McDEVITT, Justice.
This is a rehearing of an appeal brought by Randall Bainbridge from his conviction for first degree murder following a retrial of the case pursuant to State v. Bainbridge, 108 Idaho 273, 698 P.2d 335 (1985). In State v. Bainbridge, id., this Court reversed the first conviction and remanded for a new trial with instructions concerning hypnotically refreshed testimony.
The facts of this case are set forth in State v. Bainbridge, id., and State v. Sivak, 112 Idaho 197, 731 P.2d 192 (1986). In summary, Bainbridge and Sivak were convicted of the murder of a service station attendant, Dixie Wilson. Sivak was sentenced to death. Bainbridge received a fixed life sentence.
I. FOURTH AMENDMENT SEIZURES
Bainbridge claims that statements he made to police officers, in the Barrister Station interrogation' room, should have been suppressed because they were made pursuant to an illegal seizure that violated his rights under Article I, § 17 of the Idaho Constitution, and the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution, made applicable to the individual states through the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution.
When reviewing “seizure” issues, we defer to the trial court’s factual findings, unless they are clearly erroneous. We freely review, de novo, the trial court’s legal determination of whether or not an illegal seizure occurred. United States Constitution, Amendment IV; State v. Heinen, 114 Idaho 656, 759 P.2d 947 (1988). Since Bainbridge is contesting the legality of the seizure, we will review this issue de novo.
The Fourth Amendment is virtually identical to Article 1, § 17 of the Idaho Constitution which reads:
§ 17. Unreasonable searches and seizures prohibited. — The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures shall not be violated; and no warrant shall issue without probable cause shown by affidavit, particularly describing the place to be searched and the person or thing to be seized.
In this case, where no warrant was issued, the proper analysis for determining whether there has been an illegal seizure is to determine:
A. Whether the police conduct in question does, in fact constitute a seizure, and if it does;
B. Whether the seizure falls within one of the recognized exceptions to the warrant requirement. See Dunaway v. New York, 442 U.S. 200, 99 S.Ct. 2248, 60 L.Ed.2d 824 (1979); State v. Johnson, 110 Idaho 516, 716 P.2d 1288 (1986).
C. Once it has been determined that there is a constitutionally prohibited seizure, evidence or information acquired as a result of the seizure will be excluded unless the causal connection between the seizure and the acquisition has been broken. Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 83 S.Ct. 407, 9 L.Ed.2d 441 (1963); United States v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544, 100 S.Ct. 1870, 64 L.Ed.2d 497 reh. denied 448 U.S. 908, 100 S.Ct. 3051, 65 L.Ed.2d 1138 (1980); Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491, 103 S.Ct. 1319, 75 L.Ed.2d 229 (1983).
A. WHETHER THE POLICE SEIZED BAINBRIDGE
The State argues that this Court’s decision in Bainbridge 1 (that Bainbridge spoke to the police voluntarily) precludes any possible Fourth Amendment violation.
United States Supreme Court decisions hold that a seizure occurs “only if, in view of all of the circumstances surrounding the incident, a reasonable person would have believed that he was not free to leave.” United States v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544, 554, 100 S.Ct. 1870, 1877, 64 L.Ed.2d 497 (1980); See also, Florida v. Royer, 460 [248]*248U.S. 491, 502, 103 S.Ct. 1319, 1326, 75 L.Ed.2d 229 (1983); Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 88 S.Ct. 1868, 20 L.Ed.2d 889 (1968); Dunaway v. New York, 442 U.S. 200, 99 S.Ct. 2248, 60 L.Ed.2d 824 (1979).
The purpose of the Fourth Amendment and Article 1, § 17 of the Idaho Constitution is to protect a person’s legitimate expectation of privacy. See State v. Johnson, 110 Idaho 516, 716 P.2d 1288 (1986).
Upon making contact with Bainbridge, the officers promptly informed him of his Miranda rights. He stated that he did not want to talk to them until he had an opportunity to consult with his parole officer, but that he did not have a phone. One of the officers “suggested” that the three of them drive to the station house and make the call.
The record is clear that while they were in Bainbridge’s house, the officers controlled all ingress and egress. One of the officers followed Bainbridge’s spouse into the kitchen and controlled access to the rear door. The other stationed himself next to the front door in the living room where Bainbridge was located.
At this point no reasonable person would have thought they were free to leave. The officers’ “suggestion” not only reflected a desire for immediate action, but it directed the course of action to be taken. The fact that Bainbridge’s spouse told him he did not have to go is inconsequential. She was not the one being taken. She was not in his position.
Shortly after the officers and Bainbridge got into the car, they informed him that they were not going to take him to the Garden City station, but were taking him to the Barrister Station. They did not seek his approval and they did not inform him that he could refuse to go. At this point, Bainbridge was clearly seized and in police custody. The officers had Bainbridge in the squad car and were making unilateral decisions about where they were taking him.
When they arrived at the Barrister Station, the officers immediately took Bainbridge to an interrogation room. One of the officers left to call the parole officer for Bainbridge. The other stayed in the interrogation room. He informed Bainbridge of his Miranda rights and asked him questions. Bainbridge said that he wanted to talk to his parole officer. The detectives gave him a form explaining his Miranda Rights. He signed the waiver portion of that form. The officer continued to ask him questions to which Bainbridge responded. There can be no doubt that Bainbridge’s “seizure” was dramatically intensified in the Barrister Station. No reasonable person would feel free to leave under those circumstances.
In Justice White’s dissent to the majority opinion in U.S. v. Mendenhall, joined by Brennan, Marshall and Stevens, he wrote:
Whatever doubt there may be concerning whether Ms. Mendenhall’s Fourth Amendment interests were implicated during the initial stages of her confrontation with the DEA agents, she undoubtedly was “seized” within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment when the agents escorted her from the public area of the terminal to the DEA office for questioning and a strip-search of her person. In Dunaway v. New York, 442 U.S. 200, 99 S.Ct. 2248, 60 L.Ed.2d 824 (1979), we held that a person who accompanied police officers to a police station for purposes of interrogation undoubtedly was “seized in the Fourth Amendment sense,” even though “he was not told he was under arrest.” Id. at 207, 203, 99 S.Ct. at 2253, 2251. We found it significant that the suspect was taken to a police station, “was never informed that he was ‘free to go,”’ and “would have been physically restrained if he had refused to accompany the officers or had tried to escape their custody.” Id. at 212, 99 S.Ct. at 2256.[1]
Mendenhall, 100 S.Ct. at 1887.
The United States Supreme Court has consistently held that a confession obtained [249]*249during a custodial interrogation that follows an illegal seizure should be excluded regardless of whether the speaker’s Fifth or Sixth Amendment rights were violated, and there is but one exception: that is when intervening events break the causal connection between the illegal arrest and the confession so that the confession is “sufficiently an act of free will to purge, the primary taint.” Taylor v. Alabama, 457 U.S. 687, 690, 102 S.Ct. 2664, 2667, 73 L.Ed.2d 314 (1982); See also, Brown v. Illinois, 422 U.S. 590, 599-602, 95 S.Ct. 2254, 2259-61, 45 L.Ed.2d 416 (1975); Dunaway v. New York, 442 U.S. 200, 204, 99 S.Ct. 2248, 2252 (1979).
In each of the above cases the Supreme Court held that even if the statements were voluntary under the Fifth Amendment and Miranda, the Fourth Amendment issue would remain. In short, the causal connection between an illegal seizure and statements made to the police is not broken by a voluntary waiver of the Fifth Amendment alone.
B. WHETHER BAINBRIDGE’S STATEMENTS SHOULD HAVE BEEN EXCLUDED AT TRIAL
Evidence or information acquired as a result of a constitutionally impermissible seizure will be excluded unless the causal connection between the seizure and the acquisition has been broken. Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 488, 83 S.Ct. 407, 417 (1963). In further explanation of this rule, the Wong Sun court stated:
We need not hold that all evidence is “fruit of the poisonous tree” simply because it would not have come to light but for illegal actions of the police. Rather, the more apt question in such a case is “whether, granting establishment of the primary illegality, the evidence to which instant objection is made has been come at by exploitation of that illegality or instead by means sufficiently distinguishable to be purged of the primary taint.”
Id.
In explaining why a voluntary waiver of Fifth Amendment and Miranda rights does not cure an illegal seizure, the U.S. Supreme Court in Brown v. Illinois stated:
If Miranda warnings, by themselves, were held to attenuate the taint of an unconstitutional arrest, regardless of how wanton and purposeful the Fourth Amendment violation, the effect of the exclusionary rule would be substantially diluted. See Davis v. Mississippi, 394 U.S. 721, 726-27, 89 S.Ct. 1394, 1397, 22 L.Ed.2d 676 (1969). Arrests made without warrant or without probable cause, for questioning or “investigation” would be encouraged by the knowledge that evidence derived therefrom could well be made admissible at trial by the simple expedient of giving Miranda warnings. Any incentive to avoid Fourth Amendment violations would be eviscerated by making the warnings, in effect, a “cure-all,” and the constitutional guarantee against unlawful searches and seizures could be said to be reduced to a “form of words.” See Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. [643] at 648, 81 S.Ct. [1684] at 1687 [6 L.Ed.2d 1081 (1961)].
It is entirely possible, of course, as the State here argues, that persons arrested illegally frequently may decide to confess, as an act of free will unaffected by the initial illegality. But the Miranda warnings, alone and per se, cannot always make the act sufficiently a product of free will to break, for Fourth Amendment purposes, the causal connection between the illegality and the confession. They cannot assure in every case that the Fourth Amendment violation has not been unduly exploited. See Westover v. United States, 384 U.S. 436, 496-97, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 1639, 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966).
Brown, 95 S.Ct. at 2261 (footnotes omitted).
The Court went on to state:
[250]*250The question of whether a confession is the product of a free will under Wong Sun must be answered on the facts of each case. No single fact is dispositive. The workings of the human mind are too complex, and the possibilities of misconduct too diverse to permit protection of the Fourth Amendment to turn on such a talismanic test. [Referring to a test in which a voluntary waiver of Miranda rights, alone, would be sufficient to break the causal connection following an impermissible seizure, thereby making any statements pursuant to the Miranda waiver admissible.] The Miranda warnings are an important factor, to be sure, in determining whether the confession is obtained by exploitation of an illegal arrest. But they are not the only factor to be considered. The temporal proximity of the arrest and the confession, the presence of intervening circumstances, see Johnson v. Louisiana, 406 U.S. 356, 365, 92 S.Ct. 1620, 1626, 32 L.Ed.2d 152 (1972), and, particularly, the purpose and flagrancy of the official misconduct[2] are all relevant. See Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. at 491, 83 S.Ct. at 419. The voluntariness of the statement is a threshold requirement, cf. 18 U.S.C. § 3501. And the burden of showing the admissibility rests, of course, on the prosecution.
95 S.Ct. at 2261, 2262 (footnotes omitted).
In the recently released opinion, United States v. George, 883 F.2d 1407 (9th Cir. 1989), the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals explained the policy reasons behind the three considerations laid out in Brown. The court explained that the temporal proximity of the arrest and the confession and the presence of intervening circumstances assist in determining whether the defendant’s response to police questioning is sufficiently an act of free will to purge the primary taint of the unlawful invasion. Determining the “purposes and flagrancy of the official misconduct” satisfies the deterrent rationale of the exclusionary rule and has been decisive most often in cases where police officers did not have probable cause to arrest, but instead took a suspect, into custody hoping that an interrogation would yield incriminating statements.
The State bears the burden of showing that the causal connection between an impérmissible seizure and statements made by the detainee, has been sufficiently broken so as to render those statements admissible at trial. See Brown v. Illinois, 422 U.S. at 604, 95 S.Ct. at 2262. However, the Brown court also noted that even where the lower courts have failed to undertake the inquiry mandated by Wong Sun, the trial may result in a record of amply sufficient detail and depth for the reviewing court to make the determination. As in Brown, the record of the trial is amply sufficient for us to determine whether Bainbridge’s statements should have been excluded.
I. THE TEMPORAL PROXIMITY OF THE ARREST SEIZURE AND THE CONFESSION
The temporal proximity of the seizure and the confession, in this case, is analogous to the situation in Brown. In Brown, the defendant was seized at approximately 5:00 p.m. During the twenty minute drive to the police station the officers asked Brown questions which he alternately evaded or answered falsely. Upon arrival at the station house, Brown was placed in the second floor interrogation room. He was left alone for some twenty minutes. Upon returning to the interrogation room the officers warned Brown of his Miranda rights. There was no assertion that he did not understand these rights. Brown’s first statement pertaining to the murder in question was separated from his illegal arrest by less than two hours. Later, at approximately 8:45 p.m., three hours and forty-five minutes after his apprehension, Brown specifically said that he wanted to talk about the homicide.
[251]*251Like Brown, Bainbridge was seized from his home, asked questions in the squad car on the way to the police station and immediately taken to an interrogation room after arriving at the station. Upon entering the interrogation room, Bainbridge signed a written waiver of his Miranda rights. The officers then engaged him in a discussion pertaining to his activities on the day in question. Bainbridge made no incriminating statements. The officers then left him alone with his parole officer. Following this private consultation, Bainbridge admitted his presence at the time Dixie Wilson was murdered.
2. THE PRESENCE OF INTERVENING CIRCUMSTANCES
We hold that properly warning Bainbridge of his Fifth Amendment/Miranda rights by itself was not by itself sufficient to purge the taint of the impermissible seizure.
There is an additional significant factor that distinguishes the circumstances of this case from Brown. That is Bainbridge’s private consultation with his parole officer. The audio tape of the station house interrogation reveals that after discussing what Bainbridge did on the day that Dixie Wilson was murdered, one of the detectives told Bainbridge the parole officer was there, got up, opened the door, and brought Bainbridge’s parole officer, Greg Fisher, into the room. The officers briefly informed Fisher what had transpired in the interrogation room up to that point.
One officer then addressed Bainbridge, saying: “Maybe you want to hear it from Greg whether or not you ought to cooperate with us and be honest with us.”
Bainbridge responded: “I know how I sound. I sound frightened.”
Officer: “Well, you know a lot of times things happen that-ah-(to Bainbridge) let me finish — okay? A lot of times things happen that when you look at them they look pretty bad; but when you find out the reasons why they happened they’re not all that bad, or at least the reasons are a little different. We’re not lying to you when we know that you’re involved in this. We’re not lying to you. You know that you wouldn’t be here if we didn’t know.”
Bainbridge: “Yeah.”
Officer: “And, ah (pause), we’re interested, naturally, in whether or not you have an account of why it happened or how it could have happened. Don’t leave us to just draw the worst conclusion because of what we saw.”
Officer: “That’s important.”
The officers left the room.
Bainbridge then discussed the matter with Fisher for approximately the next twenty minutes. Bainbridge admitted to Fisher that he had been with Sivak when Sivak killed Dixie Wilson. Bainbridge denied any active participation in the murder, claiming that he had just watched in disbelief. Fisher then told Bainbridge that the detectives, Vaughn Killeen and Dee Pfeifer, were people that he had worked with before, to which Bainbridge replied: “That’s what they were saying. That’s why I kinda told them, I told them you know, I let them know that I was telling the truth, but they weren’t going to get it out of me.” Fisher then repeated Bainbridge’s story to him to make sure he had everything straight.
The officers came back to the interrogation room. Within moments after their return, Bainbridge stated: “I give it to you. You knew it all along and I give it to you as clear as a could without admitting it....”
Bainbridge’s statement that before meeting with Fisher he would not admit to anything shows he did not intend to admit anything or think that he had admitted anything prior to consulting with Fisher.
Bainbridge’s first admission to the officers came after he had been alone with Fisher, the person whom Bainbridge had selected for advice. Bainbridge then told the officer that he had been with Lacey Sivak in the gas station and that he had seen Sivak murder Dixie Wilson. These facts, combined with the fact that Bainbridge, from the time of his first contact [252]*252with officers Killeen and Pfeifer had said that he did not want to talk until he had the opportunity to speak with his parole officer, indicate that Bainbridge’s private consultation with Fisher was a significant intervening circumstance between the illegal seizure and Bainbridge’s incriminating statements.
3. THE PURPOSES AND FLAGRANCY OF THE OFFICIAL MISCONDUCT
“The 1 st of the three factors, ‘the purpose and flagrancy of the official misconduct,’ is ‘particularly important’ because it comes closest to satisfying the ‘deterrence rationale for application of the exclusionary rule.’ ” United States v. George, 883 F.2d 1407, 1416 (9th Cir.1989), citing United States v. Perez-Esparza, 609 F.2d 1284, 1289 (9th Cir.1979). “This factor has been decisive most often in those cases where police officers did not have probable cause to effectuate an arrest, but instead took a suspect into custody hoping that an interrogation would yield incriminating statements. E.g. Brown, 422 U.S. at 604-05; 95 S.Ct. at 2262-63; cf United States v. Howard, 828 F.2d 552, 556 (9th Cir.1987).” United States v. George, 883 F.2d at 1416.
In Brown v. Illinois, the Supreme Court explained why the illegal arrest “had a quality of purposefulness:”
The impropriety of the arrest was obvious; awareness of that fact was virtually conceded by the two detectives when they repeatedly acknowledged, in their testimony, that the purpose of their action was “for investigation” or for “questioning.” The arrest, both in design and in execution, was investigatory. The detectives embarked upon this expedition for evidence in the hope that something might turn up. The manner in which Brown’s arrest was effected gives the appearance of having been calculated to cause surprise, fright, and confusion.
Brown, 422 U.S. at 605, 95 S.Ct. at 2262 (1975) (footnotes & citations omitted).
It appears that in this case, as in Brown, the seizing officers (Killeen and Pfeifer) were on a fishing expedition. While Killeen testified at trial that the only suspects were Bainbridge and Sivak, trial testimony from Detective Pfeifer and Officer Sprague (the reporting officer) indicates something quite different. Pfeifer testified that at the time Bainbridge was seized there were four or five suspects and nothing distinguished Bainbridge from the other suspects. Officer Sprague also testified that there were a few different suspects at this time. The record corroborates Pfeifer and Spragues’ testimony. At the time Bainbridge was seized, Sivak had not even been arrested.
There was, however, nothing in the manner of the action of the officers “seizing” Bainbridge to instill surprise, fright or confusion, although Bainbridge stated, as noted, that he was frightened.
4. THE RESULT
After considering all of the factors discussed above, we hold that the threshold factor that Bainbridge was properly informed of his Miranda rights, combined with his lengthy private discussion with his parole officer interrupting any police activity, outweigh considerations that militate in favor of excluding Bainbridge’s statements made after his conversation with the parole officer.
The case law on this issue speaks in terms of whether or not there is a break in the causal connection. The intervening circumstance inquiry is the most apropos to this question. In this case, Bainbridge’s private consultation with his parole officer was a significant intervening circumstance. All along Bainbridge wanted to speak to his parole officer before talking to the detectives. After speaking to his parole officer, his story changed dramatically. And while the purposefulness of the officers’ improprietous actions is highly undesirable and should be discouraged, it is simply not enough to overcome the break in the causal connection created by Bainbridge’s private consultation with his parole officer, viewed in conjunction with his valid waiver of his Miranda Rights.
Accordingly, we hold that the statements that Bainbridge made in the station house [253]*253interrogation on the night of April 8, 1981, were properly admitted at trial.
II. TESTIMONY OF PREVIOUSLY HYPNOTIZED WITNESSES
Appellant Bainbridge argues that the district court erred in ruling that the pre-hypnotic recall of witnesses Leyden and Chilton was admissible because police reports substantiated their reliability. Both Chilton and Leyden had been at the scene of the crime on the morning that Dixie Wilson was killed. Chilton purchased gasoline and paid for it in the station. He saw Dixie Wilson and he saw two large bearded men. He stated that he sensed something was amiss. Leyden had driven up to the station and was going to go inside, but when she looked into the station she did not see her friend, Dixie Wilson. Instead she saw two men. When one of the men looked at her and started walking towards the door, she decided to leave.
Bainbridge argues that the trial court’s ruling was incorrect because: (1) at the time of trial neither Leyden or Chilton had any present memory of certain details they included in their testimony that were extremely damaging to appellant Bainbridge; and (2) the police reports of Leyden’s and Chilton’s pre-hypnotic statements were not written until after Leyden and Chilton were hypnotized. The police officers attended the hypnotic sessions. The officers’ reports could have been influenced by what they heard at the hypnosis sessions. This, Bainbridge argues, combined with the time lapse between the pre-hypnotic statements and the writing of the reports, renders the reports void of any indicia of reliability.
Appellant Bainbridge relies heavily on this Court’s opinion in State v. Iwakiri, 106 Idaho 618, 682 P.2d 571 (1984). In Iwakiri, this Court set forth six specific safeguards to be used by the district court in testing the admissibility of hypnotically refreshed testimony which were to be considered on a “totality of the circumstances” basis. In Bainbridge’s first trial, the post-hypnotic testimony of Leyden and Chilton was admitted. On retrial, the defendant filed a motion to exclude all of Leyden’s and Chilton’s testimony on the ground that it was inadmissible under Iwakiri. The trial court granted the motion in part. The trial court ruled that all testimony and evidence pertaining to Leyden’s and Chilton’s posthypnotic recall was inadmissible under Iwakiri, but that both witnesses could testify as to matters they recalled prior to being hypnotized.
The six safeguards set forth in Iwakiri pertain to post-hypnotic testimony. Accordingly, the trial court properly applied these safeguards in ruling Leyden’s and Chilton’s post-hypnotic testimony inadmissible. The Iwakiri safeguards do not pertain to pre-hypnotic testimony. Regarding pre-hypnotic testimony, the Iwakiri court stated:
[T]he trial court may determine that the witness is still competent to testify in areas where the witness’s recollection is unmarred by the hypnotic sessions. This may or may not be limited to situations where it is clear that certain parts of a witness’s memory of events were in existence before hypnosis and thus is still in existence, untainted, after hypnotic session.
Id. at 626, 682 P.2d 571.
The Court then cited Collins v. Superior Court, 132 Ariz. 180, 644 P.2d 1266 (1982), for the proposition that hypnosis does not render witnesses incompetent to testify to facts “demonstrably” recalled prior to hypnosis. With regard to what constitutes a “demonstrable showing,” the Collins court stated that:
[T]he party intending to offer the prehypnotic recall [should] appropriately record in written, tape recorded or, preferably videotaped form, the substance of the witness’ knowledge and about the evidence in question so that the prehypnotic recall may be established. Such recordation must be preserved so that at trial the testimony of that witness can be limited to prehypnotic recall. If such steps are not taken, admission of the pre-hypnotic recall will be error, which, if prejudicial, will require reversal.
644 P.2d at 1296.
Whether the witness testifies in areas unmarred by hypnotic session or de[254]*254monstratively recalled prior to hypnosis, the witness must testify from a present recollection of those matters recalled prior to hypnosis. A recording of statements made prior to hypnosis is required as a means of verifying that the witness’s testimony at trial has not been tainted by the hypnosis session.
The police reports of the pre-hypnosis interviews with Leyden and Chilton indicate that at approximately 6:45 a.m. on the day of the murder, each of the witnesses stopped at the service station and observed two men inside the station. The descriptions in those pre-hypnosis reports indicate that the two men had beards, cowboy hats, and blue jeans. They were described as being in their mid-twenties, white males, approximately six feet tall, and two hundred pounds. Leyden reported that one of them had a pot-belly and that one was bigger ,than the other.
While portions of Officer Sprague’s report are dated April 17, 1981, the details testified to at trial all appear on pages dated April 7, 1981, in Sprague’s report. Accordingly, we find no merit to appellant Bainbridge’s argument that the reports were written after the hypnosis sessions. We also find it significant that these portions of the police report statements were introduced into evidence in a manner suggested by defense counsel.
Finally, we note that defense counsel’s specific objections to Chilton’s and Leyden’s testimony were sustained. Counsel moved to strike Chilton’s testimony that the two men in the station were wearing “light-colored” clothing because in his prehypnosis statement he said that they were wearing “dark-colored” clothing. The court granted the motion and instructed the jury to disregard testimony regarding the color of clothing. Counsel objected to Leyden’s testimony as to which one of the two men had a “pot-belly” and which of the two men was “taller,” because in her prehypnosis statement she merely said that one of the two men had a “pot-belly” and one was “bigger” than the other. The court granted this motion and instructed the jury to disregard and strike from their minds this testimony.
In sum, the trial court was very cautious in dealing with Leyden’s and Chilton’s testimony. Every objection raised by defense counsel was carefully considered and correctly decided. Because the witnesses were only allowed to testify as to their then present memory of details they recalled prior to being hypnotized, and because the police report properly substantiated this testimony as being reliable and untainted by the hypnosis session, we hold that the trial court did not err.
III. TESTIMONY OF GISH
Bainbridge next asserts error in the admission of the testimony of the prosecution witness, Gish. That witness was employed to collect cash receipts from the service station where the crime was committed. She testified that she observed Sivak and another man following her along her driving route approximately one week prior to the murder. She stated her opinion that the passenger in the Sivak vehicle was Bainbridge. Bainbridge asserts that such identification allowed the jury to infer that he was involved through the planning stages of the crime. At trial, Bainbridge argued that he was an innocent, unsuspecting bystander at the crime scene. Bainbridge argues that such testimony should have been excluded because it was unreliable and highly prejudicial, thus he attacks only the weight and credibility of the witness’s testimony. We hold that the trial court did not err. The weight and credibility of that testimony was properly a matter for the jury. State v. Fenley, 103 Idaho 199, 646 P.2d 441 (Ct.App.1982).
IY. TESTIMONY OF THE JAIL HOUSE INFORMANT
Bainbridge next assigns error to the admission of testimony by one Fazio, a fellow inmate in the jail where Bainbridge was being held prior to trial.3 Bainbridge [255]*255asserts that Fazio’s testimony should have been prohibited under Massiah v. United States, 377 U.S. 201, 84 S.Ct. 1199, 12 L.Ed.2d 246 (1964); United States v. Henry, 447 U.S. 264, 100 S.Ct. 2183, 65 L.Ed.2d 115 (1980); and Maine v. Moulton, 474 U.S. 159, 106 S.Ct. 477, 88 L.Ed.2d 481 (1985). The court in Maine v. Moulton explained how testimony of jailhouse informants implicates defendants’ Sixth Amendment rights as follows:
The Sixth Amendment guarantees the accused, at least after the initiation of formal charges, the right to rely on counsel as a “medium” between him and the State. As noted above, this guarantee includes the State’s affirmative obligation not to act in a manner that circumvents the protections accorded the accused by invoking this right. The determination of whether a particular action by state agents violates the accused’s right to the assistance of counsel must be made in light of this obligation. Thus, the Sixth Amendment is not violated whenever — by luck or happenstance— the state obtains incriminating statements from the accused after the right to counsel was attached. See Henry, 447 U.S. at 276, 100 S.Ct. at 2189 (POWELL, J. concurring). However, knowing exploration by the State of an opportunity to confront the accused without counsel being present is as much a breach of the State’s obligation not to circumvent the right to the assistance of counsel as is the intentional creation of such an opportunity. Accordingly, the Sixth Amendment is violated when the State obtains incriminating statements by knowingly circumventing the accused’s right to have counsel present in a confrontation between the accused and a State agent.
106 S.Ct. at 487.
The record in this case simply does not reveal that the state took affirmative acts designed to circumvent Bainbridge’s right to counsel. Detectives Killeen and Pfeifer specifically refused to barter diminished jail time in exchange for information with Fazio. Furthermore, the detectives specifically instructed Fazio not to question Bainbridge.
While the jailer in this case did instruct Fazio to keep his eyes and ears open when he was brought to the jail, this was two weeks prior to Bainbridge’s confinement. This, combined with the fact that the jailer had no connection to Bainbridge or Killeen and Pfiefers’ investigation of the case, sufficiently distinguishes this case from the facts in United States v. Henry. (In Henry government agents instructed an informant who was confined in the same cell block as the defendant to be alert to any statements made by the defendant.)
Contrary to the facts in Massiah, Bainbridge was not housed in the same cell as Fazio. They were housed in a cell block that contained single cell units. The prisoners spent most of their hours alone in their own cells. During the hours between 8:00 a.m. and 4:00 p.m., inmates were allowed to leave their own cells and congregate in a meeting room and watch television. Although Fazio had numerous contacts with Bainbridge, including on five or six occasions reviewing Bainbridge trial documents, the crux of his testimony was that once when a number of inmates were gathered in the T.V. room, Bainbridge, comparing a woman on the T.V. screen to the victim, stated: “That’s just what she looked like. She had those great big breasts and I was squeezing her while she was squirming around. She had that death quiver.” The record indicates that Bainbridge’s comment was audible to anyone in the T.V. room and not directed to anyone in particular. Bainbridge’s broad publication of the statement proves that he did not expect any attorney client confidentiality or privacy. He spoke to anyone in general and no one in particular. It was mere “happenstance” that Fazio was present and mere “luck” that he told the police. Fazio, by his own admission, had testified at over 1,000 trials. Someone with his proven propensity to “snitch” certainly needed no encouragement from the authorities.
Appellant would have us infer from the fact that Fazio did receive favorable treatment subsequent to the first Bainbridge trial (at which he did not testify) that a “deal” had been made with him at the time [256]*256he overheard the T.V. room admission. We cannot so infer.
Defense counsel inquired into all matters relating to Fazio’s testimony at trial. Fazio, under oath, denied that his testimony was given as a result of a deal made with the police authorities, and denied that he was in any way working for the county as an informant. He also denied that he deliberately attempted to elicit any incriminating statements from Bainbridge. The trial court considered and rejected Bainbridge’s argument that Fazio was a paid police-informant. Fazio was subjected to severe cross-examination by the defense, leaving the jury to consider his credibility. Accordingly, the court ruled that Fazio’s testimony was not prohibited under Massiah, Henry and Maine v. Moulton. We agree and affirm.
PROSECUTORIAL MISCONDUCT
Appellant Bainbridge’s final attack on tlu underlying proceeding is that he was denied a fair trial because of prosecutorial misconduct. In essence, Bainbridge claims that “the prosecuting attorney engaged in almost every devious trick during the trial, and numerous incidents of his prejudicial conduct are mentioned throughout appellant’s brief____”
All of appellant’s arguments relate to either one of two matters. The first is the prosecution’s disclosures and attempted disclosures that Bainbridge was on parole at the time of the murder. The second is the prosecutor’s attempt to put the victim’s character into evidence.
The trial court had specifically ruled information pertaining to Bainbridge’s parole status inadmissible. Appellant Bainbridge claims that the prosecutor (1) nonetheless hinted that the defense had portions of a tape recording edited and the transcript thereof excluded; (2) failed to edit one reference on the tape to Bainbridge’s parole status; and (3) misquoted and argued the contents of the tape recording in closing arguments.
(1)Defense counsel failed to object to the prosecution’s statements now complained of. Furthermore, we find nothing objectionable in the prosecutor’s statements because they were merely made in an attempt to get the tapes admitted into evidence and do not indicate a deliberate effort to imply that the defense had the tapes edited.
(2) After the court ordered that portions of the tape referring to Bainbridge’s parole status be edited before going to the jury, defense counsel agreed to have the prosecution assume the task of editing. Counsel never checked the available edited versions before they went to the jury. Counsel has thereby waived any right to object. Additionally, counsel has failed to present any kind of compelling argument that this failure to edit one statement in the tape was the result of deliberate misconduct on the part of the prosecutor rather than a mere oversight. We also note that the prosecutor took precautions to prevent Fisher from testifying that he was Bainbridge’s parole officer. And, while some hints as to their relationship could be inferred from reviewing the transcript, the prosecutor did not go outside the bounds of what was necessary to establish a foundation for Fisher’s knowledge of Bainbridge.
(3) Finally, we do not believe that any of the prosecutor’s alleged misstatements were sufficiently egregious to deprive Bainbridge of a fair trial.
We now turn to the matter of character evidence.
The trial court sustained defense counsel’s objection to the prosecutor’s attempt to put the victim’s character in evidence. The prosecutor agreed that such evidence was inadmissible. Appellant Bainbridge now argues that in spite of the trial court’s ruling and the prosecutor’s agreement, the prosecutor portrayed the victim’s good character and family status to the jury throughout the trial. In State v. Izatt, 96 Idaho 667, 534 P.2d 1107 (1975), we held that the jury is entitled to base its decision on a full and accurate description of the events concerning the whole criminal act. Subsequent to the court’s ruling that evidence of the victim’s good character was inadmissible, reference was made, at differ-
[257]*257ent points during the trial, to the victim’s being well acquainted with some of her customers and her habit of extending credit to some of the customers in times of financial need. This testimony was clearly relevant to establish the credibility of the testimony of prosecution witnesses Chilton and Leyden, i.e., their familiarity with the victim and her habits. Our review of the record persuades us that no error resulted.
After reviewing the entire record, and analyzing the arguments presented, we hold that there was no prejudicial error. The conviction and sentence are affirmed.
BAKES, C.J., and JOHNSON and BOYLE, JJ., concur.