Strike 3 Holdings, LLC v. Doe

CourtDistrict Court, District of Columbia
DecidedJanuary 11, 2018
DocketCivil Action No. 2017-2346
StatusPublished

This text of Strike 3 Holdings, LLC v. Doe (Strike 3 Holdings, LLC v. Doe) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, District of Columbia primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Strike 3 Holdings, LLC v. Doe, (D.D.C. 2018).

Opinion

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

STRIKE 3 HOLDINGS, LLC,

Plaintiff,

v. Civil Action No. 17-cv-2346 (TJK) JOHN DOE subscriber assigned IP address 108.31.134.183,

Defendant.

MEMORANDUM OPINION

Before the Court is Plaintiff’s Motion for Leave to Serve a Third Party Subpoena Prior to

a Rule 26(f) Conference. ECF No. 5. For the reasons stated herein, this Motion is GRANTED.

I. FACTUAL BACKGROUND

Plaintiff Strike 3 Holdings, LLC owns the rights to certain adult entertainment films.

ECF No. 1 (“Compl.”) ¶ 2. Plaintiff alleges that Defendant, currently identified as John Doe

subscriber assigned IP address 108.31.134.183, has been downloading and distributing these

films using a BitTorrent protocol in violation of the Copyright Act, 17 U.S.C. §§ 101 et seq.

Compl. ¶¶ 4-6, 23-32. Plaintiff further alleges that it used geolocation technology to trace the IP

address used by Defendant to a physical address in the District of Columbia. Id. ¶ 9.

Plaintiff has moved for leave to file a third-party subpoena on Defendant’s internet

service provider (“ISP”) to “learn Defendant’s identity, investigate Defendant’s role in the

infringement, and effectuate service.” ECF No. 6 (“Pl.’s Mem.”) at 2. Plaintiff asserts that the

subpoena “will only demand the true name and address of Defendant” and that the information

will only be used to prosecute claims in its complaint. Id. II. LEGAL STANDARD

A party ordinarily “may not seek discovery from any source” prior to a conference under

Rule 26(f) unless “authorized . . . by court order.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(d)(1). “To determine

whether to authorize discovery prior to a Rule 26(f) conference in a particular case, this district

has applied a ‘good cause’ standard.” Malibu Media, LLC v. Doe, 64 F. Supp. 3d 47, 49 (D.D.C.

2014) (quoting Warner Bros. Records v. Does 1-6, 527 F. Supp. 2d 1, 2 (D.D.C. 2007)). “Good

cause to take discovery prior to the Rule 26(f) conference exists where the discovery is necessary

‘before th[e] suit can progress further.’” Malibu Media, LLC v. Doe, No. 15-cv-986 (RDM),

2015 WL 5173890, at *1 (D.D.C. Sept. 2, 2015) (alteration in original) (quoting Arista Records

LLC v. Does 1-19, 551 F. Supp. 2d 1, 6 (D.D.C. 2008)).

A plaintiff also “must ‘have at least a good faith belief that such discovery will enable it

to show that the court has personal jurisdiction over the defendant[s].’” AF Holdings, LLC v.

Does 1-1058, 752 F.3d 990, 995 (D.C. Cir. 2014) (alteration in original) (quoting Caribbean

Broad. Sys., Ltd. v. Cable & Wireless PLC, 148 F.3d 1080, 1090 (D.C. Cir. 1998)). “The

Copyright Act does not provide for the exercise of personal jurisdiction over alleged infringers

on any basis.” Malibu Media, LLC v. Doe, 177 F. Supp. 3d 554, 556-57 (D.D.C. 2016) (citing

Exquisite Multimedia, Inc. v. Does 1-336, No. 11-cv-1976 (RWR/JMF), 2012 WL 177885, at *2

(D.D.C. Jan. 19, 2012)). Thus, a plaintiff “must predicate this Court’s jurisdiction over the

infringers on the reach of District of Columbia law.” Id. Under the District of Columbia’s long-

arm statute, “the only conceivable way that personal jurisdiction might properly be exercised” is

if Defendant is a “resident[] of the District of Columbia or at least downloaded the copyrighted

work in the District.” AF Holdings, 752 F.3d at 996 (citing D.C. Code § 13-423(3), (4)).

2 III. ANALYSIS

Plaintiff has satisfied the good cause standard to serve discovery prior to a Rule 26(f)

conference. As an initial matter, “this suit cannot move forward without Plaintiff first being able

to identify Defendant so that service can be effected.” Malibu Media, LLC v. Doe, No. 16-cv-

639 (RC/AK), 2016 WL 1698263, at *2 (D.D.C. Apr. 27, 2016). According to a declaration

provided by Plaintiff, Defendant’s internet service provider is the only entity that can identify

Defendant by correlating the IP address that has been linked to the alleged infringement with its

subscriber. ECF No. 5-3 ¶ 12.

Plaintiff has also established a good faith belief that this Court has personal jurisdiction

over Defendant. Plaintiff used geolocation technology to trace Defendant’s IP address to a

physical location within the District of Columbia. Pl.’s Mem. at 6. The D.C. Circuit “has

suggested that reliance on ‘geolocation services’ of this sort is sufficient to justify a ‘good faith

belief’ that a district court has personal jurisdiction over unknown defendants.” Malibu Media,

2015 WL 5173890, at *2 (quoting A.F. Holdings, 752 F.3d at 996); see also Malibu Media, 2016

WL 1698263, at *2 (“Using a geolocation service that estimates that location of Internet users

based on their IP addresses is sufficient to demonstrate a good faith belief that the court has

personal jurisdiction over the defendant.”); Nu Image, Inc. v. Does 1-23,322, 799 F. Supp. 2d 34,

41 (D.D.C. 2011) (“Plaintiff has a good faith basis to believe a putative defendant may be a

District of Columbia resident if a geolocation service places his/her IP address within the District

of Columbia . . . .”) (emphasis in original). Thus, in its “broad discretion to . . . dictate the

sequence of discovery,” Watts v. SEC, 482 F.3d 501, 507 (D.C. Cir. 2007) (quoting Crawford-El

v. Britton, 523 U.S. 574, 598 (1998)), the Court authorizes Plaintiff to serve limited discovery on

Defendant’s ISP.

3 IV. PROTECTIVE ORDER

Plaintiff notes that in similar cases involving adult content, some courts “have found it

appropriate to issue a protective order establishing procedural safeguards,” and it has encouraged

this Court to do so here if it deems it appropriate. Pl.’s Mem. at 7-8. The Court finds that a

protective order is warranted here. “The fact that a copyrighted work was illegally downloaded

from a certain IP address does not necessarily mean that the owner of that IP address was the

infringer.” Media Prods., Inc. v. Does 1-26, No. 12-cv-3719 (HB), 2012 WL 2190613, at *1

(S.D.N.Y. June 12, 2012). “Indeed, the true infringer could just as easily be a third party who

had access to the internet connection, such as a son or daughter, houseguest, neighbor, or

customer of a business offering an internet connection,” and “[t]here is a real risk that defendants

might be falsely identified and forced to defend themselves against unwarranted allegations.” Id.

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Related

Crawford-El v. Britton
523 U.S. 574 (Supreme Court, 1998)
Watts v. Securities & Exchange Commission
482 F.3d 501 (D.C. Circuit, 2007)
Nu Image, Inc. v. Does 1-23,322
799 F. Supp. 2d 34 (District of Columbia, 2011)
Arista Records LLC v. John Does 1-19
551 F. Supp. 2d 1 (District of Columbia, 2008)
Warner Bros. Records, Inc. v. DOES 1-6
527 F. Supp. 2d 1 (District of Columbia, 2007)
AF Holdings, LLC v. Does 1-1058
752 F.3d 990 (D.C. Circuit, 2014)
Malibu Media, LLC v. Doe
64 F. Supp. 3d 47 (District of Columbia, 2014)
Malibu Media, LLC v. Doe
177 F. Supp. 3d 554 (District of Columbia, 2016)

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