State v. Warner

564 N.E.2d 18, 55 Ohio St. 3d 31, 1990 Ohio LEXIS 1383
CourtOhio Supreme Court
DecidedOctober 26, 1990
DocketNos. 89-584 and 90-84
StatusPublished
Cited by251 cases

This text of 564 N.E.2d 18 (State v. Warner) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Ohio Supreme Court primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
State v. Warner, 564 N.E.2d 18, 55 Ohio St. 3d 31, 1990 Ohio LEXIS 1383 (Ohio 1990).

Opinion

Holmes, J.

Because Warner and Schiebel were tried together, numerous issues presented on appeal by the state and on cross-appeal by the defendants are intertwined. To avoid duplication, we have resolved issues common to both defendants in either the instant case or State v. Schiebel (1990), 55 Ohio St. 3d 71, 564 N.E. 2d 54.

89-584

In case No. 89-584, the issues are whether there was clear and convincing evidence that Warner was unavoidably prevented from timely filing his motion for a new trial, and whether the aliunde rule incorporated into Evid. R. 606(B) was violated. For the reasons expressed in State v. Schiebel, supra, we hold that the court of appeals erred in substituting its judgment for that of the trial court. Thus, the judgment of the court of appeals is reversed.

90-84

I

Special Prosecutor

On cross-appeal, Warner’s first proposition of law maintains that the appointment of the special prosecutor violated the principle of separation of powers embodied in the Ohio Constitution. Defendant claims that the legislation creating the special prosecutor in this case compelled the special prosecutor to act in a particular manner and, therefore, the General Assembly, not the Governor, directed the substance of the special prosecutor’s duties. Further, defendant claims that the legislation unconstitutionally divested the executive department of its absolute discretion to decide whether to investigate and prosecute a particular matter.

As a preliminary issue we note, as did the court of appeals, that both defendants waived the issue of the constitutionality of the office of special prosecutor as established by Am. S.B. No. 147 by not challenging the legislation at trial. However, due to the importance of the legislation and its effects on the parties, we will examine the merits of this issue.

In response to the collapse of Home State and other Ohio savings and loan institutions, the General Assembly promulgated Am. S.B. No. 1477 (“the Act”), which “[r]equire[d] that ihe special prosecutor appointed [42]*42under S.B. 119 of the 116th General Assembly to investigate and prosecute any criminal violations relating to the closing of the Home State Savings Bank [and] also investigate and prosecute criminal violations by any public [43]*43official or other person relating to financial losses incurred by any municipal corporation as a result of transactions with E.S.M. Government Securities, Inc.” Committee Comment to Am. S.B. No. 147. The purpose behind the Act was to require the Ohio Attorney General to appoint a special prosecutor to investigate and prosecute criminal violations committed in connection with events leading to the naming of a conservator for Home State. Id. The special prosecutor was commissioned, through Am. S.B. No. 134, with the same powers county prosecuting attorneys have under R.C. 2939.10.8 Id. at 1-2.

We begin this analysis with the presumption that the Act is constitutional, and it will not be declared unconstitutional unless it “appear[s] beyond a reasonable doubt that the legislation and constitutional provisions are clearly incompatible.” State, ex rel. Dickman, v. Defenbacher (1955), 164 Ohio St. 142, 57 O.O. 134, 128 N.E. 2d 59, paragraph one of the syllabus; State, ex rel. Jackman, v. Cuyahoga Cty. Court of Common Pleas (1967), 9 Ohio St. 2d 159, 161, 38 O.O. 2d 404, 405, 224 N.E. 2d 906, 908-909 (“* * * when an enactment of the General Assembly is challenged, the challenger must overcome a strong presumption of constitutionality”).9 Although the federal Constitution is a grant of power to the federal Congress, the state Constitution is primarily a limitation on legislative power of the General Assembly; therefore, the General Assembly may pass any law unless it is specifically prohibited by the state or federal Constitutions. Jackman, supra, at 161-162, 38 O.O. 2d at 405, 224 N.E. 2d at 909.

In discussing the doctrine of separation of powers, we stated in South Euclid v. Jemison (1986), 28 Ohio St. 3d 157, 158-159, 28 OBR 250, 251-252, 503 N.E. 2d 136, 138, that:

“* * * While Ohio, unlike other jurisdictions, does not have a constitutional provision specifying the concept of separation of powers, this doctrine is implicitly embedded in the entire framework of those sections of the [44]*44Ohio Constitution that define the substance and scope of powers granted to the three branches of state government. See State v. Harmon (1877), 31 Ohio St. 250. See, also, State, ex rel. Bryant, v. Akron Metro. Park Dist. (1929), 120 Ohio St. 464. While no exact rule can be set forth for determining what powers of government may or may not be assigned by law to each branch, Harmon, supra, at 258, * * [i]t is nevertheless true, in the American theory of government, that each of the three grand divisions of the government, must be protected from encroachments by the others, so far that its integrity and independence may be preserved. * * *’ Fairview v. Giffee (1905), 73 Ohio St. 183, 187.”

In the case at bar, the General Assembly retained no powers of appointment, removal, supervision or review over the special prosecutor once the Act was passed. Rather, as the Act provided, the Attorney General held the power of appointment, which impliedly included the power to remove the special prosecutor and supervise or review his actions. Warner and Schiebel have failed to identify any portion of the Act which diminished the Attorney General’s authority to assist or control the investigation by the special prosecutor. Instead, Warner claims that a letter dated August 6, 1985 sent to special prosecutor Lawrence A. Kane, Jr., by the Attorney General removed any control the executive branch had over the special prosecutor.10 The letter, specifically drafted to address Kane’s compensation as special prosecutor pursuant to his appointment by the Attorney General, reserved the power to terminate the special prosecutor at any time, subject to the limitations of the March 21, 1985 appointment letter establishing his authority to complete an investigation. Although the Attorney General indicated that he would not exercise control over the office of the special prosecutor, there was no legislative mandate that he abstain. Clearly, the level of involvement by the Attorney General’s office was left within the prerogative of the Attorney General and not the General Assembly. The General Assembly’s involvement was limited strictly to a call for executive action. Thus, Warner’s argument that the General Assembly somehow controlled the investigation by the special prosecutor is without merit. We hold that the commissioning of a special prosecutor is a constitutional exercise of legislative power when the General Assembly has conferred the powers of appointment, removal and supervision on the state Attorney General.

The second part of Warner’s discussion on the violation of the separation of powers doctrine is based on the prosecutor’s power to obtain sub[45]*45poenas. We reject this argument. Issuing subpoenas is a ministerial, not a judicial function. The Act mandates that the clerk of any court of common pleas, not the court itself, issue subpoenas when requested.11

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Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
564 N.E.2d 18, 55 Ohio St. 3d 31, 1990 Ohio LEXIS 1383, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/state-v-warner-ohio-1990.