Storer v. Hayes Microcomputer Products, Inc.

960 F. Supp. 498, 1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 7044, 1997 WL 174747
CourtDistrict Court, D. Massachusetts
DecidedMarch 25, 1997
DocketCivil Action 96-10602-WGY
StatusPublished
Cited by8 cases

This text of 960 F. Supp. 498 (Storer v. Hayes Microcomputer Products, Inc.) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, D. Massachusetts primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Storer v. Hayes Microcomputer Products, Inc., 960 F. Supp. 498, 1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 7044, 1997 WL 174747 (D. Mass. 1997).

Opinion

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

YOUNG, District Judge.

James A. Storer and Refac International, Ltd. (collectively the “Plaintiffs”) are the owners of United States Patent 4,876,541 (the “Storer Patent”). The Storer Patent describes a “data compression system,” embodied in a computer program, that dynamically compresses and then decompresses streams of electronic data. The most widespread practical application of the invention is the speedy and efficient transmission of electronic data (in compressed form) from one computer to another via modem.

The Plaintiffs commenced this action alleging that computer modems manufactured and sold by Hayes Microcomputer Products, Inc. (“Hayes”) and Zoom Telephonies, Inc. (“Zoom,” collectively the “Defendants”), infringe upon one or more of the claims of the Storer Patent. Both Hayes and Zoom advertise that their modems compress and decompress data according to an international standard adopted after the Storer Patent issued, entitled Recommendation V.42 bis (“V.42 bis”). 1 The Plaintiffs contend that all modems which follow the V.42 bis standard infringe upon the Storer Patent.

The Defendants now come before this Court having each filed a pre-discovery motion for summary judgment of non-infringement. For purposes of these motions: 1) the Defendants stipulate that their respective modems operate according to the exact specifications set forth in the V.42 bis standard, and 2) the Plaintiffs concede the absence of literal infringement, but assert that a genuine issue of material fact exists as to whether the accused modems infringe upon the Storer Patent under the doctrine of equivalents.

I. RELEVANT LEGAL STANDARDS

Summary judgment is appropriate where no genuine issue of material fact exists and the moving party is entitled to judgment as matter of law. Fed.R.Civ.P. 56; London v. Carson Pirie Scott & Co., 946 F.2d 1534, 1537 (Fed.Cir.1991). A “genuine” issue of fact is one that a reasonable jury, on the record before the court, could resolve in favor of the non-moving party. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 2510, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986). In making this determination, the court must view the evidence in the light most favorable to the non-moving party and draw all reasonable inferences in its favor. Eastman Kodak Co. v. Image Technical Servs., Inc., 504 U.S. 451, 456, 112 S.Ct. 2072, 2076, 119 L.Ed.2d 265 (1992) (citing Anderson, 477 U.S. at 255, 106 S.Ct. at 2513).

Resolving a claim of patent infringement is a two-step process. The court must first determine the meaning and scope of the patent claims at issue, a question of law, before the factfinder may resolve whether the accused device infringes the patent claims as construed by the court, a question of fact. Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., — U.S. -, ---, 116 S.Ct. 1384, 1393-96, 134 L.Ed.2d 577 (1996). Although Markman involved literal infringement, the same analytical framework applies — at least for now — to claims brought under the doctrine of equivalents. See Warner-Jenkinson Co. v. Hilton Davis Chem. Co., — U.S. -, -, 117 S.Ct. 1040, 1053, 137 L.Ed.2d 146 (1997) (declining to reach the issue of whether infringement under the doctrine of equivalents is a question for the *501 jury rather than the judge, but noting that “there is ample support in our prior cases” for the Federal Circuit’s holding that it is question for the jury).

A. Claim Interpretation

“It is well-settled that, in interpreting an asserted [patent] claim, the court should look first to the intrinsic evidence of record, i.e., the patent itself, including the claims, the specification, and if in evidence, the prosecution history.” Vitronics Corp. v. Conceptronic, Inc., 90 F.3d 1576, 1582 (Fed.Cir.1996) (citing Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 52 F.3d 967, 979 [Fed.Cir.1995]). The terms used in the patent to describe an invention are given their ordinary and customaiy meaning “unless another meaning is specified or evident from the patent history.” Johansson v. Rose Displays, Ltd., 924 F.Supp. 328, 330 (D.Mass.1996) (citing Transmatic Inc. v. Guiton Indus., 53 F.3d 1270, 1277 [Fed.Cir.1995]; Carroll Touch, Inc. v. Electro Mechanical Sys., Inc., 15 F.3d 1573, 1577 [Fed.Cir.1993]). A court may look to extrinsic evidence to aid its interpretation of a patent claim only if the intrinsic evidence is ambiguous. Vitronics, 90 F.3d at 1583.

B. Infringement Under the Doctrine of Equivalents

In its recent opinion in Warner-Jenkinson Co. v. Hilton Davis Chem. Co., — U.S. -, 117 S.Ct. 1040, 137 L.Ed.2d 146 (1997), the Supreme Court attempted to clarify the applicable standard for claims of infringement under the doctrine of equivalents. Historically, courts have applied a “triple identity” test, see id. at -, 117 S.Ct. at 1054, which looks to whether the accused device “performs substantially the same overall function or work, in substantially the same way, to produce substantially the same overall result as the claimed invention.” Dolly, Inc. v. Spalding & Evenflo Cas., 16 F.3d 394, 397 (Fed.Cir.1994) (citing Graver Tank & Mfg. Co. v. Linde Air Prods. Co., 339 U.S. 605, 608, 70 S.Ct. 854, 856, 94 L.Ed. 1097 [1950]). In Hilton Davis Chem. Co. v. Warner-Jenkinson Co., 62 F.3d 1512 (Fed.Cir.1995), however, the Federal Circuit held that “evaluation of function, way, and result does not necessarily end the inquiry,” id. at 1518, and announced the circular and somewhat amorphous standard that “infringement under the doctrine of equivalents requires proof of insubstantial differences between the claimed and accused products or processes,” id. at 1521-22, from the vantage point of a person of ordinary skill in the relevant art, id. at 1519.

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960 F. Supp. 498, 1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 7044, 1997 WL 174747, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/storer-v-hayes-microcomputer-products-inc-mad-1997.