GORDON, Chief Justice.
Steven Raymond Phillips, appellant, pled guilty to the offense of leaving the scene of an accident involving personal injury. Appellant was placed on three years’ probation and ordered to pay restitution of $6,130.65 to the accident victim. Appellant appealed and sought to have the restitution order vacated. The court of appeals affirmed the judgment and sentence. State v. Phillips, 152 Ariz. 531, 733 P.2d 1114 (Ct.App.1986). We have jurisdiction pursuant to Ariz. Const, art. 6, § 5(3) and Rule 31.19, 17 A.R.S. Rules of Crim.Proc.
I
Appellant was driving home from work on June 25, 1985, when a truck ahead of [534]*534him slowed down. Appellant, unaware that the truck was slowing down to permit an 84-year-old woman carrying groceries to cross the street, switched lanes to pass the truck. Appellant unsuccessfully tried to avoid hitting the woman. The woman suffered multiple injuries, including a broken pelvis. Appellant panicked after hitting the woman and did not stop at the accident scene. Someone who saw the accident recorded appellant’s license number and gave it to the police. The following day, appellant denied involvement to an investigating officer. Appellant later contacted the officer and admitted his involvement.
Pursuant to a plea agreement, appellant pled guilty to leaving the scene of an accident involving death or personal injuries, a violation of A.R.S. § 28-661. The plea agreement provided: “Restitution of economic loss to the victim in the amount of $ to be determined will be required.” (Emphasis in original). The court placed appellant on three years’ probation and ordered him to pay restitution “in the total amount of $6,130.65 at the direction of the probation department.”
We conclude that the trial court could impose restitution as a proper condition of probation. However, we conclude that the trial court ordered an improper amount of restitution and erred in allowing the probation department to set the manner of payment.
II
Under Arizona law, a trial court does not abuse its discretion in ordering a defendant to pay restitution as a condition of probation if the defendánt agrees to pay restitution pursuant to a plea agreement or otherwise. State v. Pleasant, 145 Ariz. 307, 308, 701 P.2d 15, 16 (App.1985); State v. Reese, 124 Ariz. 212, 214-15, 603 P.2d 104, 106-07 (App.1979). Here, appellant agreed to pay restitution “of economic loss” to the victim. By agreeing to pay for the victim’s economic losses, appellant did not limit his responsibility only to injuries for which he was at fault or to injuries aggravated when appellant fled the scene. Thus it is immaterial that appellant never admitted to being at fault for the accident, that the trial court never determined who was at fault, and that there was no evidence that appellant, by leaving the scene, aggravated the victim’s injuries. Appellant’s agreement to compensate the victim for her economic losses permitted the trial court to impose restitution as a proper condition of probation.1
Ill
Although we agree that the trial court could order restitution as a proper condition of appellant’s probation, we believe that the trial court erred in imposing restitution of $6,130.65 in light of our recent holding in State v. Lukens, 729 P.2d 306 (Ariz.1986).
In Lukens, the defendant pled guilty to theft of property valued at between $100 and $250. Pursuant to a plea agreement, Lukens agreed to make restitution of economic loss to the victim. The trial court ordered Lukens to pay restitution of $9,132.65. In determining whether the trial court properly could order Lukens to pay such a restitutionary amount, we wrote:
We hold that a defendant cannot be required to pay restitution in an amount exceeding statutorily-prescribed monetary parameters of the crime to which he pleads guilty unless he voluntarily and intelligently agrees to pay a higher amount. The record must clearly reveal that any agreement to pay a higher amount was voluntarily and intelligently made. Such an agreement may be found when 1) a specific dollar amount of restitution is set forth in the plea agreement, 2) a defendant states in court that he agrees to pay a specific dollar amount of restitution, or 3) the defendant pleads guilty after being warned by the trial [535]*535judge that a specific dollar amount of restitution may be ordered. Only if one of these three statements are found in the record will we conclude that a defendant voluntarily and intelligently agreed to pay restitution in an amount exceeding statutorily-prescribed monetary parameters of the crime to which he pled guilty.
At 309.
This case arguably is distinguishable from Lukens on two grounds. First, unlike in Lukens, the crime to which appellant pled guilty, leaving an accident scene, is not defined by statutorily-prescribed monetary parameters. Second, at the change-of-plea proceedings the trial court advised appellant that restitution could be ordered; Lukens was not warned at her change-of-plea proceedings that she might have to make restitution to her victim. These are distinctions without a difference, however, and do not render our holding in Lukens inapplicable here.
“For a plea to be intelligently made, a defendant must thoroughly understand its consequences.” Lukens, at 307 (citing State v. Cutler, 121 Ariz. 328, 329, 590 P.2d 444, 445 (1979) (emphasis added)). We do not believe that a defendant can “thoroughly understand” the consequences of his agreement to make restitution if he is unaware of the restitutionary amount that can be imposed. Knowledge that restitution can be ordered for the victim’s “full economic loss” is insufficient. The defendant must be aware of the specific dollar amounts of restitution that can be imposed before we will find that the defendant voluntarily and intelligently agreed to pay restitution.
As in Lukens, we will conclude that appellant thoroughly understood the consequences of his agreement to pay restitution only if the record contains at least one of the following: (1) a statement in the plea agreement setting forth a specific dollar amount of restitution; (2) a statement by the defendant indicating agreement to pay a specific dollar amount of restitution; or (3) a warning by the trial judge prior to accepting the defendant’s plea that he can order restitution of a specific dollar amount.2 We have reviewed the record and cannot find any of the above statements therein. We therefore conclude that the trial court erred in ordering appellant to pay restitution of $6,130.65.
IV
The trial court ordered that restitution of $6,130.65 be paid “at the direction of the probation department.” The record does not indicate under which statute the trial court ordered restitution.
Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI
GORDON, Chief Justice.
Steven Raymond Phillips, appellant, pled guilty to the offense of leaving the scene of an accident involving personal injury. Appellant was placed on three years’ probation and ordered to pay restitution of $6,130.65 to the accident victim. Appellant appealed and sought to have the restitution order vacated. The court of appeals affirmed the judgment and sentence. State v. Phillips, 152 Ariz. 531, 733 P.2d 1114 (Ct.App.1986). We have jurisdiction pursuant to Ariz. Const, art. 6, § 5(3) and Rule 31.19, 17 A.R.S. Rules of Crim.Proc.
I
Appellant was driving home from work on June 25, 1985, when a truck ahead of [534]*534him slowed down. Appellant, unaware that the truck was slowing down to permit an 84-year-old woman carrying groceries to cross the street, switched lanes to pass the truck. Appellant unsuccessfully tried to avoid hitting the woman. The woman suffered multiple injuries, including a broken pelvis. Appellant panicked after hitting the woman and did not stop at the accident scene. Someone who saw the accident recorded appellant’s license number and gave it to the police. The following day, appellant denied involvement to an investigating officer. Appellant later contacted the officer and admitted his involvement.
Pursuant to a plea agreement, appellant pled guilty to leaving the scene of an accident involving death or personal injuries, a violation of A.R.S. § 28-661. The plea agreement provided: “Restitution of economic loss to the victim in the amount of $ to be determined will be required.” (Emphasis in original). The court placed appellant on three years’ probation and ordered him to pay restitution “in the total amount of $6,130.65 at the direction of the probation department.”
We conclude that the trial court could impose restitution as a proper condition of probation. However, we conclude that the trial court ordered an improper amount of restitution and erred in allowing the probation department to set the manner of payment.
II
Under Arizona law, a trial court does not abuse its discretion in ordering a defendant to pay restitution as a condition of probation if the defendánt agrees to pay restitution pursuant to a plea agreement or otherwise. State v. Pleasant, 145 Ariz. 307, 308, 701 P.2d 15, 16 (App.1985); State v. Reese, 124 Ariz. 212, 214-15, 603 P.2d 104, 106-07 (App.1979). Here, appellant agreed to pay restitution “of economic loss” to the victim. By agreeing to pay for the victim’s economic losses, appellant did not limit his responsibility only to injuries for which he was at fault or to injuries aggravated when appellant fled the scene. Thus it is immaterial that appellant never admitted to being at fault for the accident, that the trial court never determined who was at fault, and that there was no evidence that appellant, by leaving the scene, aggravated the victim’s injuries. Appellant’s agreement to compensate the victim for her economic losses permitted the trial court to impose restitution as a proper condition of probation.1
Ill
Although we agree that the trial court could order restitution as a proper condition of appellant’s probation, we believe that the trial court erred in imposing restitution of $6,130.65 in light of our recent holding in State v. Lukens, 729 P.2d 306 (Ariz.1986).
In Lukens, the defendant pled guilty to theft of property valued at between $100 and $250. Pursuant to a plea agreement, Lukens agreed to make restitution of economic loss to the victim. The trial court ordered Lukens to pay restitution of $9,132.65. In determining whether the trial court properly could order Lukens to pay such a restitutionary amount, we wrote:
We hold that a defendant cannot be required to pay restitution in an amount exceeding statutorily-prescribed monetary parameters of the crime to which he pleads guilty unless he voluntarily and intelligently agrees to pay a higher amount. The record must clearly reveal that any agreement to pay a higher amount was voluntarily and intelligently made. Such an agreement may be found when 1) a specific dollar amount of restitution is set forth in the plea agreement, 2) a defendant states in court that he agrees to pay a specific dollar amount of restitution, or 3) the defendant pleads guilty after being warned by the trial [535]*535judge that a specific dollar amount of restitution may be ordered. Only if one of these three statements are found in the record will we conclude that a defendant voluntarily and intelligently agreed to pay restitution in an amount exceeding statutorily-prescribed monetary parameters of the crime to which he pled guilty.
At 309.
This case arguably is distinguishable from Lukens on two grounds. First, unlike in Lukens, the crime to which appellant pled guilty, leaving an accident scene, is not defined by statutorily-prescribed monetary parameters. Second, at the change-of-plea proceedings the trial court advised appellant that restitution could be ordered; Lukens was not warned at her change-of-plea proceedings that she might have to make restitution to her victim. These are distinctions without a difference, however, and do not render our holding in Lukens inapplicable here.
“For a plea to be intelligently made, a defendant must thoroughly understand its consequences.” Lukens, at 307 (citing State v. Cutler, 121 Ariz. 328, 329, 590 P.2d 444, 445 (1979) (emphasis added)). We do not believe that a defendant can “thoroughly understand” the consequences of his agreement to make restitution if he is unaware of the restitutionary amount that can be imposed. Knowledge that restitution can be ordered for the victim’s “full economic loss” is insufficient. The defendant must be aware of the specific dollar amounts of restitution that can be imposed before we will find that the defendant voluntarily and intelligently agreed to pay restitution.
As in Lukens, we will conclude that appellant thoroughly understood the consequences of his agreement to pay restitution only if the record contains at least one of the following: (1) a statement in the plea agreement setting forth a specific dollar amount of restitution; (2) a statement by the defendant indicating agreement to pay a specific dollar amount of restitution; or (3) a warning by the trial judge prior to accepting the defendant’s plea that he can order restitution of a specific dollar amount.2 We have reviewed the record and cannot find any of the above statements therein. We therefore conclude that the trial court erred in ordering appellant to pay restitution of $6,130.65.
IV
The trial court ordered that restitution of $6,130.65 be paid “at the direction of the probation department.” The record does not indicate under which statute the trial court ordered restitution. From our review of the Criminal Code, we conclude that the only statutes under which the trial court could have ordered restitution in this case are A.R.S. § 13-603(C) or A.R.S. § 13-901(H). Section 13-603(C) provided at the time of appellant’s accident: “If a person is convicted of an offense, the court shall require the convicted person to make restitution ... in the manner as determined by the court____” Section 13-901(H) provided: “When restitution is made a condition of probation, the court shall fix the amount thereof and the manner of performance____”
Under either statute, the trial court is required to set the manner of payment of restitution. The trial court thus erred in ordering the probation department to set the manner of payment rather than setting the manner of payment itself. See State v. Tietjens, 729 P.2d 914, 916-917 (Ariz.1986).
V
We vacate the judgment and sentence of the trial court and remand the matter for proceedings before the trial court where appellant must be given an opportunity to withdraw his guilty plea if he so desires. If appellant does not withdraw his guilty plea, or if he does withdraw his guilty plea [536]*536and a new plea agreement is fashioned under which the trial court can order appellant to pay restitution as a condition of probation, the trial court itself must fix the manner of payment.
HAYS, J. (Retired), and CAMERON and HOLOHAN, JJ., concur.