Beck v. Washington

369 U.S. 541, 82 S. Ct. 955, 8 L. Ed. 2d 98, 1962 U.S. LEXIS 2210

• Court: Supreme Court of the United States
• Decided: June 25, 1962
• Docket: 40
• Status: Published

Opinions

Mr. Justice Clark

delivered the opinion of the Court.

Petitioner David D. Beck contends that his conviction of grand larceny in the Superior Court of the State of Washington for King County is invalid under the Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment. This contention is based primarily on what is characterized as voluminous and continuous adverse publicity circulated by news media in the vicinity of Seattle, Washington, where he was indicted and tried. Specifically he claims, inter alia, that the grand jury was unfairly impaneled and instructed, that the prosecutor acted improperly before the grand jury, and that his motions for a change of venue and for continuances were erroneously denied. The judges of the Supreme Court of Washington divided equally in review, 56 Wash. 2d 474, 349 P. 2d 387, 353 P. 2d 429, leaving petitioner’s conviction undisturbed. We granted certiorari limited to the above contentions, 365 U. S. 866, and we now affirm the conviction.

I. The Publicity oe Which Petitioner Complains.

In addition to challenges to the grand and petit juries, petitioner prior to the selection of the petit jury made five motions on the ground of bias and prejudice arising from the publicity, viz., one to quash the indictment, three for continuances ranging from one month to an indefinite period, and one for a change of venue to Snohomish or Whatcom County. Petitioner’s counsel supported his factual contentions in regard to these various motions by his personal affidavits as well as by photostats of stories appearing in local newspapers and national magazines. We shall now summarize the highlights of the publicity set forth by the petitioner in his moving papers and exhibits.

The Select Committee on Improper Activities in the Labor or Management Field of the United States Senate began its investigation on February 26, 1957. In early March the Chairman of the Committee announced that the Committee had “produced ‘rather conclusive’ evidence of a tie-up between West Coast Teamsters and underworld bosses to monopolize vice in Portland, Ore.” The announcement also stated that “Teamsters’ President Dave Beck and Brewster [also a Teamster leader] will be summoned for questioning on a charge that they schemed to control Oregon’s law enforcement machinery from a local level on up to the governor’s chair.”

On March 22 the Committee was quoted in the newspapers as stating “$250,000 had been taken from Teamster funds . . . and used for Beck’s personal benefit.” Petitioner appeared before the Committee on March 26, and the newspapers reported: “BECK TAKES 5TH AMENDMENT President of Teamsters ‘Very Definitely’ Thinks Records Might Incriminate Him.” Television cameras were permitted at the hearings. One Seattle TV station ran an 8%-hour “live” broadcast of the session on March 27, and films of this session were shown by various TV stations in the Seattle-Tacoma area. The April 12 issue of the U. S. News & World Report ran a caption: “Take a look around Seattle these days, and you find what a Senate inquiry can do to a top labor leader in his own home town.” On April 26 the county prosecutor announced that a special grand jury would be impaneled in Seattle “to investigate possible misuse of Teamsters Union funds by international president Dave Beck . . . .” It was later announced that former Mayor Devin of Seattle was to be appointed Chief Special Prosecutor. On May 3 petitioner was indicted by a federal grand jury at Tacoma for income tax evasion. The announcement of this action was of course in front-page headlines. Five days later the petitioner was again called as a witness before the Committee in Washington. News stories on his appearance concentrated on his pleading of the Fifth Amendment 60 times during the hearings. Other stories emanating from the Committee hearings were featured intermittently, and on May 20, the day of the convening of the special grand jury, the Chairman of the Senate Committee announced that “the Committee has not convicted Mr. Beck of any crime, although it is my belief that he has committed many criminal offenses.” The publicity continued to some degree after the grand jury had been convened and during the three-week period in which the prosecutors were gathering up documentary evidence through the use of grand jury subpoenas. Among other stories that appeared was one of June 4 stating that at the Committee hearings “Beck, Jr., who even refused to say whether he knew his father, took shelter behind the [fifth] amendment 130 times, following the example of Beck, Sr., who refused to answer 210 times in three appearances before the committee.” The indictment in this case was returned by the special grand jury on July 12 and of course received banner headlines. Intermittent publicity continued, some from Washington, D. C., until August 28 when a federal grand jury indicted petitioner and others on additional income tax evasion counts. The co-conspirators named in this latter indictment were then called before the Committee in Washington, and these hearings, which were held on November 5, brought on additional publicity. On November 12 Dave Beck, Jr., went to trial on other larceny charges and was convicted on November 23, a Saturday. The state papers gave that event considerable coverage. The trial of petitioner in this case began on December 2 and continued until his conviction on December 14.

II. The Objections to the Grand Jury Proceedings.

Ever since Hurtado v. California, 110 U. S. 516 (1884), this Court has consistently held that there is no federal constitutional impediment to dispensing entirely with the grand jury in state prosecutions. The State of Washington abandoned its mandatory grand jury practice some 50 years ago.¹ Since that time prosecutions have been instituted on informations filed by the prosecutor, on many occasions without even a prior judicial determination of “probable cause” — a procedure which has likewise had approval here in such cases as Ocampo v. United States, 234 U. S. 91 (1914), and Lem Woon v. Oregon, 229 U. S. 586 (1913). Grand juries in Washington are convened only on special occasions and for specific purposes. The grand jury in this case, the eighth called in King County in 40 years, was summoned primarily to investigate circumstances which had been the subject of the Senate Committee hearings.

In his attempts before trial to have the indictment set aside petitioner did not contend that any particular grand juror was prejudiced or biased. Rather, he asserted that the judge impaneling the grand jury had breached his duty to ascertain on voir dire whether any prospective juror had been influenced by the adverse publicity and that this error had been compounded by his failure to adequately instruct the grand jury concerning bias and prejudice. It may be that the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment requires the State, having once resorted to a grand jury procedure, to furnish an unbiased grand jury. Compare Lawn v. United States, 355 U. S. 339, 349-350 (1958); Costello v. United States, 350 U. S. 359, 363 (1956); Hoffman v. United States, 341 U. S. 479, 485 (1951). But we find that it is not necessary for us to determine this question; for even if due process would require a State to furnish an unbiased body once it resorted to grand jury procedure — a question upon which we do not remotely intimate any view — we have concluded that Washington, so far as is shown by the record, did so in this case.

Petitioner’s appearance before the Senate Committee was current news of high national interest and quite normally was widely publicized throughout the Nation, including his home city of Seattle and the State of Washington. His answers to and conduct before the Committee disclosed the possibility that he had committed local offenses within the jurisdiction of King County, Washington, against the laws of that State. In the light of those disclosures the King County authorities were duty-bound to investigate and, if the State’s laws had been violated, to prosecute the offenders. It appears that documentary evidence — in the hands of petitioner’s union — was necessary to a complete investigation. The only method available to secure such documents was by grand jury process, and it was decided therefore to impanel a grand jury. This Washington was free to do.

Twenty-three prospective grand jurors were called. The trial judge explained, as is customary in such matters, that they had been called primarily to investigate possible crimes committed in King County by officers of the Teamsters Union which had been the subject of the Senate Committee hearings. In impaneling the grand jury the judge, after determining their statutory qualifications, businesses, union affiliations and the like, asked each of the prospective jurors: “Is there anything about sitting on this grand jury that might embarrass you at all?” In answer to this or the question of whether they were conscious of any prejudice or bias, which was asked whenever previous answers suggested a need for further inquiry, two admitted they were prejudiced by the publicity and were excused. Another stated that whether he was prejudiced was “pretty hard to answer,” and he, too, was excused. In addition three persons who were or had been members of unions that were affiliated with petitioner’s union were excused. The remaining 17 were accepted and sworn as grand jurors and as a part of the oath swore that they would not “present [any] person through envy, hatred or malice.” Among them were a retired city employee who had been a Teamster, the manager of a real estate office, a bookkeeper, an engineer, an airplane manufacturer’s employee, a seamstress whose husband was a union member, a material inspector, a gravel company superintendent who was a former Teamsters Union member, a civil engineer with the State Department of Fisheries, and an engineer for a gyroscope manufacturer.

In his charge to the grand jury the trial judge explained that its “function is to inquire into the commission of crime in the county,” that ordinarily this was done “by the regularly established law enforcement agencies,” but that this was impossible here because further investigation was necessary requiring the attendance of witnesses and the examination of books and records which a prosecutor had no power to compel. As to the purpose for which it was called, he explained that “disclosures” by the Senate Investigating Committee indicated “hundreds of thousands of dollars of the funds” of the Teamsters Union had been “embezzled or stolen” by its officers. He also stated that the president of the Teamsters had “publicly declared” that the money he had received was a loan. “This presents a question of fact,” he added, “the truth of which is for you to ascertain.” After mentioning other accusations he concluded, “I urge you to do all that you can within practical limitations to ascertain the truth or falsity of these charges. . . . You have a most serious task to perform .... It is a tremendous responsibility, and I wish you well in your work.”

It is true that the judge did not admonish the grand jurors to disregard or disbelieve news reports and publicity concerning petitioner. Nor did he mention or explain the effect of the invocation of the Fifth Amendment by petitioner before the Committee or inquire as to the politics of any panel member. Discussion along such lines might well have added fuel to the flames which some see here. Apparently sensing this dilemma the judge admonished the grand jury that its function was to inquire into the commission of crime in the county and that it was to conduct an examination of witnesses as well as books and records. Twice in his short statement he said that it was for the grand jury to determine whether the charges were true or false. Taking the instructions as a whole, they made manifest that the jurors were to sift the charges by careful investigation, interrogation of witnesses, and examination of records, not by newspaper stories.

In the light of these facts and on the attack made we cannot say that the grand jury was biased. It was chosen from the regular jury list. Some six months thereafter a petit jury to try this case was selected from the same community and, as will hereafter be shown, was not found to be prejudicéd. Indeed, every judge who passed on the- issue in the State’s courts, including its highest court, has so held. A look at the grand jury through the record reveals that it was composed of people from all walks of life, some of whom were former union members. The judge immediately and in the presence of all of the panel eliminated six prospective grand jurors when indications of prejudice appeared. No grand juror personally knew petitioner or was shown to be adverse to the institutions with which petitioner is generally identified. Every person who was selected on the grand jury took an oath that he would not indict any person through “hatred or malice.” Moreover, the grand jury sat for six weeks before any indictment was returned against petitioner. The record also indicates that it heard voluminous testimony on the charges that had been made against petitioner and others and that it gave the matter most meticulous and careful consideration. We therefore conclude that petitioner has failed to show that the body which indicted him was biased or prejudiced against him.

In addition to the above due process contention three equal protection arguments are made by petitioner or suggested on his behalf. First, petitioner argues he is a member of a class (Teamsters) that was not accorded equal treatment in grand jury proceedings. The contention is based on references to the Teamsters by the judge impaneling the grand jury as he conducted the voir dire and explained the scope of the investigation. The complete answer to petitioner’s argument is that references to the Teamsters were necessary in the voir dire to eliminate persons who might be prejudiced for or against petitioner and in the instructions to explain the purpose and scope of this special body. Petitioner has totally failed to establish that non-Teamsters who are members of groups under investigation are given any different treatment.

Secondly, it is said that the Washington statute permitting persons in custody to challenge grand jurors, Revised Code of Washington § 10.28.030, denies equal protection to persons not in custody who are investigated by grand juries. This point is not properly before this Court. Although both opinions of the Washington Supreme Court discuss the interpretation of § 10.28.030, neither considered that question in light of the equal protection argument for that argument was never properly presented to the court in relation to this statute. The Washington Supreme Court has unfailingly refused to consider constitutional attacks upon statutes not made in the trial court, even where the constitutional claims arise from the trial court’s interpretation of the challenged statute. E. g., Johnson v. Seattle, 50 Wash. 2d 543, 313 P. 2d 676 (1957).² Petitioner’s formal attack at the trial court level did not even mention § 10.28.030, much less argue that a restrictive interpretation would be unconstitutional under the Equal Protection Clause.³ That the prosecution and the court viewed petitioner as outside the scope of § 10.28.030 was brought home to him in the course of the trial court proceedings on his grand jury attack. But even then petitioner did not suggest that constitutional considerations might compel a different result. The failure to inject the equal protection contention into the case was carried forward to the proceedings before the Washington Supreme Court when petitioner failed to comply with that court’s rule prescribing the manner in which contentions are to be brought to its attention. Rule 43 of the Rules on Appeal, Revised Code of Washington, provides that “[n]o alleged error of the superior court will be considered by this court unless the same be definitely pointed out in the 'assignments of error’ in appellant’s brief.” Mere generalized attacks upon the validity of the holding below as petitioner made in his “assignments of error” ⁴ are not considered by reason of this rule sufficient to invoke review of the underlying contentions. See, e. g., Washington v. Tanzymore, 54 Wash. 2d 290, 292, 340 P. 2d 178, 179 (1959); Fowles v. Sweeney, 41 Wash. 2d 182, 188, 248 P. 2d 400, 403, (1952). Nor will the Washington Supreme Court search through the brief proper to find specific contentions which should have been listed within the “assignments of error.” See Washington ex rel. Linden v. Bunge, 192 Wash. 245, 251, 73 P. 2d 516, 518-519 (1937). Moreover, the failure of petitioner to argue the constitutional contention in his brief, as opposed to merely setting it forth as he did in one sentence of his 125-page brief, is considered by the Washington Supreme Court to be an abandonment or waiver of such contention. E. g., Martin v. J. C. Penney Co., 50 Wash. 2d 560, 565, 313 P. 2d 689, 693 (1957); Washington v. Williams, 49 Wash. 2d 354, 356-357, 301 P. 2d 769, 770 (1956). Nor was the equal protection contention made at all in the petitions for rehearing filed after the Supreme Court had agreed with the lower court’s interpretation of the statute to exclude petitioner. Assuming arguendo that for the purposes of our jurisdiction the question would have been timely if raised in a petition for rehearing, not having been raised there or elsewhere or actually decided by the Washington Supreme Court, the argument cannot be entertained here under an unbroken line of precedent. E. g., Ferguson v. Georgia, 365 U. S. 570, 572 (1961); Capital City Dairy Co. v. Ohio, 183 U. S. 238, 248 (1902). Furthermore, it was not within the scope of the questions to which the writ of certiorari in this case was specifically limited, 365 U. S. 866, and for this additional reason cannot now be presented.

The final argument under the Equal Protection Clause is that Washington has singled out petitioner for special treatment by denying him the procedural safeguards the law affords others to insure an unbiased grand jury. But this reasoning proceeds on the wholly unsupported assumption that such procedures have been required in Washington in all other cases.⁵ Moreover, it is contrary to the underlying finding of the Superior Court, in denying the motion to dismiss the indictment, that the grand jurors were lawfully selected and instructed. And even if we were to assume that Washington law requires such procedural safeguards, the petitioner’s argument here comes down to a contention that Washington law was misapplied. Such misapplication cannot be shown to be an invidious discrimination. We have said time and again that the Fourteenth Amendment does not “assure uniformity of judicial decisions . . . [or] immunity from judicial error . . . .” Milwaukee Electric Ry. & Light Co. v. Wisconsin ex rel. Milwaukee, 252 U. S. 100, 106 (1920). Were it otherwise, every alleged misapplication of state law would constitute a federal constitutional question. Finally, were we to vacate this conviction because of a failure to follow certain procedures although it has not been shown that their ultimate end — a fair grand jury proceeding — was not obtained, we would be exalting form over substance contrary to our previous application of the Equal Protection Clause, e. g., Graham v. West Virginia, 224 U. S. 616, 630 (1912).

Petitioner also contends that a witness before the grand jury was improperly interrogated in a manner which prejudiced his case before that body. It appears that an employee of petitioner’s union was called before the grand jury to testify in reference to activities within his employment. During his first appearance he made statements which he subsequently changed on a voluntary reappearance before the grand jury some two days before the indictment was returned. On the second appearance the prosecutor attacked the witness’ changed story as incredible and warned him that he was under oath, that he might be prosecuted for perjury, and that there was no occasion for him to go to jail for petitioner. The record indicates that the prosecutor became incensed over the witness’ new story; and though some of his threats were out of bounds, it appears that they had no effect upon the witness whatsoever for he stuck to his story. We can find no irregularity of constitutional proportions, and we therefore reject this contention.

III. The Objections as to the Petit JuRy.

As in his grand jury attack, petitioner makes no claim that any particular petit juror was biased. Instead, he states the publicity which prevented the selection of a fair grand jury also precluded a fair petit jury. He argues that such a strong case of adverse publicity has been proved that any jury selected in Seattle at the time he was tried must be held to be presumptively biased and that the trial court’s adverse rulings on his motions for a change of venue and for continuances were therefore in error. Of course there could be no constitutional infirmity in these rulings if petitioner actually received a trial by an impartial jury. Hence, our inquiry is addressed to that subject.

Petitioner’s trial began early in December. This was nine and one-half months after he was first called before the Senate Committee and almost five months after his indictment. Although there was some adverse publicity during the latter period which stemmed from the second tax indictment and later Senate hearings as well as from the trial of petitioner’s son, it was neither intensive nor extensive. The news value of the original “disclosures” was diminished, and the items were often relegated to the inner pages. Even the occasional front-page items were straight news stories rather than invidious articles which would tend to arouse ill will and vindictiveness. If there was a campaign against him as petitioner infers, it was sidetracked by the appearance of other “labor bosses” on the scene who shared the spotlight.

The process of selecting a jury began with the exclusion from the panel of all persons summoned as prospective jurors in the November 12 trial of Dave Beck, Jr. In addition, all persons were excused who were in the courtroom at any time during the trial of that case. Next, the members were examined by the court and counsel at length. Of the 52 so examined, only eight admitted bias or a preformed opinion as to petitioner’s guilt and six others suggested they might be biased or might have formed an opinion — all of whom were excused. Every juror challenged for cause by petitioner’s counsel was excused; in addition petitioner was given six peremptory-challenges, all of which were exercised. Although most of the persons thus selected for the trial jury had been exposed to some of the publicity related above, each indicated that he was not biased, that he had formed no opinion as to petitioner's guilt which would require evidence to remove, and that he would enter the trial with an open mind disregarding anything he had read on the case.

A study of the voir dire indicates clearly that each juror’s qualifications as to impartiality far exceeded the minimum standards this Court established in its earlier cases as well as in Irvin v. Dowd, 366 U. S. 717 (1961), on which petitioner depends. There we stated:

“To hold that the mere existence of any preconceived notion as to the guilt or innocence of an accused, without more, is sufficient to rebut the presumption of a prospective juror’s impartiality would be to establish an impossible standard. It is sufficient if the juror can lay aside his impression or opinion and render a verdict based on the evidence presented in court.” Id., at 723.

We cannot say the pretrial publicity was so intensive and extensive or the examination of the entire panel revealed such prejudice that a court could not believe the answers of the jurors and would be compelled to find bias or preformed opinion as a matter of law. Compare Irvin v. Dowd, supra, at 723-728, where sensational publicity adverse to the accused permeated the small town in which he was tried, the voir dire examination indicated that 90% of 370 prospective jurors and two-thirds of those seated on the jury had an opinion as to guilt, and the accused unsuccessfully challenged for cause several persons accepted on the jury. The fact that petitioner did not challenge for cause any of the jurors so selected is strong evidence that he was convinced the jurors were not biased and had not formed any opinions as to his guilt. In addition, we note that while the Washington Supreme Court was divided on the question of the right of an accused to an impartial grand jury, the denial of the petitioner’s motions based on the bias and prejudice of the petit jury did not raise a single dissenting voice.

“While this Court stands ready to correct violations of constitutional rights, it also holds that 'it is not asking too much that the burden of showing essential unfairness be sustained by him who claims such injustice and seeks to have the result set aside, and that it be sustained not as a matter of speculation but as a demonstrable reality.’ ” United States ex rel. Darcy v. Handy, 351 U. S. 454, 462 (1956). This burden has not been met.

Affirmed.

Me. Justice Frankfurter took no part in the decision of this case. Mr. Justice White took no part in the consideration or decision of this case.

1 Washington Laws 1909, c. 87.

2 Washington v. Griffith, 52 Wash. 2d 721, 328 P. 24 897 (1958), does not detract from this principle. In Griffith the Washington Supreme Court, while recognizing the general rule that constitutional arguments cannot be presented for the first time in the Supreme Court, found an exception to this general rule when the accused in a capital case asserts his court-appointed attorney incompetently conducted his trial. The reasons for such an exception are obvious, and it is just as obvious that such reasons are not applicable to the present case.

3 Petitioner made the following attacks upon the grand jury:

“Motion to Set Aside and Dismiss Indictment — Filed October 18, 1957

“Comes Now David D. Beck, also known as Dave Beck, defendant herein, by and through his attorneys of record herein, and respectfully moves to set aside and dismiss the indictment on the following grounds:

“1. That the grand jurors were not selected, drawn, summoned, impaneled or sworn as prescribed by law.

“2. That unauthorized persons, not required or permitted by law to attend sessions of the grand jury were present before the grand jury during the investigation of the allegations of the indictment.

“3. That persons other than the grand jurors were present before the grand jury during consideration of the matters and things charged in the indictment.

“4. That the proceedings of the grand jury which returned the indictment were conducted in an atmosphere of extreme bias, prejudice and hostility toward this defendant, and that said atmosphere was in part created by the Prosecuting Attorney and by persons acting or claiming to act upon his behalf; all of which was prejudicial to this defendant and which has denied and will continue to deny him rights guaranteed under the 14th Amendment of the Constitution of the United States, Amendment 10 of the Constitution of the State of Washington, and Article I, § 3 of the Constitution of the State of Washington.

“5. That by reason of extreme bias, prejudice and hostility toward the defendant herein, contributed to in part by the conduct of the Prosecuting Attorney and persons acting or claiming to act upon his behalf, it is and will be impossible for the defendant to secure and obtain a fair and impartial trial in the jurisdiction of this Court, all of which is and will be prejudicial to this defendant and which will constitute a denial of his rights guaranteed under the 14th Amendment of the Constitution of the United States, Amendment 10 of the Constitution of the State of Washington, and Article I, § 3 of the Constitution of the State of Washington.

“6. That the Court erred in its instructions and directions to the Grand Jury to the prejudice of the defendant and in denial of rights guaranteed under the 14th Amendment of the Constitution of the United States, Amendment 10 of the Constitution of the State of Washington, and Article I, § 3 of the Constitution of the State of Washington.

“7. That there were excluded from the Grand Jury persons of defendant’s financial, social and business class and occupation, contrary to the 14th Amendment to the Constitution of the United States, and contrary to Article I, § 3 of the Constitution of the State of Washington.

“8. That the defendant herein was required and compelled to give evidence against himself, contrary to the provisions of Article I, § 9 of the Constitution of the State of Washington and the 5th and 14th Amendments of the Constitution of the United States.

“9. That the Grand Jury committed misconduct in violation of RCW 10.28.085 and R.CW 10.28.100.

“This motion is based upon all of the files, records, transcripts, exhibits and affidavits herein.”

"Challenge to Grand Jury — Filed October 18, 1957

“Comes Now the defendant herein and challenges each and all of the members of the grand jury which returned the indictment herein for the reason and on the grounds that the Court which impaneled said grand jury made no determination as to whether a state of mind existed on the part of any juror such as would render him unable to act impartially and without prejudice.”

4 Petitioner’s 29 “assignments of error” included the following:

“6. The lower court erred in denying appellant’s motion to set aside and dismiss the indictment.

“7. The lower court erred in denying appellant’s challenge to grand jury.

“25. The court denied appellant’s rights to a fair and impartial grand jury.”

However, when petitioner did attempt to conform to the rule of the Washington Supreme Court by pointing out “definitely” the errors committed in denying his attacks upon the grand jury, he limited the review to violations of the Due Process Clause as set out below.

“29. The appellant was denied due process of law under the Fourteenth Amendment of the Constitution of the United States of America and under the Tenth Amendment of the Constitution of the State of Washington, as follows:

“a. by denying appellant his right to challenge the grand jury or to dismiss the indictment for bias and prejudice of the grand jury members.

“b. by denying his motions for continuance and change of venue thereby forcing appellant to go to trial in an atmosphere of extreme hostility and prejudice.

“c. by misconduct of the prosecutor

“1. during and after the grand jury proceedings, and

“2. at the trial.

“d. by denying appellant an opportunity to examine or inspect transcripts of proceedings before the grand jury after the State had introduced evidence of particular statements made before the grand jury by cross-examination or secondary evidence.

“e. the means used to accuse and convict appellant were not compatible with reasonable standards of fair play.”

5 There are no reported Washington cases so holding. The two cases on which this claim is predicated, Washington v. Guthrie, 185 Wash. 464, 56 P. 2d 160 (1936), and Washington ex rel. Murphy v. Superior Court, 82 Wash. 284, 144 P. 32 (1914), were concerned only with whether the members of the grand jury had been selected by chance as the law requires. Quotations from these cases when read in context clearly have reference only to the desirability of selecting grand jurors by chance. Petitioner in his rehearing petition before the Washington Supreme Court quoted from two unnamed, unreported Washington grand jury proceedings in which some prospective jurors were questioned as to bias. Even if it were clear that all the jurors in those cases were so questioned (which it is not), such isolated, unreviewable instances would not establish that Washington law requires the claimed procedures.