OPINION
SWANN, Judge.
¶ 1 Alvin J. Sweeney (“Appellant”) was convicted of Transportation of Narcotic Drugs for Sale after the superior court denied a motion to suppress evidence seized from his car. We hold that after a lawful traffic stop has concluded, an officer must have reasonable cause to initiate a second detention of a suspect. In this case, we conclude that no such reasonable cause existed and the forcible detention of Appellant to facilitate a canine sniff constituted a violation of the Fourth Amendment. Accordingly, we reverse and remand.
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY1
¶ 2 On the morning of January 8, 2008, Arizona Department of Safety Officer Mace Craft initiated a stop after he observed Appellant following another vehicle at what he believed to be an unsafe distance. Officer Craft, a member of the canine unit, was traveling with his drug interdiction dog. Officer Craft used a stopwatch to determine that the “gap” time between the vehicles was .88 seconds. Thereafter, Officer Craft activated his lights and initiated the stop.2
¶ 3 When Officer Craft approached Appellant’s car from the passenger side, he noticed that Appellant’s vehicle was a rental, and he smelled deodorizer emanating from the vehicle. Officer Craft also testified that when Appellant handed him his Canadian driver’s license and the car rental agreement,3 Appellant’s hands were shaking and he was breathing heavily. Officer Craft asked Appellant to step back to his patrol vehicle, and, while filling out a warning citation, asked Appellant questions about his travels and the reason for his visit to Arizona.
¶ 4 During this exchange, Appellant told Officer Craft that he traveled from New York to Arizona in search of an old Chevrolet Camaro. Officer Craft found it unusual that someone would drive from New York to Arizona in search of a ear and asked Appellant about the possibility of flying. Appellant responded that he enjoyed driving. When asked if he had found a Camaro online, Appellant responded that he had not. Officer Craft also asked Appellant where he stayed while in Arizona and Appellant responded, without elaboration, that he had stayed in a hotel.
¶ 5 After Officer Craft finished filling out the warning citation (a process that consumed eight minutes), he handed it to Appellant and wished him a safe trip. Appellant said “thank you very much,” and Officer Craft responded “alright, be careful.” When Appellant turned and began walking back to his vehicle, Officer Craft called out to Appellant and asked if he could speak with him again. In response, Appellant turned around and walked back to Officer Craft. Officer Craft asked Appellant whether he had anything illegal in his vehicle, and Appellant responded that he did not. Finally, Officer Craft asked for Appellant’s consent to search the vehicle. Appellant replied, “No, you can’t, cause I don’t think it’s in [the] law, is it?” Officer Craft responded, “No, it’s not” [110]*110and requested Appellant’s consent to a narcotics dog sniff of the car. Appellant again declined.4
¶6 After this exchange, Appellant again turned to walk toward his car when the officer grabbed Appellant by the arm, turned him around and told him he was being detained. After ordering Appellant to stand in front of the patrol car, Officer Craft called for another unit to stand by Appellant while he took his dog out of his car and walked her around Appellant’s vehicle. The dog indicated the presence of drugs. When Officer Craft searched the car, he found a black bag in the trunk containing five kilograms of cocaine. Appellant was placed under arrest and indicted on two counts: (1) Transportation of Narcotic Drugs for Sale and (2) Possession of Narcotic Drugs for Sale.
¶7 Appellant moved to suppress the evidence seized from the car, arguing that (1) the detention was illegal; (2) the stop was illegal; and (3) the detention went beyond the scope of the traffic stop. The court held two evidentiary hearings, separately addressing the legality of the stop and the detention.
¶8 In a May 27, 2008 minute entry, the trial court found that there was reasonable suspicion to initiate a stop. The court gave little weight to Officer Craft’s testimony that the “gap” time between Appellant’s ear and the vehicle it was following was .88 seconds. Instead, the court based its ruling on a number of factors, including the icy condition of the roadway and expert testimony concerning traffic speed and safe following distances.
¶ 9 In a June 20 minute entry, the court found that (1) the length of the detention was reasonable; (2) the encounter between Officer Craft and Appellant was consensual after the warning citation was given; and (3) there was reasonable suspicion for the continued detention. With respect to the continued detention, the court noted Officer Craft’s testimony that his suspicions were aroused by the following factors:
(1) Appellant stated that the purpose of his trip was to buy a vintage Camaro in the Phoenix area. The officer concluded that it was not plausible for a person to drive over 4,000 miles round-trip to buy a car sight unseen.
(2) Appellant displayed an overly nervous demeanor, even after the officer told him that he was to receive a warning and not a citation. Appellant’s demeanor included a shaking hand, heavy breathing and twitching cheeks.
(3) Appellant gave vague answers to questions regarding his travel, and attempted to deflect the officer’s questioning by trying to discuss the weather. One answer in particular was suspicious to the officer. In response to a question about where he had looked in Phoenix to buy the car, Appellant had replied with a general statement about “car lots and stuff’ rather than a specific location.
(4) A strong smell of deodorant emanated from the passenger side of the front compartment when the officer first made contact with Appellant. The officer testified that many times deodorants are used to mask the odor of drugs.
(5) Appellant had started the trip that day from Phoenix. The car was clean inside and out. It had snowed in Flagstaff the night prior to the stop.
(6) There was an atlas on the passenger seat of the ear.
(7) The car was a rental car with Massachusetts license plates. Appellant rented it in Syracuse, New York, for a round-trip.
(8) Appellant is a Canadian citizen.'
(9) When the officer was driving near Appellant’s ear prior to the stop, Appellant appeared to the officer to be avoiding his sight by sitting far back in his seat.
[111]*111The court gave little weight to factors 2, 5, and 6; some weight to factors 7, 8, and 9; and great weight to factors 1, 3, and 4.
¶ 10 After a three-day trial, a jury found Appellant guilty of Transportation of Narcotic Drugs for Sale, and found that Appellant possessed an amount of cocaine in excess of nine grams.5
¶ 11 Appellant timely appeals. We have jurisdiction under Article 6, Section 9 of the Arizona Constitution and pursuant to A.R.S. §§ 12-120.21(A)(1) (2003), 13-4031 (2001), and 13-4033(A)(1) (Supp.2009).
DISCUSSION
¶ 12 We generally review the denial of a motion to suppress with deference to the trial court’s factual determinations, including its evaluation of the credibility of witness testimony. State v. Box, 205 Ariz. 492, 495, ¶ 7, 73 P.3d 623, 626 (App.2003). But we review de novo mixed questions of fact and law, including whether the totality of the circumstances gave rise to reasonable suspicion to support an investigative detention and whether the duration of that detention was reasonable. See State v. Teagle, 217 Ariz. 17, 22, ¶ 19, 170 P.3d 266, 271 (App.2007). In this ease, the trial court also admitted into evidence an audio/video recording of the entire encounter between Appellant and Officer Craft, and that recording is part of the record on appeal. Because the trial court is in no better position to evaluate the video than the appellate court, we have conducted an independent review of the video evidence. Cf. Danielson v. Evans, 201 Ariz. 401, 406, ¶ 13, 36 P.3d 749, 754 (App.2001); State v. McCoy, 692 N.W.2d 6, 29 (Iowa 2005).
A. The Detention of Appellant After the Termination of the Initial Stop Was Not De Minimis.
¶ 13 As a preliminary matter, we address the trial court’s legal finding that any additional period of detention after the issuance of the warning and termination of the traffic stop was de minimis. Citing $JM, 905.00 and Box, the court based its finding on the fact that there was reasonable suspicion for the continued detention, “especially given the strong governmental interest in preventing the transportation of illegal drugs on our roadways.”6
¶ 14 In $W,905.00, the Eighth Circuit held that the Fourth Amendment was not violated when an officer conducted a dog sniff of the defendant’s vehicle after the traffic stop was completed but before the defendant’s license had been returned to him. 182 F.3d at 648-49. There, the driver did not object to a sniff of his ear’s exterior. The court reasoned that a two-minute delay to complete a dog sniff was a de minimis intrusion on the defendant’s liberty. Id. at 649. In Box, this court held that a brief post-traffic-stop detention to accommodate a dog sniff was de minimis. 205 Ariz. at 499, ¶ 24, 73 P.3d at 630.
¶ 15 We cannot conclude that the post-traffic-stop detention in this case was de minimis. Unlike in $h0J¡,905.00 and Box, Officer Craft waited until the arrival of a second officer (whose presence he had not requested until after Appellant declined to consent to a search) before conducting the sniff. Moreover, Officer Craft used physical force to detain Appellant when he grabbed his arm and ordered him to stand in front of the patrol ear. And unlike $J/JJh905.00 and Box, there was nothing consensual about the encounter at the time it occurred. Because we conclude that the intrusion was not de minimis, we turn our examination to whether the duration of the detention was reasonable.
B. The Duration of the First Detention Was Reasonable.
¶ 16 Traffic stops are seizures within the meaning of the Fourth Anendment, but because they are less intrusive than ar[112]*112rests, an officer needs only reasonable suspicion that a traffic violation has occurred to initiate a stop. Arizona v. Johnson, — U.S. -, -, 129 S.Ct. 781, 784, 172 L.Ed.2d 694 (2009) (permitting a traffic stop “when the police officer reasonably suspects” a traffic violation). If an officer has “an articulable, reasonable suspicion, based on the totality of the circumstances,” that a traffic violation has occurred, he or she may conduct a limited investigatory stop. Teagle, 217 Ariz. at 22-23, ¶ 20, 170 P.3d at 271-72 (citing Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 30, 88 S.Ct. 1868, 20 L.Ed.2d 889 (1968)).
¶ 17 “[A]n investigative detention must be temporary and last no longer than is necessary to effectuate the purpose of the stop.” Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491, 500, 103 S.Ct. 1319, 75 L.Ed.2d 229 (1983). “[W]here there is less than probable cause to justify a stop, duration is an essential element in determining whether the initially lawful intrusion takes on the characteristics of an unlawful detention.” United States v. Huberts, 637 F.2d 630, 636 (9th Cir.1980). After an officer has effectuated the purpose of the stop, he must allow a driver to continue on his way unless (1) the encounter between the driver and the officer becomes consensual, or (2) during the encounter, the officer develops a reasonable and articulable suspicion that criminal activity is afoot. Teagle, 217 Ariz. at 23, ¶ 22, 170 P.3d at 272.
¶ 18 Appellant argues that the duration of the first detention was not reasonable. There is no bright-line rule distinguishing an investigative stop from a de facto arrest. United States v. Sharpe, 470 U.S. 675, 685, 105 S.Ct. 1568, 84 L.Ed.2d 605 (1985). To determine the reasonableness of the length of a detention, we must consider the degree of intrusion on an individual’s privacy and weigh that against the purpose of the stop and the diligence with which the officer pursued that purpose. Id. at 685-86, 105 S.Ct. 1568.
¶ 19 We do not find that the detention was illegally extended when Officer Craft inquired about Appellant’s travels and his reasons for coming to Arizona. “An officer’s inquiries into matters unrelated to the justification for the traffic stop ... do not convert the encounter into something other than a lawful seizure, so long as the inquiries do not measurably extend the duration of the stop.” Johnson, — U.S. at —, 129 S.Ct. at 788 (citing Muehler v. Mena, 544 U.S. 93, 100-101, 125 S.Ct. 1465, 161 L.Ed.2d 299 (2005)). Here, Officer Craft merely asked Appellant about his travels and the reasons for his visit while he was completing the paperwork to issue the warning, a process that consumed only eight minutes.
¶ 20 However, after the stop had been completed and Appellant refused to allow Officer Craft to conduct a search of his ear, Officer Craft grabbed Appellant’s arm, told him he was “being detained” and ordered him to stand in front of the patrol car. Accordingly, the continued detention of Appellant after he declined to allow the search was an additional seizure under the Fourth Amendment. We therefore turn our examination to whether Officer Craft had reasonable suspicion after completion of the stop to continue to detain Appellant to conduct a search of his vehicle.
C. The Totality of the Circumstances Did Not Give Rise to Reasonable Suspicion for the Continued Detention.
¶ 21 Reasonable suspicion is something short of probable cause, but it must be more than an “inchoate and unparticularized suspicion or ‘hunch.’” United States v. Sokolow, 490 U.S. 1, 7, 109 S.Ct. 1581, 104 L.Ed.2d 1 (1989) (quoting Terry, 392 U.S. at 27, 88 S.Ct. 1868). The Fourth Amendment requires that an officer have some minimal, objective justification for the detention. Teagle, 217 Ariz. at 23, ¶ 25, 170 P.3d at 272.
¶ 22 To determine whether circumstances give rise to reasonable suspicion, we view the totality of the circumstances, considering such objective factors as the defendant’s appearance and conduct and the officer’s relevant knowledge, experience, and training. State v. Fornof, 218 Ariz. 74, 76, ¶ 6, 179 P.3d 954, 956 (App.2008). We must not, however, “parse out each individual fac[113]*113tor, categorize it as potentially innocent, and reject it. Instead, [we] must look at all of the factors, (all of which would have a potentially innocent explanation, or else there would be probable cause), and examine them collectively.” State v. O’Meara, 198 Ariz. 294, 296, ¶ 10, 9 P.3d 325, 327 (2000). But circumstances or factors that do not reliably distinguish between suspect and innocent behaviors are insufficient to establish reasonable suspicion because they may east too wide a net and subject all travelers to “virtually random seizures.” Reid v. Georgia, 448 U.S. 438, 441, 100 S.Ct. 2752, 65 L.Ed.2d 890 (1980) (per curium). Instead, “[t]he articulated factors together must serve to eliminate a substantial portion of innocent travelers before the requirement of reasonable suspicion will be satisfied.” Teagle, 217 Ariz. at 24, ¶25, 170 P.3d at 273 (alteration in original) (quoting United States v. Foreman, 369 F.3d 776, 781 (4th Cir.2004)).
¶ 23 Here, Officer Craft testified that the following factors indicated to him that Appellant may have been transporting illegal drugs: (1) it was implausible that Appellant would travel 4,000 miles round-trip to buy a Camaro without first determining that one was available for purchase; (2) Appellant was overly nervous and his nervousness did not subside during the entirety of the detention; 7 (3) Appellant’s answers to the officer’s questions were vague, and he discussed the weather; (4) a strong smell of deodorizer emanated from Appellant’s ear; (5) Appellant’s car was clean and devoid of personal effects; (6) there was an atlas on the passenger seat of the car;8 (7) the ear was rented in New York and had a Massachusetts license plate; (8) Appellant was a Canadian citizen; and (9) Appellant was driving while sitting far back in his seat, in a rigid upright position.9
¶ 24 Considered in the aggregate, these factors did not give rise to objective reasonable suspicion of anything. At most, they gave rise to the “inchoate and unparticular-ized suspicion or hunch” that the Supreme Court rejected as grounds for detention in Sokolow and Terry. A reasonably prudent person’s suspicions would not be raised after observing a foreign national driving a clean, deodorized rental ear with an atlas on the passenger seat, who upon being stopped and questioned outside in the three-degree weather by the police, failed to articulate with specificity the places he had visited while staying in an unfamiliar city. A holding to the contrary would subject nearly everyone to a continued, intrusive detention following a routine traffic stop. Our review of the recording of the encounter reveals that Appellant was calm, friendly and cooperative during the entire stop. Whatever Officer Craft’s subjective beliefs, we cannot agree that the totality of the circumstances gives rise to any objective suspicions that would not be raised regarding the most innocent travelers.
¶ 25 We note that the factors upon which Officer Craft and the superior court relied resemble those employed in drug courier profiles, which are now inadmissible at trial as evidence of guilt. State v. Lee, 191 Ariz. 542, 546, ¶ 18, 959 P.2d 799, 803 (1998). Of course, such evidence is not inadmissible on a motion to suppress, and may indeed be highly relevant to the evaluation of reasonable suspicion. Beijer v. Adams, 196 Ariz. 79, 82, ¶ 18, 993 P.2d 1043, 1046 (App.1999). Yet the plasticity of the factors employed in such [114]*114analyses merits vigilance in the evaluation of objective reasonable suspicion.
¶26 In his dissent in United States v. Hooper, 935 F.2d 484, 499-500 (2d Cir.1991), Judge Pratt compiled a partial list of the conflicting attributes that had been held by courts to fit such a profile. Factors evidencing drug courier behavior included observations that the defendant: arrived late at night or arrived early in the morning; was one of the first to deplane, one of the last to deplane, or deplaned in the middle; used a one-way ticket or used a round-trip ticket; carried brand-new luggage or carried a small gym bag; traveled alone or traveled with a companion; acted too nervous or acted too calm; wore expensive clothing and gold jewelry; dressed in black corduroys, white pullover shirt, loafers without socks; dressed in dark slacks, work shirt, and hat; dressed in brown leather aviator jacket, gold chain, hair down to shoulders; dressed in loose-fitting sweatshirt and denim jacket; walked rapidly through airport or walked aimlessly through airport; flew in to Washington National Airport on the LaGuardia Shuttle; had a white handkerchief in his hand. Id. (internal citations omitted).
¶27 In this case, Officer Craft testified that the absence of luggage in the passenger compartment of Appellant’s car caused suspicion, but that the presence of luggage also would have caused suspicion. These examples underscore the wisdom of our supreme court’s wholesale rejection of profile evidence at trial in Lee, and illustrate the danger to nearly every innocent person of unchecked deference to law enforcement’s objectively unsupported expressions of suspicion in support of warrantless searches.
¶ 28 We might overlook the objective circumstances revealed by the recording and instead marvel at the acuity of Officer Craft’s instincts in identifying Appellant as a likely drug courier on such innocuous facts. But were we to engage in such tautological reasoning, we would render the Fourth Amendment a nullity — the objective (not instinctive) reasonable suspicion must exist before the detention, and the ultimate discovery of contraband cannot retroactively justify an otherwise unwarranted detention. We might also wonder after reviewing the recording whether the officer possessed other information that prompted his suspicions, but he testified to none.
¶ 29 Our reasoning is underscored by Officer Craft’s own response to these factors during the initial seizure. Although he learned of these “suspicious” circumstances while conducting the initial traffic stop, he issued a traffic warming without conducting further investigation and announced the termination of the stop by releasing Appellant back to his car-despite the fact that he had in his car a drug interdiction dog who could have confirmed any suspicions in a matter of seconds before the stop ended.10
¶ 30 The parties agree that the traffic stop ended when the officer returned Appellant’s paperwork and wished him a safe trip. When Officer Craft called out to Appellant to ask him to answer additional questions, Appellant’s consent to such an encounter was established by the fact that he walked back to the officer and willingly answered the additional questions. Until this point in the second encounter, there was no intimidation or show of force and therefore no seizure under the Fourth Amendment. See United States v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544, 557, 100 S.Ct. 1870, 64 L.Ed.2d 497 (1980); Teagle, 217 Ariz. at 23, ¶ 23, 170 P.3d at 272.
¶ 31 In United States v. Esquivel, the court noted that “the Trooper’s announcement that the traffic stop was over and [the defendant] was free to leave was also an intervening circumstance between the ... detention and the consent.” 507 F.3d 1154, 1160 (8th Cir.2007). Here, Officer Craft announced that the traffic stop had ended before asking for consent to search. That announcement constituted an intervening event, [115]*115and nothing happened between that event and the detention of Appellant apart from his polite refusal of the officer’s request for consent to search. Though the record shows that Officer Craft was trained to employ this “catch and release” tactic during traffic stops, that training does not trump the Fourth Amendment. Because Appellant did not consent to further detention, the further detention was unlawful absent reasonable suspicion.
¶ 32 Our review of the recording confirms that it was indeed Appellant’s refusal to consent that triggered the sudden change in tone and tactics. But the invocation of one’s constitutional rights cannot constitute a circumstance that gives rise to reasonable suspicion. If the mere refusal of consent itself constituted reasonable suspicion, nothing would prevent warrantless searches of random individuals, because either the grant or refusal of consent would eventually justify the searches. We conclude that the Fourth Amendment would be rendered largely meaningless by placing every person in such a Catch-22. See State v. Palenkas, 188 Ariz. 201, 212, 933 P.2d 1269, 1280 (App.1996) (“[W]e believe that a defendant’s invocation of constitutional rights is probative of no thing except the defendant’s awareness of his or her constitutional rights.”).
CONCLUSION
¶33 Because the circumstances here did not form a particularized and objective basis for the second seizure, the absence of consent rendered that seizure and subsequent search unlawful. We therefore reverse the trial court’s denial of Appellant’s motion to suppress.11
CONCURRING: LAWRENCE F. WINTHROP, Judge.