Suzuki Motor Co. v. Superior Court

200 Cal. App. 3d 1476, 246 Cal. Rptr. 376, 1988 Cal. App. LEXIS 433
CourtCalifornia Court of Appeal
DecidedMay 6, 1988
DocketE004900
StatusPublished
Cited by27 cases

This text of 200 Cal. App. 3d 1476 (Suzuki Motor Co. v. Superior Court) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering California Court of Appeal primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Suzuki Motor Co. v. Superior Court, 200 Cal. App. 3d 1476, 246 Cal. Rptr. 376, 1988 Cal. App. LEXIS 433 (Cal. Ct. App. 1988).

Opinion

Opinion

McDANIEL, J.

Introduction

Suzuki Motor Co., Ltd. (Suzuki), defendant below, by the petition here seeks a writ of mandate to compel the superior court to vacate its order *1478 denying Suzuki’s motion to quash service of process and to enter an order granting that motion.

Facts

Suzuki is a Japanese corporation which is named as a defendant in an action now pending in the superior court entitled Peggy Armenia v. Bellflower Suzuki, et al., case No. BCV 003277.

Peggy Armenia, the plaintiff in that action and the real party in interest in this proceeding, allegedly sustained personal injuries while operating a 1984 Suzuki four-wheel, all-terrain vehicle. Ms. Armenia filed a complaint for products liability and negligence against a number of defendants, including Suzuki.

Plaintiff purported to effect service of process upon Suzuki by sending the summons, together with copies of the complaint, certificate of assignment and amendment to the complaint, via registered mail to Suzuki’s ofiice in Hamamatsu, Japan. These documents, which actually were received by Suzuki, were not translated into Japanese.

Suzuki moved to quash service of process, asserting that service was improper under the provisions of the California Code of Civil Procedure as well as the provisions of the Hague Convention. In support of its motion to quash, Suzuki filed the declaration of Hidetoshi Asakura, a partner with the law firm of Graham & James, licensed to practice law in Japan and California.

In his declaration, Mr. Asakura expounded on the acceptable methods of service of process in Japan and concluded that plaintiff here had failed to conform to these methods, and thereby had also failed to conform to the requirements of the Hague Convention for service of process in the Convention’s signatory states. Plaintiff did not contest the information contained in Mr. Asakura’s declaration, but relied instead on the First District’s decision in Shoei Kako, Co. v. Superior Court (1973) 33 Cal.App.3d 808 [109 Cal.Rptr. 402].

The superior court refused to grant the motion to quash service, and rightly so, in light of the holding in Auto Equity Sales, Inc. v. Superior Court (1962) 57 Cal.2d 450, 455 [20 Cal.Rptr. 321, 369 P.2d 937] (which holds that a lower court which refuses to follow a binding precedent of a higher court is acting in excess of jurisdiction), and because there has been no holding contrary to that of Shoei Kako in this or any other appellate district.

*1479 We, however, are not bound by the holding in Shoei Kako, particularly because it was based in part on a unique factual record before that court, a record which differs substantially from that now before us. Therefore, as explained below, we hold that the service of process described above was not effective, and we shall grant the petition for writ of mandate.

Discussion

In 1969, the United States signed the Convention on the Service Abroad of Judicial and Extrajudicial Documents in Civil or Commercial Matters (20 U.S.T. 361-367, T.I.A.S. 6638) (the Hague Convention or the Convention). (See appen. A.) Japan became a signatory to the Convention in 1970.

The Convention provides several acceptable methods for service of process abroad. These methods are: (1) service through the receiving country’s designated “Central Authority” for service of foreign process (art. 5); (2) delivery by the Central Authority to an addressee who accepts service “voluntarily” so long as the method used is not incompatible with the law of the receiving state (art. 5); (3) service through diplomatic or consular agents of the sending state (art. 8); (4) service through the judicial officers, officials or other competent persons of the receiving state (art. 10, subdivisions (b) and (c)); and (5) service as permitted by the internal law of the receiving state for documents coming from abroad (art. 19).

Real party in interest urges that there is yet another method of service of process which meets the requirements of the Convention, to wit, service by registered mail as allowed by California Code of Civil Procedure sections 413.10 1 and 4 1 5.30 2 and article 10, subdivision (a) of the Convention, which provides that “Provided the State of destination does not object, the present Convention shall not interfere with—(a) the freedom to send judicial docu *1480 merits, by postal channels, directly to persons abroad, . . .” According to real party in interest and the court in Shoei Kako, this section of the Convention allows service of process by mail.

The Shoei Kako court analyzed the issue of the interpretation of the section, concluding that the Convention permitted signatories to exclude the methods of service outlined in articles 8 and 10 by filing objections to them. Japan objected to article 10, subdivisions (b) and (c), which provide for service via the judicial officers, officials, or other competent persons of the receiving state. Japan, however, did not object to article 10, subdivision (a). Downplaying the fact that article 10, subdivision (a) specifically refers to the sending of judicial documents rather than the service of such documents, the Shoei Kako court interpreted article 10, subdivision (a), like article 10, subdivisions (b) and (c), as also referring to the service of process by mail. According to that court, “The reference to ‘the freedom to send judicial documents by postal channels, directly to persons abroad’ would be superfluous unless it was related to the sending of such documents for the purpose of service. The mails are open to all.” (Id., 33 Cal.App.3d at p. 821.) Therefore, it concluded that Japan’s failure to object specifically to subdivision (a) meant such service was acceptable.

The Shoei Kako court also relied on article 15 of the Convention to hold that service by registered mail was proper. Article 15 provides, in relevant part, “Where a writ of summons or an equivalent document had to be transmitted abroad for the purpose of service, under the provisions of the present Convention, and the defendant has not appeared, judgment shall not be given until it is established that—(a) the document was served by a method prescribed by the internal law of the State addressed for the service of documents in domestic actions upon persons who are within its territory, or [1|] (b) the document was actually delivered to the defendant or to his residence by another method provided for by this Convention, and that in either of these cases the service or the delivery was effected in sufficient time to enable the defendant to defend. . . .” (Italics added.) According to the Shoei Kako

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Bluebook (online)
200 Cal. App. 3d 1476, 246 Cal. Rptr. 376, 1988 Cal. App. LEXIS 433, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/suzuki-motor-co-v-superior-court-calctapp-1988.