Field v. Knowles. Field v. Knowles

183 F.2d 593, 37 C.C.P.A. 1211, 86 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 373, 1950 CCPA LEXIS 79
CourtCourt of Customs and Patent Appeals
DecidedJune 30, 1950
DocketPatent Appeals 5692, 5693
StatusPublished
Cited by43 cases

This text of 183 F.2d 593 (Field v. Knowles. Field v. Knowles) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Customs and Patent Appeals primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Field v. Knowles. Field v. Knowles, 183 F.2d 593, 37 C.C.P.A. 1211, 86 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 373, 1950 CCPA LEXIS 79 (ccpa 1950).

Opinion

JOHNSON, Judge.

On August 28, 1942, an interference, No. 80,398 was declared by the Primary Examiner in the United States Patent Office between the patent applications of Crosby Field, No. 352,709, filed August 15, 1940, and Frank W. Knowles, No. 262,869, filed March 20, 1939. The single count of the interference related to Field’s claim 41 and Knowles’s claim 50 which the parties had added to their applications at the suggestion of the examiner for interference purposes. On February 12, 1943, Knowles moved to dissolve the interference alleging inoperativeness of the Field device. Additionally, Knowles considered the count broader than his invention, and did not believe Field could make a claim reciting a limitation, not present in the count, which Knowles believed essential to operativeness; as a consequence of which Knowles was “cancelling the claim” from his application, and moved for dissolution of the interference, stating that his action was not a concession of priority to Field as to their respective materials. Field’s assignee on February 27, 1943, moved to amend the issue in Interference No. 80,398 by adding counts drawn from Field’s applications Nos. 352,707, 352,708, and a joint application of Field and Stover, No. 352,710, as well as moving to dissolve the interference on the ground that Knowles’s disclosure was inoperative. On September 21, 1943, the Primary Examiner ruled on the motions of the parties, denying the respective motions to dissolve, and granting the motion of Field’s assignee to bring into the interference the additional applications of Field and Field and Stover as to certain of the proposed counts. On November 17, 1943, the Primary Examiner added to Interference No. 80,398 the Field applications Nos. 352,707 and 352,708. Field thus had three *596 applications in interference with the Knowles application with the relationship of the interference counts and claims of the applications being as follows:

Counts Field Case A Field Case B Field Case B . Knowles (352,709) (352,708) (352,707) "(262,869)
1 41 50
2 22 51
3 38 52

Also on November 17, 1943, the Primary Examiner declared Interference No. 21,217 to exist between the Field and Stover application No. 352,710 and the before-mentioned Knowles application No. 262,869, the' relationship of counts and claims being as follows:

Counts Field et al. Knowles
1 29 37
2 31 48
3 32 43

Both parties took testimony, each incorporating into a single record the evidence relied upon for both interferences. The cases came on for hearing before the Board of Interference Examiners in the U. S. Patent Office, which rendered its separate decisions on May 28, 1948, awarding in Interference No. 80,398 priority of invention as to count 1 to Field, and as to counts 2 and 3 to Knowles. Priority of invention as to all counts in Interference No. 81,217 was awarded to Knowles. Knowles entered no appeal as to the adverse ruling on count 1 in Interference No. 80,398. Field has appealed from' the board’s decision in Interference No. 80,398, noting 47 assignments of error, while Field and Stover have appealed from the decision in Interference No. 81,217, bringing 35 assignments of error in that case before us.

The appellants’ applications in interference were filed August 15, 1940. The appellee’s application was filed March 20, 1939. Appellee having filed his application first, the presumption arises that he is the first inventor, Gallagher v. Hien, 25 App.D.C. 77, 68 L.R.A. 272, and the burden is thus on the appellants as junior parties to establish priority of invention by a preponderance of the evidence, Anderson v. Walch, 152 F.2d 975, 33 C.C.P.A., Patents, 774.

Interference No. 80,398, P.A. 5692.

As will appear from the counts, the subject matter involved is refrigerating apparatus wherein liquid frozen on the surface of a flexible metal belt passing over a refrigerated surface is removed therefrom by a flexing of the belt by means provided therefor in the apparatus.

The counts of Interference No. 80,398 read as follows:

“1. An ice making apparatus comprising an evaporator forming part of a closed refrigerating system and having a refrigerating surface of constant curvature; an endless flexible belt of heat conducting material; means maintaining a portion of said belt in close proximity to a major portion of said refrigerating surface and causing said portion of the belt to conform in curvature to said surface, said means including an element spaced from said refrigerating surface and presenting a curved surface in contact with the inner surface of the belt; and means for applying water to be frozen to the exterior of the belt; said belt being movable relative to said surfaces and said apparatus being constructed and arranged to hold a quantity of liquid having a freezing point below the lowest temperature to be reached by the operation of said apparatus and to cause the relative movement of the belt with respect to the refrigerating *597 surface to interpose a portion of said liquid in the form of a film between the latter and the portion of the belt conforming thereto in curvature and to flex the belt across the second mentioned curved surface to break a layer of ice frozen thereto.
“2. In refrigerating apparatus, in combination an evaporator having a continuous curved refrigerated surface, an endless flexible belt encompassing said refrigerated surface and contacting a portion thereof, means closing the open sides of said endless belt, deflector means adapted to flex successive sections of said belt out of contact with said evaporator, and a liquid positioned between said belt and said refrigerated surface adapted to keep wet the contacting surfaces thereof.
“3. In refrigerating apparatus, in combination, a framework, a refrigerated member mounted on said framework and having a rigid convexly curved refrigerated surface, and endless flexible metal belt encompassing said refrigerated member and having a greater periphery than said member, means for tensioning said belt against said convexly curved refrigerated surface, means for imparting relative movement between said belt and said surface, and sealing means including an apron extending from said belt and including means extending from said framework, said apron and last-named means coacting to seal the space between said belt and said refrigerated surface from the atmosphere.”

Count 1 requires an apparatus with a curved evaporator with refrigerated surface ; an endless, flexible, movable belt held against that surface by means of a roller urged against the inner surface of the belt, flexing the belt; means for supplying water to be frozen to the belt; and anti-freeze liquid between the belt and evaporator. Count 2 adds means for closing the open sides of the belt. The belt is not required to be movable with relation to the evaporator. Count 3 requires the end closure means to include an apron extending from the belt coacting with the closure means to perfect the seal.

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Bluebook (online)
183 F.2d 593, 37 C.C.P.A. 1211, 86 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 373, 1950 CCPA LEXIS 79, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/field-v-knowles-field-v-knowles-ccpa-1950.