SHEPARD, Chief Justice.
This is a review of the decision of the Court of Appeals (State v. Elisondo, 112 Idaho 815, 736, P.2d 867 (1987), in which appellant Elisondo’s conviction for aggravated battery was affirmed. The dispositive issue here is the admission at trial of the preliminary hearing testimony of an eyewitness to the crime. Prior to 1981 the decisions of this Court prohibited the admission of such preliminary hearing testimony. In 1981 the then constituted Court overruled those prior decisions in State v. Mee, 102 Idaho 474, 632 P.2d 663 (1981) and held that the admission of such preliminary hearing testimony was not error. In the instant case the Court of Appeals followed the decision in Mee and affirmed the convic[413]*413tion. Today we overrule the decision in State v. Mee, supra, reverse the conviction, and remand for further proceedings.
The victim of the .crime was the uncle of appellant Elisondo, 74-year-old Cruse Galindo. The circumstances and severity of the crime are set forth in the opinion of the Court of Appeals and are perhaps also demonstrated by the trial court’s imposition of a 14-year indeterminate sentence. At the preliminary hearing, testimony was given by the victim Galindo and the defendant’s sister Martha, and the defendant’s daughter Christina, both of whom were witnesses to the crime.
Although subpoenaed, the defendant’s sister Martha failed to appear and testify at trial. The efforts of the State to locate and produce that witness, and whether the State made a “reasonable good faith effort” to secure the attendance of Martha are amply set forth in the decision of the Court of Appeals. The issue of a witness being “unavailable” in spite of the State’s “good faith effort to obtain his presence at trial,” was raised by the majority opinion in Mee, as it related to asserted violation of the confrontation clause of the sixth amendment to the United States Constitution. See Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56,100 S.Ct. 2531, 65 L.Ed.2d 597 (1980). Since our decision today is not based on the confrontation clause of the United States Constitution, and since we overrule Mee, further discussion or decision on unavailability of the witness despite asserted good faith efforts of the State, is unnecessary.
As stated by the Court of Appeals in its opinion in the instant case:
In Mee, the Court departed from an 80-year-old Idaho practice by condoning the admission at trial of the preliminary hearing testimony of a witness who refused to testify at trial despite reasonable efforts by the trial court and the state to have her testify.
In Mee, this Court stated in its 3-2 decision:
Appellant contends that the use of Miss Priest’s preliminary hearing testimony was foreclosed by State v. Villarreal, supra [94 Idaho 246, 486 P.2d 257 (1971)], and its predecessory case State v. Potter, 6 Idaho 584, 57 P. 431 (1899), overruling Territory v. Evans, 2 Idaho 651, 23 P. 232 (1890). We agree.
The Court then proceeded to overrule Villarreal and Potter.
In Mee the Court indulged in considerable discussion as to the facts in Potter, pointing out that the Potter Court was dealing with “depositions” of witnesses, and based its decision on the asserted violation of the confrontation clause of the United States Constitution. The Court in Mee correctly analyzed the decisions of the United States Supreme Court, which hold that the confrontation clause of the United States Constitution is not offended when the testimony of a witness at a preliminary hearing is later used at trial under certain circumstances, i.e., that the witness is unavailable at trial and good faith efforts have been made to secure attendance at trial, and that there exists sufficient indicia of trustworthiness and reliability. See Ohio v. Roberts, supra; California v. Green, 399 U.S. 149, 90 S.Ct. 1930, 26 L.Ed.2d 489 (1970).
The Court in Mee gave little if any attention to the previous decision of this Court in State v. Villarreal, supra. The Court in Mee inferred that the sole basis of the decision in Villarreal was the Court’s previous decision in State v. Potter, supra. The Court in Mee then peremptorily overruled both Potter and Villarreal.
Ohio v. Roberts, supra, and arguably California v. Green, supra, suggest that with the satisfaction of certain safeguards the testimony of a witness taken at a preliminary hearing is admissible at trial and such procedure does not offend the confrontation clause of the United States Constitution. On the other hand, we are cited to no authority of the United States Supreme Court, or any other court, holding that the prohibition to introduction of such preliminary hearing testimony is somehow offensive to the strictures of the United States Constitution. In fact, the court in both Green and Roberts points out that the states remain free to make their own decisions in this area without violating the confrontation clause of the federal Constitu[414]*414tion. As stated by Chief Justice Burger in his special concurrence in Green: “I add this comment only to emphasize the importance of allowing the States to experiment and innovate especially in the area of criminal justice. If new standards and procedures are tried in one State their success or failure will be a guide to others and to Congress.”
In Mee the Court noted that Idaho was then in a distinct minority of the states in prohibiting such testimony. We agree. Nevertheless we note that many of the decisions of other jurisdictions are based only upon the alleged violation of the confrontation clause of the United States Constitution, and do not deal with policy considerations which may dictate the need to prohibit the admission of preliminary hearing testimony of a witness.
The function of a preliminary hearing in Idaho is to determine if an offense has been committed, and further if there is probable cause to believe that the crime was committed by the accused. State v. Ruddell, 97 Idaho 436, 546 P.2d 391 (1976); State v. Haggard, 94 Idaho 249, 486 P.2d 260 (1971); State v. Linn, 93 Idaho 430, 462 P.2d 729 (1969); Freeman v. State, 87 Idaho 170, 392 P.2d 542 (1964); State v. Bilboa, 33 Idaho 128, 190 P. 248 (1920); see also I.C.R. 5.1. As stated in State v. Linn, supra, 93 Idaho at 434, 462 P.2d at 733, “[a] preliminary hearing is in no sense a trial and therefore it does not require the same formality and precision observed at a trial.” In California v. Green, supra, 399 U.S. at 196, 90 S.Ct. at 1955, it was stated: “In most ... criminal prosecutions the preliminary examination is conducted as a rather perfunctory uncontested proceeding with only one likely denouement — an order holding the defendant for trial.” Thus a preliminary hearing is a truncated proceeding conducted in a relatively informal manner for which the purpose is to make a finding of probable cause, as contrasted with the establishment of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.
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SHEPARD, Chief Justice.
This is a review of the decision of the Court of Appeals (State v. Elisondo, 112 Idaho 815, 736, P.2d 867 (1987), in which appellant Elisondo’s conviction for aggravated battery was affirmed. The dispositive issue here is the admission at trial of the preliminary hearing testimony of an eyewitness to the crime. Prior to 1981 the decisions of this Court prohibited the admission of such preliminary hearing testimony. In 1981 the then constituted Court overruled those prior decisions in State v. Mee, 102 Idaho 474, 632 P.2d 663 (1981) and held that the admission of such preliminary hearing testimony was not error. In the instant case the Court of Appeals followed the decision in Mee and affirmed the convic[413]*413tion. Today we overrule the decision in State v. Mee, supra, reverse the conviction, and remand for further proceedings.
The victim of the .crime was the uncle of appellant Elisondo, 74-year-old Cruse Galindo. The circumstances and severity of the crime are set forth in the opinion of the Court of Appeals and are perhaps also demonstrated by the trial court’s imposition of a 14-year indeterminate sentence. At the preliminary hearing, testimony was given by the victim Galindo and the defendant’s sister Martha, and the defendant’s daughter Christina, both of whom were witnesses to the crime.
Although subpoenaed, the defendant’s sister Martha failed to appear and testify at trial. The efforts of the State to locate and produce that witness, and whether the State made a “reasonable good faith effort” to secure the attendance of Martha are amply set forth in the decision of the Court of Appeals. The issue of a witness being “unavailable” in spite of the State’s “good faith effort to obtain his presence at trial,” was raised by the majority opinion in Mee, as it related to asserted violation of the confrontation clause of the sixth amendment to the United States Constitution. See Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56,100 S.Ct. 2531, 65 L.Ed.2d 597 (1980). Since our decision today is not based on the confrontation clause of the United States Constitution, and since we overrule Mee, further discussion or decision on unavailability of the witness despite asserted good faith efforts of the State, is unnecessary.
As stated by the Court of Appeals in its opinion in the instant case:
In Mee, the Court departed from an 80-year-old Idaho practice by condoning the admission at trial of the preliminary hearing testimony of a witness who refused to testify at trial despite reasonable efforts by the trial court and the state to have her testify.
In Mee, this Court stated in its 3-2 decision:
Appellant contends that the use of Miss Priest’s preliminary hearing testimony was foreclosed by State v. Villarreal, supra [94 Idaho 246, 486 P.2d 257 (1971)], and its predecessory case State v. Potter, 6 Idaho 584, 57 P. 431 (1899), overruling Territory v. Evans, 2 Idaho 651, 23 P. 232 (1890). We agree.
The Court then proceeded to overrule Villarreal and Potter.
In Mee the Court indulged in considerable discussion as to the facts in Potter, pointing out that the Potter Court was dealing with “depositions” of witnesses, and based its decision on the asserted violation of the confrontation clause of the United States Constitution. The Court in Mee correctly analyzed the decisions of the United States Supreme Court, which hold that the confrontation clause of the United States Constitution is not offended when the testimony of a witness at a preliminary hearing is later used at trial under certain circumstances, i.e., that the witness is unavailable at trial and good faith efforts have been made to secure attendance at trial, and that there exists sufficient indicia of trustworthiness and reliability. See Ohio v. Roberts, supra; California v. Green, 399 U.S. 149, 90 S.Ct. 1930, 26 L.Ed.2d 489 (1970).
The Court in Mee gave little if any attention to the previous decision of this Court in State v. Villarreal, supra. The Court in Mee inferred that the sole basis of the decision in Villarreal was the Court’s previous decision in State v. Potter, supra. The Court in Mee then peremptorily overruled both Potter and Villarreal.
Ohio v. Roberts, supra, and arguably California v. Green, supra, suggest that with the satisfaction of certain safeguards the testimony of a witness taken at a preliminary hearing is admissible at trial and such procedure does not offend the confrontation clause of the United States Constitution. On the other hand, we are cited to no authority of the United States Supreme Court, or any other court, holding that the prohibition to introduction of such preliminary hearing testimony is somehow offensive to the strictures of the United States Constitution. In fact, the court in both Green and Roberts points out that the states remain free to make their own decisions in this area without violating the confrontation clause of the federal Constitu[414]*414tion. As stated by Chief Justice Burger in his special concurrence in Green: “I add this comment only to emphasize the importance of allowing the States to experiment and innovate especially in the area of criminal justice. If new standards and procedures are tried in one State their success or failure will be a guide to others and to Congress.”
In Mee the Court noted that Idaho was then in a distinct minority of the states in prohibiting such testimony. We agree. Nevertheless we note that many of the decisions of other jurisdictions are based only upon the alleged violation of the confrontation clause of the United States Constitution, and do not deal with policy considerations which may dictate the need to prohibit the admission of preliminary hearing testimony of a witness.
The function of a preliminary hearing in Idaho is to determine if an offense has been committed, and further if there is probable cause to believe that the crime was committed by the accused. State v. Ruddell, 97 Idaho 436, 546 P.2d 391 (1976); State v. Haggard, 94 Idaho 249, 486 P.2d 260 (1971); State v. Linn, 93 Idaho 430, 462 P.2d 729 (1969); Freeman v. State, 87 Idaho 170, 392 P.2d 542 (1964); State v. Bilboa, 33 Idaho 128, 190 P. 248 (1920); see also I.C.R. 5.1. As stated in State v. Linn, supra, 93 Idaho at 434, 462 P.2d at 733, “[a] preliminary hearing is in no sense a trial and therefore it does not require the same formality and precision observed at a trial.” In California v. Green, supra, 399 U.S. at 196, 90 S.Ct. at 1955, it was stated: “In most ... criminal prosecutions the preliminary examination is conducted as a rather perfunctory uncontested proceeding with only one likely denouement — an order holding the defendant for trial.” Thus a preliminary hearing is a truncated proceeding conducted in a relatively informal manner for which the purpose is to make a finding of probable cause, as contrasted with the establishment of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.
At a preliminary hearing the defense has little reason to cross-examine prosecution witnesses since “only television lawyers customarily demolish the prosecution in the magistrate’s court” and it is assumed by most to be a tactical error to indulge in extensive cross-examination of prosecution witnesses since such “may easily amount to a grant of gratis discovery to the state.” See Brennan, J. dissenting in California v. Green, supra. As noted in the dissent in Mee:
Until today it has been deemed advisable by the prosecution, the defense and the courts that an accused be granted a preliminary hearing at a very early point in time. Reflecting the concern of the court is Idaho Criminal Rule 5.1 indicating that if an accused is in custody, a preliminary hearing must be held “in any event not later than 14 days following the defendant’s request for a preliminary hearing,” and if not in custody then “no later than 21 days after the request for a preliminary hearing.
From the standpoint of the prosecution, it is clearly undesirable to, at the preliminary stage, conduct an entire trial, but rather it is better to present only such evidence as will satisfy the probable cause requirement, to thereafter file an information and then prepare for and go to total trial as quickly as possible to be consistent with the accused’s right to a speedy trial. From the defense standpoint, if the prosecution has no case, it will be discovered in its failure to sustain its burden of showing probable cause and the accused will be free at an early time.
If an accused must anticipate that upon his ultimate trial he may be faced with the testimony taken at the preliminary hearing, he must be thoroughly prepared at the preliminary hearing. Clearly all discovery on the part of the defense must be completed prior to the preliminary hearing and presumably all motions to suppress or for a physical or a mental examination and the like should have been made and ruled upon prior to the preliminary hearing. The defense would not be able to, as is presently customary, reserve its cross-examination for the time of trial. In brief, the result in preliminary hearing procedure would [415]*415in time and effort be largely duplicative of that spent at a subsequent trial. I doubt that the increased thorough preparation for a preliminary hearing can be conducted within the time constraints of our present rules and policies.
We conclude that the Court erred in State v. Mee, supra, when it authorized the introduction of the preliminary hearing testimony of a witness not present at trial. Hence, we overrule State v. Mee to the extent it is inconsistent with our decision today. We emphasize that our decision today is not based on an asserted violation of the confrontation clause of the United States Constitution, but rather the independent right of a state to exercise its own authority in this area, and our view that public policy considerations require such decision. In determining whether this decision should apply prospectively or retroactively, we have weighed the purpose of this new rule, the reliance of our trial courts and prosecutors on State v. Mee, and the effect of this new rule on the administration of justice. State v. Whitman, 96 Idaho 489, 491, 531 P.2d 579, 581 (1975). We conclude that our decision shall apply only prospectively, i.e., to this case, to future appeals, and to appeals now pending in which similar testimony was admitted.
The conviction is reversed and the cause remanded for further proceedings.
BISTLINE, HUNTLEY and JOHNSON, JJ., concur.