DONALDSON, Justice.
On rehearing.
The previous opinion issued in this case on July 28, 1975, is withdrawn and this opinion is hereby substituted therefor.
This appeal is taken by Alton W. Wyman from the judgment of conviction for voluntary manslaughter entered against him for the death of June Diggs. The primary issues involved the adherence by the arresting police officers to the requirements of Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966), I.C. § 19-615, and Idaho Rules of Criminal Practice and Procedure, rule 5(a). For the reasons stated below, the judgment of conviction is affirmed.
After working approximately twelve hours, appellant Wyman left his place of employment at 10:30 p.m., December 1, 1972, and went to a trailer house occupied by himself and June Diggs, the deceased, in Garden City, Ada County, Idaho. The two then went to a bar and remained there drinking until 1:00 a.m. in the morning of Saturday, December 2. While leaving the bar, appellant and June Diggs began to argue. The argument continued while they drove to a cafe to buy cigarettes and then as they drove to the trailer house.
Upon their return to the trailer, the argument became more heated. Wyman testified that as he was trying to return a rifle to a closet, the deceased rushed across the room and grabbed the barrel of the rifle. The weapon discharged, fatally wounding June Diggs. Wyman immediately telephoned for the police and an ambulance.
[488]*488The first officer arrived at approximately 2:00 a.m.1 After observing the victim and initiating first aid, Officer Merrill of the Garden City Police Department asked appellant what had happened. Appellant replied that he had gone outside to retrieve the newly purchased cigarettes from the car, heard a shot, and returned to the trailer to find June Diggs mortally wounded.
By that time the ambulance crew and Officers Adair and Patterson had arrived, and the main activity was the treating of the victim. However, she was soon taken to a hospital and the appellant became the focal point of attention. Within a short time of the departure of the ambulance for the hospital, the officer that accompanied the victim telephoned the officers at the scene to inform them that June Diggs had died. Police testimony was given to the effect that Wyman was given an oral Miranda warning either immediately before or immediately after he was told of the victim’s death.
From 2:00 a.m. to 3:00 a.m., Saturday, December 2, the police officers were occupied primarily with the collection of the physical evidence of the crime. Little direct questioning was done of the appellant, but he did repeat the initial version of his being outside when the victim was wounded.
At 3:00 a.m., appellant was taken to the Garden City Police Station. He was held without questioning until 5:00 a.m. Part of this time he was locked in a cell.
At 5:15 a.m., questioning of appellant was resumed. Wyman wrote and signed a statement repeating his original version of the shooting.2 Prior to making the statement, appellant initialed and signed a notification of rights form.3 The statement [489]*489form also contained a recitation of the Miranda rights. This statement is hereinafter referred to as exhibit 30.
At 7:40 a.m., questioning was resumed and appellant wrote and signed a second statement. The story had changed to the extent that Wyman admitted holding the rifle in his hands when it discharged.4 This statement is hereinafter referred to as exhibit 7.
At 11:30 a.m., appellant was taken to an office used by Bud Mason to give polygraph tests. Appellant signed two constitutional rights forms, and a polygraph release form.5 During appellant’s stay, he was questioned with and without the [490]*490sensing devices of the polygraph attached to his body. The questioning done without the polygraph was by Mason and Officer Adair and was tape recorded. The cassettes upon which the recording was done are exhibits 31, 32, and 33.
At 4:30 p.m., the appellant was taken back to the Garden City Jail and placed in a cell.
At 7:30 p.m., Saturday, December 2, 1972, the appellant was arrested for first deree murder. Subsequently, he was transferred to the Ada County jail and was arraigned on Monday, December 4, 1972, on that charge.
Prior to trial appellant filed a motion to suppress exhibits 7, 30, 31, 32, and 33. This motion was denied. At trial by jury appellant was found to be guilty of voluntary manslaughter. Judgment was subsequently entered against him and he was sentenced to the custody of the State Board of Corrections for an indeterminate period of time, not to exceed (6) years.
It is from that judgment of conviction that this appeal is taken.
Appellant’s first assignments of error contend that the trial court erred in denying the motion to suppress exhibits 7, 30, 31, 32, and 33. The primary contention is that the requirements of Miranda, supra, were not met by the investigating officer. According to the appellant, he was not given an oral Miranda warning at the scene of the shooting, or, in the alternative, he was too overcome by grief, fatigue, and alcohol to intelligently and voluntarily waive his rights. Since, appellant continues, the original statements he made were wrongfully acquired by the police, the subsequent written statements (exhibits 7 and 30) and taped interrogation (exhibits 31, 32, and 33) are inadmissible under the so-called “poisonous fruit” doctrine of Harrison v. United States, 392 U.S. 219, 88 S.Ct. 2008, 20 L.Ed.2d 1047 (1968).
When the investigating officers initially arrived on the scene, they did ask appellant about the shooting before reading him the Miranda warning. However, a review of the record indicates that those preliminary questions were proper under the rule that permits questioning of an individual if that individual has not become the focal point of an investigation. State v. McClellan, 96 Idaho 569, 532 P.2d 574 (1975); State v. Sanches, 94 Idaho 125, 483 P.2d 173 (1971).
The appellant next contends that once the Miranda warning was given, he was unable to waive the rights intelligently and voluntarily because of the combined effects of fatigue, intoxication, and grief upon his thinking processes. Upon such claims, a defendant is entitled to a fair hearing to assess both the underlying factual issues and the voluntariness of his statement. State v. Ortega, 95 Idaho 239, 506 P.2d 466 (1973). The defendant was afforded such a hearing, and the court [491]*491found that appellant was given the appropriate warnings, the appellant was sufficiently alert to understand the meaning of the warnings, and that his statements to the police were voluntarily made.
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DONALDSON, Justice.
On rehearing.
The previous opinion issued in this case on July 28, 1975, is withdrawn and this opinion is hereby substituted therefor.
This appeal is taken by Alton W. Wyman from the judgment of conviction for voluntary manslaughter entered against him for the death of June Diggs. The primary issues involved the adherence by the arresting police officers to the requirements of Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966), I.C. § 19-615, and Idaho Rules of Criminal Practice and Procedure, rule 5(a). For the reasons stated below, the judgment of conviction is affirmed.
After working approximately twelve hours, appellant Wyman left his place of employment at 10:30 p.m., December 1, 1972, and went to a trailer house occupied by himself and June Diggs, the deceased, in Garden City, Ada County, Idaho. The two then went to a bar and remained there drinking until 1:00 a.m. in the morning of Saturday, December 2. While leaving the bar, appellant and June Diggs began to argue. The argument continued while they drove to a cafe to buy cigarettes and then as they drove to the trailer house.
Upon their return to the trailer, the argument became more heated. Wyman testified that as he was trying to return a rifle to a closet, the deceased rushed across the room and grabbed the barrel of the rifle. The weapon discharged, fatally wounding June Diggs. Wyman immediately telephoned for the police and an ambulance.
[488]*488The first officer arrived at approximately 2:00 a.m.1 After observing the victim and initiating first aid, Officer Merrill of the Garden City Police Department asked appellant what had happened. Appellant replied that he had gone outside to retrieve the newly purchased cigarettes from the car, heard a shot, and returned to the trailer to find June Diggs mortally wounded.
By that time the ambulance crew and Officers Adair and Patterson had arrived, and the main activity was the treating of the victim. However, she was soon taken to a hospital and the appellant became the focal point of attention. Within a short time of the departure of the ambulance for the hospital, the officer that accompanied the victim telephoned the officers at the scene to inform them that June Diggs had died. Police testimony was given to the effect that Wyman was given an oral Miranda warning either immediately before or immediately after he was told of the victim’s death.
From 2:00 a.m. to 3:00 a.m., Saturday, December 2, the police officers were occupied primarily with the collection of the physical evidence of the crime. Little direct questioning was done of the appellant, but he did repeat the initial version of his being outside when the victim was wounded.
At 3:00 a.m., appellant was taken to the Garden City Police Station. He was held without questioning until 5:00 a.m. Part of this time he was locked in a cell.
At 5:15 a.m., questioning of appellant was resumed. Wyman wrote and signed a statement repeating his original version of the shooting.2 Prior to making the statement, appellant initialed and signed a notification of rights form.3 The statement [489]*489form also contained a recitation of the Miranda rights. This statement is hereinafter referred to as exhibit 30.
At 7:40 a.m., questioning was resumed and appellant wrote and signed a second statement. The story had changed to the extent that Wyman admitted holding the rifle in his hands when it discharged.4 This statement is hereinafter referred to as exhibit 7.
At 11:30 a.m., appellant was taken to an office used by Bud Mason to give polygraph tests. Appellant signed two constitutional rights forms, and a polygraph release form.5 During appellant’s stay, he was questioned with and without the [490]*490sensing devices of the polygraph attached to his body. The questioning done without the polygraph was by Mason and Officer Adair and was tape recorded. The cassettes upon which the recording was done are exhibits 31, 32, and 33.
At 4:30 p.m., the appellant was taken back to the Garden City Jail and placed in a cell.
At 7:30 p.m., Saturday, December 2, 1972, the appellant was arrested for first deree murder. Subsequently, he was transferred to the Ada County jail and was arraigned on Monday, December 4, 1972, on that charge.
Prior to trial appellant filed a motion to suppress exhibits 7, 30, 31, 32, and 33. This motion was denied. At trial by jury appellant was found to be guilty of voluntary manslaughter. Judgment was subsequently entered against him and he was sentenced to the custody of the State Board of Corrections for an indeterminate period of time, not to exceed (6) years.
It is from that judgment of conviction that this appeal is taken.
Appellant’s first assignments of error contend that the trial court erred in denying the motion to suppress exhibits 7, 30, 31, 32, and 33. The primary contention is that the requirements of Miranda, supra, were not met by the investigating officer. According to the appellant, he was not given an oral Miranda warning at the scene of the shooting, or, in the alternative, he was too overcome by grief, fatigue, and alcohol to intelligently and voluntarily waive his rights. Since, appellant continues, the original statements he made were wrongfully acquired by the police, the subsequent written statements (exhibits 7 and 30) and taped interrogation (exhibits 31, 32, and 33) are inadmissible under the so-called “poisonous fruit” doctrine of Harrison v. United States, 392 U.S. 219, 88 S.Ct. 2008, 20 L.Ed.2d 1047 (1968).
When the investigating officers initially arrived on the scene, they did ask appellant about the shooting before reading him the Miranda warning. However, a review of the record indicates that those preliminary questions were proper under the rule that permits questioning of an individual if that individual has not become the focal point of an investigation. State v. McClellan, 96 Idaho 569, 532 P.2d 574 (1975); State v. Sanches, 94 Idaho 125, 483 P.2d 173 (1971).
The appellant next contends that once the Miranda warning was given, he was unable to waive the rights intelligently and voluntarily because of the combined effects of fatigue, intoxication, and grief upon his thinking processes. Upon such claims, a defendant is entitled to a fair hearing to assess both the underlying factual issues and the voluntariness of his statement. State v. Ortega, 95 Idaho 239, 506 P.2d 466 (1973). The defendant was afforded such a hearing, and the court [491]*491found that appellant was given the appropriate warnings, the appellant was sufficiently alert to understand the meaning of the warnings, and that his statements to the police were voluntarily made.
Our examination of the record reveals that following the shooting the appellant was able to summon the authorities, initiate first aid, discuss the event with the police (although in a somewhat “rambling” manner), and attempt to return the weapon in a closet. Moreover, the record contains no evidence of coercion. In short, the findings of the lower court as to the Miranda requirements are supported by substantial competent evidence. Thus, the assignment is rejected. State v. Ranstrom, 94 Idaho 348, 487 P.2d 942 (1971); State v. Thomas, 94 Idaho 430, 489 P.2d 1310 (1971).
Furthermore, since Miranda Was adhered to throughout the questioning, the appellant’s challenge to exhibits 31, 32, and 33 under the Harrison doctrine is not tenable.
The appellant further argues that the statements and tapes are inadmissible due •to violations of I.C. § 19-615 6 and I.C.R. rule 5(a).7 Following an arrest without a warrant, these provisions require that the accused be taken before a magistrate and arraigned “without unnecessary delay” and “a complaint be filed forthwith.” The appellant contends that he was not promptly arraigned and that all statements obtained following that time are inadmissible. This claim is based on the exclusionary rule of McNabb v. United States, 318 U.S. 332, 638 S.Ct. 608, 87 L.Ed. 819 (1943) and Mallory v. United States, 354 U.S. 449, 77 S.Ct. 1356, 1 L.Ed.2d 1479 (1957).
A majority of states have rejected a per se application of the federal “Mc-Nabb-Mallory” rule which would render inadmissible a confession or statement obtained from an accused during an unlawful detention — unlawful because he was not brought before a magistrate “without unnecessary delay” — even though the statement was voluntarily given.8 Instead, such delay is merely regarded as a factor, to be considered with other circumstances, in determining whether the statement was involuntary and therefore inadmissible under the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.9 We find this to be the more well-reasoned approach.
We do not want it understood from this opinion that this Court condones the failure of the police to comply with I.C. § 19-615 and I.C.R. rule 5(a). Such failure could result in an unconstitutional restraint on liberty, since the defendant is incarcerated without a determination of whether probable cause existed for the ar[492]*492rest.10 However, we hold that such a delay does not ipso facto make the statements inadmissible. The record indicates none of the “third degree” tactics that are the target of the “McNabb-Mallory” rule were used by the police. Certainly, no lengthy interrogations took place. Appellant was questioned for less than an hour from the time he was taken to the police station until the time of the polygraph test. Also during this interim the appellant was given, as he requested, time to lie down and rest, The polygraph test was administered by Bud Mason, who was not associated with the Garden City Police Force, but rather was a polygraphist for the state. The test did not take place at the police station but in Mason’s office in the Derr Building. Only one officer was present at the time the statements were taken, and no police officers were present during the administration of the polygraph tests. While the entire examination lasted approximately four hours, it was not continuous in that breaks were allowed. It is this Court’s opinion that appellant failed to show the coercion and involuntariness needed to justify the exclusion of the exhibits. We therefore find no reversible error.
The first of appellant’s final two assignments of error as to the tapes, contends that prejudicial error resulted from the inclusion in the taped interrogations of the theories of the officers as to the method of the commission of the shooting.11 The tapes contain the interrogating officers’ statements to appellant that the trajectory of the fatal bullet indicated that the rifle barrel was parallel to the floor when the shot was fired. According to the officers, this would indicate that the appellant deliberately aimed the rifle at the deceased. The appellant acknowledges that tape recordings may be properly admitted into evidence. The challenge is to the contents of the tape. The record indicates that the officers were extensively cross-examined at trial on the issue of the trajectory, thus the appellant’s explanation as to how the shooting occurred was before the jury. Based upon the record at trial and the paucity of appellant’s authority, we cannot say that appellant has met his burden of showing prejudicial error. State v. Anstine, 91 Idaho 169, 418 P.2d 210 (1966); State v. Mundell, 66 Idaho 297, 158 P.2d 818 (1945).
The burden is also not met in regard to appellant’s claim of error as to a portion of the interrogation wherein appellant discloses a prior arrest for “drunken driving.” This goes, according to appellant, beyond the scope of impeachment which allows the admission into evidence of prior felony convictions. The appellant objected to the material only after it had been played to the jury. Rather than declare a mistrial, the trial judge instructed the jury to disregard that material not relevant to the issue at hand. In view of the instruction and the relatively trivial nature of the admission in comparison with the charge of first degree murder with which appellant was being tried, the appellant has not met the burden discussed above.
Appellant next assigns as error the admission by the trial court of a photograph taken of appellant approximately one hour after the police first arrived. The photograph shows appellant standing in the kitchen area of the trailer house holding a cigarette and looking toward the camera. The clothes he was wearing had [493]*493patches of a dark substance on them. Testimony at trial indicated that the substance was June Diggs’ blood.
The case of State v. Oldham, 92 Idaho 124, 438 P.2d 275 (1968), is offered for the proposition that posed photographs are not admissible when they merely portray a scene arranged to support a contention advanced by the profferer. Oldham involved a photograph of a cold chisel that was found in Oldham’s car being fitted into an indentation on a juke box’s coin box. The obvious intention was to show that the chisel would fit the mark on the box. The case at hand does not fall under the authority of Oldham because the challenged photograph was not a carefully arranged scene attempting to simulate a prior event, but rather simply a photograph of appellant wearing the same clothes he had been wearing at the time of the shooting. It was not an attempt at reenacting the event, but simply showed appellant at the time the photograph was taken. If it was error it was harmless error because the appearance of appellant’s clothing was of probative value to appellant’s version of the shooting and his attempts at administering first aid to the victim. See State v. Hokenson, 96 Idaho 283, 527 P.2d 487 (1974); State v. Beason, 95 Idaho 267, 506 P.2d 1340 (1973); State v. Dillon, 93 Idaho 698, 471 P.2d 553 (1970).
Appellant also assigns as error the limitations imposed by the trial court upon evidence of the victim’s psychiatric history. While the victim had been under the care of a Boise psychiatrist from 1959 until the time of-the shooting, the doctor was allowed to testify as to only two consultations. Those were in June and August of 1972.
An offer of proof was presented to the trial court by the defense to the point that the doctor in 1959 had diagnosed the victim as suffering from acute schizophrenia. As a result of the illness the victim had occasionally had auditorial hallucinations and bouts of irrational behavior. The appellant contends that the victim’s entire psychiatric history is admissible because of the proffered self-defense theory. The case of State v. Wilson, 41 Idaho 616, 243 P. 359 (1925) is offered as authority by appellant for the rule that when the defendant in a criminal prosecution for homicide relies upon a theory of self-defense the reputation of the victim for being turbulent, quarrelsome, or dangerous is admissible.
The record indicates that several witnesses, including the psychiatrist, testified as to the victim’s propensities toward violence. In view of the discretion afforded the trial court in evidentiary matters, it was not error for the trial court to exclude evidence that was primarily cumulative. Avery v. State, 514 P.2d 637 (Alaska 1973); Maes v. People, 169 Colo. 200, 454 P.2d 792 (1969).
The trial court did not err. The judgment of conviction is affirmed.
McFADDEN and SHEPARD, JJ., concur.