MACY, Justice.
Appellant Jetty Lee Harvey appeals from his convictions of kidnapping and first-degree sexual assault.1 Although appellant presents several issues for our consideration, the fundamental and dispositive issue in this case, as in the companion case of Phillips v. State, 774 P.2d 118 (Wyo.1989), is whether, under the circumstances of the case, a delay of over one and one-half years between the filing of the criminal complaint and the subsequent trial violated appellant’s constitutionally guaranteed right to a speedy trial.
We reverse.
In Stuebgen v. State, 548 P.2d 870 (Wyo.1976), this Court reversed two felony drug convictions and dismissed the informations where there had been a delay, largely attributable to the State and the trial court, of eighteen months between the defendants’ arrests and their trial. Three years later, in Cherniwchan v. State, 594 P.2d 464, 470 (Wyo.1979), although we declined to dismiss the defendants’ felony convictions on speedy trial grounds, we issued a stem warning admonishing
law enforcement officials throughout Wyoming that this must not happen again, and all persons — whether they be prisoners or whomsoever — will be given their Rule-5 and speedy-trial rights, fail[90]*90ing which the supervisory authority of this court will be brought into play to address such negligent conduct.
Even though we have reviewed a number of cases since Chemiwchan in which a speedy trial violation has been alleged, we have not, in these cases, encountered a clear violation necessitating reversal and dismissal. It was perhaps inevitable, however, that this Court would eventually be confronted with a case wherein the result in Stuebgen and the warning in Cher-niwchan would not have been heeded. This is that case.
The crimes involved in this case are serious. Appellant, Everett Phillips (whose appeal comprises the companion case of Phillips, 774 P.2d 118), and David Swazo were arrested in January 1986 in connection with the January 5, 1986, abduction and rape of a Rock Springs woman. Although at trial the prosecution and the defendants presented conflicting versions of the significant events, the jury was entitled to and did accept the evidence presented by the State, which is summarized briefly as follows.
The State’s evidence indicated that appellant, Phillips, and Swazo abducted the victim from a Rock Springs street on the evening of January 5,1986, forced her into Phillips’ crew cab pickup, and drove away. Thereafter, as the vehicle proceeded to drive to the outskirts of the city, Swazo sexually assaulted the victim in the back seat, with encouragement from appellant and Phillips. Phillips drove the pickup to an isolated trailer court and parked, indicating that he intended to join in and continue the assault. Unbeknownst to the men, however, the abduction had been witnessed by an individual in a nearby vehicle. This witness followed the pickup to the trailer court entrance and then contacted law enforcement authorities. The police responded quickly and intercepted Phillips’ pickup as it was leaving the vicinity, the men having seen the police. The police rescued the victim and arrested appellant and Swazo on the spot. Phillips was arrested later upon further investigation. The State’s evidence indicated that the police intervention very likely saved the victim from further violence, at least in the form of further sexual assault.
On January 9, 1986, a criminal complaint was filed in Sweetwater County Court, charging appellant with kidnapping and sexual assault in the first degree or aiding and abetting in those crimes. Appellant was appointed counsel, and a preliminary hearing was held on January 29, 1986, at which appellant was bound over to the district court.
On February 5,1986, an information was filed in district court charging appellant identically with the county court complaint. An arraignment was also held on February 5, at which time appellant entered a plea of not guilty, and his bond was continued. At this arraignment, the district court advised appellant that, if he pleaded not guilty, he was entitled to a jury trial within 120 days. On February 18, 1986, appellant filed a motion for discovery and a motion to dismiss. The record does not indicate whether the district court ever ruled on these motions.
At this point the record becomes totally silent as to any further proceedings for a period of nearly ten months. The next entry in the record occurs on December 5, 1986, when a letter from the court to counsel was filed notifying the parties that the court had consolidated appellant’s case with that of his co-defendants, Phillips and Swazo, and that trial was set for January 6, 1987. On December 9, 1986, the State obtained a continuance of the trial. This fact is not reflected in the record on appeal, as there is no record of any motion for a continuance, of any order granting the continuance, or of any indication that appellant had any prior notice and opportunity to object to this continuance. The fact that the State obtained this continuance, however, is acknowledged by the State in its brief, and we therefore accept it as a conceded point. Absent the State’s concession on this matter, we would be without any explanation of why trial was not held on January 6, 1987, as scheduled.
The record next reflects that on December 15, 1986, appellant’s retained private [91]*91counsel made an entry of appearance. Correspondingly, on January 22, 1987, appellant’s appointed counsel submitted a motion to withdraw as counsel, which was granted by the court on that same date.
In January 1987, another lapse in the record occurs. On January 16,1987, appellant’s retained counsel submitted to the district court a motion to dismiss for lack of a speedy trial. This motion was not filed, for reasons that remain unknown, but again the State has conceded in brief and in oral argument that the motion was submitted on that date. On April 27, 1987, counsel for appellant filed what was designated as a duplicate motion to dismiss, again on the basis of a speedy trial violation, with an accompanying certificate stating that the January 16 motion had been submitted. Standing alone, we would not accept this representation of counsel as to the earlier speedy trial motion absent record support, but in consideration of the State’s concession that it in fact was made, we will credit appellant with having made the earlier assertion of his right.2
On February 4, 1987, the district court ordered a presentence investigation, indicating in the order that the investigation had been requested by both parties. The next event of record was appellant’s July 2, 1987, motion to disqualify the district judge. This motion was promptly denied. On July 13,1987, the district court ordered, pursuant to the application of appellant, that a subpoena be issued for Swazo to appear and testify at trial. Swazo, upon a guilty plea, had previously been sentenced to the Wyoming State Penitentiary. On July 20, 1987, appellant adopted and joined in the “BRIEF OF DEFENDANT IN SUPPORT OF MOTION TO DISMISS FOR LACK OF SPEEDY TRIAL” filed by his co-defendant, Phillips.
Appellant’s trial began on July 21, 1987. In a pretrial chambers conference, the district court denied appellant’s speedy trial motion. The jury, after a three-day trial, found appellant guilty on both charges. Appellant was sentenced to not less than twenty years nor more than thirty years in the Wyoming State Penitentiary on each count, the sentences to run concurrently. This appeal followed.
The right to a speedy trial is found in both the United States3 and the Wyoming4 Constitutions. In Wyoming, additional speedy trial protections are provided by W.R.Cr.P. 45(b)5 and Rule 204 of the Uniform Rules for the District Courts of the State of Wyoming. The specific time constraints of Rule 204, and the exceptions thereto, will be discussed infra in connection with the length of delay analysis.
The United States Supreme Court, in Klopfer v. North Carolina, 386 U.S. 213, 87 S.Ct. 988, 18 L.Ed.2d 1 (1967), held that the Sixth Amendment right to a speedy trial applies to the states through the Fourteenth Amendment. In Cherniwchan, 594 P.2d at 467, we quoted the following passage from Klopfer, 386 U.S. at 223, 87 S.Ct. at 993:
“We hold here that the right to a speedy trial is as fundamental as any of the rights secured by the Sixth Amendment. That right has its roots at the very foundation of our English law heritage. Its first articulation in modern jurisprudence appears to have been made in Magna Carta (1215), wherein it was written, ‘We will sell to no man, we will not deny or defer to any man either justice or right’; ...”
The Supreme Court, in Klopfer, traced the evolution of the right to a speedy trial from its origin in the Magna Carta through Sir [92]*92Edward Coke’s The Second Part of the Institutes of the Laws of England to George Mason’s bill of rights for the colony of Virginia and thereafter to its prominent position in the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution. 386 U.S. at 223-26, 87 S.Ct. at 993-95. See also United States v. Provoo, 17 F.R.D. 183 (D.Md.), aff'd 350 U.S. 857, 76 S.Ct. 101, 100 L.Ed. 761 (1955) (influence of speedy trial aspects of British Habeas Corpus Act upon the Bill of Rights); and Poulos and Coleman, Speedy Trial, Slow Implementation: The ABA Standards in Search of a Statehouse, 28 Hastings L.J. 357 (1976) (tracing the right from Magna Carta to the Sixth Amendment). Thus, the Supreme Court, in Klopfer, 386 U.S. at 226, 87 S.Ct. at 995, concluded that the right to a speedy trial “is one of the most basic rights preserved by our Constitution.”
In Dickey v. Florida, 398 U.S. 30, 37-38, 90 S.Ct. 1564, 1568-1569, 26 L.Ed.2d 26 (1970), Chief Justice Burger, speaking for the Court, said:
The right to a speedy trial is not a theoretical or abstract right but one rooted in hard reality in the need to have charges promptly exposed. If the case for the prosecution calls on the accused to meet charges rather than rest on the infirmities of the prosecution’s case, as is the defendant’s right, the time to meet them is when the case is fresh. Stale claims have never been favored by the law, and far less so in criminal cases. Although a great many accused persons seek to put off the confrontation as long as possible, the right to a prompt inquiry into criminal charges is fundamental and the duty of the charging authority is to provide a prompt trial.
(Footnote omitted.)
In Cosco v. State, 503 P.2d 1403 (Wyo.1972), cert. denied 411 U.S. 971, 93 S.Ct. 2164, 36 L.Ed.2d 693 (1973), this Court adopted the balancing test for evaluating speedy trial challenges enunciated by the United States Supreme Court in Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 92 S.Ct. 2182, 33 L.Ed.2d 101 (1972). We have applied this test in a long line of cases since Cosco, including Sodergren v. State, 715 P.2d 170 (Wyo.1986); Grable v. State, 649 P.2d 663 (Wyo.1982); Robinson v. State, 627 P.2d 168 (Wyo.1981); and Phillips v. State, 597 P.2d 456 (Wyo.1979). The balancing test requires that we look at: (1) the length of the delay; (2) the reason for the delay; (3) the defendant’s assertion of his right; and (4) the prejudice to the defendant. Barker, 407 U.S. 514, 92 S.Ct. 2182; Caton v. State, 709 P.2d 1260, 1264 (Wyo.1985); Estrada v. State, 611 P.2d 850, 852 (Wyo.1980). These four factors must be considered together and balanced in relation to all relevant circumstances. Moore v. Arizona, 414 U.S. 25, 94 S.Ct. 188, 38 L.Ed.2d 183 (1973); Heinrich v. State, 638 P.2d 641 (Wyo.1981).
LENGTH OF DELAY
There is not a precise length of delay that automatically constitutes a violation of the right to a speedy trial. Caton, 709 P.2d at 1264; Phillips, 597 P.2d 456. In Phillips, id. at 460, however, we noted that,
when the delay is so protracted as to be presumptively prejudicial, it is a triggering mechanism, which requires “inquiry into the other factors that go into the balance.” Barker v. Wingo, supra, 92 S.Ct. at 2192.
In Barker, 407 U.S. at 523, 92 S.Ct. at 2188, the Supreme Court stated that, although the constitution does not require the speedy trial right to be quantified into a specific number of days or months, the states are free to establish a reasonable period in accordance with constitutional standards. See also United States v. Taylor, — U.S. -, 108 S.Ct. 2413, 2421 n. 12, 101 L.Ed.2d 297 (1988) (Barker did not specify a time period, leaving that kind of legislative or rule-making activity to others in a better position to do so).
Some states have set mandatory time limits for bringing a defendant to trial requiring dismissal when the statute or rule has been violated, with exclusions and extensions provided for certain delays, such as those caused by the defendant or necessitated by competency proceedings, et cetera. See, e.g., State v. Jones, 111 Wash.2d [93]*93239, 759 P.2d 1183 (1988) (applying procedural rule requiring trial within sixty days of arraignment); Miller v. State, 706 P.2d 336 (Alaska App.1985) (reversing and dismissing charges upon violation of Alaska R.Crim.P. 45 requiring trial within 120 days of arrest); People v. Bell, 669 P.2d 1381 (Colo.1983) (affirming trial court’s dismissal of criminal charges where the defendant was not brought to trial within six months of entry of not guilty plea in accordance with § 18-1-405(1) of the Colorado Revised Statutes (1973 and 1978 Repl. Vol. 8)).
Similarly, Congress has enacted the Speedy Trial Act of 1974, 18 U.S.C. §§ 3161-3174 (1982), which decrees that a defendant in the federal courts must be tried within seventy days of the information or indictment, again with exceptions for specified delays, or the charges will be dismissed. Section 3162(a)(2) of the Act provides that, in considering whether the dismissal should be with or without prejudice, the court shall consider the seriousness of the offense, the facts and circumstances of the case that led to the dismissal, and the impact of a reprosecution. The federal courts, however, have recognized that, while review of compliance with the Act is a matter of statutory interpretation, the inquiry into whether a constitutional speedy trial violation has occurred continues to be guided by Barker. United States v. Gonzalez, 671 F.2d 441 (11th Cir.), cert. denied 456 U.S. 994, 102 S.Ct. 2279, 73 L.Ed.2d 1291 (1982); United States v. DiFrancesco, 604 F.2d 769 (2d Cir.1979), cert. granted 444 U.S. 1070, 100 S.Ct. 1012, 62 L.Ed.2d 751, rev’d on other grounds 449 U.S. 117, 101 S.Ct. 426, 66 L.Ed.2d 328 (1980).
In Wyoming, Rule 204 (formerly Rule 22) of the Uniform Rules for the District Courts of the State of Wyoming fixes a deadline of 120 days after the filing of the information or indictment for bringing a defendant to trial, with certain delays excluded from the time computation.6 We have held, however, that Rule 204 is not an exclusive or mandatory test but rather that it is advisory in nature, and it is another factor to be considered in the balancing test from Barker. Caton, 709 P.2d 1260; Cook v. State, 631 P.2d 5 (Wyo.1981); Robinson, 627 P.2d 168.
Rule 204 provides a convenient and logical starting point for the analysis of the length of delay in the instant case. Under Rule 204(b), the measuring period for speedy trial purposes commences at the date of filing the information or indictment.7 Here, the information was filed on February 5, 1986. Appellant’s trial began on July 21, 1987, 531 days after the information was filed. Rule 204 requires that [94]*94trial be held within 120 days after the filing of the information. Although Rule 204 delineates certain periods that are to be excluded from the count, the record in this case does not reflect any delays properly excludable under the rule. See the discussion regarding the reason for the delay, infra. Thus, even though we consider Rule 204 to be advisory only, i.e., a touchstone for analysis, the delay in this case of 531 days, which is in excess of four times greater than the period prescribed by the rule, is more than sufficient to trigger further analysis into the other factors. See Caton, 709 P.2d at 1265; and Barker, 407 U.S. at 530, 92 S.Ct. at 2192. Additionally, under constitutional analysis, the speedy trial clock starts to run upon arrest or when the complaint is filed. United States v. Marion, 404 U.S. 307, 92 S.Ct. 455, 30 L.Ed.2d 468 (1971); Caton, 709 P.2d 1260; Estrada, 611 P.2d 850. Appellant was arrested on January 5, 1986, and the complaint was filed on January 9, 1986. Thus, from the date of his arrest, 562 days elapsed before appellant was brought to trial. Although, as we have said, no precise length of delay will automatically constitute a speedy trial violation, the excessive and appalling delay involved in this case is presumptively prejudicial and must be weighed heavily in favor of appellant in the balancing test analysis. See Caton, 709 P.2d at 1265; and Phillips, 597 P.2d at 460.
REASON FOR DELAY
The State, in its brief, concedes that there is nothing in the record justifying or even explaining the delay from the initiation of the case until December 1986, a period of approximately eleven months from appellant’s arrest and ten months from the filing of the information. We agree. The State argues, however, that the delay encompassing the period from December 10, 1986, to the date of trial is equally attributable to both appellant and the prosecution. This assertion, however, is not borne out in the record, absent resort to speculation.
Unquestionably, delays attributable to a defendant may disentitle him to speedy trial safeguards. Phillips, 597 P.2d at 461; Cherniwchan, 594 P.2d at 468. Rule 204 embraces this principle in its provisions for excluding certain periods from the 120-day count. Periods excluded from the Rule 204 computation include proceedings regarding the defendant’s mental condition, proceedings on other charges, delay resulting from the defendant’s change of counsel or application therefor, delay for continuances granted to the defendant, and delay for continuances granted to the prosecution when the defendant expressly consents or the prosecution’s evidence is unavailable despite the exercise of due diligence or when required in the due administration of justice. Rule 204(c) and (d).
The State contends that appellant’s December 10, 1986, change of counsel (the entry of appearance is dated December 10, but it was not filed until December 15) is a delay factor attributable to appellant. It does not appear on the record, however, that this change caused any delay in the proceedings. Appellant did not request a continuance of the previously set January 6, 1987, trial date. The State argues, though, that appellant did not object to the continuance obtained by the State on December 9, 1986, thereby apparently implying that appellant agreed to the continuance as a fortuitous event giving appellant’s new counsel additional time for trial preparation. As mentioned earlier, the record is totally silent as to this continuance, containing neither a motion requesting the continuance nor an order granting the continuance. Were it not for the State’s acknowledgment in briefing that it obtained this continuance, our only clue that a continuance occurred, other than appellant’s assertion to that effect, would have been the fact that trial was not held on January 6, 1987, as scheduled. No reason for the continuance is apparent. Similarly, on this record, we cannot assume that appellant agreed to a continuance or even that appellant had any prior notice and opportunity to object to it. Thus, this continuance obtained by the State does not qualify for exclusion under Rule 204, and [95]*95we attribute the delay caused by this continuance solely to the State. Correspondingly, we cannot connect the delay occasioned by this continuance, inexplicable on the record, to appellant’s change of counsel, and we find no delay attributable to that change.
The State also attempts to justify the post-December 1986 delay upon assertions that appellant was involved in plea negotiations much of this time, that the State was negotiating a plea agreement with Swazo so that it could obtain his testimony against appellant, and that the docket was crowded. We initially note that there is no record support for any of these purported justifications, except for inferences, and also we observe that the State never sought a continuance upon any of these grounds. With respect to plea negotiations involving appellant, the only record evidence supporting this assertion is the February 4, 1987, order requesting a pre-sentence investigation and a December 26, 1986, letter to counsel from the trial court requesting the parties to confer regarding a plea bargain. This letter is found in the record attached to an affidavit of appellant’s counsel, as it was not formally filed in the record by the district court. Although we would probably be safe in assuming that some plea negotiations took place, it would be sheer speculation to attribute, much less justify, any of the delay to plea negotiations without record support. Similarly, with respect to any delay occasioned by the State’s plea negotiations with Swazo in return for his testimony, the only record support for such delay is in the fact that Swazo was convicted upon a guilty plea prior to appellant’s trial and the fact that he testified for the State against appellant. At what point the plea bargain with Swazo was reached and how much time was spent in reaching that agreement simply cannot be ascertained from the record. The Supreme Court, in Barker, 407 U.S. at 534, 92 S.Ct. at 2194, stated that some delay is perhaps permissible for the prosecution to obtain the testimony of a co-defendant. While we agree with that principle, on the record before us we cannot determine how much, if any, of the delay is attributable to the State’s attempt to obtain Swazo’s testimony. Finally, regarding the crowded docket as a reason for delay, there is no evidence in the record to support that contention.
We conclude that none of the cause for the delay can be attributed to appellant. The burden is upon the State to prove that delays in bringing a defendant to trial are reasonable and necessary. Estrada, 611 P.2d at 854; Stuebgen, 548 P.2d at 875; W.R.Cr.P. 45(b). The State has failed in meeting its burden in this case. While it is recognized that neutral or innocent unnecessary delay should be weighed less heavily against the State than deliberate unnecessary delay, Caton, 709 P.2d at 1265; Estrada, 611 P.2d 850; Barker, 407 U.S. 514, 92 S.Ct. 2182, it is also recognized that such delay must nevertheless be considered, because the government, rather than the defendant, bears the ultimate responsibility for such circumstances. Estrada, 611 P.2d at 854; Barker, 407 U.S. at 531, 92 S.Ct. at 2192. Here, we are unable to determine whether the delay was in fact neutral as opposed to deliberate, although nothing in the record indicates any sinister motive on behalf of the State. What we do find in this case, however, is simply no reason or justification for the delay, and we cannot say that the State made a good faith effort to bring appellant to trial as quickly as possible. See Heinrich, 638 P.2d at 644. Thus, the reason for delay factor weighs substantially in appellant’s favor.
DEFENDANT’S ASSERTION OF HIS RIGHTS
Although it is not absolutely necessary that a defendant assert his right to a speedy trial as a prerequisite to an ultimate conclusion that a speedy trial violation has occurred, it is a relevant and proper factor to consider. Estrada, 611 P.2d at 854; Cherniwchan, 594 P.2d at 469 n. 4; Barker, 407 U.S. at 531-32, 92 S.Ct. at [96]*962192-93.8 In the instant case, appellant moved for dismissal on January 16, 1987, and again on April 27, 1987, and joined in his co-defendant’s speedy trial brief before trial. It is noteworthy that appellant’s initial assertion of his speedy trial right in January 1987 occurred shortly after he retained private counsel and shortly after the State obtained a continuance postponing the original January 6, 1987, trial date. We have observed a distinction in the instance of an uncounseled failure to assert the right as opposed to a counseled failure to do so. Estrada, 611 P.2d at 854-55. See also Barker, 407 U.S. at 529, 92 S.Ct. at 2191 (court may “attach a different weight to a situation in which the defendant knowingly fails to object from a situation in which his attorney acquiesces in long delay without adequately informing his client, or from a situation in which no counsel is appointed”). In this respect it is sufficient to note that, once appellant retained private counsel, his speedy trial right was promptly asserted.
The State argues, however, that appellant did not vigorously press the issue despite the two motions. It is true that on the record appellant limited his speedy trial challenges to the two motions and the pretrial brief. It is also axiomatic, however, that a defendant has no duty to bring himself to trial. Barker, 407 U.S. at 527, 92 S.Ct. at 2190; Dickey, 398 U.S. at 38, 90 S.Ct. at 1569. Under the circumstances of this case, we conclude that appellant adequately asserted his right to a speedy trial and that this factor also weighs in appellant’s favor in the balancing test.
PREJUDICE TO DEPENDANT
The final factor in the Barker balancing test is prejudice to the defendant. It is not necessary that prejudice be shown in order to prove a speedy trial violation. Caton, 709 P.2d at 1266; Heinrich, 638 P.2d at 644. In Moore, 414 U.S. at 26, 94 S.Ct. at 189, the Supreme Court said, “Barker v. Wingo expressly rejected the notion that an affirmative demonstration of prejudice was necessary to prove a denial of the constitutional right to a speedy trial.” Although prejudice need not be shown, it should be considered as a factor in the balancing test. Grable, 649 P.2d at 671. In Barker, 407 U.S. at 532, 92 S.Ct. at 2193, the Supreme Court observed that prejudice to a defendant may consist of (1) lengthy pretrial incarceration; (2) pretrial anxiety; and (3) impairment of the defense. See also Heinrich, 638 P.2d 641; and Estrada, 611 P.2d 850.
In both the Caton and Cherniwchan cases, we cited with approval Justice Brennan’s discussion of prejudice to the defendant in Dickey, 398 U.S. at 39, 90 S.Ct. at 1569 (Brennan, J., concurring). In Caton, 709 P.2d 1260, we adopted Justice Brennan’s analysis in Dickey, and we held that, in the case of excessive delay, prejudice should be presumed. We stated:
[T]he kinds of prejudice produced by long delays may be substantial even if the defendant’s ability to defend himself is not impaired. The defendant's social relations, freedom of movement, and anxiety over public accusation are seriously affected when the delay is prolonged. These effects are precisely the kinds of prejudice that would be difficult for a defendant to demonstrate if he had the burden of proving prejudice.
709 P.2d at 1266. We further noted in Catón, however, that short delays do not ordinarily produce these types of impacts and, if there is prejudice from a short delay, it normally consists of impairment of the defense, which can affirmatively be proven by the defendant. Thus, we held in Catón that, “until delay exceeds a point where there is a ‘probability of substantial prejudice,’ the burden of proving prejudice should remain with the accused.” Id. at 1266 (quoting from Dickey, 398 U.S. at 55, 90 S.Ct. at 1577 (Brennan, J., concurring)). In Catón, we determined that a delay of slightly more than six months did not reach the point at which substantial prejudice [97]*97became probable. In the instant case, however, the delay of approximately eighteen months is sufficiently long to be presumptively prejudicial with respect to pretrial anxiety and related concerns. Caton, 709 P.2d at 1266. Although this prejudice to appellant may have been minimal, it cannot be overlooked. In Moore, the Supreme Court said:
[Prejudice to a defendant caused by delay in bringing him to trial is not confined to the possible prejudice to his defense in those proceedings. Inordinate delay,
“wholly aside from possible prejudice to a defense on the merits, may ‘seriously interfere with the defendant’s liberty, whether he is free on bail or not, and ... may disrupt his employment, drain his financial resources, curtail his associations, subject him to public obloquy, and create anxiety in him, his family and his friends.’ These factors are more serious for some than for others, but they are inevitably present in every case to some extent, for every defendant will either be incarcerated pending trial or on bail subject to substantial restrictions on his liberty.”
414 U.S. at 26-27, 94 S.Ct. at 190 (quoting from Barker, 407 U.S. at 537, 92 S.Ct. at 2195 (White, J., concurring)) (citation and footnote omitted).
The other two elements of prejudice identified by the Supreme Court in Barker, however, do not appear to be present in this case. Appellant was not subjected to lengthy pretrial incarceration, apparently spending only seven days in jail after his arrest. Further, we do not see, nor does appellant contend, that the delay impaired his trial defense. Of course, the delay enabled the State to obtain Swazo’s testimony against appellant, but we do not perceive that this is the type of prejudice properly contemplated in considerations of impairment of defense. Thus, with respect to the factor of prejudice, we conclude that appellant was presumptively prejudiced by the lengthy delay, but only minimally, so that, as to this factor, the balance is tipped only slightly in appellant’s favor in the overall balancing test.
BALANCING THE FACTORS
A balancing of the four factors from Barker leads us to the inescapable conclusion that a speedy trial violation has occurred in this case. The first three factors — length of delay, reason for delay, and assertion of the right — all weigh substantially in appellant’s favor as far as establishing a speedy trial violation. The final factor of prejudice to the defendant is less conclusive, but it again leans slightly in favor of appellant. The case is not even particularly close. The delay in this case of one and one-half years between appellant’s arrest and his trial was not only unnecessary, it was inexcusable. In Cher-niwchan, the concurring opinion made the following comments, which are equally pertinent in the instant case:
Not only have those responsible for the prosecution of this case violated the rights of these defendants, but they also have failed to perform the responsibilities, which by virtue of their offices, they have assumed. Public officials should not casually or designedly hazard the interest of the people in enforcement of the laws of the State. Those who do should expect to account to their constituencies for such failures for they have not accomplished the obligations of the offices which they hold.
594 P.2d at 470 (Thomas, J., specially concurring).
The remedy for a violation of the right to a speedy trial is reversal and dismissal of the information. Strunk v. United States, 412 U.S. 434, 93 S.Ct. 2260, 37 L.Ed.2d 56 (1973); Stuebgen, 548 P.2d 870. Dismissal is indeed a drastic remedy, but, as the Supreme Court said in Barker, “it is the only possible remedy.” 407 U.S. at 522, 92 S.Ct. at 2188. The denial of the speedy trial right is different than violations of other constitutionally guaranteed rights of the accused, such as the failure to provide a public trial or an impartial jury or the admission of evidence obtained in an unconstitutional search, because those vio[98]*98lations can generally be corrected by providing another trial in which the defendant’s rights are observed. The denial of a speedy trial, however, cannot be remedied by a further trial. It is for this reason that courts are understandably hesitant in finding a failure to provide a speedy trial. Strunk, 412 U.S. at 438, 93 S.Ct. at 2263.
In the case at bar, therefore, where the violation is clear, the fundamental determination is reduced to this: Either there is a right to a speedy trial or there is not — and either Rule 204 has some meaning or it is simply an empty gesture of no substance. If the right to a speedy trial has vitality, and we believe that it does, then it must be observed in this case, if ever. The temptation certainly exists in a case such as this, where the crime involved is deplorable, to gloss over the constitutional violation and affirm the conviction, thereby obtaining the popular result. That is a dangerous business. The constitutional guarantee of a speedy trial exists for all of us, and its preservation would be seriously jeopardized if it were to be honored only in those cases where the defendants evoked our sympathy or the crimes were minor in nature. We perceive that the right should apply with equal or greater force when a major crime is involved, because the detriment to the accused of pending unresolved charges and the interests of society in a prompt and decisive response to criminal activity are magnified in cases of serious crime.
It is regrettable, nevertheless, that, in order to preserve this fundamental right, a convicted defendant must slip through virtually unpunished. Guilt or innocence, however, is not the issue. The constitutional guarantee of a speedy trial, as with other constitutional protections for the accused, exists to protect every citizen from oppressive governmental prosecution, and an innocent man facing criminal charges would be little comforted to know that this Court has chosen to overlook constitutional violations in order to uphold the conviction of an obviously guilty man. A constitutional guarantee cannot be selectively observed, with exceptions carved out in the tough cases, without threatening the very existence of the right. Once exceptions are made, the guarantee becomes shallow and meaningless, and its further erosion is inevitable. Former Supreme Court Justice William 0. Douglas once commented, regarding the freedoms guaranteed by the Bill of Rights:
But that guarantee is not self-executing. As nightfall does not come all at once, neither does oppression. In both instances, there is a twilight when everything remains seemingly unchanged. And it is in such twilight that we all must be most aware of change in the air — however slight — lest we become unwitting victims of the darkness.
The Douglas Letters: Selections from the Private Papers of Justice William 0. Douglas at 162 (M. Urofsky ed. 1987). We will not relegate the speedy trial right to that uncertain twilight.
For the foregoing reasons, we reverse appellant’s convictions and remand to the district court with instructions to dismiss the information.
URBIGKIT, J., filed a specially concurring opinion.
THOMAS, J., filed a dissenting opinion in which GOLDEN, J., joined.
GOLDEN, J., filed a dissenting opinion in which THOMAS, J., joined.