Opinion
MOSK, J.
We hold here that absent extraordinary circumstances probation for a defendant may not be conditioned on restitution of sums involved in a purported crime of which he was acquitted.
[617]*617Defendant was charged with two counts of grand theft (Pen. Code, § 484) arising out of the sale of mining claims and quitclaim deeds. The People presented evidence that William Ward and Juanita Garbuio, in separate transactions, purchased documents at a public auction because defendant, who executed the sales, led them to believe they were buying sufficient interests to enable them to hunt, fish, or build houses. In fact, the documents conveyed virtually no rights. A jury convicted defendant with respect to the Garbuio sale, but found him not guilty of the charge arising from the Ward transaction. The court placed defendant on two years’ probation, on condition that he serve five months in county jail and that he pay $925 in “restitution” to Ward.
I
Before determining the validity of the restitution order, we turn briefly to defendant’s attack on the conviction. He asserts that certain testimony by Mrs. Garbuio was erroneously admitted.
The testimony concerned a conversation among defendant, Mrs. Garbuio and her husband, and the district attorney, that took place in the latter’s office. Mrs. Garbuio told the jury that she asked defendant for the return of her money, and that the district attorney accused defendant of failing to perform the groundwork necessary to validate the claim he sold her. At this point a defense objection on hearsay grounds was overruled. In response to her refund request and the district attorney’s accusation, Mrs. Garbuio continued, defendant said he did not have the money to repay Mrs. Garbuio. He said he needed more time and offered Mrs. Garbuio another mining claim, which she characterized as “just as worthless as the one we had just had.” The court overruled another hearsay objection, noting that the testimony regarding the conversation had not been completed.
On cross-examination, Mrs. Garbuio elaborated on her direct testimony. She said that defendant expressly admitted he failed to do the necessary groundwork on the mining claim because he did not have time. She also explained her characterization of the claim as worthless: a third person could usurp her stake in the claim simply by performing the necessary groundwork.
The witness’ recollection of defendant’s own statements is clearly admissible. Under Evidence Code section 1220, evidence of a statement [618]*618is not made inadmissible by the hearsay rule when offered against a party declarant.1
The testimony concerning statements of the district attorney presents a closer question. By themselves, the statements would be inadmissible hearsay. However, they were introduced to show defendant’s response to them, an admissible purpose under Evidence Code section 1221. The section provides that, absent constitutional considerations not raised by these facts, a. statement offered against a party may be introduced when the party manifests his adoption of the statement or his belief in its truth. (People v. Preston (1973) 9 Cal.3d 308, 313-316 [107 Cal.Rptr. 300, 508 P.2d 300].)
Mrs. Garbuio’s testimony on direct examination, while somewhat ambiguous, supported the reasonable inference that the district attorney accused defendant of failing to perform the necessary groundwork on the claim he helped sell, and defendant, understanding the allegation, failed to deny it. Whether defendant’s response actually constituted an adoptive admission was a question for the jury to decide. (People v. Preston (1973) supra, 9 Cal.3d 308, 316; People v. Davis (1954) 43 Cal.2d 661, 671-672 [276 P.2d 801].) The court cannot be faulted for overruling the objection to the testimony pending its completion. If, at that point, defendant had moved to strike the prosecutor could have elicited from Mrs. Garbuio testimony that defendant directly admitted he failed to perform the groundwork, an admission that was eventually disclosed on cross-examination.
Defendant also maintains that admission of the district attorney’s statements violated his Sixth Amendment right to confront adverse witnesses. This contention was answered in People v. Preston (1973) supra, 9 Cal.3d 308, 315-316, in which we held that an out-of-court statement could properly be admitted against a defendant for the purpose of demonstrating the defendant’s adoption of the statement, provided the juiy is instructed on the limited purpose of admission. In this case the prosecutor expressly declared, after defendant’s objection, that the evidence was offered only to show the response of defendant to the district attorney’s accusation. Although no limiting instruction was [619]*619given, defendant, having failed to request such an instruction, may not complain of its absence. (Evid. Code, § 355; People v. Perry (1972) 7 Cal.3d 756, 787-788 [103 Cal.Rptr. 161, 499 P.2d 129].)
II
We turn now to the question of the validity of the probation order. The court ordered defendant, as a condition of probation, to make “restitution” to Ward, even though defendant was acquitted of criminal charges in the Ward transaction.2
Trial courts are granted broad discretion under Penal Code section 1203.1 to prescribe conditions of probation. (In re Bushman (1970) 1 Cal.3d 767, 776 [83 Cal.Rptr. 375, 463 P.2d 727].) However, a condition imposed must serve a purpose specified in the code section.
This requirement presents no problem for a court ordering a convicted defendant to make restitution to the victim for damages actually caused by the crime. Section 1203.1 expressly allows courts to impose reparation conditions “for any injury done to any person resulting from such breach.” A closer question arises, however, when the court imposes a probationary condition requiring a defendant to pay a third party for losses not actually caused by the defendant’s crime. In those circumstances the defendant is in effect required to choose between accepting incarceration and righting a wrong he may not in fact have committed. Indeed, here the trial judge, in ordering defendant to make restitution, declared, “I would be disposed to giving him a little less time in jail for that.”
A number of jurisdictions, refusing to allow courts to impose such conditions, have limited restitution to actual losses caused by the crime proved.3 California has not been so parsimonious. Restitution [620]*620may exceed the losses for which a defendant has been held culpable (People v. Lent (1975) 15 Cal.3d 481 [124 Cal.Rptr. 905, 541 P.2d 545]; People v. Miller (1967) 256 Cal.App.2d 348 [64 Cal.Rptr. 20]). But courts must tread lightly in this area lest they be reduced to “mere collection agencies” (People v. Miller, supra, at p. 356; People v. Williams (1966) 247 Cal.App.2d 394, 409 [55 Cal.Rptr.
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Opinion
MOSK, J.
We hold here that absent extraordinary circumstances probation for a defendant may not be conditioned on restitution of sums involved in a purported crime of which he was acquitted.
[617]*617Defendant was charged with two counts of grand theft (Pen. Code, § 484) arising out of the sale of mining claims and quitclaim deeds. The People presented evidence that William Ward and Juanita Garbuio, in separate transactions, purchased documents at a public auction because defendant, who executed the sales, led them to believe they were buying sufficient interests to enable them to hunt, fish, or build houses. In fact, the documents conveyed virtually no rights. A jury convicted defendant with respect to the Garbuio sale, but found him not guilty of the charge arising from the Ward transaction. The court placed defendant on two years’ probation, on condition that he serve five months in county jail and that he pay $925 in “restitution” to Ward.
I
Before determining the validity of the restitution order, we turn briefly to defendant’s attack on the conviction. He asserts that certain testimony by Mrs. Garbuio was erroneously admitted.
The testimony concerned a conversation among defendant, Mrs. Garbuio and her husband, and the district attorney, that took place in the latter’s office. Mrs. Garbuio told the jury that she asked defendant for the return of her money, and that the district attorney accused defendant of failing to perform the groundwork necessary to validate the claim he sold her. At this point a defense objection on hearsay grounds was overruled. In response to her refund request and the district attorney’s accusation, Mrs. Garbuio continued, defendant said he did not have the money to repay Mrs. Garbuio. He said he needed more time and offered Mrs. Garbuio another mining claim, which she characterized as “just as worthless as the one we had just had.” The court overruled another hearsay objection, noting that the testimony regarding the conversation had not been completed.
On cross-examination, Mrs. Garbuio elaborated on her direct testimony. She said that defendant expressly admitted he failed to do the necessary groundwork on the mining claim because he did not have time. She also explained her characterization of the claim as worthless: a third person could usurp her stake in the claim simply by performing the necessary groundwork.
The witness’ recollection of defendant’s own statements is clearly admissible. Under Evidence Code section 1220, evidence of a statement [618]*618is not made inadmissible by the hearsay rule when offered against a party declarant.1
The testimony concerning statements of the district attorney presents a closer question. By themselves, the statements would be inadmissible hearsay. However, they were introduced to show defendant’s response to them, an admissible purpose under Evidence Code section 1221. The section provides that, absent constitutional considerations not raised by these facts, a. statement offered against a party may be introduced when the party manifests his adoption of the statement or his belief in its truth. (People v. Preston (1973) 9 Cal.3d 308, 313-316 [107 Cal.Rptr. 300, 508 P.2d 300].)
Mrs. Garbuio’s testimony on direct examination, while somewhat ambiguous, supported the reasonable inference that the district attorney accused defendant of failing to perform the necessary groundwork on the claim he helped sell, and defendant, understanding the allegation, failed to deny it. Whether defendant’s response actually constituted an adoptive admission was a question for the jury to decide. (People v. Preston (1973) supra, 9 Cal.3d 308, 316; People v. Davis (1954) 43 Cal.2d 661, 671-672 [276 P.2d 801].) The court cannot be faulted for overruling the objection to the testimony pending its completion. If, at that point, defendant had moved to strike the prosecutor could have elicited from Mrs. Garbuio testimony that defendant directly admitted he failed to perform the groundwork, an admission that was eventually disclosed on cross-examination.
Defendant also maintains that admission of the district attorney’s statements violated his Sixth Amendment right to confront adverse witnesses. This contention was answered in People v. Preston (1973) supra, 9 Cal.3d 308, 315-316, in which we held that an out-of-court statement could properly be admitted against a defendant for the purpose of demonstrating the defendant’s adoption of the statement, provided the juiy is instructed on the limited purpose of admission. In this case the prosecutor expressly declared, after defendant’s objection, that the evidence was offered only to show the response of defendant to the district attorney’s accusation. Although no limiting instruction was [619]*619given, defendant, having failed to request such an instruction, may not complain of its absence. (Evid. Code, § 355; People v. Perry (1972) 7 Cal.3d 756, 787-788 [103 Cal.Rptr. 161, 499 P.2d 129].)
II
We turn now to the question of the validity of the probation order. The court ordered defendant, as a condition of probation, to make “restitution” to Ward, even though defendant was acquitted of criminal charges in the Ward transaction.2
Trial courts are granted broad discretion under Penal Code section 1203.1 to prescribe conditions of probation. (In re Bushman (1970) 1 Cal.3d 767, 776 [83 Cal.Rptr. 375, 463 P.2d 727].) However, a condition imposed must serve a purpose specified in the code section.
This requirement presents no problem for a court ordering a convicted defendant to make restitution to the victim for damages actually caused by the crime. Section 1203.1 expressly allows courts to impose reparation conditions “for any injury done to any person resulting from such breach.” A closer question arises, however, when the court imposes a probationary condition requiring a defendant to pay a third party for losses not actually caused by the defendant’s crime. In those circumstances the defendant is in effect required to choose between accepting incarceration and righting a wrong he may not in fact have committed. Indeed, here the trial judge, in ordering defendant to make restitution, declared, “I would be disposed to giving him a little less time in jail for that.”
A number of jurisdictions, refusing to allow courts to impose such conditions, have limited restitution to actual losses caused by the crime proved.3 California has not been so parsimonious. Restitution [620]*620may exceed the losses for which a defendant has been held culpable (People v. Lent (1975) 15 Cal.3d 481 [124 Cal.Rptr. 905, 541 P.2d 545]; People v. Miller (1967) 256 Cal.App.2d 348 [64 Cal.Rptr. 20]). But courts must tread lightly in this area lest they be reduced to “mere collection agencies” (People v. Miller, supra, at p. 356; People v. Williams (1966) 247 Cal.App.2d 394, 409 [55 Cal.Rptr. 550]), and restitution must in each case be narrowly tailored to serve a purpose described in section 1203.1.
The major goal of section 1203.1 is to rehabilitate the criminal. Restitution imposed in a proper case and in an appropriate manner may serve the salutary purpose of making a criminal understand that he has harmed not merely society in the abstract but also individual human beings, and that he has a responsibility to make them whole.
But the trial judge herein appeared to posit an additional and ill-conceived purpose: to resolve the civil liability of the criminal. In making the restitution order, the court observed that defendant “owed the money” to Ward, and “allowing him to avoid this debt would be unjust.”
Disposing of civil liability cannot be a function of restitution in a criminal, case. To begin with, the criminal justice system is essentially incapable of determining that a defendant is in fact civilly liable, and if so, to what extent. A judge may infer from a jury verdict of guilt in a theft case that a defendant is liable to the crime victim. But a trial court cannot properly conclude that the defendant owes money to a third party for other unproved or disproved crimes or conduct. A party sued civilly has important due process rights, including appropriate pleadings, discovery, and a right to a trial by jury on the specific issues of liability and damages. The judge in the criminal trial should not be permitted to emasculate those rights by simply declaring his belief that the defendant owes a sum of money.
The Michigan Supreme Court, in People v. Becker (1957) supra, 84 N.W.2d 833, 839, has pointed out the weakness of such practice. Striking down a probation condition requiring a defendant convicted of leaving the scene of an accident to pay the medical expenses of the pedestrians he hit, the court declared, “The liability ... is fixed by the [trial] court. How? Is it by a trial in open court, upon pleadings, defining the claims [621]*621and issues, with the taking of testimony, under oath, confrontation of witnesses, cross-examination, and assertion of defenses, including that of contributory negligence? Clearly not. It was determined, says the court, ‘from my investigation.’ ”
Similarly, in the present case, defendant’s liability to Ward cannot be based merely on the trial court’s belief that money was owed to Ward. No matter how compelling the evidence may have been, the juiy made- no finding that defendant owed a debt. More importantly, defendant never received a trial on the debt issue. At his criminal trial, defendant was required to raise a reasonable doubt regarding any of the elements of theft. No duty was placed on him, nor could it be in that proceeding, to prove that he was not civilly liable. Any legal conclusion that defendant owed money, therefore, is not only insupportable, it is reached here in the absence of due process rights assured to every litigant.
Even if it can be implied that defendant owes money to Ward, the conclusion does not necessarily follow that he is civilly liable. Civil law, of course, provides for priorities among creditors and rehabilitation of debtors in many cases. No evidence could have been introduced in the criminal trial herein as to whether defendant had declared bankruptcy or other creditors had asserted monetaiy claims against him superior to that of Ward. Thus “Restitution or reparation is not a substitute for a civil action to recover damages” (People v. Grago (1960) 24 Misc.2d 739 [204 N.Y.S.2d 774, 777]), and a defendant’s duty of restitution cannot be predicated merely on a purported debt.4
However, as noted above, California courts have approved the imposition for rehabilitative purposes of restitution not limited to the loss caused by the offense of which the defendant was convicted. The [622]*622question then is whether compelling defendant to pay Ward $925 served a demonstrably rehabilitative purpose.
It is generally difficult to determine, as is required by section 1203.1, when an order of restitution is likely to help reform a criminal. Ideally, restitution is designed to redirect the “conscious or unconscious thoughts, emotions, or conflicts which motivated the crime” (Schafer, Restitution to Victims of Crime—An Old Correctional Aim Modernized (1965) 50 Minn.L.Rev. 243, 250). In this way, the criminal is encouraged to accept his social responsibility. (Id.)
If a restitution order is to redirect a defendant to acceptance of responsibility for the crime he has committed, the order must be directly related to that crime. (People v. Dominguez (1967) supra, 256 Cal.App.2d at p. 628.) It is obvious that unless the act for which the defendant is ordered to make restitution was committed with the same state of mind as the offense of which he was convicted, this salutary rehabilitative effect cannot take place.5 No rehabilitative purpose can be served by forcing a person to confront tendencies which differ from those which induced his crime. For example, in People v. Williams (1966) supra, 247 Cal.App.2d 394, the defendant assaulted a store proprietor who refused to honor his Diners Club credit card. The Court of Appeal struck down a restitution order requiring the defendant to repay Diners Club for money owed on the credit card. The purpose of restitution in an assault case is to make the defendant accept responsibility for and thus curb his violent tendencies, a purpose that would have justified requiring restitution to the assault victim. But restitution to Diners Club would, at best, cause the defendant to confront his inclination towards fiscal irresponsibility, which is neither related to violence nor criminally punishable in California.6
[623]*623In contrast, we recently upheld the validity of a restitution order in People v. Lent (1975) supra, 15 Cal.3d 481. In Lent, the defendant was convicted of one count of defrauding a woman of $500, but acquitted on another count charging him with theft of $1,278 from the same woman. The trial court held a two-day probation and sentencing hearing, at which nine witnesses were heard. At the conclusion of the hearing, the judge declared that the fact the defendant had been acquitted of stealing the $1,278 did not absolve him of the false statements regarding the disposition of those funds. He ordered the defendant, as a condition of probation, to pay the victim the $1,278, as well as the $500 he was convicted of stealing. On appeal, we held the $1,278 restitution order justified because the defendant had shown the same type of dishonesty in regard to the disposition of those funds as he had demonstrated in the proved theft of the $500.
While the present case seems at first glance to involve facts comparable to Lent, closer analysis reveals that the restitution order here is more akin to that disapproved in Williams. As in Williams, there was no showing that making defendant pay restitution to Ward would in any way rehabilitate him for his proved criminal behavior toward Mrs. Garbuio. After the jury exonerated him of criminal conduct towards Ward, the judge made no specific finding that defendant’s behavior in the Ward transaction or his testimony regarding it showed a dishonest state of mind comparable to that involved in the charge of which he was convicted. The judge merely declared, “I know from the evidence presented during the course of the trial that Mr. and Mrs. Ward received nothing of value from the defendant as a result of the purchase made, and they were obviously relieved of some nine hundred plus dollars which has not yet been recovered. ... I think very definitely that Mr. Richards should make restitution to Mr. and Mrs. Ward because he got their money.” In other words, the court erroneously believed that restitution could be imposed merely to collect the purported debt to Ward.
[624]*624Even if the trial court’s statement could be interpreted as a conclusion that defendant had acted improperly in the Ward transaction, restitution would still not be justified. The jury did not find overt dishonesty on the part of defendant towards Ward. And, in contrast to the Lent case, the court held no hearing to determine facts other than those which led to defendant’s acquittal. No witnesses were heard, and the entire sentencing procedure took only a few minutes. The trial judge is not justified to draw conclusions about an acquitted defendant’s responsibility for restitution to persons other than the criminal victim based solely on the trial record.
It is entirely irrelevant that the burden of proof in a criminal case differs from the burden in a civil case. This is not a civil case. It is a criminal proceeding in which the defendant, protecting his liberty, will be acquitted if he raises a reasonable doubt of his guilt. In the course of convincing a jury to doubt his guilt on one charge, a defendant should not have the additional task of persuading the judge regarding the subsequent sentencing disposition on other charges.
The order admitting defendant to probation on condition that he make restitution to Ward is reversed. As the court has already determined that defendant is a proper candidate for probation, the case is remanded with directions to grant probation on reasonable conditions.
Wright, C. J., Tobriner, J., and Sullivan, J., concurred.