FOSHEIM, Chief Justice.
Michael Lang appeals a judgment of conviction entered on a jury verdict against him for three counts of distribution of marijuana with consideration and one count of unauthorized manufacture or distribution of a substance with high potential for abuse. We affirm.
Pursuant to a drug investigation, Michael Sanders, a paid informant, purchased drugs from appellant on four separate occasions. The sheriff and deputy sheriff monitored these transactions by recorders placed on the informant. The purchases were also witnessed by the informant’s girlfriend, Karen Huber. Four separate grand jury indictments were returned. The trial resulting in the convictions was held July 21 and 22, 1983.
Appellant presents five issues: (1) Did the trial court abuse its discretion in refusing to grant a continuance, (2) Was it reversible error to try all four indictments together, (3) Did the trial court commit reversible error by failing to fully admonish the jury prior to one recess, (4) Did the trial court abuse its discretion in allowing Karen Huber to testify and (5) Was the sheriff’s testimony concerning the recorded conversations admissible.
On the eve of trial, appellant requested a second continuance on the grounds he could not locate five witnesses and because defense counsel was not ready for trial.1 His defense rested on alibi testimony that he was with others on the dates of the alleged drug sales.
A trial may be postponed “upon good cause shown.” SDCL 15-11-4. The granting of a continuance is within the sound discretion of the trial court and its rulings will not be disturbed absent a clear showing of abuse of discretion. State v. Rosales, 302 N.W.2d 804 (S.D.1981). The trial court had continued the trial once before for similar reasons. Despite his claim of unpreparedness, appellant produced seven witnesses who testified regarding his whereabouts on the dates of the drug transactions. We conclude there was no abuse of discretion in the trial court’s refusal to grant a continuance. Id.
Concerning his claim that it was reversible error to try all four indictments together, appellant has failed to preserve a record. See, SDCL 23A-11-2 (relief from pre-judicial joinder of offenses); SDCL 23A-8-3(6) (request for severance of charges must be made prior to trial).
For his third issue, appellant relies on SDCL 23A-24-5 which provides:
Jurors must also, at each adjournment of court, whether permitted to separate or kept in charge of officers, be admonished by the court that it is their duty not to converse, among themselves or with anyone else, on any subject connected with the trial, or to form or express any opinion thereon, until the case is finally submitted to them.
[725]*725At the conclusion of the appellant’s testimony a short recess was taken and the court admonished the jury as follows:
THE COURT: Alright, [the court reporter] said he’s getting warm up here and his hands are getting sore, so again, I admonish you not to discuss this case among yourselves, with anyone else, nor permit anyone to discuss it with you. With that, we’ll be in recess for about five minutes.
Appellant contends that because the court failed to additionally admonish the jury not to form or express any opinions prior to this recess his convictions should be reversed. The trial lasted two full days. Numerous recesses were taken both before and after the five minute recess in question. The trial judge carefully followed all parts of SDCL 23A-24-5 at every other adjournment. There is no indication that this minor omission affected the verdict and a reversal will not be granted. Kost v. State, 344 N.W.2d 83 (S.D.1984), citing, Rosales, supra.
We next consider whether it was reversible error to admit the testimony of the informant’s girlfriend, Karen Huber. Her name was not on the grand jury indictment and the State did not formally disclose she would be a witness until the day of trial.
“It is important to note ... the rule ... requiring disclosure of material and exculpatory material applies only to situations where defense counsel discovers after trial that the prosecution had material information that remained undisclosed during the trial. We do not equate late disclosure with suppression, especially where, as here the trial record indicates that defense counsel made use of the information at trial.” State v. Fox, 313 N.W.2d 38 (S.D.1981), citing State v. Moves Camp, 286 N.W.2d 333, 339 (S.D.1979); See also, California v. Trombetta, — U.S. -, 104 S.Ct. 2528, 81 L.Ed.2d 413 (1984); State v. Coe, 286 N.W.2d 340 (S.D.1979); State v. Church, 6 S.D. 89, 60 N.W. 143 (1894); rev’d on other grounds, 7 S.D. 289, 64 N.W. 152 (1895); Karen Huber’s name was listed in the police reports made available to the appellant. Counsel for appellant never requested a witness list from the State. Both the trial court and the State attempted to minimize any possible prejudice to appellant by offering to make Ms. Huber available to appellant’s counsel before she testified. Counsel did not take advantage of this opportunity, nor was this given as a reason for the requested continuances. Counsel for appellant extensively cross-examined Ms. Huber during the trial. The State did not offer previously undisclosed evidence at trial. State v. McKee, 314 N.W.2d 866 (S.D.1982). In the absence of any showing of prejudice to appellant, we hold the trial court did not abuse its discretion in allowing Karen Huber to testify. See SDCL 23A-13-17.
We close this decision with a consideration of appellant’s claim the trial court erroneously allowed the sheriff to testify regarding conversations recorded on tape. He claims the tapes themselves, and not testimony, were the “best evidence” of the conversations. SDCL 19-18-2. In United States v. Gonzales-Benitez, 537 F.2d 1051, 1053 (9th Cir.1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 923, 97 S.Ct. 323, 50 L.Ed.2d 291 (1976), the ninth circuit court discussed this question:
Appellants simply misconstrue the purpose and effect of the best evidence rule. The rule does not set up an order of preferred admissibility, which must be followed to prove any fact.
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FOSHEIM, Chief Justice.
Michael Lang appeals a judgment of conviction entered on a jury verdict against him for three counts of distribution of marijuana with consideration and one count of unauthorized manufacture or distribution of a substance with high potential for abuse. We affirm.
Pursuant to a drug investigation, Michael Sanders, a paid informant, purchased drugs from appellant on four separate occasions. The sheriff and deputy sheriff monitored these transactions by recorders placed on the informant. The purchases were also witnessed by the informant’s girlfriend, Karen Huber. Four separate grand jury indictments were returned. The trial resulting in the convictions was held July 21 and 22, 1983.
Appellant presents five issues: (1) Did the trial court abuse its discretion in refusing to grant a continuance, (2) Was it reversible error to try all four indictments together, (3) Did the trial court commit reversible error by failing to fully admonish the jury prior to one recess, (4) Did the trial court abuse its discretion in allowing Karen Huber to testify and (5) Was the sheriff’s testimony concerning the recorded conversations admissible.
On the eve of trial, appellant requested a second continuance on the grounds he could not locate five witnesses and because defense counsel was not ready for trial.1 His defense rested on alibi testimony that he was with others on the dates of the alleged drug sales.
A trial may be postponed “upon good cause shown.” SDCL 15-11-4. The granting of a continuance is within the sound discretion of the trial court and its rulings will not be disturbed absent a clear showing of abuse of discretion. State v. Rosales, 302 N.W.2d 804 (S.D.1981). The trial court had continued the trial once before for similar reasons. Despite his claim of unpreparedness, appellant produced seven witnesses who testified regarding his whereabouts on the dates of the drug transactions. We conclude there was no abuse of discretion in the trial court’s refusal to grant a continuance. Id.
Concerning his claim that it was reversible error to try all four indictments together, appellant has failed to preserve a record. See, SDCL 23A-11-2 (relief from pre-judicial joinder of offenses); SDCL 23A-8-3(6) (request for severance of charges must be made prior to trial).
For his third issue, appellant relies on SDCL 23A-24-5 which provides:
Jurors must also, at each adjournment of court, whether permitted to separate or kept in charge of officers, be admonished by the court that it is their duty not to converse, among themselves or with anyone else, on any subject connected with the trial, or to form or express any opinion thereon, until the case is finally submitted to them.
[725]*725At the conclusion of the appellant’s testimony a short recess was taken and the court admonished the jury as follows:
THE COURT: Alright, [the court reporter] said he’s getting warm up here and his hands are getting sore, so again, I admonish you not to discuss this case among yourselves, with anyone else, nor permit anyone to discuss it with you. With that, we’ll be in recess for about five minutes.
Appellant contends that because the court failed to additionally admonish the jury not to form or express any opinions prior to this recess his convictions should be reversed. The trial lasted two full days. Numerous recesses were taken both before and after the five minute recess in question. The trial judge carefully followed all parts of SDCL 23A-24-5 at every other adjournment. There is no indication that this minor omission affected the verdict and a reversal will not be granted. Kost v. State, 344 N.W.2d 83 (S.D.1984), citing, Rosales, supra.
We next consider whether it was reversible error to admit the testimony of the informant’s girlfriend, Karen Huber. Her name was not on the grand jury indictment and the State did not formally disclose she would be a witness until the day of trial.
“It is important to note ... the rule ... requiring disclosure of material and exculpatory material applies only to situations where defense counsel discovers after trial that the prosecution had material information that remained undisclosed during the trial. We do not equate late disclosure with suppression, especially where, as here the trial record indicates that defense counsel made use of the information at trial.” State v. Fox, 313 N.W.2d 38 (S.D.1981), citing State v. Moves Camp, 286 N.W.2d 333, 339 (S.D.1979); See also, California v. Trombetta, — U.S. -, 104 S.Ct. 2528, 81 L.Ed.2d 413 (1984); State v. Coe, 286 N.W.2d 340 (S.D.1979); State v. Church, 6 S.D. 89, 60 N.W. 143 (1894); rev’d on other grounds, 7 S.D. 289, 64 N.W. 152 (1895); Karen Huber’s name was listed in the police reports made available to the appellant. Counsel for appellant never requested a witness list from the State. Both the trial court and the State attempted to minimize any possible prejudice to appellant by offering to make Ms. Huber available to appellant’s counsel before she testified. Counsel did not take advantage of this opportunity, nor was this given as a reason for the requested continuances. Counsel for appellant extensively cross-examined Ms. Huber during the trial. The State did not offer previously undisclosed evidence at trial. State v. McKee, 314 N.W.2d 866 (S.D.1982). In the absence of any showing of prejudice to appellant, we hold the trial court did not abuse its discretion in allowing Karen Huber to testify. See SDCL 23A-13-17.
We close this decision with a consideration of appellant’s claim the trial court erroneously allowed the sheriff to testify regarding conversations recorded on tape. He claims the tapes themselves, and not testimony, were the “best evidence” of the conversations. SDCL 19-18-2. In United States v. Gonzales-Benitez, 537 F.2d 1051, 1053 (9th Cir.1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 923, 97 S.Ct. 323, 50 L.Ed.2d 291 (1976), the ninth circuit court discussed this question:
Appellants simply misconstrue the purpose and effect of the best evidence rule. The rule does not set up an order of preferred admissibility, which must be followed to prove any fact. It is, rather, a rule applicable only when one seeks to prove the contents of documents or recordings. Fed.R.Evid. 1002. Thus, if the ultimate inquiry had been to discover what sounds were embodied on the tapes in question, the tapes themselves would have been the “best evidence.” However, the content of the tapes was not in itself a factual issue relevant to the case. The inquiry concerned the content of the conversations.
see also, United States v. Rose, 590 F.2d 232 (7th Cir.1978), cert. denied, 442 U.S. 929, 99 S.Ct. 2859, 61 L.Ed.2d 297 (1979); 5 Weinstein 1002[03] (1976). Here, the issue was what transpired between the appellant [726]*726and the informant during the drug transactions. The sheriff monitered the conversations as they occurred and were taped. The fact that the recordings were admitted into evidence does not require they be treated as the only admissible evidence of the conversations. “Any witness who heard may testify to words even though they were transcribed or recorded." 5 Weinstein 1002[03], 1002-11 (1976); see also, U.S. v. Bell, 651 F.2d 1255 (8th Cir.1981); U.S. v. Gonzales-Benitez, supra; U.S. v. Rose, supra.
We hold there were no prejudicial errors warranting reversal of appellant’s conviction. Affirmed.
WOLLMAN, DUNN, and MORGAN, JJ., concur.
HENDERSON, J., dissents.