Stichting Pensioenfonds ABP v. Wachovia Corp.

753 F. Supp. 2d 326, 2011 WL 1344027
CourtDistrict Court, S.D. New York
DecidedMarch 31, 2011
Docket08 Civ. 6171(RJS), 09 Civ. 4473(RJS), 09 Civ. 5466(RJS), 09 Civ. 6351(RJS)
StatusPublished
Cited by111 cases

This text of 753 F. Supp. 2d 326 (Stichting Pensioenfonds ABP v. Wachovia Corp.) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, S.D. New York primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Stichting Pensioenfonds ABP v. Wachovia Corp., 753 F. Supp. 2d 326, 2011 WL 1344027 (S.D.N.Y. 2011).

Opinion

OPINION AND ORDER

RICHARD J. SULLIVAN, District Judge.

In these related actions, Plaintiffs bring a panoply of claims under the Securities Act of 1933 (the “Securities Act”) and the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (the “Exchange Act”) against Defendant Wachovia Corporation (‘Wachovia”) and a variety of related entities and individuals. All claims arise from the financial disintegration Wachovia experienced between its 2006 purchase of Golden West Financial Corporation and its 2008 merger with Wells Fargo & Company. Now before the Court are no fewer than seven motions to dismiss four complaints. For the reasons stated here *342 in, those motions are granted in part and denied in part.

I.Background

A. Facts 1

The four complaints at issue span a grand total of 605 pages and 1,814 paragraphs. 2 Although the following recitation of facts provides only a bird’s-eye view of the litigation, the Court will delve into the details of the pleadings as necessary to resolve particular legal challenges.

1. Overview

The relevant narrative begins in 2006, when Wachovia was one of the country’s largest financial services providers, with a market capitalization of $112 billion. (Eq. Compl. ¶ 4.) As a bank holding company, Wachovia engaged in capital management, general banking, and investment banking {id. ¶ 61), and maintained retail banking offices in 21 states {id. ¶ 33).

On October 1, 2006, Wachovia completed its acquisition of Golden West Financial Corporation (“Golden West”), an Oakland-based mortgage lender, for more than $24 billion. 3 {Id. ¶¶ 5, 62.) Prior to the Golden West acquisition, a majority of the loans funded by Wachovia were traditional fixed-rate mortgages. {Id. ¶ 80.) Golden West’s main product, however, was a payment option adjustable rate mortgage (“Option ARM”) known as the Pick-A-Payment (“Pick-A-Pay”) mortgage, which allowed borrowers to choose from multiple payment options each month. {Id. ¶ 5.) Among those options was a “minimum” payment that, because it did not cover the monthly interest, actually increased the principal of the loan—a phenomenon known as “negative amortization.” {Id. ¶ 6.)

Plaintiffs allege that following the Golden West acquisition, Wachovia began to focus on selling Pick-A-Pay loans rather than the traditional loans that had previously comprised the bulk of its residential mortgage business. {Id. ¶ 85.) Plaintiffs further allege that Wachovia weakened the credit quality of the Pick-A-Pay portfolio by lowering minimum credit scores {id. ¶ 97), failing to verify borrower income levels {id. ¶ 113), implementing quotas and sales incentives for loan officers {id. ¶ 125), and relying on inflated third-party appraisals of home value {id. ¶ 142). According to Plaintiffs, Wachovia adopted debased underwriting standards and aggressive marketing strategies in order to maximize Pick-A-Pay loan volume “at all costs.” {Id. ¶ 137; see id. ¶ 85.)

2. Alleged Misrepresentations

Plaintiffs collectively identify allegedly false and misleading statements made by Wachovia on 24 separate occasions. In the interest of brevity, the Court will summarize a representative sampling of these statements.

On a May 8, 2006 conference call announcing the Golden West acquisition, Defendant G. Kennedy Thompson (“Thompson”), the President and CEO of Wachovia, indicated that Golden West was “obsessed with conservative underwriting,” had “no subprime origination,” and maintained a *343 “very conservative portfolio.” (Id. ¶ 169.) On an April 16, 2007 call, Thompson similarly touted the “superior credit quality” of Wachovia’s mortgage portfolio. (Id. ¶ 190.) “It would be ha[r]d for me to imagine,” Thompson said, “how anybody could look at our underwriting of these loans and draw any conclusion ... other than [that] we are very responsible underwriters.” (Id. ¶ 194.)

As the housing market continued to decline, Defendants allegedly misrepresented the comparative advantages of the Pick-A-Pay mortgage relative to the troubled subprime market. On a July 20, 2007 conference call, Defendant Donald K. Truslow (“Truslow”), Wachovia’s Chief Risk Officer, stated that “we’ve actively managed our business to minimize our exposure to the subprime market. So as a result there’s been little impact to our businesses with the turbulence in the sub-prime markets.... ” (Id. ¶ 205.) On a January 22, 2008 earnings call, Defendant Thomas J. Wurtz (“Wurtz”), Wachovia’s Chief Financial Officer, referred to a series of charts comparing the Pick-A-Pay portfolio with prime, subprime, and Alt-A industry performance. 4 Wurtz concluded that “[t]here is clear evidence that our Pick-A-Pay portfolio is, to date, performing very similar to the average prime portfolio in the industry....” (Id. ¶ 241.)

Plaintiffs separately allege that during 2006 and 2007, Wachovia created, structured, and underwrote approximately $10.11 billion of collateralized debt obligations (“CDOs”) backed by pools of sub-prime mortgages. 5 (Id. ¶ 164.) Until November 9, 2007, however, Wachovia allegedly concealed that it had retained more than $2.1 billion of those CDOs. (Id.) Wachovia carried these CDOs at par value until October 19, 2007, despite the fact that their value was allegedly impaired no later than February 2007. (Id.)

3. The Crash

According to the pleadings, the true “risks and realities” of the Pick-A-Pay portfolio began to seep out in early 2008. (Id. ¶ 286; see id. ¶¶ 287-88.) In an April 14, 2008 conference call, Wachovia disclosed for the first time that 14% of the $120 billion Pick-A-Pay portfolio had loan-to-value (LTV) ratios above 100%. 6 (Id. ¶ 287.) Defendants simultaneously admitted that due to Pick-A-Pay losses, Wachovia would need to raise billions in new capital and could not afford to continue its dividend payout. (Id. ¶ 282.) Thompson was forced to resign as CEO on June 2, 2008. (Id. ¶ 24.) The new CEO, Lanty Smith, later admitted to investors that “there has been a complete recognition at the Board level that Golden West was a mistake and that we have to deal with the consequences of it.” (Id. ¶ 25.)

By late September 2008, Wachovia’s share price fell below $1 per share for a market capitalization loss of approximately $109.8 billion from early 2007. (Id.)

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753 F. Supp. 2d 326, 2011 WL 1344027, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/stichting-pensioenfonds-abp-v-wachovia-corp-nysd-2011.