Huthnance v. District of Columbia

255 F.R.D. 297, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 101055, 2008 WL 5220571
CourtDistrict Court, District of Columbia
DecidedDecember 15, 2008
DocketCivil Action No. 06-1871 (HHK/JMF)
StatusPublished
Cited by8 cases

This text of 255 F.R.D. 297 (Huthnance v. District of Columbia) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, District of Columbia primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Huthnance v. District of Columbia, 255 F.R.D. 297, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 101055, 2008 WL 5220571 (D.D.C. 2008).

Opinion

MEMORANDUM OPINION

JOHN M. FACCIOLA, United States Magistrate Judge.

This case is before me for resolution of certain discovery motions. Currently pending and ready for resolution is Defendants’ Motion to Compel Plaintiffs Responses to Their Interrogatories (“Defs.Mot.”) [# 46]. For the reasons stated herein, defendants’ motion will be granted.

DISCUSSION1

In this motion, defendants seek to compel plaintiffs answers to defendants’ interrogatories. First, defendants argue that they are entitled to interrogatory responses which are in plaintiffs “own words.” Defendants’ Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Support of Their Motion to Compel Plaintiffs Responses to Their Interrogatories (“Defs.Mem.”) at 2. Second, they contend, that even if the interrogatories propounded are “contention interrogatories,” plaintiff is nonetheless bound to answer them promptly. Id. at 6. Plaintiff counters that her answers may be properly deferred until the close of discovery and that her answers need not be stated in “her own words.” Plaintiffs Opposition to Defendant’s Motion to Compel (“Plains.Opp.”) at 3, 8.

1. The Timing of Plaintiffs Answers

Under Rule 33 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, “[t]he responding party must serve its answers and any objections within 30 days after being served with the interrogatories. A shorter or longer time may be stipulated to under Rule 29 or be ordered by the court.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 33(b)(2).

While it is unclear from the record when defendants served their interrogatories, plaintiff responded on March 10, 2008. See Defs. Mot., Exhibit 1. On May 5, 2008, defendants sent plaintiff a letter noting the deficiencies in plaintiffs responses. Id. at Exhibit 2. Plaintiff responded by letter on the same day. Id. at Exhibit 3.

As to those interrogatories that are now the subject of defendants’ motion, Interrogatory Nos. 9, 13-25, plaintiff objected on the grounds that they were “premature as discovery is ongoing and Plaintiff is still developing her factual support.” See Defs. Mot., Exhibit 2 at 10. At no time did plaintiff seek a stipulation with defendants allowing her to file her answers to interrogatories at a date later than the thirty day period permitted by the Rules. Nor did plaintiff ever seek a protective order from this Court. Instead, plaintiff conveyed her view to defendants by letter dated May 5, 2008:

As we explained, it is customary for contention interrogations to be deferred. And given the extremely detailed complaint that Plaintiff filed, we are confident that the Court would agree with us that Defendants would be hardly disadvantaged by a deferral of responses until we have had the Defendants!]] discovery. That said, we will consider whether there are any contention interrogatories that can, at this stage, be answered.

Defs. Mot., Exhibit 3 at 2.

Assuming, for the sake of the argument, that defendants’ interrogatories are indeed contention interrogatories and as such might be more appropriately propounded at the close of discovery,2 this does not absolve [299]*299plaintiff of her responsibility to reply to them in a timely fashion. Plaintiff should have responded to defendants’ interrogatories to the best of her ability at the time they were propounded.3 Alternatively, plaintiff should have sought relief from the court in the form of a protective order, seeking to delay her responses until other events had transpired. Failing that, plaintiff should have answered the interrogatories and not, as it were, sua sponte granted herself an extension of time within which to answer them. See Pulliam v. Continental Cas. Co., No. 02-CV-370, 2003 WL 1085939, at *7 (D.D.C. Feb. 27, 2003) (“The Court overrules Continental’s objections based on over breadth and improper timing. The Court will not order a delay in responding to this inquiry. Fed.R.Civ.P. 33(c). Continental is directed to respond based on the information it now has and may supplement its responses as appropriate. Fed.R.Civ.P. 26(e).”). Compare Kendrick v. Sullivan, 125 F.R.D. 1, 3 (D.D.C.1989) (denying defendants’ motion to compel answers to contention interrogatories without prejudice to their ability to rewrite and resubmit the interrogatories once discovery has progressed further because interrogatories “effectively asked the plaintiffs to express their legal position on what are, in essence, hypotheti-eals”).

II. The Form of Plaintiff's Answers

Two potential issues are raised by the parties in their arguments as to the correct form answers to interrogatories must take. The first issue is a party’s reference to a business record in her answer to an interrogatory. According to defendants, plaintiff improperly answered the interrogatories by referring defendants to the Arrest Prosecution Report and to her Amended Complaint. Defendants District of Columbia, Officers Liliana Acebal, James Antonia and Jose Morales’ Reply to Plaintiffs Opposition to Their Motion to Compel (“Defs.Reply”) at 4. Plaintiff, on the other hand, claims that “these references were not intended to comply with Rule 33(d) and are not intended to be a substitute for responses to Defendants’ contention interrogatories at the appropriate juncture in this case.” Plains. Opp. at 6, n. 4.

Rule 33 states the following:
If the answer to an interrogatory may be determined by examining, auditing, compiling, abstracting, or summarizing a party’s business records (including electronically stored information), and if the burden of deriving or ascertaining the answer will be substantially the same for either party, the responding party may answer by:
(1) specifying the records that must be reviewed, in sufficient detail to enable the interrogating party to locate and identify them as readily as the responding party could; and
(2) giving the interrogating party a reasonable opportunity to examine and audit the records and to make copies, compilations, abstracts, or summaries.

[300]*300Fed.R.Civ.P. 33(d). By plaintiffs own admission, however, her reference to the Arrest Prosecution Report and her Amended Complaint “were not intended to comply with Rule 33(d).” See Plains. Opp. at 6 n. 4. Defendants’ objections to plaintiffs answers, at least based on this theory, are therefore correct.

The second issue is whether a party must compose her own answers to her opponent’s interrogatories. Plaintiff argues that, pursuant to Rule 33, she need not provide a statement that is “in her own words,” and that Rule 33 interrogatories are not the proper “discovery device for obtaining [her] sworn testimony.” Plains. Opp. at 8 (emphasis in original).

Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI

Related

Shaw v. Davis
D. Nevada, 2021
(PC) Spence v. Kaur
E.D. California, 2020
Barnes v. District of Columbia
289 F.R.D. 1 (District of Columbia, 2012)
Volterra Semiconductor Corp. v. Primarion, Inc.
796 F. Supp. 2d 1025 (N.D. California, 2011)

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
255 F.R.D. 297, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 101055, 2008 WL 5220571, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/huthnance-v-district-of-columbia-dcd-2008.