State v. Zavala

5 P.3d 993, 5 P.2d 993, 134 Idaho 532, 2000 Ida. App. LEXIS 42

• Court: Idaho Court of Appeals
• Decided: June 14, 2000
• Docket: 25225
• Status: Published

Opinions

PERRY, Chief Judge.

The state appeals from an order of the district court granting Severino Zavala’s motion to suppress. For the reasons set forth below, we reverse and remand.

I.

BACKGROUND

On May 7, 1998, a Twin Falls County deputy stopped a car for speeding. After effectuating the traffic stop, the officer approached the car and made contact with the driver. The driver provided an Illinois driver’s license identifying him as Zavala. Zavala also provided the vehicle’s registration and proof of insurance. The vehicle had Idaho license plates, but was not registered to Zavala.

The officer asked Zavala some general questions about where he was coming from and his destination. The officer returned to his patrol car and requested that other officers, including a canine unit, join him at the scene. While in his patrol car, the officer wrote Zavala a citation for speeding.

After completing all of the standard checks involved in a traffic stop, including the writing of the speeding citation, the officer again approached Zavala’s vehicle. Although he had finished writing the citation, the officer did not issue it to Zavala, but had Zavala and a passenger step out of the vehicle for further questioning regarding where they were coming from and to where they were going. Shortly after the passenger answered the officer’s questions and got back into the vehicle, the other officers arrived at the scene.

Once the other officers arrived, the initiating officer again approached the driver’s side of the vehicle. The officer handed Zavala the citation for speeding, his driver’s license, and proof of insurance and vehicle registration and informed Zavala that he was free to go. Immediately thereafter, however, the officer asked Zavala for consent to search the vehicle. After gaining, and confirming, Zavala’s consent to a vehicle search, and having the occupants of the vehicle sit on a nearby lawn, the canine unit commenced a search of the vehicle. During that search, drugs were discovered. Zavala and the other occupants of the vehicle were taken into custody. Upon being transported to the sheriffs office, Zavala was read his Miranda1 rights and signed a form indicating his waiver of those rights. In a subsequent statement, Zavala admitted to ownership of the drugs discovered in the vehicle.

Zavala was charged with possession of methamphetamine, I.C. §§ 37-2732(c)(l) and -2707(d)(2), and possession of marijuana in excess of three ounces, I.C. § 37-2732(e). Subsequently, Zavala filed a motion to suppress the evidence seized from the ear as well as his statements. The district court granted Zavala’s motion. The state appeals.

II.

ANALYSIS

A. Standard of Review

The standard of review of a suppression motion is bifurcated. When a decision on a motion to suppress is challenged, we accept the trial court’s findings of fact which were supported by substantial evidence, but we freely review the application of constitutional principles to the facts as found. State v. Atkinson, 128 Idaho 559, 561, 916 P.2d 1284, 1286 (Ct.App.1996).

B. Analysis

The district court, in granting Zavala’s motion to suppress, found the purpose of the traffic stop was completed before the other officers arrived. Thus, the district court determined that Zavala was the subject of an illegal detention. On appeal, the state does not challenge this determination. Instead, the state contends that the illegal detention ended prior to Zavala’s consent to search the vehicle being given. Therefore, the state asserts that the district court erred when it failed to determine whether Zavala’s consent to the search of the automobile was voluntary. The state asserts that if Zavala’s consent was voluntary, then neither the evidence, nor Zavala’s statement, should be suppressed.

After finding that Zavala was illegally detained, the district court stated:

The final issue is the affect of the illegal detention on the evidence found during the consensual search of the vehicle and [Zavala’s] written confession____ [T]he evidence seized from the vehicle which [Zavala] was driving cannot be introduced against [Zavala] since it was the product of an unlawful seizure.

Additionally, statements made by [Zavala] which “result from being confronted by the police with the fruits of an illegal search constitute the fruit of the poisonous tree and are inadmissible in evidence in a criminal prosecution.”

(Citations omitted.)

In this ease, the search of the vehicle was conducted without a warrant. In his motion to suppress, Zavala alleged that any consent given “was not knowingly and voluntarily given, and/or was the product of coercion.”

The district court did not determine whether the illegal detention ceased prior to the officer’s request for consent to search the automobile. Such a determination is necessary because consent to search, given during an illegal detention, is tainted by the illegality and, thus, is ineffective. Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491, 507-08, 103 S.Ct. 1319, 1329-30, 75 L.Ed.2d 229, 242-43 (1983). Where consent and a search pursuant to that consent accompany an arrest, “the events are so intertwined, one with the other, that the consent does not expunge the taint of the illegal arrest.” State v. Barwick, 94 Idaho 139, 142, 483 P.2d 670, 673 (1971). See also State v. Whiteley, 124 Idaho 261, 265, 858 P.2d 800, 804 (Ct.App.1993) (Where consent and a subsequent search accompany an arrest, the events are intertwined to the extent that if the arrest is illegal, the search pursuant to the consent is illegal as well.). There is no distinction between an illegal arrest and an illegal detention for purposes of the rule announced in Barwick and followed in Whiteley.

Furthermore, both parties concede that the district court failed to determine whether Zavala’s consent to search the vehiele was voluntarily given. Zavala’s motion to suppress placed this issue squarely before the district court. The question whether a waiver of a Fourth Amendment right was voluntary, knowing, and intelligent is a factual issue lending itself best to resolution by the trial court. State v. Josephson, 125 Idaho 119, 122, 867 P.2d 993, 996 (Ct.App.1993). Our Supreme Court has held that where a trial court did not make express findings of fact in the disposition of a motion, an appellate court should examine the “implicit” findings that support the trial court’s ruling. State v. Schevers, 132 Idaho 786, 788, 979 P.2d 659, 661 (Ct.App.1999). The state urges this Court to imply a finding of voluntariness based on the language of the district court’s order, which states the “final issue is the affect of the illegal detention on the evidence found during the consensual search of the vehicle.” However, based on the record before us, and the absence of any findings of fact regarding the voluntariness of Zavala’s consent, this Court will not imply a finding of voluntariness in the district court’s order.

Based on the foregoing analysis, the critical inquiries in the present case are whether, at the time of his consent, Zavala was still illegally detained; and, if not, whether Zavala’s consent was voluntary. Unfortunately, there are no findings by the district court contained in the record regarding either of these questions.

Accordingly, we conclude that the district court’s order must be reversed and the case remanded for further findings by the district court. We note that, the district court, in its discretion, may utilize the existing record in making the requisite findings of fact, see State v. Wren, 115 Idaho 618, 626, 768 P.2d 1351, 1359 (Ct.App.1989), because the parties relied solely on the transcript from the preliminary hearing in support of their arguments in favor of, and against, suppression.

The district court is directed to determine whether the illegal detention ended when the officer informed Zavala that he was free to go, issued Zavala the speeding citation and returned his license, registration, and proof of insurance. In order to do so, the district court must consider all the circumstances surrounding the encounter to determine whether a reasonable person would have believed that he or she was free to terminate the encounter. Florida v. Bostick, 501 U.S. 429, 439, 111 S.Ct. 2382, 2388-89, 115 L.Ed.2d 389, - (1991); State v. Ferreira, 133 Idaho 474, 479, 988 P.2d 700, 705 (Ct.App.1999). If the illegal detention had not ended when Zavala consented to the search of the vehicle, then the evidence seized from the vehicle must be suppressed.

Only if the district court finds that the illegal detention ceased, must it determine whether Zavala’s consent to search was voluntarily given. The Fourth Amendment requires that all searches and seizures be reasonable. Warrantless searches and seizures are considered unreasonable per se unless they come within one of the few specifically established and well-delineated exceptions to the warrant requirement. California v. Acevedo, 500 U.S. 565, 580, 111 S.Ct. 1982, 1991, 114 L.Ed.2d 619, 634 (1991); State v. Murphy, 129 Idaho 861, 863, 934 P.2d 34, 36 (Ct.App.1997). A search conducted pursuant to consent is such an exception to the warrant requirement. State v. Rodriguez, 128 Idaho 521, 523, 915 P.2d 1379, 1381 (Ct.App.1996). The voluntariness of an individual’s consent is evaluated in light of all the circumstances. Whiteley, 124 Idaho at 261, 858 P.2d at 803. The state has a heavy burden to prove that consent was given freely and voluntarily. State v. Huskey, 106 Idaho 91, 94, 675 P.2d 351, 354 (Ct.App.1984). The state must show that consent was not the result of duress or coercion, either direct or implied. Schneckloth v. Bustamante, 412 U.S. 218, 248, 93 S.Ct. 2041, 2058, 36 L.Ed.2d 854, 875 (1973); State v. Staatz, 132 Idaho 693, 695, 978 P.2d 881, 883 (Ct.App.1999). If the district court determines that Zavala’s consent was involuntary, then the evidence seized from the vehicle must be suppressed.

Only if the district court determines that Zavala’s consent was voluntary must the district court analyze whether Zavala’s consent was sufficiently attenuated to dissipate the taint of the illegal detention. See Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 484, 83 S.Ct. 407, 415-16, 9 L.Ed.2d 441, 453 (1963); State v. Luna, 126 Idaho 235, 239, 880 P.2d 265, 269 (Ct.App.1994). The district court must make the above findings in order to determine whether the evidence seized from the vehicle should be suppressed.

Regardless of the district court’s analysis of Zavala’s consent, it must analyze whether the causal connection between the illegal detention and Zavala’s statement was broken. See State v. Bainbridge, 117 Idaho 245, 249, 787 P.2d 231, 235 (1990). The question of whether a statement, following an illegal arrest, is the product of free will must be answered on the facts of each case. Brown v. Illinois, 422 U.S. 590, 603, 95 S.Ct. 2254, 2261, 45 L.Ed.2d 416, 427 (1975). The state bears the burden of showing that the causal connection between an impermissible seizure and a statement made by a detainee, has been sufficiently broken to render those statements admissible at trial. Bainbridge, 117 Idaho at 250, 787 P.2d at 236. When analyzing whether the state has met its burden, the district 00104; should consider, the temporal proximity of the arrest and the statement, the presence of intervening circumstances, and the purpose and flagraney of the official misconduct. Brown v. Illinois, 422 U.S. 590, 603-04, 95 S.Ct. 2254, 2261-62, 45 L.Ed.2d 416, 427-28 (1975); State v. Yeates, 112 Idaho 377, 383, 732 P.2d 346, 352 (Ct.App.1987). Additionally, we note that Miranda warnings, although an important factor in the analysis of whether an incriminating statement was the product of free will, are insufficient by themselves to attenuate the taint of an illegal arrest. Brown, 422 U.S. at 605, 95 S.Ct. at 2262, 45 L.Ed.2d at 428. This is because Miranda warnings alone do not sufficiently deter Fourth Amendment violations, id. at 601, 95 S.Ct. at 2260-61, 45 L.Ed.2d at 425-26, and an analysis under Wong Sun “mandates consideration of a statement’s admissibility in light of the distinct policies and interests of the Fourth Amendment.” Id. at 602, 95 S.Ct. at 2261, 45 L.Ed.2d at 426.

III.

CONCLUSION

We hold that the district court erred when it failed to determine whether Zavala remained unlawfully detained when he agreed to permit a search of the automobile. We further hold that the district court erred when it failed to find whether Zavala’s consent to search the vehicle was voluntary. Therefore, the order of the district court is reversed, and this ease remanded for proceedings consistent with this opinion.

Judge Pro Tern EISMANN concurs.

1 . See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966).