Mr. Justice Brown,
after making the foregoing statement, delivered the opinion of the court.
Two issues are presented by the record in this case, which are so far distinct as to require separate consideration. They depend upon the applicability of different provisions of the Constitution, and, in determining the question of affirmance or reversal, should not be confounded. The first of these involves the immunity of the witness from oral examination; the second, the legality of his action in refusing to produce the documents called for by the subpoena duces tecum.
1. The appellant justifies his action in refusing to answer the [59]*59questions propounded to him, 1st, upon the ground that there was no specific “ charge ” pending before the grand jury against any particular person; 2d, that the answers would tend to criminate him.
The first objection requires a definition of the word “ charge” as used in this connection, which it is not easy to furnish. An accused person is usually charged with crime by a complaint made before a committing magistrate, which has fully performed its office when the party is committed or held to bail, and it is quite unnecessary to the finding of an indictment by a grand jury; or by an information of the district attorney, which is of no legal value in prosecutions for felony; or by a presentment usually made, as in this case, for an offense committed in the presence of the jury; or by an indictment which, as often as not, is drawn after the grand jury has acted upon the testimony. If another kind of charge be contemplated, when and by whom must it be preferred? Must it be in writing, and if so, in what form? Or may it be oral? The suggestion of the witness that he should be furnished with' a copy of such charge, if applicable to him is applicable to other witnesses summoned before the grand jury. .Indeed, it is a novelty in criminal procedure with which we are wholly unacquainted, and one which might involve a betrayal of the secrets of the grand jury room.
Under the ancient English system, criminal prosecutions were instituted at the suit of private prosecutors, to which the King lent his name in the interest of the public pfeace and good order of society. In such cases the usual practice was to prepare the proposed indictment and lay it before the grand jury for their consideration. There was much propriety in this, as the most valuable function oi the grand jury was not only to examine into the commission of crimes, but to stand between the prosecutor and the accused, and to determine whether the charge was founded upon credible testimony or was dictated by malice or personal ill will.
We are pointed to no case, however, holding that a grand jury [60]*60cannot proceed without the formality of a written charge. Indeed, the oath administered to the foreman, which has come down to us from the most ancient times, and is found in Rex v. Shaftsbury, 8 Howell’s State Trials, 759, indicates that the' grand jury was competent to act solely on its own volition. This oath was that “you shall diligently inquire and true presentments make of all such matters, articles, and things as shall be given to you in charge, as of all other matters, and things as shall come to your own knowledge touching this present service, ” etc. This oath láas remained substantially unchanged to the present day. There was a difference, too, in the nomenclature of the two cases of accusations by private persons and upon their own knowledge. In the former case their action was embodied in an indictment formally laid before them for their consideration; in the latter case, in the form of a presentment. Says Blaekstone in his Commentaries, Book IV, page 301:
“A presentment, properly speaking, is a notice taken by a' grand jury of any offense from their own knowledge or observation, without any bill of indictment laid before them at the suit of the King, as the presentment of a nuisance, a libel, and the like; upon which the officer of the court must afterwards frame an indictment, before the party presented can be put to answer it.”'
Substantially the same language is used in 1 Chitty Crim. Law, 162.
In United States v. Hill, 1 Brock. 156, it was indicated by Chief Justice Marshall that a presentment and indictment are to be considered as one act, the second to be considered only as an amendment to the first, and that the usage of this country has been to pass over, unnoticed, presentments on which the attorney does not think it proper to institute proceedings.
In a case arising in Tennessee the grand jury, without the agency of the district attorney, had called witnesses before them, whom they interrogated as to. their knowledge concerning the then late Cuban expedition. Mr. Justice Catron sustained the legality of the proceeding and compelled the wit[61]*61nesses to answer. His opinion is reported in Wharton’s Criminal Pleading and Practice, 8th ed. §337. He says: “The grand jury have the undoubted right to send for witnesses and have them sworn to give evidence generally, and to found presentments on the evidence of such witnesses; and the question here is, whether a witness thus introduced is legally bound to disclose whether a crime has been committed, and also who committed the crime. ” His charge contains a thorough discussion of the whole subject.
While presentments have largely fallen into disuse in this country, the practice of grand juries acting upon notice, either of their own knowledge or upon information obtained by them, and incorporating their findings in an indictment, still largely obtains. Whatever doubts there may be with regard to the early English procedure, the practice in this country, under the system of public prosecutions carried on by officers of the State appointed for that purpose, has been entirely settled since the adoption of the Constitution. ' In a lecture delivered by Mr. Justice Wilson of this court, who may be assumed to have known the current practice, before the students of the University of Pennsylvania, he says (Wilson’s Works, vol. II, page 213):
“It has been alleged, that grand juries are confined, in their inquiries, to the bills offered to them, to the crimes given them in charge, and to the evidence brought before them by the prosecutor. But these conceptions are much too contracted; they present but a very imperfect and unsatisfactory view of the duty required from grand jurors, and of the trust reposed in them. They are not appointed for the prosecutor or for the court; they are appointed-for the government and for the people; and of both the government and people it is surely the concernment that; on one hand, all crimes, whether given or not given in charge, whether described or not described with. professional skill, should receive the punishment, which the law denounces; and thatf on the other hand, innocence, however Strongly assailed by accusations drawn up in regular form, and [62]*62by accusers, marshalled in legal array, should, on full investigation, be secure in that protection, which the law engages that she shall enjoy inviolate.
“The oath of a grand juryman — and his oath is the commission under which he acts — assigns no limits, except those marked by diligence itself, to the course of his inquiries: Why, then, should it be circumscribed by more contracted boundaries? Shall diligent inquiry be enjoined? And shall the means and opportunities of inquiry be-prohibited or restrained?”
Similar language was used by Judge Addison, President of the Court of Common Pleas, in charging, the grand jury at the session of the Common Pleas Court in 1791 (Addison’s Pa. Rep. Appx. p. 38):
“If the grand jury, of their own knowledge, or the knowledge of any of them, or from the examination of witnesses, know of any offense committed in the county, for which no indictment is preferred to them, it is their duty, either to inform the officer, who prosecutes for the State, of the nature of the offense, and desire that an indictment for it be laid before them; or, if they do not, or if no such indictment be given them, it is their duty to give such information of it to the court; stating, without any particular form, the facts and circumstances which constitute the offense. This is called a presentment. ”
■ The practice then prevailing, with regard to the duty of grand juries, shows that a presentment may be based not only upon their own personal knowledge, but from the examination of witnesses.
While no case has arisen in this court in which the question has been distinctly presented, the authorities in the state courts largely preponderate in favor of the theory that the grand jury may act upon information received by them from the examination of witnesses without a formal indictment, or other charge previously laid before them. An analysis of cases approving of this method of procedure would unduly burden this opinion, but the following are the leading ones upon the subject: Ward v, State, 2 Missouri, 120; State v. Terry, 30 Missouri, 368; Ex [63]*63parte Brown, 72 Missouri, 83; Commonwealth v. Smyth, 11 Cushing, 473; State v. Wolcott, 21 Connecticut, 272, 280; State v. Magrath, 44 N. J. L. 227; Thompson & Merriam on Juries, §§ 615-617. In Blaney v. Maryland, 74 Maryland, 153, the court said:
“However restricted the functions of the grand juries may be elsewhere, we hold that in this State they have plenary inquisitorial powers, and may lawfully themselves, and upon their own motion, originate charges against offenders though no preliminary proceedings have been had before a magistrate, and though neither the court not the state’s attorney has laid the matter before them.”
The rulings of the inferior Federal courts are to the same effect. Mr. Justice Field, in charging a grand jury in California (2 Sawy. 667), said to the grand jury acting upon .their own knowledge:
“ Not by rumors or reports, but by knowledge acquired from the evidence before you; and from your own observations. Whilst you are inquiring as to one offense, another and á different offense may be proved, or witnesses before you may, in testifying, commit'-the crime of perjury.”
Similar language was used in United States v. Kimball, 117 Fed. Rep. 156, 161; United States v. Reed, 2 Blatch. 435, 449; United States v. Terry, 39 Fed. Rep. 355. And in Frisbie v. United States, 157 U. S. 160, it is said by Mr. Justice Brewer:
“But in this country it is for the grand jury to investigate any alleged crime, no matter how or by whom suggested to them, and after determining that the evidence is sufficient to justify putting the suspected party on trial, to direct the preparation of the formal charge or indictment. ”
There are doubtless a few cases in the state courts which take • a contrary view, but they are. generally such as deal with the abuses of the system, as the indiscriminate summoning of witnesses with no definite object in view and in a spirit of meddlesome inquiry. In the most pertinent of these cases, In re Lester, 77 Georgia, 143, the Mayor of Savannah, who was also ex [64]*64officio the presiding judge of a court of record, was called upon to bring into the Superior Court the “Information Docket” of his court, to be used as evidence by the State in certain cases pending before the grand jury. It was held “that the powers of the body are inquisitorial to a certain extent is undeniable; yet they have to be .exercised within well defined limits. . . .
The grand jury can find.no bill nor make any presentment except upon the testimony of witnesses sworn in a particular case, •where the party is charged with a specified offense. ”
This case is readily distinguishable from the one under consideration, in the fact that the subpcena in this case did specify the action as one between the United States and the American Tobacco Company and the MacAndrews-Forbes Company; and that the Georgia Penal Code prescribed a form of oath for the grand jury, “that the evidence you shall give the grand jury on this bill of indictment (or presentment, as the case- may be, here state the case), shall.be the truth,” etc. This seems to confine the witness to a charge already laid -before the jury;
In Lewis v. Board of Commissioners, 74 N. Car. 194, the English practice, which requires a preliminary investigation where the accused can confront the accuser and witnesses with testimony, was adopted, as more consonant to principles of justice and personal liberty. It was further said that none but witnesses have any business before the grand jury, and that the solicitor may not be present, even to examine them. The practice in this particular in the Federal courts has been- quite the contrary.
Other cases lay down the principle that it must be made to appear, to the grand jury that there is reason to believe that a crime has been committed, and that they have not the power to institute or prosecute an inquiry on the chance that some crime may be discovered. In Matter of Morse, 18 N. Y. Criminal Rep. 312; State v. Adams, 70 Tennessee, 647 (an unimportant case, turning upon a local statute). In Pennsylvania grand juries are somewhat more restricted in their powers than is usual in other States, McCullough v. Commonwealth, 67 Pa. St. [65]*6530; Rowand v. Commonwealth, 82 Pa. St. 405; Commonwealth v. Green, 126 Pa. St. 531, and in Tennessee inquisitorial powers are granted in certain cases and withheld in others. State v. Adams, supra; State v. Smith, Meigs, 99.
We deem it entirely clear that under the practice in this country, at least, the examination of witnesses need not be preceded by a presentment or indictment formally 'drawn up, but that the grand jury may proceed, either upon their own knowledge or upon the-examination of witnesss, to inquire for themselves whether a crime cognizable by the court has been committed; that the result of their investigations may be subsequently embodied-in an indictment, and that in summoning witnesses it is quite sufficient to apprise them of the names of the parties with respect to whom they will be called to testify, without indicating the nature of the charge against them. So valuable is this inquisitorial power of the grand jury that, in States where felonies may be prosecuted by information as well as indictment, the power is ordinarily reserved to courts of impanelling grand juries for the investigation of riots, frauds and nuisances, and other cases where it is impracticable to ascertain in advance the names of the persons implicated. It is impossible to conceive that in such cases the examination of witnesses must be stopped until a basis is laid by an indictment formally preferred, when the very object of the examination is to ascertain who shall be indicted. As criminal prosecutions are instituted by the State through an officer selected for that purpose, he is vested with a certain discretion with respect to the cases he will call to their attention, the number and character of the witnesses, the form in which the indictment shall be drawn, and other details of the proceedings. Doubtless abuses of this power may be imagined, as if the object of the inquiry were merely to pry into the details of domestic or business life. But were such abuses called to the attention of the court, it would doubtless be alert to repress them. While the grand jury may not indict upon current rumors or unverified reports, they may act upon knowledge acquired either from their own obser[66]*66vations or upon the evidence of witnesses given before them.
2. Appellant also invokes the protection- of the Fifth Amendment to the Constitution, which declares that no person “shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself, ” and in reply to various questions put to him he declined to answer, on the ground that he would thereby incriminate himself.
The answer to this is found in a proviso to the General Appropriation Act of February 25, 1903, 32 Stat. 854, 904, that “no person shall be prosecuted or be subjected to any penalty or forfeiture for or on account of any transaction, matter or thing concerning which he may testify or produce evidence, documentary or otherwise, in any proceeding, suit, or prosecution under said acts, ” of which-the Anti Trust Law is one, providing, however, that “no person so testifying shall be exempt from prosecution or punishment for perjury committed in so testifying. ”
While there may be some doubt whether the examination of witnesses before a grand jury is a suit or prosecution, we have no doubt that it is a “proceeding” within the meaning of this proviso. The word should receive as wide a construction as is necessary to protect the witness in his disclosures, whenever such disclosures are made in pursuance of a judicial inquiry, whether such inquiry be instituted by a grand jury, or upon the trial of an indictment found by them. The word “ proceeding ” is not a- technical one, and is aptly used by courts to designate an inquiry before a grand jury. It has received this interpretation in a number of cases. Yates v. The Queen, 14 Q. B. D. 648; Hogan v. State, 30 Wisconsin, 428.
The object of the amendment is to establish in express language and-upon a firm basis the general principle of English and American jurisprudence, that no one shall be compelled to give testimony which may expose him to prosecution for crime. It is not declared that he may not be compelled to testify to facts which may impair his reputation for probity, or even tend to disgrace him, but the,line is drawn at testimony that may ex[67]*67pose him to prosecution. If the testimony relate to criminal acts long since past, and against the prosecution of which the statute of limitations has run, or for which he has already received a pardon or is guaranteed an immunity, the amendment does not apply.
The interdiction of the Fifth Amendment operates only where a witness is asked to incriminate himself — in other words, to give testimony which may possibly expose him to a criminal charge. But if the criminality has already been taken away, the Amendment ceases to apply. ' The criminality provided against is a present, not a past criminality, which lingers only as a memory and involves no present danger of prosecution. To put an extreme case, a man'in his boyhood or youth may have committed acts which the law pronounces criminal, but it would never be asserted that he would thereby be made a criminal for life. It is here that the law steps in and says that if the offense be outlawed or pardoned, or its criminality has been removed by statute, the Amendment ceases to apply. The extent of this immunity was fully considered by this court in Counselman v. Hitchcock, 142 U. S. 547, in which the immunity offered by Rev. Stat. section 860, was declared to be insufficient. In consequence of this decision an act was passed applicable to testimony before the Interstate Commerce Commission in almost the exact language of the act of February 25, 1903; above quoted. This act was declared by this court in Brown v. Walker, 161 U. S. 591, to afford absolute immunity against prosecution for the offense to which the question related, and deprived the. witness of his constitutional right to refuse to answer. Indeed, the act was passed apparently to meet the declaration in Counselman v. Hitchcock, p. 586, that “a statutory enactment; to be valid, must afford absolute immunity against future prosecution for the offense to which the question relates. ” If the constitutional Amendment were unaffected by the immunity statute, it would put it within the power of .the witness to be his own judge as to what would tend' to incriminate him, and would justify him in refusing to answer almost [68]*68any question in a criminal case, unless it clearly appeared that the immunity was not set up in good faith.
We need not restate the reasons given in Brown v. Walker, both in the opinion of the court, and in the dissenting opinion, wherein all the prior authorities were reviewed, and a conclusion reached by a majority of the court, which fully covers the case under consideration.
The suggestion that a person who has testified compulsorily before a grand jury may net be able, if subsequently indicted for some matter concerning which he testified, to procure the evidence necessary to maintain his plea, is more fanciful than real. He would have not only his own oath in support of his immunity, but the notes often, though not always, taken of the testimony before the grand jury, as well as the testimony of the prosecuting officer, and of every member of the jury present. It is scarcely possible that all of them would have forgotten the general nature of his incriminating testimony or that any serious conflict would arise therefrom. In any event, it is a question relating to the weight of the testimony, which could scarcely be considered in determining the effect of the immunity statute. The difficulty of maintaining a case upon the available evidence is a danger which the law does not recognize. In prosecuting a case, or in setting up a defense, the law takes no account of the practical difficulty which either party may have in procuring his testimony. It judges of the law by the facts which each party claims, and not by what he' may ultimately establish.
The further suggestion that the statute offers no immunity from prosecution in the state courts was also fully considered in Brown v. Walker and held to be no answer. The converse of this was also decided in Jack v. Kansas, 199 U. S. 372, namely, that the fact that an immunity granted to a witness under a state statute .would not prevent a prosecution of such witness for a violation of a Federal statute, did not invalidate such statute under the Fourteenth Amendment. It was held both by this court and by the Supreme Court of Kansas that [69]*69the possibility that information given by the witness might be used under the Federal act did not operate as a reason for permitting the witness to refuse to answer, and that a danger so unsubstantial and remote did not impair the legal immunity. Indeed, if the argument were a sound one it might be carried still further and held to apply not only to state prosecutions within the same jurisdiction, but to prosecutions under the criminal laws of other States to which the witness might have subjected himself. The question has been fully considered in England, and the conclusion reached by the courts of that country that the only danger to be considered is one arising within the same jurisdiction and under the same sovereignty. Queen v. Boyes, 1 B. & S. 311; King of the Two Sicilies v. Willcox, 7 State Trials (N. S.), 1049, 1068; State v. March, 1 Jones (N. Car.), 526; State v. Thomas, 98 N. Car. 599.
The case of United States v. Saline Bank, 1 Pet. 100, is not in conflict with this. That was a bill for discovery, filed by the United States against the cashier of the Saline Bank, in the District Court of the Virginia District, who pleaded that the emission of certain unlawful bills took place, within the State of Virginia, by the law whereof penalties were inflicted for such emissions. It was held that defendants were not bound to answer and s.ubject themselves to those penalties. It is sufficient to say that the prosecution was under a state law which imposed the penalty, and that the Federal court was simply administering the state law, and no question arose as to a prosecution under another jurisdiction.
But it is further insisted that while the immunity statute may protect individual witnesses it would not protect the corporation of which appellant was the agent and representative. This is true, but the answer is that it was not designed to do so. The right of a person under the Fifth Amendment to refuse to incriminate himself is purely a personal privilege of the witness. It was never intended to permit him to plead the fact that some third person might be incriminated by his testimony, even [70]*70though he were the agent o.f such person. A privilege so extensive might be used to put a stop to the examination of every witness who was called upon to testify before the grand jury with regard to the doings or business of his principal, whether such principal were an individual or a corporation. The question whether a corporation is a “person” within the meaning of this Amendment really does not arise, except perhaps where a corporation is called upon to answer a bill of discovery, since it can only be heard by oral evidence in the person of some one of its agents or employés. The Amendment is limited to a person who shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself, and if he cannot set up the privilege of a third person, he certainly cannot set up the privilege of a corporation. As the combination or conspiracies provided against by the Sherman Anti Trust Act can ordinarily be proved only by the testimony of parties thereto, in the person of their agents or employés, the privilege claimed would practically nullify the whole act of Congress. Of what use would it be for the legislature to declare these combinations unlawful if the judicial power may close the door of access to every available source of information upon the subject? Indeed, so strict is the rule that the privilege is. a personal one that it has been held in some cases that counsel will not be allowed to make the objection. We hold that the questions should have been answered.
3. The second branch of. the case relates to the non-production by the witness "of the books and papers called for by the subpoena duces ■ tecum. The witness put his' refusal on the ground, first, that it was impossible for him-to collect them within the timé allowed; second, because he was advised by counsel that under the circumstances he was under no obligation to produce them; and, finally, because they might tend to incriminate him.
' Had the witness relied solely upon the first ground, doubtless the court would have given him the necessary time. The last ' ground we have already held untenable. While the second ground does not set forth with technical accuracy the real .rea[71]*71son for declining ;o produce them, the witness could.not be expected to speak with legal exactness, and we think is entitled to assert that the subpoena was an infringement upon the Fourth Amendment to the Constitution, which declares that “the right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no warrants shall issue but upon probable cause, supported by oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to.be seized.”
The construction of this amendment was exhaustively considered in the case of Boyd v. United States, 116 U. S. 616, which was an information in rem against certain cases of plate glass, alleged to have been imported in fraud of the revenue acts. On the trial it became important to show the quantity and value of the glass contained in a number of cases previously imported; and the district judge, under section 5 of the act of June 22, 1874, directed a notice to be given to the claimants, requiring them to produce the invoice of these cases under penalty that the allegations respecting their contents should be taken as confessed. We held (p. 622) “that a compulsory production of a man’s private papers to establish a criminal charge against him, or to forfeit his property, is within the scope of the Fourth Amendment to the Constitution, in all cases in which a search and seizure would be, ” and that the order in question was an unreasonable search and seizure within that Amendment.
The history of .this provision of the Constitution and its connection with the former practice of general warrants, or writs of assistance, was given at great length, and the conclusion reached that the compulsory extortion of a man’s own testimony, or of his private papers, to connect him with a crime or a forfeiture of his goods, is illegal (p. 634), “is compelling him to be a witness against himself, within the meaning of the Fifth Amendment to the Constitution, and is the equivalent of a search and seizure — and an unreasonable search and seizure— within the Fourth Amendment.
[72]*72Subsequent cases treat the Fourth and Fifth Amendments as quite distinct, having different histories, and performing separate functions. Thus in the case of Interstate Commerce Commission v. Brimson, 154 U. S. 447, the constitutionality of the Interstate Commerce Act, so far as it authorized the Circuit Courts to use their processes in aid of inquiries before the Commission, was sustained, the court observing in that connection :
“It was clearly competent for Congress, to that end, to invest the Commission with'authority to require the attendance and testimony of witnesses, and the production of books, papers, tariffs, contracts, agreements and documents relating to any matter legally committed to that body for investigation. We do not understand that any of these propositions are disputed in this case.”
The case of Adams v. New York, 192 U. S. 585, which was a writ of error to the Supreme Court of the State of New York, involving the seizure of certain gambling paraphernalia, was treated as involving the construction of the Fourth and Fifth Amendments to the Federal Constitution. It was held, in substance, that the fact that papers pertinent to the issue may have been illegally taken from the possession of the party against whom they are offered, was not a valid objection' to their admissibility; that the admission, as evidence in a criminal trial of papers found in -the execution of a valid search warrant prior to the indictment, was not an infringement of the Fifth Amendment, and that by the introduction of such evidence defendant was not compelled to incriminate himself. The substance of the opinion is contained in the following paragraph. It was contended that “If a search warrant is issued for stolen property and burglars’ tools be discovered and seized, they are to be excluded from testimony by force of these Amendments. We think they were never intended to have that effect, but are rather designed to protect against compulsory testimony from a defendant against himself in a criminal trial, and to punish wrongful invasion of the home of the citizen or the unwarranted seizure of his papers and property, and to [73]*73render invalid legislation or judicial procedure having such effect. ”
The Boyd case must also be read in connection with the still later case of Interstate Commerce Commission v. Baird, 194 U. S. 25, which arose upon the petition of the Commission for orders requiring the testimony of witnesses and the production of certain books, papers and documents. The case grew out of a complaint against certain railway companies that they charged unreasonable and unjust rates for the transportation of anthracite coal. Objection' was made to the production of certain contracts between these companies upon the ground that it would compel the witnesses to furnish evidence against themselves in violation of the Fifth Amendment, and would also subject the parties to unreasonable searches and seizures. It was held that the Circuit Court erred in holding the contracts to be irrelevant, and in refusing, to order their production as evidence by the witnesses who were parties to the appeal. In delivering the opinion of the court the Boyd case was again considered in connection with the Fourth and Fifth Amendments, and the remark made by Mr. Justice Day that the immunity statute of 1893 “ protects the witness from such use of the testimony given as will result in his punishment for crime or the forfeiture of his estate.”
. Having already held that by reason of the immunity act of 1903, the witness could not avail himself of the Fifth Amendment, it follows that he cannot set up that Amendment as against the production of the books and papers, since, in respect to these he would also be protected by the immunity act. ; We think it quite clear that the search and seizure clause of the Fourth Amendment was not inténded to interfere with the power of courts to compel, through a subpoena duces tecum, the production, upon a trial in court, of documentary evidence. As remarked in Summers v. Moseley, 2 Cr. & M. 477, it would be “utterly impossible to carry on the administration of justice” without this writ. The following authorities are conclusive upon this question: Amey v. Long, 9 East, 473; Bull v. Love-[74]*74land, 10 Pick. 9; U. S. Express Co. v. Henderson, 69 Iowa, 40; Greenleaf on Evidence, 469a.
If, whenever an officer or employé of a corporation were summoned before, a grand jury as a witness he could refuse to produce the books and documents of such corporation, upon the ground that they would incriminate the corporation itself, it would result in the failure of a large number of cases where the illegal combination was determinable only upon the examination of such papers. Conceding that the witness was an officer' of the corporation under investigation, and that he was entitled to assert the rights of the corporation with respect to the production of its books and papers, we are of the opinion that there is a clear distinction in this particular between an individual and a corporation, and that the latter-has no right to refuse to submit its books and papers for an examination at the suit of the State. The individual may stand upon his constitutional rights as a citizen. He is entitled to carry on his private business in his own way. His power to contract is unlimited. He owes no duty to the State or to his neighbors to divulge his business, or to open his doors to an investigation, so far'as it may tend to’ criminate him. He owes no such duty to the State, since he receives nothing therefrom, beyond the protection of his life and property. His rights are such as existed by the' law of the land long antecedent to the organization of the State, and can only be taken from him by due process of law, and in accordance with the Constitution. Among his rights are a refusal to incriminate himself, and the immunity of himself and his property from arrest or seizure except under a warrant of the law. He owes nothing to- the public so long as he does not trespass upon their rights.
.Upon the other hand, the corporation is a creature of 'the State. It is presumed to be incorporated for the benefit of the public. It receives certain special privileges and franchises, and holds them subject to the laws of the State and the limitations of its charter. Its powers are limited by law. It can make no contract not authorized by its charter. Its rights to [75]*75act as a corporation are only preserved to it so long as it obeys the laws of its creation. There is a reserved right in the legislature to investigate its contracts and find out whether it has exceeded its powers. It would be a strange anomaly to hold that a State, having chartered a corporation-to make use of certain franchises, could not in the exercise of its sovereignty inquire how these franchises had been employed, and whether they had been abused, and demand the production of the corporate books and papers for that purpose. The defense amounts to this: That an officer of a corporation, which is charged with a criminal violation of the statute, may plead the criminality of such corporation as a refusal to produce its books. To state this proposition is to answer it. While an individual may lawfully refuse to answer incriminating questions unless protected by an immunity statute, it does not follow that a corporation, vested with special privileges and franchises, may refuse to show its hand when charged with an abuse of such privileges.
It is true that the corporation in this case was chartered under the laws of New Jersey, and that it receives its franchise from the legislature of that State; but such franchises, so far as they involve questions of interstate commerce, must also be exercised in subordination to the power of Congress to regulate such commerce, and in respect to this the General Government may also assert a sovereign authority to ascertain whether such franchises have been exercised 'in a lawful manner, with a due regard to its own laws. Being subject to this dual sovereignty, the General Government possesses the same right to see that its own laws are respected as the State would have with respect to the special franchises vested in it by the laws, of the State. The powers of the General Government in this particular in the vindication of its own laws, are the same as if the corporation had been created by an act of Congress. It is not intended to intimate, however, that it has a general visitatorial power over state corporations.
4. Although, for the reasons above stated, we are of the [76]*76opinion that an officer of a corporation which is charged with a violation of a statute of the State of its creation, or of an act of Congress passed in the exercise of its constitutional powers, cannot refuse to produce the books and papers of such corporation, we do not wish to be understood as holding that a corporation is not entitled to immunity, under the Fourth Amendment, against unreasonable searches and seizures. A corporation is, after all, but an association of individuals under an assumed name and with a distinct legal entity. In organizing itself as a collective body it waives no constitutional immunities appropriate to such body. Its property cannot be taken without compensation. It can only be proceeded against by due process of law, and is protected, under the Fourteenth Amendment, against unlawful discrimination. Gulf &c. Railroad Company v. Ellis, 165. U. S. 150, 154, and cases cited. Corporations are a necessary feature of modem business activity, and their aggregated capital has become the source of nearly all great enterprises.
We are also of opinion that an order for the production of books and papers may constitute an unreasonable search and seizure within the Fourth Amendment. While a search ordinarily implies a quest by an officer of the law, and a seizure contemplates a forcible dispossession of the owner, still, as was held in the Boyd case, the substance of the offense is the compulsory production of private papers, whether under a search warrant or a subpoena duces tecum, against which the person, be he individual or corporation, is entitled to protection. Applying the test of reasonableness to the present case, we think the subpoena duces tecum is far too sweeping in its terms to be regarded as reasonable. It does' not require the production of a single contract, or of contracts with a particular corporation, or a limited number of documents, but all understandings, contracts or correspondence bntween the MacAndrews & Forbes Company, and no less than six different companies, as well as ' all reports made, and accounts rendered by such companies from the date of the organization of the MacAndrews & Forbes Com[77]*77pany, as well as all letters received by that company since its organization from more than a dozen different companies, situated in seven different States in the Union.
If the writ had required the production of all the books, papers and documents found in the office of the MacAndrews & Forbes Company, it would scarcely be more universal-in its operation, or more completely put a stop to the business of that company. Indeed, it is difficult to say how its business could be carried on after it had been denuded of this mass of material, which is not shown to be necessary in the prosecution of this case, and is clearly in violation of the general principle of law with regard to the particularity required in the description of. documents necessary to a search warrant or subpoena.. Doubtless many, if not all, of these documents may ultimately be required, but some necessity should be shown, either from, an examination of the witnesses orally, or from the known transactions of these companies with the other companies implicated, or some evidence of their materiality produced, to justify an order for the production of such a mass of papers. A general subpoena of this description is equally indefensible as a search warrant would be if couched in similar terms. Ex parte Brown, 72 Missouri, 83; Shaftsbury v. Arrowsmith, 4 Ves. 66; Lee v. Angas, L. R. 2 Eq. 59.
- Of course, in view of the power of Congress over interstate commerce to which we have adverted, we do not wish to be understood as holding that an examination of the books of a corporation, if duly authorized by act of. Congress, would constitute an unreasonable search and seizure within the Fourth Amendment.
But this objection to the subpoena does not go to the validity of the order remanding the petitioner, which is, therefore,
Affirmed.