State v. Hobson

579 P.2d 697, 99 Idaho 200, 1978 Ida. LEXIS 401

• Court: Idaho Supreme Court
• Decided: June 1, 1978
• Docket: 12046
• Status: Published

Opinions

McFADDEN, Justice.

This is the second appeal concerning the January 21,1972, arrest of defendant-appellant Jerry L. Hobson for illegal possession of drugs. See: State v. Hobson, 95 Idaho 920, 523 P.2d 523 (1974) (hereinafter Hobson I). On this appeal appellant argues that: (1) he was arrested without probable cause; (2) his consent to a police search of his motel room was involuntary; and (3) he was denied the right to a speedy trial. In light of our disposition of the case we need only discuss the last contention. On that basis we reverse.

In Hobson I an order of the district court suppressing evidence obtained in a search of appellant’s automobile and motel room was reversed and the case was remanded for trial. Remittitur was issued on July 3, 1974, following denial of a petition for rehearing. On September 4, 1974, two months after the remittitur in Hobson I, appellant moved to dismiss the information, asserting a denial of his right to a speedy trial pursuant to I.C. § 19-3501. No hearing was held on this motion until March 20, 1975, when the motion to dismiss was denied by the district court. Trial was held on June 9, 1975, and a jury found appellant guilty on June 11, 1975.

Appellant asserts that his constitutional right to a speedy trial has been violated in contravention of both the Idaho and United States Constitutions. Because we hold that appellant’s right of speedy trial under article 1, § 13, of the Idaho Constitution, as defined by I.C. § 19-3501, has been abridged, we need not also address the sixth amendment issue.

Criminal defendants are constitutionally guaranteed the right to a speedy public trial. U. S. Const. Amend. VI. The sixth amendment guarantee is a fundamental right, made binding on the states by the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment. Klopfer v. State of North Carolina, 386 U.S. 213, 87 S.Ct. 988, 18 L.Ed.2d 1 (1967). The Idaho Constitution also affords the party accused in a criminal prosecution the right to a speedy trial. Idaho Const, art. 1, § 13. However, the right to a speedy trial under the Idaho Constitution is not identical to the right guaranteed by the United States Constitution. State v. Lindsay, 96 Idaho 474, 531 P.2d 236 (1975). While inquiries into speedy trial claims under the federal constitution involve ad hoc determinations under guidelines established by the United States Supreme Court in Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 92 S.Ct. 2182, 33 L.Ed.2d 101 (1972), the Idaho constitutional provision has been supplemented by legislation. I.C. § 19-3501; Schrom v. Cramer, 76 Idaho 1, 275 P.2d 979 (1954); Ellenwood v. Cramer, 75 Idaho 338, 272 P.2d 702 (1954).

Idaho Code § 19-3501 provides:

19-3501. When action may be dismissed. — The court, unless good cause to the contrary is shown, must order the prosecution or indictment to be dismissed, in the following cases:

(2) If a defendant, whose trial has not been postponed upon his application, is not brought to trial at the next term of the court in which the indictment is triable, after it is found.¹

Under I.C. § 19-3501, the district court must dismiss an action wherein a criminal defendant is not tried during the next term of court after the information is triable, “unless good cause to the contrary is shown.” When a criminal defendant makes a prima facie showing that his right to a speedy trial is violated under I.C. § 19-3501, the district court must determine whether “good cause” for the delay is shown by the state under our statute. In such cases the burden is on the state to show “good cause” for the delay, just as the primary responsibility for bringing a case to trial is upon the state. Barker v. Wingo, supra 407 U.S. at 529, 92 S.Ct. 2182; United States v. MacDonald, 531 F.2d 196, 207 (4th Cir. 1976); United States v. Macino, 486 F.2d 750, 753 (7th Cir. 1973).

Appellant was not tried until the third term of court following the term of court that the remittitur in Hobson I issued.² Under I.C. § 19-3501, appellant should have been tried at least before the end of the September 1 — December 31, 1974 term of court, “unless good cause to the contrary is shown.” The issue, therefore, is whether any of the delay after the case was ordered to be tried by the remittitur in Hobson I is justified under I.C. § 19-3501 as being for “good cause.”

The state has not shown any justification for failure to prosecute appellant during the two intervening terms of court from the date of the court’s remittitur in Hobson I and the date of appellant’s trial, as is required by I.C. § 19-3501. Initially, we note that none of this delay was upon the appellant’s application. The state asserts that delay in hearing appellant’s speedy trial claim was due to confusion in noticing his motion for hearing, and that the trial was held shortly after the motion to dismiss was heard and denied by the district court. This argument ignores the fact that appellant’s motion to dismiss notified the state of appellant’s assertion of his right to a speedy trial. This occurred on September 4, 1974, following the term of court that the remittitur was issued and the prosecution found triable, and only two months after the remittitur issued. Despite appellant’s assertion of his right to a speedy trial, the state failed to prosecute appellant until the third term of court following remittitur in Hobson I. We hold that “good cause” for the delay not having been shown by the state, the district court erred in denying appellant’s motion to dismiss pursuant to I.C. § 19-3501.

The district court mistakenly applied the four-fold balancing test for speedy trial claims enunciated by the United States Supreme Court in Barker v. Wingo, supra, in denying appellant’s motion to dismiss.³ This ignores the legislative supplementation of the Idaho constitutional guarantee. I.C. § 19-3501. Barker v. Wingo, supra, is not applicable when I.C. § 19-3501 has been violated. The district court should have applied I.C. § 19-3501 and dismissed the action on that basis.

Judgment of conviction is reversed with directions to the district court to dismiss the information.

BAKES and BISTLINE, JJ., concur. DONALDSON, J., concurs in the result.

1 . Provisions concerning indictments are equally applicable to prosecutions based upon an information. I.C. § 19-1304.

2 . Three terms of court are held in the Fourth Judicial District each year. Unless the day is a non-judicial day or holiday, each term of court in Ada County begins on the first Monday of January, May and September. IDAHO STATE BAR DESK BOOK, Local District Court Rules and Calendars, Fourth Judicial District.

3 .In State v. Lindsay, supra, a fourteen month delay had occurred in bringing the defendant to trial. In that case I.C. § 19-3501 had not been contravened, however, and the only issue was whether the Idaho constitutional guarantee, apart from the statutory definition, had been violated. We there applied the Barker balancing test in determining the constitutional speedy trial issue.