearing before an assistant city attorney acting as hearing officer. By memorandum decision, the hearing officer recommended that the city council award the contract for the project to Rein and Dahl, the low bidder, [143]*143based on a finding that both the Rein and Dahl joint venture and Tanner met the requirements of A.R.S. § 34-241(A). Since each was entitled to the statutory preference, the contract should be awarded to the lower bid. On April 18, the Phoenix City Council awarded the contract to Rein and Dahl. On April 19, Tanner filed a special action in the Superior Court of Maricopa County. An interlocutory stay was obtained, and an accelerated hearing was held on April 26. The following day, judgment was entered granting the City of Phoenix’s motions for dismissal and summary judgment. We accepted jurisdiction of this special action for the purpose of clarifying the superior court’s erroneous construction of A.R.S. § 34-241(A).
A contractor must meet three requirements to be entitled to a contract award under the resident taxpayer preference: (1) satisfactory performance of prior public contracts; (2) payment of state and county taxes for not less than two successive years immediately prior to submitting a bid “on a plant and equipment such as is ordinarily required for performance of the contract ... or on other real or personal property in the state equivalent in value to such plant;” and (3) submission of a bid within five percent of the lowest bid on a project by contractors not entitled to the preference. A.R.S. § 34-241(A).
Before examining the superior court’s findings on the statutory requirements, we address Tanner’s claim that the formation of a joint venture solely for the purpose of satisfying the statutory terms constitutes a “sham or ruse,” and should accordingly disqualify Rein and Dahl from the resident contractor preference. Both the city hearing officer and the trial court found that Rein and Dahl had entered into a verbal agreement to form a joint venture prior to submitting its bid. The bid application clearly indicated that submission was on behalf of the joint venture. A written joint venture agreement was formalized following the city hearing on Tanner’s protest. The agreement provided for joint responsibility in bid preparation and submission, joint and several liability on all bonds required by the city, and sharing of costs and expenses, project management, and profits and losses.
To constitute a valid joint venture under Arizona law, there must exist: (1) a contract; (2) a common purpose; (3) a community of interest; (4) an equal right to control; and (5) participation in the profits and losses. Ellingson v. Sloan, 22 Ariz. App. 383, 527 P.2d 1100 (1975). Based upon this standard, we can find no abuse of discretion in the trial court’s ruling that the verbal joint venture agreement, formalized in writing following the city hearing, constituted a valid joint venture under Arizona law. Nor does the fact that Rein and Dahl entered into the agreement merely to qualify for the resident contractor preference invalidate the contractual arrangement as a “sham or ruse.”
Joint venturers share full liability in agency and in tort. Sparks v. Republic National Life Insurance Co., 132 Ariz. 529, 647 P.2d 1127 (1982). A joint venture, which shares the benefits and liabilities of the separate acts of each individual joint venturer, should also be allowed to benefit from the qualifications of each participant. The use of the joint venture form was rare enough at the time of the original enactment of the statute in 1933 that it is unlikely the legislature considered it in drafting the statute. The intent of the legislature in enacting the statute was to give an advantage to resident over nonresident contractors because they had made a contribution through tax payments “to the funds from which they are to reap a benefit.” Schrey v. Allison Steel Mfg. Co., supra, 75 Ariz. at 287, 255 P.2d at 607. A second rationale was to provide continuous work for Arizona residents and businesses. Mardian Construction Co. v. Superior Court, 113 Ariz. 489, 492, 557 P.2d 526, 529 (1976). We see no reason why a bona fide joint venture which, through its participants, fulfills the statutory requirements regarding performance of prior public contracts and payment of specified in-state taxes should not be treated the same as [144]*144other bidders. Thus the joint venture formed for this project, once having been found to be a valid entity, was entitled to the same consideration that a single contractor would get for the purposes of A.R.S. § 34-241(A). It was not a sham merely because it was created with the explicit purpose of qualifying for the preference.
Having established that a qualified joint venture is eligible for the resident contractor preference, we proceed to examine the superior court’s application of the statutory requirements to Rein and Dahl. In its petition before this court, Tanner did not contest Dahl’s completion of prior public contracts within the meaning of the statute. We therefore accept the superior court’s finding that this requirement has been satisfied. We also accept the determination that Rein and Dahl’s bid was the lowest bid absent the five percent preference. At issue then is only whether the superior court correctly applied the prior in-state tax payment requirement to qualify respondents as entitled to the preference. Rein and Dahl as a joint venture claim compliance with the two year in-state tax payment requirement by reason of the following tax payments:
1.
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HOLOHAN, Chief Justice.
This special action arises out of the award of a contract by the City of Phoenix to Robert Rein (Rein) and Rein, Schultz & Dahl of Illinois, Inc. (Dahl), a joint venture, for the construction of a highway. The superior court upheld the contract award following a challenge by Tanner Companies (Tanner). A special action by Tanner was filed in this court. We accepted jurisdiction, vacated the judgment of the superior court, and issued an order directing that the contract be awarded to the petitioner, Tanner, with a written opinion to follow.
The essential facts are that pursuant to a Notice to Contractors by the City of Phoenix inviting bids for construction of a certain roadway within the city, Rein and Dahl submitted the low bid of $733,961. Tanner submitted the next lowest bid, $753,881, which was less than five percent higher than Rein and Dahl’s. Each bidder claimed the five percent resident contractor taxpayer preference pursuant to A.R.S. § 34-241(A).1 Tanner then filed a bid protest with the City alleging, inter alia, that Rein and Dahl had not paid taxes during the preceding two years sufficient to qualify for the five percent statutory preference. On April 4, 1984, Tanner’s protest was considered in an administrative hearing before an assistant city attorney acting as hearing officer. By memorandum decision, the hearing officer recommended that the city council award the contract for the project to Rein and Dahl, the low bidder, [143]*143based on a finding that both the Rein and Dahl joint venture and Tanner met the requirements of A.R.S. § 34-241(A). Since each was entitled to the statutory preference, the contract should be awarded to the lower bid. On April 18, the Phoenix City Council awarded the contract to Rein and Dahl. On April 19, Tanner filed a special action in the Superior Court of Maricopa County. An interlocutory stay was obtained, and an accelerated hearing was held on April 26. The following day, judgment was entered granting the City of Phoenix’s motions for dismissal and summary judgment. We accepted jurisdiction of this special action for the purpose of clarifying the superior court’s erroneous construction of A.R.S. § 34-241(A).
A contractor must meet three requirements to be entitled to a contract award under the resident taxpayer preference: (1) satisfactory performance of prior public contracts; (2) payment of state and county taxes for not less than two successive years immediately prior to submitting a bid “on a plant and equipment such as is ordinarily required for performance of the contract ... or on other real or personal property in the state equivalent in value to such plant;” and (3) submission of a bid within five percent of the lowest bid on a project by contractors not entitled to the preference. A.R.S. § 34-241(A).
Before examining the superior court’s findings on the statutory requirements, we address Tanner’s claim that the formation of a joint venture solely for the purpose of satisfying the statutory terms constitutes a “sham or ruse,” and should accordingly disqualify Rein and Dahl from the resident contractor preference. Both the city hearing officer and the trial court found that Rein and Dahl had entered into a verbal agreement to form a joint venture prior to submitting its bid. The bid application clearly indicated that submission was on behalf of the joint venture. A written joint venture agreement was formalized following the city hearing on Tanner’s protest. The agreement provided for joint responsibility in bid preparation and submission, joint and several liability on all bonds required by the city, and sharing of costs and expenses, project management, and profits and losses.
To constitute a valid joint venture under Arizona law, there must exist: (1) a contract; (2) a common purpose; (3) a community of interest; (4) an equal right to control; and (5) participation in the profits and losses. Ellingson v. Sloan, 22 Ariz. App. 383, 527 P.2d 1100 (1975). Based upon this standard, we can find no abuse of discretion in the trial court’s ruling that the verbal joint venture agreement, formalized in writing following the city hearing, constituted a valid joint venture under Arizona law. Nor does the fact that Rein and Dahl entered into the agreement merely to qualify for the resident contractor preference invalidate the contractual arrangement as a “sham or ruse.”
Joint venturers share full liability in agency and in tort. Sparks v. Republic National Life Insurance Co., 132 Ariz. 529, 647 P.2d 1127 (1982). A joint venture, which shares the benefits and liabilities of the separate acts of each individual joint venturer, should also be allowed to benefit from the qualifications of each participant. The use of the joint venture form was rare enough at the time of the original enactment of the statute in 1933 that it is unlikely the legislature considered it in drafting the statute. The intent of the legislature in enacting the statute was to give an advantage to resident over nonresident contractors because they had made a contribution through tax payments “to the funds from which they are to reap a benefit.” Schrey v. Allison Steel Mfg. Co., supra, 75 Ariz. at 287, 255 P.2d at 607. A second rationale was to provide continuous work for Arizona residents and businesses. Mardian Construction Co. v. Superior Court, 113 Ariz. 489, 492, 557 P.2d 526, 529 (1976). We see no reason why a bona fide joint venture which, through its participants, fulfills the statutory requirements regarding performance of prior public contracts and payment of specified in-state taxes should not be treated the same as [144]*144other bidders. Thus the joint venture formed for this project, once having been found to be a valid entity, was entitled to the same consideration that a single contractor would get for the purposes of A.R.S. § 34-241(A). It was not a sham merely because it was created with the explicit purpose of qualifying for the preference.
Having established that a qualified joint venture is eligible for the resident contractor preference, we proceed to examine the superior court’s application of the statutory requirements to Rein and Dahl. In its petition before this court, Tanner did not contest Dahl’s completion of prior public contracts within the meaning of the statute. We therefore accept the superior court’s finding that this requirement has been satisfied. We also accept the determination that Rein and Dahl’s bid was the lowest bid absent the five percent preference. At issue then is only whether the superior court correctly applied the prior in-state tax payment requirement to qualify respondents as entitled to the preference. Rein and Dahl as a joint venture claim compliance with the two year in-state tax payment requirement by reason of the following tax payments:
1. Vehicular taxes prorated for part year ownership in 1983 in the amount of $990, and full year 1984 taxes in the amount of $1,853.
2. Personal property taxes as part of rental payments on equipment for 1983 and 1984.
3. Real estate taxes on a personal winter residence owned by Rein, cash valued in 1983 at $131,576, with 1982 taxes paid of $598 and 1983 taxes of $117.
In determining statutory qualification on the basis of these tax payments, the superi- or court found that the prorated vehicular taxes did not satisfy the two year requirement. The court found, however, that the real estate taxes paid by Rein satisfied the statute.2 While we agree with the superior court that the 1983 prorated vehicular taxes (in concert with the 1984 payment) do not satisfy the statutory requirement, we disagree that the real property taxes meet the clear statutory language requiring real or personal property tax payments “equivalent in value” to plant and equipment “such as is ordinarly required for performance of the contract____” A.R.S. § 34-241(A).
The trial court determined that the city hearing officer erred in finding that Dahl’s payment of a prorata share of its 1983 vehicle tax in addition to its full 1984 vehicle tax fulfilled the requirement of A.R.S. § 34-241(A) that the bidder pay “state and county taxes within the state for not less than two successive years immediately pri- or to submitting a bid.” The trial court relied upon Speer Construction Co. v. Arizona Dept. of Transportation, 124 Ariz. 208, 603 P.2d 100 (App.1979). While we agree with the result of the trial court, we decline to adopt the reasoning of Speer, supra as it is unnecessary to the disposition of the instant case. Speer stands for the proposition that the language “paid state and county taxes within the state for not less than two successive years prior to submitting a bid” (emphasis supplied) does not require a bidder claiming the statutory preference to have paid taxes for a time period of 24 months or 730 days. According to Speer, the two-year requirement is satisfied “if an amount equal to two years’ taxes has been paid within the time.allowed by the appropriate taxing statute ... notwithstanding the fact that the elapsed time from the first payment is less than two years.” Id. at 211, 603 P.2d at 103. Be[145]*145cause the tax payment at issue does not constitute an “amount equal to two years’ taxes,” we find no reason to proceed further. We hold that a prorata tax payment, in effect a tax payment for only part of a year, may be counted for the purpose of § 34-241(A) only for the fraction of the year on which the tax was paid. Thus, the vehicular taxes are not applicable.
The only other taxes which might qualify the joint venture for the preference are those paid by Rein in the past two years on his personal winter residence in Scottsdale. The preference statute requires taxes to be paid “on a plant and equipment such as is ordinarily required for performance of the contract for which the bid is submitted, or on other real or personal property in the state equivalent in value to such plant____” A.R.S. § 34-241(A) (emphasis added). Rein and Dahl claim the statutory preference by reason of real estate taxes on Rein’s personal winter residence, with a 1983 cash value of $131,576, on which taxes of $598 and $117 were paid in 1982 and 1983, respectively. On the basis of deposition testimony by Mr. Martin Eastin, president of Dahl, the value of plant and equipment necessary to complete the project can be conservatively estimated at $350,000. Standing alone, the real estate taxes paid on a condominium unit, arguably used for business purposes and valued significantly less than the plant and equipment necessary to complete the bid, cannot satisfy the statutory terms. In Mardian, supra this court found that the intent of the resident contractor preference statute was to insure that preference be given to bona-fide resident contractors. Implicit in the opinion was a determination that neither an administrative hearing officer nor a reviewing court would inquire into the sufficiency of the taxes paid so as not to discriminate against smaller contractors bidding on public contracts. We have difficulty with the rather narrow reading given to the statutory language in Mardian. Failure to examine the sufficiency of the taxes paid on real and personal property to determine whether it is at least equivalent in value to plant and equipment necessary to complete the bid could result in frustration of the purposes and intent of the statute. It was never the legislative intent that any contractor, wherever situated, could ally itself with a resident taxpayer who has paid taxes on a home for two years and thus qualify for a preference on public construction contracts. We find such a result untenable. We hold, therefore, that in order to satisfy the terms of A.R.S. § 34-241(A) concerning taxes paid on “real or personal property equivalent in value to such plant,” a bidding contractor, at the time of bid, must have paid taxes for two years on such real or personal property in an amount equal to a reasonable valuation of the plant and equipment necessary to complete the bid.
Each party will bear its own attorney’s fees.
HAYS and CAMERON, JJ., concur.