Sun Ray Gas Corp. v. Bellows-Claude Neon Co.

49 F.2d 886, 9 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 433, 1931 U.S. App. LEXIS 3280
CourtCourt of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit
DecidedMay 12, 1931
Docket5644
StatusPublished
Cited by31 cases

This text of 49 F.2d 886 (Sun Ray Gas Corp. v. Bellows-Claude Neon Co.) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Sun Ray Gas Corp. v. Bellows-Claude Neon Co., 49 F.2d 886, 9 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 433, 1931 U.S. App. LEXIS 3280 (6th Cir. 1931).

Opinions

HICKENLOOPER, Circuit Judge.

Appellants urge the invalidity of claim 1 of patent No. 1,125,476, for a “system of illuminating by luminescent [neon] tubes” (issued January 19, 1915, upon application of Georges Claude), upon the ground of insufficient disclosure in the specification upon the allegedly essential and all-important subject of pressure; and because the claim, printed in the margin,1 has used what is said to be a meaningless ratio as descriptive of the size of the electrodes. It is also claimed that the appellants’ tubes do not infringe, in that electrodes of the cap type are used, and these are said not to be “internal electrodes” nor to have been specifically “deprived of occluded gases,” and because the neon is said not to be “previously purified.” We shall consider first the contention of noninfringement.

It is true that Claude disclosed in his specification a method of purifying the neon gas “on the spot,” or when and as the tube was exhausted and then partially filled (to less than atomspherie pressure) with said gas, and that defendants do not use that method for securing a practically pure neon content for their tubes. But this method of purification was not, we think, of the essence of Claude’s invention. He was vitally interested in securing a pure neon content, and to this end it was probably necessary that he describe a method by which this could be accomplished. ■ He has described such a method. At that time neon gas was just coming into commercial production, as a by-product of the liquification of air, and the various pumping apparatus for producing vacuum were much less efficient than they are today. A [887]*887practically complete vacuum can now1 be produced, and a substantially pure commercial neon can then be admitted to the tube, thus dispensing with the necessity of Claude’s scavenging process. We feel constrained to construe the words “containing previously purified neon” as descriptive only of the state or degree of purity of the neon gas after introduction into the tube and when such tube is ready for operation. In other words, the claim calls for the tube after complete construction and as ready for operation, and one descriptive element is a content of a substantially pure neon.

Viewed in the above light, the phrase “said electrodes being deprived of occluded gases” also operates to the same general end, although it is directed not so much to the initial purity of the neon as to the provision for a continuance of that purity and an avoidance of contamination through the subsequent release of occluded gases. Neither of the clauses above discussed may be regarded as requiring more than that, when completed, the tube shall contain, and shall continue to contain during operation, a substantially and operatively pure neon. It is therefore immaterial that the defendant does not use the methods disclosed by Claude for purifying its neon or for removing the occluded gases from the tube and electrodes.

We are also of the opinion that the dofendants’ electrodes are within the call of the claim for “internal electrodes.” It may well lie that the cap electrodes are an improvement upon the cylindrical type, open at opposing ends, and that the fact that there were, or might be, more useful designs and shapes for the electrodes than the cylindrical and plate types then in common use, may not have occurred to the mind of Claude, but we think that he intended to distinguish only between those electrodes (of carbon, graphite, or metal) which came into immediate contact with the gas, and which were directly connected with conductors for the electric current, and electrodes which were external to the tube, did not contact with the gas, and operated by induction. It is obvious that the defendant’s cap electrodes fall within the former and not the latter of the two types.

A somewhat more difficult question is presented by the contention that the disclosure upon the subjects of pressure and volume of the neon is wholly insufficient to enable one, even though as of that time to be considered skilled in the art, to practice the invention; and that, except as regards certain pressures, the ratio of at least 1.5 square decimeters of electrode surface per ampere is wholly meaningless. Both contentions are based upon the provisions of Rev. St. § 4888 (35 U. S. C. § 33 [35 TJSCA § 33]), that the specification shall contain “a written description of the (invention) * * * in such full, clear, eoneise, and exact terms as to enable any person skilled in the art or science to which it appertains, or with which it is most nearly connected, to make, construct, compound, and use the same; * * * and he [the applicant or patentee] shall particularly point out and distinctly claim the part, improvement, or combination which he claims as his invention or discovery.” Definiteness is expressly required both in the description and the claims. But by the terms of the act also the specification is addressed to those “skilled in the art,” and a specification should be held sufficient if a mechanic skilled in such art, with the specification and drawings before him, 'and without the necessity of further experiment itself of an inventive nature, can construct and practice the invention of the patent. O’Reilly v. Morse, 15 How. 62, 118, 119, 14 L. Ed. 601; Tyler v. Boston, 7 Wall. 327, 330, 19 L. Ed. 93; Loom Co. v. Higgins, 105 U. S. 580, 585, 26 L. Ed. 1177; The Incandescent Lamp Patent, 159 U. S. 465, 474, 475, 16 S. Ct. 75, 40 L. Ed. 221; Minerals Separation, Ltd., v. Hyde, 242 U. S. 261, 271, 37 S. Ct. 82, 61 L. Ed. 286; Beidler v. U. S., 253 U.. S. 447, 453, 40 S. Ct. 564, 64 L. Ed. 1006; Eibel Co. v. Paper Co., 261 U. S. 45, 66, 43 S. Ct. 322, 67 L. Ed. 523; American Lava Co. v. Steward, 155 F. 731, 736 (C. C. A. 6), affirmed 215 U. S. 161, 30 S. Ct. 46, 54 L. Ed. 139; and Featheredge Rubber Co. v. Miller Rubber Co., 259 F. 565, 570 (C. C. A. 6), are a few of the many authorities establishing the rule of decision in such eases.

In some of the above authorities the claims were held void for vagueness or insufficiency of the description; in others the description was held adequate. The difficulty is not with the rule, but with its application, and in applying it due 1’egard must be given to the collateral principles that the claims measure the invention (Motion Picture Patents Co. v. Universal Film Mfg. Co., 243 U. S. 502, 510, 37 S. Ct. 416, 61 L. Ed. 871, L. R. A. 1917E, 1187, Ann. Cas. 1918A, 959; Paper Bag Patent Case, 210 U. S. 405, 419, 28 S. Ct. 748, 52 L. Ed. 1122; McClain v. Ortmayer, 141 U. S. 419, 424, 12 S. Ct. 76, 35 L. Ed. 800), that such claims should be liberally construed so as to uphold and not destroy the right of the inventor, especially in the [888]*888ease of a generic invention (Temco Co. v.

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Bluebook (online)
49 F.2d 886, 9 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 433, 1931 U.S. App. LEXIS 3280, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/sun-ray-gas-corp-v-bellows-claude-neon-co-ca6-1931.