Storer v. Hayes Microcomputer Products, Inc.

995 F. Supp. 185, 46 U.S.P.Q. 2d (BNA) 1083, 1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 2208, 1998 WL 69475
CourtDistrict Court, D. Massachusetts
DecidedJanuary 23, 1998
DocketCiv.A. 96-10602-WGY
StatusPublished
Cited by1 cases

This text of 995 F. Supp. 185 (Storer v. Hayes Microcomputer Products, Inc.) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, D. Massachusetts primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Storer v. Hayes Microcomputer Products, Inc., 995 F. Supp. 185, 46 U.S.P.Q. 2d (BNA) 1083, 1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 2208, 1998 WL 69475 (D. Mass. 1998).

Opinion

*186 MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

YOUNG, District Judge.

James A. Storer and REFAC International, Inc. (collectively “the plaintiffs”) brought this patent infringement action against the defendants, Hayes Microcomputer Products, Inc., (“Hayes”), and Zoom Telephonies, Inc., (“Zoom”), alleging that Hayes and Zoom manufacture and sell modem devices under various trade names, all of which infringe on one or more claims of the plaintiffs’ United States Patent No. 4,876,541 entitled “System for Dynamically Compressing and Decompressing Electronic Data” (“the Storer patent”). This Court has already granted summary judgment of non-infringement as to all of the patent claims except Claim 18 and its' dependent Claim 54. See Storer v. Hayes Microcomputer Prods., Inc., 960 F.Supp. 498, 500-501 (D.Mass. March 25, 1997) (summary judgment on Claim 54 vacated upon reconsideration May 12, 1997). As to the remaining Claims 18 and 54, this Court denied summary judgment. Zoom now comes before this Court with a second motion for summary judgment of non-infringement on Claims 18 and 54. 1 Because Zoom’s position now turns upon a point that was not fully and precisely addressed by this Court’s earlier Memorandum and Order, and in view of the Federal Circuit’s recent opinion in B. Braun Medical, Inc. v. Abbott Laboratories, 124 F.3d 1419 (Fed.Cir.1997), this Court has conducted a thorough reconsideration of the issues Zoom raises.

I. BACKGROUND

This Court, in its previous Memorandum & Order, set forth an extensive explanation of the Storer patent and a construction of its claims. See Storer, 960 F.Supp. at 501-14. Only a small portion of that discussion is relevant in the present context, and so only a brief review is necessary.

The Storer patent describes a “dynamic” dictionary method of data-compression that utilizes, inter alia, a novel update heuristic and a novel deletion method. In simplified terms, a modem utilizes this “dynamic” dictionary method in the process of compressing and decompressing data. Each dictionary entry consists of a string of data and a corresponding shorthand code, called a pointer. The dictionary allows the sending and receiving modems to recognize entire “strings” of data, rather than individual characters, and thus accelerates the exchange of information. This process is referred to as compression.

The dictionary is described as “dynamic” because each modem continuously alters, or “updates” its dictionary using a common algorhythm, or “update heuristic”. Claims 1-17, 19-53, and 55 all recite or pertain to a novel update heuristic known as the AP (All Prefixes) heuristic. Zoom’s accused devices operate according to the international standard known as V.42 bis. For the purposes of ruling on summary judgment, the parties and this Court assume that V.42 bis uses an update algorhythm known as a FC (First Character) heuristic. A separate algorhythm, known as a “deletion method”, is used to purge the dictionary of seldom used strings to make room for new entries. Only Claims 18 and 54 recite or pertain to the novel deletion method.

With regard to all claims except Claim 18 and its dependent Claim 54, this Court concluded in its earlier Memorandum & Order that there were no genuine issues of material fact, and granted summary judgment of non-infringement. See Storer, 960 F.Supp. at 511. With regard to Claims 18 and 54, this Court denied summary judgment on the grounds that: 1) there were genuine issues of material fact as to the defendants’ infringement of the novel deletion method under the doctrine of equivalents; and 2) Claim 18’s update heuristic limitation, which is broader than the limitations in the other independent Claims, also presented genuine issues of material fact as to the defendant’s alleged infringement of that element of the Claim. See Storer, 960 F.Supp. at 514. Zoom bases the present motion for summary judgment solely on its arguments concerning the update heuristic limitation in Claim 18, and does not ask this Court to revisit its holding with respect to the deletion method.

Four of the five independent Claims in the Storer patent (the four as to which summary judgment of non-infringement has already *187 been granted) recite an “update means” for adding N new entries to the dictionary by concatenating the last current match with all of the non-empty prefixes of the current match. 2 The specification refers to this novel update means as the AP (All Prefixes) heuristic. The fifth independent Claim, Claim 18, speaks' more broadly of “update means” for 1) “updating said dictionary means” and 2) “concatenating the last matched string with the currently matched string.” 3

The plaintiffs contend that this element of Claim 18 is sufficiently broad to create a genuine issue of material fact as to infringement, despite this Court’s determination that Zoom does not infringe, either literally or under the doctrine of equivalents, on the novel AP heuristic. Zoom argues that, under the law governing. means-plus-function claims, this Court construed Claim 18’s update heuristic limitation too broadly, and that a proper construction would preclude a finding of infringement.

II. RELEVANT LEGAL STANDARDS

The construction of patent claims is matter of law for the court to determine. Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 52 F.3d 967, 979 (Fed.Cir.1995) (en banc), aff'd 517 U.S. 370,116 S.Ct. 1384, 134 L.Ed.2d 577 (1996). When a claim merely recites a “mean's” for performing some function, without also reciting a definite structure in support of that function, the claim is subject to the requirements of 35 U.S.C. § 112, ¶ 6. 4 See Cole v. Kimberly-Clark Corp., 102 F.3d 524, 532 (Fed.Cir.1996). Such a claim must not be' construed to cover every conceivable means for performing the recited function, but rather must be “limited to only those means that are ‘equivalent’ to the actual means shown in.the patent specification.” Warner-Jehkinson Co. v. Hilton Davis Chem., — U.S.-,-, 117 S.Ct. 1040, 1048, 137 L.Ed.2d 146 (1997).

Literal infringement on a means-plus-function claim is determined in the customary way, except that “an accused device must (1) perform the identical function recited in the means limitation and (2) perform that function using the identical structure disclosed in the specification or an equivalent structure.” Carroll Touch, Inc. v. Electro Mechanical Sys., Inc.,

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995 F. Supp. 185, 46 U.S.P.Q. 2d (BNA) 1083, 1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 2208, 1998 WL 69475, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/storer-v-hayes-microcomputer-products-inc-mad-1998.