Strike 3 Holdings, LLC v. Doe

District Court, District of Columbia·Decided May 11, 2018·No. Civil Action No. 2018-0808·Published

Opinion

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

) STRIKE 3 HOLDINGS, LLC, ) ) Plaintiff, ) ) v. ) Civil Action No: 18-00808 (KBJ/RMM) ) JOHN DOE, ) Subscriber IP Address 66.44.113.18 ) ) Defendant. ) )

MEMORANDUM OPINION

Pending before the Court is Plaintiff Strike 3 Holdings, LLC (“Plaintiff” or “Strike 3

Holdings”) Motion for Leave to Serve a Third Party Subpoena Prior to a Rule 26(f) Conference

(“Motion”). See ECF No. 3. Strike 3 Holdings seeks leave to serve a third-party subpoena on

RCN Telecom Services LLC (“RCN”) in order to discover Defendant John Doe’s (“Defendant”)

name and address. See Mot. Leave to Serve Third Party Subpoena (“Mot.”), Mem. in Supp.

(“Mem. in Supp.”) at 4–5, ECF No. 3-6.1 At present, Defendant is identified only by an IP

address and has not yet been served. Having considered the Motion, the attachments thereto, and

the applicable law, the Court GRANTS Plaintiff’s Motion.

BACKGROUND

Strike 3 Holdings owns the rights to certain adult entertainment films that are available

on the internet. See Mem. in Supp. at 4; Compl. ¶ 31, ECF No. 1. On April 9, 2018, Strike 3

Holdings filed a Complaint against Defendant contending that Defendant, identified only by an

1 Page numbers cited in this Memorandum Opinion reference the ECF page numbers present in the header of the document. IP address, had allegedly stolen and distributed twenty-four of Strike 3 Holdings’ films. Compl.

¶¶ 1, 4. Strike 3 Holdings learned of the actions of Defendant’s IP address through an

investigator, IPP International U.G., which Strike 3 Holdings had hired to monitor copyright

infringing activity. Mem. in Supp. at 4; see also Mot., Ex. B (“Fieser Decl.”) ¶¶ 5–7, ECF No.

3-2.

Strike 3 Holdings knows Defendant’s IP address, but contends that only Defendant’s

Internet Service Provider (“ISP”), RCN, would be able to provide further identifying

information. See Mem. in Supp. at 4; see also Mot., Ex. C (“Pasquale Decl.”) ¶ 10; Notice of

Errata, Susan B. Stalzer’s Decl. (“Stalzer Decl.”) ¶ 11, ECF No. 4-1. Accordingly, Strike 3

Holdings has sought leave to serve a Rule 45 Subpoena on RCN in order to “learn Defendant’s

identity, investigate Defendant’s role in the infringement, and effectuate service.” Mem. in

Supp. at 4–5. In its Motion, Strike 3 Holdings also proposes that the Court issue a protective

order to establish procedural safeguards to protect the Defendant’s privacy. Id. at 8.

LEGAL STANDARD

A. Expedited Jurisdictional Discovery

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26 permits a party to seek discovery in advance of a Rule

26(f) conference “when authorized . . . by court order.” FED. R. CIV. P. 26(d)(1). Courts in this

district have authorized such discovery upon a showing of “good cause.” See, e.g., Malibu

Media, LLC v. Doe, No. 18-600 (TJK), 2018 WL 1730308, at *1 (D.D.C. Apr. 10, 2018); Malibu

Media, LLC v. Doe, 64 F. Supp. 3d 47, 49 (D.D.C. 2014). Evaluating whether good cause exists

to permit expedited discovery falls within trial judges’ “broad discretion to tailor discovery

narrowly and to dictate the sequence of discovery.” Watts v. SEC, 482 F.3d 501, 507 (D.C. Cir.

2 2007) (quoting Crawford-El v. Britton, 523 U.S. 574, 598 (1998)) (internal quotation marks

omitted).

A plaintiff who seeks discovery before the Rule 26(f) conference in order to identify a

defendant “is in essence seeking jurisdictional discovery.” Malibu Media, LLC v. Doe, 177 F.

Supp. 3d 554, 556 (D.D.C. 2016) (citing Exquisite Multimedia, Inc. v. Does 1-336, No. 11-1976

(RWR/JMF), 2012 WL 177885, at *1 (D.D.C. Jan. 19, 2012)). To obtain jurisdictional

discovery, a plaintiff “must have at least a good faith belief that such discovery will enable it to

show that the court has personal jurisdiction over the defendant[].” AF Holdings, LLC v. Does 1-

1058, 752 F.3d 990, 995 (D.C. Cir. 2014) (quoting Caribbean Broad. Sys., Ltd. v. Cable &

Wireless PLC, 148 F.3d 1080, 1090 (D.C. Cir. 1998)) (internal quotation marks omitted); see

also Exponential Biotherapies, Inc. v. Houthoff Buruma N.V., 638 F. Supp. 2d 1, 11 (D.D.C.

2009) (quoting Kopff v. Battaglia, 425 F. Supp. 2d 76, 89 (D.D.C. 2006) (noting that

jurisdictional discovery is warranted only if the plaintiff “reasonably demonstrates that it can

supplement its jurisdictional allegations through discovery” (internal quotation marks omitted)).

B. Issuance of Protective Orders

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26 permits the Court, upon a showing of “good cause,”

to “issue an order to protect a party or person from annoyance, embarrassment, oppression, or

undue burden or expense.” FED. R. CIV. P. 26(c)(1). The party requesting the protective order

bears the burden of showing good cause “by demonstrating specific evidence of the harm that

would result.” Jennings v. Family Mgmt., 201 F.R.D. 272, 274–75 (D.D.C. 2001); Alexander v.

FBI, 186 F.R.D. 71, 75 (D.D.C. 1998); see also Washington v. Thurgood Marshall Acad., 230

F.R.D. 18, 21 (D.D.C), on reconsideration, 232 F.R.D. 6 (D.D.C. 2005) (reconsidering a

separate proposition). Protective orders may be used to “limit the manner in which . . .

3 confidential information is to be revealed.” Univ. of Mass. v. Roslin Inst., 437 F. Supp. 2d 57, 60

(D.D.C. 2006). See generally United States v. All Assets Held at Bank Julius Baer & Co., 312

F.R.D. 16, 22 (D.D.C. 2015) (discussing accommodation of confidentiality interests in discovery

under Rule 26(c)). Trial courts have broad discretion to issue and set the terms of a protective

order. See Seattle Times Co. v. Rhinehart, 467 U.S. 20, 36 (1984); Keaveney v. SRA Int’l, Inc.,

No. 13-00855, 2017 WL 1842544, *2 (D.D.C. May 3, 2017).

ANALYSIS

A. Strike 3 Holdings’ Request for Expedited Discovery

Good cause exists to permit Strike 3 Holdings to conduct limited expedited discovery.

Strike 3 Holdings must determine Defendant’s identity in order to serve Defendant and for this

matter to proceed. See Mem. in Supp. at 8–9; see, e.g., Malibu Media, 177 F. Supp. 3d at 557

(citing Arista Records LLC v. Does 1–19, 551 F. Supp. 2d 1, 6 (D.D.C. 2008)) (finding good

cause for expedited discovery where “Defendant must be identified before this suit can progress

further”); see also Strike 3 Holdings, LLC v. Doe, No. 17-cv-2347 (TJK), 2018 WL 385418, at

*2 (D.D.C. Jan. 11, 2018).

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