VANDE WALLE, Chief Justice.
[¶ 1] Jeff Mosbrucker appealed from a criminal judgment entered after being found guilty of gross sexual imposition following a jury trial. We affirm.
I.
[¶ 2] In August 2006, Mosbrucker and Jane Doe, who was eighteen years old at the time, had sex outside her parent’s home. Mosbrucker was charged with gross sexual imposition for engaging in a sexual act with Doe, whom the State alleged was forced into the sexual act or had a mental disease or defect rendering her incapable of understanding the nature of the conduct. Mosbrucker’s first trial in March 2007 ended in a mistrial and a second trial was held in July 2007.
[¶ 3] At the close of the State’s case-in-chief, Mosbrucker moved for a judgment of acquittal. It was partially granted as to the allegation that Doe was forced into the sexual act, with the jury deciding only whether Mosbrucker knew or had reasonable cause to believe Doe suffered from a mental disease or defect rendering her incapable of understanding the nature of the conduct. The jury found Mosbrucker guilty of gross sexual imposition. Following his trial, Mosbrucker made a motion for a new trial on the grounds that the verdict was not supported by the greater weight of the evidence. The motion was subsequently denied by the trial court.
II.
[¶ 4] Mosbrucker argues his conviction should be reversed because the trial court committed obvious error by allowing Dr. DeGree to testify regarding Doe’s ability to consent to sexual acts and her ability to understand the implications of engaging in sexual acts.
[¶ 5] Dr. DeGree testified he reported the incident because Doe told him she had not intended to have sexual relations and because he thought she would have difficulty giving consent due to her lack of mental capability. When asked if Doe had a mental disease or defect rendering her incapable of understanding the nature of [666]*666the conduct, Dr. DeGree explained that Doe might understand the act of sexual intercourse but would have difficulty understanding the implications of it. He said Doe would have extreme difficulty understanding sexually transmitted diseases, becoming pregnant and “the social relationships you have to understand and negotiate in order to engage in [sex].” When asked whether Doe could consent to the act of sex, Dr. DeGree stated:
[T]he trouble I have with that is she would not understand the implications of it, having sexually transmitted diseases, being pregnant, having consenting sex with somebody who may not be a good partner. She would have serious limitations on that.
[¶ 6] Mosbrucker objected to the testimony at trial as irrelevant. The trial court overruled the objection. Relevant evidence is evidence having any tendency to make the existence of any fact that is of consequence to the determination of the action more probable or less probable than it would be without the evidence. N.D.R.Ev. 401. Under N.D.R.Ev. 401 through 403, a trial court is vested with broad discretion to decide if evidence is relevant and if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice. State v. Carlson, 1997 ND 7, ¶ 8, 559 N.W.2d 802. We apply an abuse of discretion standard of review to a district court’s evidentiary rulings and will not reverse the court’s ruling unless it is arbitrary, capricious, or unreasonable, or a misinterpretation or misapplication of the law. State v. Wegley, 2008 ND 4, ¶ 12, 744 N.W.2d 284.
[¶ 7] Mosbrucker argues the testimony regarding whether Doe could consent to the sexual act or understand the implications of having sex were irrelevant in determining whether she had a mental disease or defect rendering her incapable of understanding the nature of the conduct. He asserts the testimony regarding Doe’s understanding of the physical act of sexual intercourse was sufficient to establish she was capable of understanding the nature of the conduct.
[¶ 8] Section 12.1 — 20—03(l)(e), N.D.C.C., provides:
1. A person who engages in a sexual act with another, or who causes another to engage in a sexual act, is guilty of an offense if:
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e. That person knows or has reasonable cause to believe that the other person suffers from a mental disease or defect which renders him or her incapable of understanding the nature of his or her conduct.
[¶ 9] It is necessary for us to ascertain what “incapable of understanding the nature of his or her conduct” entails and, consequently, what evidence is relevant to the issue. Legislative history is silent and there is no case law in our jurisdiction discussing the meaning of this particular statutory language. However, case law in other jurisdictions with similar statutory language is helpful in ascertaining what evidence is relevant in determining whether a victim was capable of understanding the nature of a sexual act.
[¶ 10] In determining the meaning of the words “incapable of understanding the nature of his or her conduct,” decisions in other jurisdictions have recognized the tensions between the individual’s right to sexual freedom and the society’s interest in protecting the individual with a mental disease or defect. Elizabeth Reed, Criminal Law and the Capacity of Mentally Retarded Persons to Consent to Sexual Activity, 83 Va. L.Rev. 799, 806 (1997). Although most jurisdictions agree that consent means knowing, intelligent and [667]*667voluntary agreement to engage in sexual activity, courts disagree as to the degree to which these factors must be determined and have resulted in three definitions courts have used to define mental incapacity so as to render the person incapable of understanding the nature of his or her conduct. Id. at 813.
[¶ 11] The majority position interprets the standard of incapable of understanding the nature of his or her conduct to mean that the person does not know either the physiological aspects of sex or the possible consequences of sexual activity, such as pregnancy and the contraction of sexually transmitted diseases. A few jurisdictions have interpreted the term to have a broader meaning and, in addition to understanding of the sexual act involved and its consequences, also require that the person must appreciate the moral dimensions of the decision to engage in sexual conduct although the person is free to act contrary to those societal ideas. Finally, one jurisdiction, New Jersey, has established the most limited interpretation and, while requiring the person understand the nature and the voluntariness of the action does not require the person understand the risk and consequences of sexual conduct. Id. at 813-14.
[¶ 12] An example of the broad definition is People v. Easley, 42 N.Y.2d 50, 396 N.Y.S.2d 635, 364 N.E.2d 1328, 1332 (1977). A valid inquiry in determining whether one is so mentally defective as to trigger protection under the law is whether there is an awareness of the social or other cost of one’s conduct. Id. at 1333. To appreciate the nature and consequences of engaging in an act of sexual penetration, the victim must have the capacity to understand the full range of ordinary and foreseeable social, medical and practical consequences that the act entails. See also State v. Soura, 118 Idaho 232, 796 P.2d 109 (1990);
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VANDE WALLE, Chief Justice.
[¶ 1] Jeff Mosbrucker appealed from a criminal judgment entered after being found guilty of gross sexual imposition following a jury trial. We affirm.
I.
[¶ 2] In August 2006, Mosbrucker and Jane Doe, who was eighteen years old at the time, had sex outside her parent’s home. Mosbrucker was charged with gross sexual imposition for engaging in a sexual act with Doe, whom the State alleged was forced into the sexual act or had a mental disease or defect rendering her incapable of understanding the nature of the conduct. Mosbrucker’s first trial in March 2007 ended in a mistrial and a second trial was held in July 2007.
[¶ 3] At the close of the State’s case-in-chief, Mosbrucker moved for a judgment of acquittal. It was partially granted as to the allegation that Doe was forced into the sexual act, with the jury deciding only whether Mosbrucker knew or had reasonable cause to believe Doe suffered from a mental disease or defect rendering her incapable of understanding the nature of the conduct. The jury found Mosbrucker guilty of gross sexual imposition. Following his trial, Mosbrucker made a motion for a new trial on the grounds that the verdict was not supported by the greater weight of the evidence. The motion was subsequently denied by the trial court.
II.
[¶ 4] Mosbrucker argues his conviction should be reversed because the trial court committed obvious error by allowing Dr. DeGree to testify regarding Doe’s ability to consent to sexual acts and her ability to understand the implications of engaging in sexual acts.
[¶ 5] Dr. DeGree testified he reported the incident because Doe told him she had not intended to have sexual relations and because he thought she would have difficulty giving consent due to her lack of mental capability. When asked if Doe had a mental disease or defect rendering her incapable of understanding the nature of [666]*666the conduct, Dr. DeGree explained that Doe might understand the act of sexual intercourse but would have difficulty understanding the implications of it. He said Doe would have extreme difficulty understanding sexually transmitted diseases, becoming pregnant and “the social relationships you have to understand and negotiate in order to engage in [sex].” When asked whether Doe could consent to the act of sex, Dr. DeGree stated:
[T]he trouble I have with that is she would not understand the implications of it, having sexually transmitted diseases, being pregnant, having consenting sex with somebody who may not be a good partner. She would have serious limitations on that.
[¶ 6] Mosbrucker objected to the testimony at trial as irrelevant. The trial court overruled the objection. Relevant evidence is evidence having any tendency to make the existence of any fact that is of consequence to the determination of the action more probable or less probable than it would be without the evidence. N.D.R.Ev. 401. Under N.D.R.Ev. 401 through 403, a trial court is vested with broad discretion to decide if evidence is relevant and if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice. State v. Carlson, 1997 ND 7, ¶ 8, 559 N.W.2d 802. We apply an abuse of discretion standard of review to a district court’s evidentiary rulings and will not reverse the court’s ruling unless it is arbitrary, capricious, or unreasonable, or a misinterpretation or misapplication of the law. State v. Wegley, 2008 ND 4, ¶ 12, 744 N.W.2d 284.
[¶ 7] Mosbrucker argues the testimony regarding whether Doe could consent to the sexual act or understand the implications of having sex were irrelevant in determining whether she had a mental disease or defect rendering her incapable of understanding the nature of the conduct. He asserts the testimony regarding Doe’s understanding of the physical act of sexual intercourse was sufficient to establish she was capable of understanding the nature of the conduct.
[¶ 8] Section 12.1 — 20—03(l)(e), N.D.C.C., provides:
1. A person who engages in a sexual act with another, or who causes another to engage in a sexual act, is guilty of an offense if:
[[Image here]]
e. That person knows or has reasonable cause to believe that the other person suffers from a mental disease or defect which renders him or her incapable of understanding the nature of his or her conduct.
[¶ 9] It is necessary for us to ascertain what “incapable of understanding the nature of his or her conduct” entails and, consequently, what evidence is relevant to the issue. Legislative history is silent and there is no case law in our jurisdiction discussing the meaning of this particular statutory language. However, case law in other jurisdictions with similar statutory language is helpful in ascertaining what evidence is relevant in determining whether a victim was capable of understanding the nature of a sexual act.
[¶ 10] In determining the meaning of the words “incapable of understanding the nature of his or her conduct,” decisions in other jurisdictions have recognized the tensions between the individual’s right to sexual freedom and the society’s interest in protecting the individual with a mental disease or defect. Elizabeth Reed, Criminal Law and the Capacity of Mentally Retarded Persons to Consent to Sexual Activity, 83 Va. L.Rev. 799, 806 (1997). Although most jurisdictions agree that consent means knowing, intelligent and [667]*667voluntary agreement to engage in sexual activity, courts disagree as to the degree to which these factors must be determined and have resulted in three definitions courts have used to define mental incapacity so as to render the person incapable of understanding the nature of his or her conduct. Id. at 813.
[¶ 11] The majority position interprets the standard of incapable of understanding the nature of his or her conduct to mean that the person does not know either the physiological aspects of sex or the possible consequences of sexual activity, such as pregnancy and the contraction of sexually transmitted diseases. A few jurisdictions have interpreted the term to have a broader meaning and, in addition to understanding of the sexual act involved and its consequences, also require that the person must appreciate the moral dimensions of the decision to engage in sexual conduct although the person is free to act contrary to those societal ideas. Finally, one jurisdiction, New Jersey, has established the most limited interpretation and, while requiring the person understand the nature and the voluntariness of the action does not require the person understand the risk and consequences of sexual conduct. Id. at 813-14.
[¶ 12] An example of the broad definition is People v. Easley, 42 N.Y.2d 50, 396 N.Y.S.2d 635, 364 N.E.2d 1328, 1332 (1977). A valid inquiry in determining whether one is so mentally defective as to trigger protection under the law is whether there is an awareness of the social or other cost of one’s conduct. Id. at 1333. To appreciate the nature and consequences of engaging in an act of sexual penetration, the victim must have the capacity to understand the full range of ordinary and foreseeable social, medical and practical consequences that the act entails. See also State v. Soura, 118 Idaho 232, 796 P.2d 109 (1990); People v. Gross, 670 P.2d 799, 801 (Colo.1983) (holding victim incapable of understanding how sexual conduct will be regarded within the framework of the societal environment of which is a part or is not capable of understanding the physiological implications of sexual conduct is incapable of “appraising the nature of her conduct” under the language of the statute.).
[¶ 13] New Jersey has taken the approach that the voluntariness of the action requires the person to understand only the nature of the act and that one need not consent to the act for the carnal gratification of another, but does not require the person to understand the risk and consequences of sexual conduct. State v. Olivio, 123 N.J. 550, 589 A.2d 597 (1991).
[¶ 14] Other jurisdictions have used an intermediate construction requiring that the person understand the nature of the sexual act as well as its consequences such as pregnancy and sexually transmitted diseases but not the moral nature of their participation in the act of intercourse. Thus, in Jackson v. State, 890 P.2d 587, 592 (Alaska Ct.App.1995) the court found a victim was incapable of understanding a sexual act although the victim knew a baby came from having sex and could demonstrate a sexual act using dolls, but did not understand birth control, sexually transmitted diseases, how to prevent pregnancy or the practical consequences of a pregnancy. See also Stafford v. State, 455 N.E.2d 402, 405-06 (Ind.Ct.App.1983) (holding “capacity to consent presupposes an intelligence capable of understanding the act, the nature and possible consequences.”) In Stafford, the court relied on People v. McMullen, 91 Ill.App.3d 184, 46 Ill.Dec. 492, 414 N.E.2d 214, 217 (1980), in which the Illinois court affirmed the conviction, adopting the standard that capacity to consent presupposes an intelligence [668]*668capable of understanding the act, its nature and its consequences and, coupling it with the standard of review on appeal, concluded beyond a reasonable doubt the victim was unable to give consent though she did have some understanding of the physical nature of sexual activity and “where babies came from.”
[¶ 15] The language of our statute “incapable of understanding the nature of his or her conduct” arguably may be broad enough to encompass the moral and societal consequences of sexual intercourse. However we believe that would be an amorphous construction of the statutory language and we decline to adopt it. But the statutory language is surely broad enough to encompass knowledge of the practical consequences of sexual intercourse such as unwanted pregnancy and sexually transmitted diseases, and we conclude the intermediate construction better reflects the legislative intent to balance the individual’s right to sexual freedom with society’s interest in protecting the individual with a mental disease or defect from conduct the nature of which he or she is incapable of understanding.
[¶ 16] Dr. DeGree’s testimony addressed Doe’s difficulty with specific implications and consequences, such as pregnancy and sexually transmitted diseases. Therefore, his testimony was relevant to an important issue in the ease, as it made it more probable that Doe had a mental disease or defect rendering her incapable of understanding the nature of the conduct, We conclude the trial court did not abuse its discretion in admitting the testimony as relevant under N.D.R.Ev. 401.
[¶ 17] Mosbrucker also argues the probative value of the evidence, if relevant, is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues or misleading of the jury. He asserts the jury was misled by the testimony into convicting Mosbrucker because Doe could not consent to the sexual act, rather than because Doe had a mental disease or defect rendering her incapable of understanding the conduct as the statute requires.
[¶ 18] Evidence may be excluded if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues or misleading the jury. N.D.R.Ev. 403. Because Mos-brucker failed to object to the evidence on this ground at trial, we do not reverse unless the admission of the evidence was obvious error. Hawes v. N.D. Dept. of Transp., 2007 ND 177, ¶10, 741 N.W.2d 202. To establish obvious error, a defendant must show 1) an error, 2) that is plain, and 3) that affects substantial rights. Wegley at ¶ 14. An alleged error does not constitute obvious error unless it is a clear deviation from an applicable legal rule under current law. Id. To affect substantial rights, a plain error must have been prejudicial or have affected the outcome of the proceeding. Id. Analyzing obvious error requires examination of the entire record and the probable effect of the alleged error in light of all the evidence. Id. Even if a defendant establishes obvious error affecting substantial rights, the decision to correct the error lies within this Court’s discretion and will be done only if the error seriously affects the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of judicial proceedings. Id.
[¶ 19] Here, Dr. DeGree offered valuable insight into Doe’s understanding of the implications and consequences of engaging in sexual acts. His testimony was that Doe would have difficulty having consenting sex with a good partner and that he reported the incident to police because he felt Doe would have difficulty consenting to sexual intercourse. Dr. DeGree did not testify as to what is needed to consent to sex nor did he testify that Doe could not [669]*669legally consent to sex. Instead, questioning of Dr. DeGree focused on whether Doe had a mental disease or defect rendering her incapable of understanding the nature of the conduct, as evidenced by multiple questions regarding her mental capacity. Under these circumstances, the probative value of the evidence exceeds any unfair prejudice that might arise out of admission of the evidence. We, therefore, conclude the trial court’s decision to admit Dr. DeGree’s testimony was not an obvious error.
III.
[¶ 20] Mosbrucker argues his conviction should be reversed because the evidence was insufficient to sustain the guilty verdict,
[¶ 21] The defendant bears the burden of showing the evidence reveals no reasonable inference of guilt when viewed in the light most favorable to the verdict. State v. Igou, 2005 ND 16, ¶ 5, 691 N.W.2d 213. When sufficiency of the evidence to support a criminal conviction is challenged, this Court reviews the record to determine if there is competent evidence allowing the jury to draw an inference reasonably tending to prove guilt and fairly warranting a conviction. Id. A conviction rests upon insufficient evidence only when no rational factfinder could have found the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt after viewing the evidence in a light most favorable to the prosecution and giving the prosecution the benefit of all inferences reasonably to be drawn in its favor. Id.
[¶ 22] Viewing the evidence in a light most favorable to the prosecution, there is a reasonable inference of guilt supporting the verdict. Along with the testimony previously discussed, Dr. DeGree testified that Doe has a mental age between nine and eleven years old and is subject to exploitation, especially by someone such as Mosbrucker, who would be viewed by Doe as an authority figure. He testified Doe might agree to sex because it is something she feels she has to do. While Mosbrucker claimed he was not aware of any handicap other than Doe’s Attention Deficit Hyperactivity Disorder, Detective McClure testified there were obvious signs of deficit in Doe when speaking with her and Mos-brucker had lived with Doe and her family for part of the year for the past two years.
[¶ 23] Also, the jury had the opportunity to see and hear Doe testify. Although Doe did testify about knowing she could become pregnant from sex, she did say she was warned by her parents not to have sex and told she could become pregnant from having sex. The jury could reasonably conclude from the testimony that Doe’s knowledge of pregnancy came solely from her parents. Evidence explaining what the victim knows and how the victim came to know it may well give rise to an inference of incapacity. Jackson, at 592. Based on our review of the record, we conclude there is competent evidence to support the verdict.
IV.
[¶ 24] Mosbrucker argues the trial court abused its discretion in denying his motion for a new trial because the guilty verdict was against the greater weight of the evidence. Under N.D.C.C. § 29-28-06, an appeal may be taken by the defendant from an order denying a motion for a new trial. Mosbrucker’s notice of appeal states that he is appealing the criminal judgment dated November 8, 2007, which does not deny his motion for a new trial. The order denying the motion for a new trial was not issued until November 9, 2007. Mosbrucker did not reference the November 9, 2007 order in his notice of appeal nor did he file an amended or additional notice of appeal.
[670]*670[¶ 25] The remedies afforded by appeal from a judgment and appeal from an order denying a new trial are independent remedies. Nevland v. Njust, 78 N.D. 747, 51 N.W.2d 845, 848 (1952). Not only have we said the rules of procedure and the statutes confirming the right to appeal do not contemplate or sanction a cursory treatment of the important process of perfecting an appeal, Everson v. Northland Life Ins. Co., 329 N.W.2d 592, 595 (N.D.1983), the filing of a notice of appeal is jurisdictional. State v. Neigum, 369 N.W.2d 375, 377-78 (N.D.1985). Because Mosbrucker did not file an amended or additional notice of appeal from the order denying his motion for a new trial, we are without jurisdiction to review the order.
[¶ 26] We affirm.
[¶ 27] MARY MUEHLEN MARING and DANIEL J. CROTHERS, JJ„ concur.