Tridelta Industries v. Frymaster Corp.

6 F. Supp. 2d 690, 1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 8287, 1998 WL 292271
CourtDistrict Court, N.D. Ohio
DecidedJune 2, 1998
Docket1:95-cv-01544
StatusPublished

This text of 6 F. Supp. 2d 690 (Tridelta Industries v. Frymaster Corp.) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, N.D. Ohio primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Tridelta Industries v. Frymaster Corp., 6 F. Supp. 2d 690, 1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 8287, 1998 WL 292271 (N.D. Ohio 1998).

Opinion

OPINION AND ORDER

GWIN, District Judge.

Plaintiff Tridelta Industries brings this suit seeking declaration that U.S. Patents Nos. 4,437,159 (the “159 patent”) 1 4,663,710 (the “710 patent”) 2 , 4,858,119 (the “119 patent”) 3 , and the 4,549,527 (the “527 patent”) 4 are invalid. Defendant Frymaster counterclaims charging plaintiffs with infringement of each of the patents.

Pursuant to Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 517 U.S. 370, 116 S.Ct. 1384, 134 L.Ed.2d 577 (1996), the Court conducted a hearing. The Court now construes Defendant Frymaster’s patent claims.

*694 I

Plaintiff Tridelta makes controllers for deep fat frying equipment. The plaintiff Pit-eo manufactures and sells deep fat frying equipment using Tridelta electronic controllers to control the time of cooking various products. The Defendant Frymaster manufactures and sells deep fat frying equipment and the controllers used in that equipment. Frymaster owns the patents in suit.

Here, the Court is asked to interpret the claims involved in Defendant Frymaster’s patents. As might be anticipated, Defendant Frymaster asks this court to broadly interpret the claims. Plaintiff Tridelta suggests a narrow construction of the claims.

II

The construction of a patent,' including terms of art within its claim, is a question of law. See Markman, 517 U.S. at 383-91, 116 S.Ct. 1384.

In resolving a claim of patent infringement, a court must “first determine the meaning and scope of the patent claims at issue, a question of law, before the factfinder may resolve whether the accused device infringes the patent claims as construed by the court, a question of fact.” Storer v. Hayes Microcomputer Prod., Inc., 960 F.Supp. 498, 500 (D.Mass.1997).

In construing a patent claim, the Court looks first to the three sources of intrinsic evidence of record: the patent itself, including the claims, the specification, and, if in evidence, the prosecution history. Genentech, Inc. v. Boehringer Mannheim GmbH, 989 F.Supp. 359, 363 (D.Mass.1997) (citations omitted).

The Court first examines the language of the claim. A construing court does not accord the specification, prosecution history, and other relevant evidence the same weight as the claim itself, but consults these sources to give the necessary context to the claim language. See Eastman Kodak Co. v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 114 F.3d 1547, 1555 (Fed.Cir.1997). Terms used in the claim are to be given their ordinary and customary meaning “unless another meaning is specified or evident from the patent history.” Storer, 960 F.Supp. at 501 (citations omitted).

The specification “acts as a dictionary when it expressly defines terms used in the claims or when it defines terms by implication.” Vitronics Corp. v. Conceptronic, Inc., 90 F.3d 1576, 1582 (Fed.Cir.1996). The specification “is always highly relevant to the claim construction analysis” and is the “single best guide to the meaning of a disputed term.” Id. The patentee may choose to use terms in a manner other than their ordinary meaning, so long as the special definition of such terms is stated in the patent specification or file history. Id.

In interpreting the claims and specification, the construing court interprets words “as one of skill in the art at the time of the invention would understand them.” Eastman Kodak, 114 F.3d at 1555. In addition, “the court should also consider the patent’s prosecution history ... in order to ascertain the true meaning of the language used in the patent claim.” Markman, 52 F.3d at 980; see also Standard Oil Co. v. American Cyanamid Co., 774 F.2d 448, 452 (Fed.Cir.1985) (“[T]he prosecution history (or file wrapper) limits the interpretation of claims so as to exclude any interpretation that may have been disclaimed or disavowed during prosecution in order to obtain claim allowance.”).

The Court looks to extrinsic evidence to assist in construing a patent claim only if the intrinsic evidence is ambiguous. 5 During ' the Markman hearing on ' these claims in this Court on April 23, 1998, the defendant offered no witnesses. The plain *695 tiffs called a Dr. Francis L. Merat, an electrical engineering professor at Case Western Reserve University. The Court has confined the construction of these claims to the actual language of the claims, the specifications, and the prosecution history. When Dr. Merat’s testimony could be construed as expert evidence, and thus extrinsic evidence, the Court has not relied on it.

Ill

Defendant Frymaster suggests that the prosecution history of its claims is of little relevance to this Court’s claim interpretation. Defendant Frymaster says that limitations in the specification cannot be incorporated into the claims. However, if a patent applicant choose to use “means plus function” expressions, federal patent law says:

An element in a claim for a combination may be expressed as a means or step’ for performing a specified function without the recital of structure, material, or acts in support thereof, and such claim shall be construed to cover the corresponding structure, material, or acts described in the specification and equivalents thereof. (emphasis added)

35 U.S.C. § 112, ¶ 6.

In Alpex Computer Corp. v. Nintendo Co. Ltd., 102 F.3d 1214 (Fed.Cir.1996), cert. denied, — U.S. -, 117 S.Ct. 2480, 138 L.Ed.2d 989 (1997), the Court described this:

Prosecution history is relevant not only for purposes of prosecution history estop-pel but also for construing the meaning and scope of the claims. See Moleculon Research Corp. v. CBS, Inc., 793 F.2d 1261

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Bluebook (online)
6 F. Supp. 2d 690, 1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 8287, 1998 WL 292271, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/tridelta-industries-v-frymaster-corp-ohnd-1998.