[Cite as State v. Gurley, 2015-Ohio-5361.]
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT SCIOTO COUNTY
STATE OF OHIO, :
Plaintiff-Appellee, : Case No. 14CA3646
v. : DECISION AND JUDGMENT ENTRY TYA T. GURLEY, :
Defendant-Appellant. : RELEASED: 12/17/2015
APPEARANCES:
Bryan Scott Hicks, Lebanon, Ohio for appellant.
Mark E. Kuhn, Scioto County Prosecuting Attorney, Portsmouth, Ohio for appellee.
Hoover, P.J.
{¶ 1} Appellant-defendant Tya T. Gurley (“Gurley”) appeals her convictions from the
Scioto County Common Pleas Court. Specifically, Gurley challenges the trial court’s judgment
denying her motion to suppress any and all evidence obtained as a result of a traffic stop. A
trooper with the Ohio State Highway Patrol stopped Gurley because she was following too
closely to another vehicle. During the stop, a drug dog responded to the presence of drugs on
Gurley’s vehicle. After engaging in a discussion with the trooper for several minutes, Gurley
admitted to having drugs inside her person and voluntarily went to a nearby Highway Patrol Post
to remove the drugs. Following the trial court’s denial of her motion to suppress, Gurley entered
a plea of no contest to one count of trafficking in drugs and one count of tampering with
evidence. The trial court sentenced Gurley to five years in prison. Scioto App. No. 14CA3646 2
{¶ 2} Here on appeal, Gurley presents two assignments of error: (1) the trial court erred
by not suppressing her statements after she asked to call an attorney; and (2) the traffic stop was
not lawful. After reviewing the entire record, we disagree with Gurley’s contentions. We find
that Gurley did not unequivocally and unambiguously invoke her right to counsel during the
trooper’s questioning. Therefore, the trooper was not required to cease his questioning. We also
find that the trooper had reasonable suspicion and probable cause to stop Gurley’s vehicle.
Further, we find that the trooper had additional reasonable suspicion to investigate criminal
activity beyond the scope of the original traffic violation. Consequently, we overrule Gurley’s
assignments of error and affirm the judgment of the trial court.
I. Facts and Procedural Posture
{¶ 3} On September 17, 2013, complaints against Gurley for charges of possession of a
controlled substance and tampering with evidence were filed in the Portsmouth Municipal Court.
On October 24, 2013, the Scioto County Grand Jury indicted Gurley on one count of trafficking
in heroin, a second degree felony, in violation of R.C. 2925.03(A)(2), one count of possession of
heroin, a second degree felony, in violation of R.C. 2925.11(A) and one count of tampering with
evidence, a third degree felony, in violation of R.C. 2921.12(A)(1). The charges stemmed from a
September 16, 2013 traffic stop, where Gurley admitted to having drugs concealed inside her
person. After the traffic stop, Gurley voluntarily went to a nearby Highway Patrol Post and
removed heroin from her vagina. At arraignment, Gurley entered a plea of not guilty to the
indicted offenses.
{¶ 4} On January 2, 2014, Gurley filed a motion to suppress any and all evidence
obtained as a result of the traffic stop. Gurley asserted that the arresting officer lacked probable
cause to stop her vehicle in violation of the 14th Amendment to the United States Constitution. Scioto App. No. 14CA3646 3
Gurley further argued that the duration of her detention was unlawful. On January 24, 2014,
Gurley filed a supplemental motion to suppress. Gurley additionally asserted that the arresting
officer’s actions violated her right to counsel pursuant to Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86
S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966).
{¶ 5} The trial court held a hearing on Gurley’s motion to suppress on February 12, 2014.
Gurley and Trooper Nick Lewis (“Trooper Lewis”) of the Ohio State Highway Patrol, the
trooper who stopped Gurley, testified at the hearing. During the suppression hearing, the State
presented a recording of the traffic stop. Trooper Lewis’s patrol cruiser was equipped with a
dashboard video recorder and a microphone that captured audio only from the inside of the
cruiser. Trooper Lewis’s belt microphone was not operating during the traffic stop. We gathered
the following facts from the video, audio, and testimony presented at the suppression hearing.
{¶ 6} On September 16, 2013, Trooper Lewis was driving south on State Route 23,
having just left the Highway Patrol Post in Lucasville, Ohio. Gurley was also traveling south on
State Route 23 in a silver Nissan. Trooper Lewis observed Gurley make a lane change from the
left lane into the right lane. Trooper Lewis then observed Gurley follow in behind a white pickup
truck. According to Trooper Lewis, Gurley followed approximately two car lengths behind the
pickup truck. Trooper Lewis believed Gurley was traveling between 55 and 60 miles per hour.
Trooper Lewis testified that Gurley maintained that following distance for about one half of a
mile. According to Trooper Lewis, the Highway Patrol uses a “rule of thumb” that a driver
should follow one car length behind the vehicle in front of them for every 10 miles per hour the
driver is traveling. Trooper Lewis then noticed Gurley slow down to about 45 miles per hour,
which was 10 miles per hour below the speed limit. At 7:40 p.m., Trooper Lewis decided to stop
Gurley’s vehicle. Scioto App. No. 14CA3646 4
{¶ 7} First, Trooper Lewis obtained Gurley’s driver’s license and information. Trooper
Lewis recognized Gurley’s last name from a previous traffic stop, in which he stopped Gurley
and another woman in Chillicothe, Ohio. Trooper Lewis recalled that during that traffic stop,
Gurley stated that she was going to Portsmouth, Ohio to look at a motorcycle. Trooper Lewis
testified that Gurley was unable to give details about the motorcycle. Trooper Lewis also
testified that the passenger did not know where they were going, rather, that she was just along
for the ride. Trooper Lewis stated that those were common things he typically hears with drug
activity.
{¶ 8} This time, Trooper Lewis again asked Gurley where she was going. Gurley
responded that she was going to Portsmouth, Ohio to see her cousin. Gurley told Trooper Lewis
that her cousin was enrolled at Shawnee State University. Trooper Lewis then requested that the
drug dog unit investigate the scene. The drug dog unit was sitting at the nearby Highway Patrol
Post. After completing a check of Gurley’s records, Trooper Lewis discovered that she had a
suspended license with limited driving privileges. According to Gurley, she could drive 50 hours
per week. At 7:45 p.m., Trooper Lewis returned to the Gurley’s vehicle with Trooper Shawn
McLaughlin, the drug dog’s handler. The dog made a quick pass of the vehicle and passively
alerted to the presence of drugs.
{¶ 9} Trooper Lewis asked Gurley to step out of her vehicle. According to Trooper
Lewis, he advised Gurley of her Miranda warnings; and she indicated that she understood the
warnings. At the suppression hearing, Gurley admitted that Trooper Lewis read her the Miranda
warnings; and when asked if she understood them, Gurley responded “Somewhat, yes.” Gurley
also testified that she was confused the whole time about her rights. Next, Trooper Lewis
performed a pat down search on Gurley then placed her inside his police cruiser. Trooper Lewis Scioto App. No. 14CA3646 5
and Trooper McLaughlin then began to search Gurley’s vehicle. Approximately two minutes into
the search, Trooper Lewis returned to Gurley and engaged in the following exchange:
Trooper Lewis: Ma’am, I’ll be honest with you. I feel like we’re just going to
waste our time searching that car. I’m very confident you’ve got something
concealed.
Gurley: Okay. (Inaudible).
Trooper Lewis: Okay. I’ll give you the same opportunity I give every other
female that comes through here with something shoved inside of them. All right?
Gurley: Right.
Trooper Lewis: I’m going to do whatever it takes to get it. So if I got to get a
search warrant, I’ll go that route. A search requires me going in, typing a search
warrant, going down to the Judges [sic] house, sitting with you at the hospital all
night until a doctor decides to come around, and we get the dope. Okay. Here’s
your other option. Other option is you cooperate with me, I take you right back
there to the Highway Patrol post, you get it out, I give you - - I actually just do it
as a direct indictment and you don’t go to jail tonight. Basically, I don’t want to
be here all night doing paperwork.
Gurley: But - - because you said- -hold on - -
Trooper Lewis: I have the video of the last time you guys - - I stopped you. You
guys had something on you.
Trooper Lewis: Okay. So - - Scioto App. No. 14CA3646 6
Gurley: But you saying - -I’m not understanding. So you saying you have video
and record of me? [sic]
Trooper Lewis: I watched the video last time.
Gurley: Okay.
Trooper Lewis: You and that other girl that was with you. You guys said you
were coming down here to look - -to look at a motorcycle.
{¶ 10} The exchange continued with Gurley asking questions such as, why Trooper
Lewis pulled her over, what is a direct incitement, if she was arrested, and what her rights were
while she was detained. Trooper Lewis told Gurley, “Well, you’re being detained. You won’t
actually get arrested until you give it to me or --.” Trooper Lewis and Gurley continued as
follows:
Trooper Lewis: You want to go home tonight. You going to- -
Gurley: I sure do want to go home.
Trooper Lewis: Well, then what will happen is I’ll take you right back here to the
Highway Patrol Post where we have a female. That’s the reason I took you over
there. We have a female up there. She’ll escort you to the bathroom. She - - you
will put it in a bag and then that’s it.
Gurley: Is there anybody I can call- -someone, a lawyer or anything, because I
don’t- -I still don’t - -I still don’t understand.
Trooper Lewis: What are you having a problem with?
Gurley: Okay you said I’m being detained from prior - -
Trooper Lewis: No, for - -for this and then from what I heard on the video last
time. Scioto App. No. 14CA3646 7
***
Trooper Lewis: Okay. Well, I’m not going to sit here and debate with you. I gave
you your options.
Gurley: Right. And I asked if I can talk to someone because I still - -
Trooper Lewis: Well, I don’t want you calling anybody.
Gurley: Because I’m bad at listen- -this is what I’m saying to you. I’m kind of
dyslectic, [sic] and I’m trying to get - -wrap my mind around this.
Trooper Lewis: Well, listen, okay, I know you got something. All right.
Gurley: I don’t have anything. That’s why I’m - - that’s what I’m not
understanding.
Gurley continued asking Trooper Lewis questions and Trooper Lewis continued to insist that he
knew she had something. Trooper Lewis also answered Gurley’s questions about a search
warrant, an indictment, and a body cavity search.
{¶ 11} Soon after, Trooper Lewis asked Gurley to step out of the car. According to his
testimony at the suppression hearing, Trooper Lewis again tried to explain to Gurley the
difference between receiving a citation and going into Municipal Court and having a direct
indictment into the Common Pleas Court. Trooper Lewis testified that not “very long” after
Gurley exited the cruiser, she stated that she had contraband inside of her and would “voluntarily
remove it at the post.” From the time Trooper Lewis initiated the stop of Gurley’s vehicle to the
time Trooper Lewis began driving back to the patrol post, approximately 30 minutes had passed.
{¶ 12} At the suppression hearing, Gurley denied ever shifting lanes and trailing behind a
white truck. She testified that no cars were in front of her. Gurley testified that she felt as though Scioto App. No. 14CA3646 8
she was not allowed to call an attorney. At the conclusion of the suppression hearing, the trial
court denied Gurley’s motion to suppress.
{¶ 13} In its judgment entry denying Gurley’s motion to suppress, the trial court made
the following pertinent findings:
The vehicle [Gurley’s] was in the left lane with no obstructions in front of it when
the Defendant saw Trooper Lewis and immediately switched behind a white
truck, where she was following one or two car lengths behind the vehicle.
The Defendant slowed down when she got behind the vehicle, and following too close,
from between 55 to 60 or 40 to 45, which caused Trooper Lewis to have some concern.
When Trooper Lewis pulled over the vehicle he recognized the name from a
traffic stop in Ross County when the Defendant stated she was going to
Portsmouth to look at a motorcycle; however, she could not really give any details
about that motorcycle, and therefore, Trooper Lewis made no arrest. However, at
a later date when Trooper Lewis was listening to a tape between the passenger in
the first stop and this Defendant, Trooper Lewis heard a conversation concerning
where they were hiding the drugs, which caused Trooper Lewis some suspicion.
All recordings from outside the vehicle were not picked up, perhaps because the battery
was dead on the radio. After much discussion, the Defendant did finally voluntarily
remove the contraband from herself at the post. The Defendant never stated that she did
not want to talk Trooper Lewis [sic]. The Defendant did say at one time something about
talking to an attorney or somebody, but at that time, Trooper Lewis simply advised the Scioto App. No. 14CA3646 9
Defendant what the difference between an investigative stop and being arrested at the
scene [sic].
The Court makes a finding that five minutes is a very reasonable time within
which for Trooper Lewis to have gotten the dog there.
{¶ 14} On May 2, 2013, Gurley withdrew her plea of not guilty and entered a plea of no
contest to the one count of trafficking in drugs and the one count of tampering with evidence.
The trial court found Gurley guilty of those offenses. The trial court dismissed the remaining
count of possession of heroin. The trial court sentenced Gurley to five years in the custody of the
Ohio Department of Rehabilitation and Correction. Gurley then filed this timely appeal.
II. Assignments of Error
{¶ 15} Gurley presents the following assignments of error for our review:
First Assignment of Error:
The trial court erred by not suppressing defendant’s statements after asking to call an attorney.
Second Assignment of Error:
The traffic stop was not lawful.
III. Standard of Review: Motion to Suppress
{¶ 16} We will address Gurley’s assignments of error in reverse order. First, we will
discuss whether or not the traffic stop was lawful. Then, we will turn to Gurley’s arguments that
Trooper Lewis violated her right to counsel. Our review of a trial court’s decision on a motion to
suppress presents a mixed question of law and fact. State v. Roberts, 110 Ohio St.3d 71, 2006-
Ohio-3665, 850 N.E.2d 1168, at ¶ 100, citing State v. Burnside, 100 Ohio St.3d 152, 2003-Ohio-
5372, 797 N.E.2d 71, at ¶ 8. When considering a motion to suppress, the trial court acts as the Scioto App. No. 14CA3646 10
trier of fact and is in the best position to resolve factual questions and evaluate witness
credibility. Id. Accordingly, we defer to the trial court’s findings of fact if they are supported by
competent, credible evidence. State v. Landrum, 137 Ohio App.3d 718, 722, 739 N.E.2d 1159
(4th Dist.2000). Accepting those facts as true, we must independently determine whether the trial
court reached the correct legal conclusion in analyzing the facts of the case. Roberts at ¶ 100,
citing Burnside at ¶ 8.
IV. Law and Analysis
A. Second Assignment of Error: Lawful Justification for a Traffic Stop
{¶ 17} In her second assignment of error, Gurley argues that Trooper Lewis’s stop of her
vehicle was not lawful. In support of her argument, Gurley asserts the following: (1) the video of
her traffic stop does not support Trooper Lewis’s testimony at the suppression hearing; (2) her
testimony at the suppression hearing was consistent with the traffic stop video; (3) she did not
pull in behind a truck, but instead was at the head of a line of traffic; and (4) the trial court never
made a finding of credibility as to Trooper Lewis or her. Therefore, Gurley concludes competent,
credible evidence did not exist to find probable cause for the stop. Gurley contends that any
evidence of drugs or statements as to drugs must be excluded.
{¶ 18} In rebuttal, the State argues that an officer need only have reasonable articulable
suspicion to stop a vehicle. The State asserts that in this case, Trooper Lewis did have such
suspicion when he initiated the stop of Gurley’s vehicle. Additionally, the State contends that the
duration of the stop was not unreasonable. The State asserts that the approximately five minutes
and four seconds Gurley and Trooper Lewis waited for the drug dog to indicate contraband in the
vehicle was not unreasonable for the issuance of a traffic citation. Scioto App. No. 14CA3646 11
{¶ 19} “ ‘The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution and the Ohio
Constitution, Article I, Section 14, prohibit unreasonable searches and seizures.’ ” State v.
Shrewsbury, 4th Dist. Ross No. 13CA3402, 2014–Ohio–716, ¶ 14, quoting State v. Emerson, 134
Ohio St.3d 191, 2012–Ohio–5047, 981 N.E.2d 787, ¶ 15. “This constitutional guarantee is
protected by the exclusionary rule, which mandates the exclusion of the evidence obtained from
the unreasonable search and seizure at trial.” Id., citing Emerson at ¶ 15; see also State v.
Lemaster, 4th Dist. Ross No. 11CA3236, 2012–Ohio–971, ¶ 8 (“If the government obtains
evidence through actions that violate an accused’s Fourth Amendment rights, that evidence must
be excluded at trial.”).
{¶ 20} “An officer’s temporary detention of an individual during a traffic stop constitutes
a seizure of a person within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment * * *.” State v. Lewis, 4th
Dist. Scioto No. 08CA3226, 2008–Ohio–6691, ¶ 14; see also State v. Eatmon, 4th Dist. Scioto
No. 12CA3498, 2013–Ohio–4812, ¶ 13 (quoting Lewis). “To be constitutionally valid, the
detention must be reasonable under the circumstances.” Lewis at ¶ 14. “While probable cause ‘is
certainly a complete justification for a traffic stop,’ it is not required.” Eatmon at ¶ 13, quoting
State v. Mays, 119 Ohio St.3d 406, 2008–Ohio–4539, 894 N.E.2d 1204, ¶ 23. “So long as ‘an
officer’s decision to stop a motorist for a criminal violation, including a traffic violation, is
prompted by a reasonable and articulable suspicion considering all the circumstances, then the
stop is constitutionally valid.’ ” Id., quoting Mays at ¶ 8. “Reasonable and articulable suspicion is
a lower standard than probable cause.” Id., citing Mays at ¶ 23.
{¶ 21} Here, Trooper Lewis’s and Gurley’s testimonies conflicted during the suppression
hearing about the initial traffic violation that prompted Trooper Lewis to stop the vehicle. Gurley
denies that she was following a white truck; instead she testified that she was the leader of a line Scioto App. No. 14CA3646 12
of cars; and no vehicle was in front of her. Trooper Lewis testified that he witnessed Gurley
switch lanes and follow too closely behind a white truck for one half of a mile. He then noticed
Gurley slow to a speed 10 miles per hour below the speed limit.
{¶ 22} R.C. 4511.21 states, in pertinent part, “ * * * no person shall drive any motor
vehicle, trackless trolley, or streetcar in and upon any street or highway at a greater speed than
will permit the person to bring it to a stop within the assured clear distance ahead.” Trooper
Lewis testified that the “rule of thumb” for following distance is one car length for every ten
miles an hour a vehicle is traveling. The video from the dashboard camera begins by showing
Gurley’s vehicle alone in the right lane. Trooper Lewis testified that in the video, the white truck
is just barely visible down the road. While the video does show a vehicle ahead of Gurley, in the
distance, it is indeed difficult to conclude that the vehicle is a white truck. In the decision
denying Gurley’s motion to suppress, the trial court found that Gurley “slowed down when she
got behind the vehicle, and following too close, from between 55 to 60 or 40 to 45, which caused
Trooper Lewis to have some concern.”
{¶ 23} As Gurley pointed out, the trial court did not make an express finding of
credibility regarding Trooper Lewis’s and Gurley’s testimony. However, the trial court seemed
to accept Trooper Lewis’s testimony regarding Gurley’s vehicle following too closely to a white
truck. Pursuant to our standard of review on a motion to suppress, we will defer to the trial
court’s ability to resolve factual disputes. Roberts, supra, at ¶ 100. Nothing in the record
suggests Trooper Lewis’s testimony was not competent or credible. Therefore, we find that
Trooper Lewis observed Gurley following too closely to another vehicle, in violation of R.C.
4511.21. Thus, having observed a traffic violation, Trooper Lewis had a reasonable and
articulable suspicion and probable cause to stop Gurley’s vehicle. See State v. Taylor, 4th Dist. Scioto App. No. 14CA3646 13
Washington No. 07CA11, 2008–Ohio–482, ¶ 15 (“It is well-settled that a law enforcement
officer possesses both reasonable suspicion and probable cause to stop a vehicle when the officer
observes a traffic violation.”)
{¶ 24} We next briefly address whether the duration of the stop was unlawful.1 “When a
law enforcement officer stops a vehicle for a traffic violation, the officer may detain the motorist
for a period of time sufficient to issue the motorist a citation and to perform routine procedures
such as a computer check on the motorist’s driver’s license, registration, and vehicle plates.”
State v. Aguirre, 4th Dist. Gallia No. 03CA5, 2003–Ohio–4909, ¶ 36, citing State v. Carlson, 102
Ohio App.3d 585, 598, 657 N.E.2d 591 (9th Dist.1995). “ ‘In determining if an officer completed
these tasks within a reasonable length of time, the court must evaluate the duration of the stop in
light of the totality of the circumstances and consider whether the officer diligently conducted
the investigation.’ ” Id., quoting Carlson at 598; see also State v. Cook, 65 Ohio St.3d 516, 521–
522, 605 N.E .2d 70 (1992) (fifteen minute detention was reasonable); United States v. Sharpe,
470 U.S. 675, 105 S.Ct. 1568, 84 L.Ed.2d 605 (1985) (twenty minute detention was reasonable).
{¶ 25} Trooper Lewis’s stop of Gurley’s vehicle lasted approximately 30 minutes. Once
Trooper Lewis recognized Gurley from the previous Chillicothe traffic stop, the stop became
more about a drug investigation. Trooper Lewis never issued a traffic citation to Gurley. Trooper
Lewis testified that when Gurley presented her driver’s license, he discovered that she had
limited driving privileges. He also testified that her privileges did not include visiting a cousin at
Shawnee State University in Portsmouth. Trooper Lewis recognized Gurley’s name from a
previous traffic stop where, after he reviewed video from it, he suspected drug activity. Trooper
Lewis radioed for a drug dog unit after Gurley presented her license and information.
1 Although Gurley does not specifically contest the duration of the stop, the State, in its appellate brief, states that Gurley challenges the duration of the traffic stop. Scioto App. No. 14CA3646 14
{¶ 26} “An officer may expand the scope of the stop and may continue to detain the
vehicle without running afoul of the Fourth Amendment if the officer discovers further facts
which give rise to a reasonable suspicion that additional criminal activity is afoot.” State v. Rose,
4th Dist. Highland No. 06CA5, 2006–Ohio–5292, ¶ 17, citing State v. Robinette, 80 Ohio St.3d
234, 240, 685 N.E.2d 762 (1997). The Robinette court explained, at paragraph one of the
syllabus:
When a police officer’s objective justification to continue detention of a person* *
* is not related to the purpose of the original stop, and when that continued
detention is not based on any articulable facts giving rise to a suspicion of some
illegal activity justifying an extension of the detention, the continued detention to
conduct a search constitutes an illegal seizure.
Conversely, “if a law enforcement officer, during a valid investigative stop, ascertains
‘reasonably articulable facts giving rise to a suspicion of criminal activity, the officer may then
further detain and implement a more in-depth investigation of the individual.’ ” Rose at ¶ 17,
quoting Robinette at 241.
{¶ 27} Moreover, “[r]ecognizing that ‘detention, not questioning, is the evil’ at issue,* *
* so long as the traffic stop is valid, ‘any questioning which occurs during the detention, even if
unrelated to the scope of the detention, is valid so long as the questioning does not improperly
extend the duration of the detention .’ ” State v. Chagaris, 107 Ohio App.3d 551, 556–557, 669
N.E.2d 92 (9th Dist.1995), quoting State v. Wright, 9th Dist. Medina No. 2371–M, 1995 WL
404964, *3-4 (June 28, 1995).
{¶ 28} Given Trooper Lewis’s discovery of Gurley’s limited driving privileges, his
recollection of the facts of his earlier stop with Gurley, and the drug dog’s alert on Gurley’s Scioto App. No. 14CA3646 15
vehicle, we find that he possessed reasonable suspicion to expand the scope of the stop. We do
not find that the dog sniff prolonged the stop. Rodriguez v. United States, 135 S.Ct. 1609, 191
L.Ed.2d 492 (2015), paragraph one of the syllabus (“Absent reasonable suspicion, police
extension of a traffic stop in order to conduct a dog sniff violates the Constitution’s shield
against unreasonable searches.”) The dog completed a sniff of the car and alerted to the presence
of drugs five minutes into the stop. Trooper Lewis testified that it takes him about 10 to 12
minutes to issue a citation during a normal traffic stop. Additionally, once the dog alerted to the
presence of drugs, Trooper Lewis had probable cause to search Gurley’s vehicle. Eatmon, 2013-
Ohio-4812 at ¶ 17. (Quotations omitted.) (“When a drug dog alerts to the presence of drugs, it
gives law enforcement probable cause to search the entire vehicle.”) Accordingly, we find the
duration of the traffic stop was not unlawful. Gurley’s second assignment of error is overruled.
B. First Assignment of Error: Miranda Right to Counsel
{¶ 29} In her first assignment of error, Gurley argues that the trial court erred by not
suppressing her statements made to a police officer after she invoked her right to counsel. First,
Gurley asserts she invoked her right to counsel, by stating, “Is there anybody I can call-
someone, a lawyer or anything, because I don’t - I still don’t- I still don’t understand.” Gurley
contends that a reasonable officer would have clearly understood that she was concerned about
her rights and that she wanted to call an attorney. Gurley states that Trooper Lewis, nevertheless,
continued his custodial interrogation. Gurley argues that she then reasserted her right to counsel,
by later asking Trooper Lewis if she could call someone. Next, Gurley contends that it was the
officer, not her, that repeatedly reinitiated the conversation after she invoked her right to counsel.
As such, Gurley argues that there was not a clear waiver of her right to counsel. According to Scioto App. No. 14CA3646 16
Gurley, this was a clear violation of Miranda and all her statements after her invocation of
counsel should have been excluded.
{¶ 30} In rebuttal, the State argues that (1) it was not clear that Gurley was asking to call
an attorney and not some other person involved in her criminal activity; and (2) even if she did
invoke her right to counsel, she reinitiated the conversation by asking additional questions
concerning her options that night.
{¶ 31} “In Miranda, * * * the United States Supreme Court held that statements made
during custodial interrogation, i.e. ‘questioning initiated by law enforcement officers after a
person has been taken into custody or otherwise deprived of his freedom of action in any
significant way,’ are admissible only upon a showing that law enforcement officials followed
certain procedural safeguards to secure the accused’s Fifth Amendment privilege against self
incrimination.” (Emphasis sic.) State v. Phillips, 4th Dist. Highland No. 11CA11, 2011-Ohio-
6773, ¶ 9, quoting Miranda, supra, at 444. Those safeguards include informing the defendant
that “he has the right to remain silent, that anything he says can be used against him in a court of
law, that he has the right to the presence of an attorney, and that if he cannot afford an attorney
one will be appointed for him prior to any questioning if he so desires.” Miranda at 479.
{¶ 32} Neither Gurley nor the State raises the issue of whether Gurley was actually
subjected to custodial interrogation. Because it is a crucial initial inquiry, however, we must
discuss the issue sua sponte. “[T]he requirement that police officers administer Miranda
warnings applies only when a suspect is subjected to both custody and interrogation.” State v.
Dunn, 131 Ohio St.3d 325, 2012–Ohio–1008, 964 N.E.2d 1037, ¶ 24. In other words, “Miranda
rights only attach when both custody and interrogation coincide.” State v. Tellington, 9th Dist.
Summit No. 22187, 2005–Ohio–470, ¶ 8, citing State v. Wiles, 59 Ohio St.3d 71, 83, 571 N.E.2d Scioto App. No. 14CA3646 17
97 (1991). “Moreover, ‘an individual has a right to counsel only when he is in custodial
interrogation, as a suspect, or once adversary proceedings have commenced and he becomes a
defendant. See, e.g., Davis v. United States, 512 U.S. 452, 456–457, 114 S.Ct. 2350, 129 L.Ed.2d
362 (1994). The person can only invoke that right during those times.’ ” State v. Guysinger, 4th
Dist. Ross No. 11CA3251, 2012–Ohio–4169, ¶ 12, quoting State v. Adams, 11th Dist. Trumbull
No.2003–T–0064, 2005–Ohio–348, ¶ 43.
{¶ 33} “[A]n individual has been placed into custody [if] * * *, under the totality of the
circumstances, a ‘reasonable person would have believed that he was not free to leave.’ ” State v.
Gumm, 73 Ohio St.3d 413, 429, 653 N.E.2d 253 (1995), quoting U.S. v. Medenhall, 446 U.S.
544, 554, 100 S.Ct. 1870, 64 L.Ed.2d 497 (1980). “The ‘term “interrogation” under Miranda
refers not only to express questioning, but also to any words or actions on the part of the police
(other than those normally attendant to arrest and custody) that the police should know are
reasonably likely to elicit an incriminating response from the suspect.’ ” State v. Williams, 4th
Dist. Scioto No. 10CA3381, 2012–Ohio–6083, ¶ 18, quoting Rhode Island v. Innis, 446 U.S.
291, 301, 100 S.Ct. 1682, 64 L.Ed.2d 297 (1980).
{¶ 34} In the case sub judice, Trooper Lewis told Gurley she was detained, while she sat
inside the patrol cruiser. Trooper Lewis also initiated questioning when he told Gurley that he
was going to retrieve the drugs in one of two ways, either by obtaining a search warrant or by
Gurley voluntarily going to the Highway Patrol Post and removing the drugs herself. We find
that Trooper Lewis knew, or should have known, that his actions and words would likely elicit
an incriminating response from Gurley. Also, Trooper Lewis stated that he did not want to spend
the night doing paperwork, inferring that Gurley’s voluntary admission would be the most
desirable outcome. Considering these facts, we find that Trooper Lewis subjected Gurley to Scioto App. No. 14CA3646 18
custodial interrogation. Accordingly, Trooper Lewis was required to administer Miranda
warnings to Gurley.
{¶ 35} The record indicates that Trooper Lewis advised Gurley of her Miranda rights
before placing her in his patrol cruiser. At the suppression hearing, Gurley testified that she
remembered being Mirandized. When asked if she understood those warnings, Gurley responded
“Somewhat, yes.” However, Gurley also testified that she was confused the whole time about her
rights. Trooper Lewis testified that Gurley said she understood the Miranda warnings. Gurley
does not argue that she never received her Miranda warnings, that she did not understand them,
or that she did not waive them. Instead, Gurley contends that during Trooper Lewis’s custodial
interrogation, she requested counsel, but Trooper Lewis continued his questioning, in violation
of Miranda. Gurley also asserts that she did not initiate further discussions after she invoked her
right to counsel.
{¶ 36} “When dealing with a claim that law enforcement continued to interrogate the
accused after he invoked his right to counsel, the first question is ‘whether the accused actually
invoked his right to counsel.’ ” State v. Jacobs, 4th Dist. Highland No. 11CA26, 2013-Ohio-
1502, ¶ 18 quoting Smith v. Illinois, 469 U.S. 91, 95, 105 S.Ct. 490, 83 L.Ed.2d 488 (1984).
“[W]hen a suspect invokes his right to counsel, police officers must cease interrogation until
counsel is present.” State v. Williams, 99 Ohio St.3d 439, 2003-Ohio-4161, 793 N.E.2d 446, ¶
24, citing, Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477, 484–485, 101 S.Ct. 1880, 68 L.Ed.2d 378 (1981).
“ ‘Invocation of the Miranda right to counsel requires, at a minimum, some statement that can
reasonably be construed to be an expression of a desire for the assistance of an attorney.’ ”
(Internal quotations omitted). Jacobs at ¶ 18 quoting Davis 512 U.S. 452 at 459, 114 S.C.t. 2350,
129 L.Ed.2d 362 (1994). “ ‘But if a suspect makes a reference to an attorney that is ambiguous or Scioto App. No. 14CA3646 19
equivocal in that a reasonable officer in light of the circumstances would have understood only
that the suspect might be invoking the right to counsel, [the Court’s] precedents do not require
the cessation of questioning.’ ” (Emphasis sic). Id. quoting Davis at 459. “ ‘Rather, the suspect
must unambiguously request counsel.’ ” Id. “The question whether a suspect invoked his or her
right to counsel is an ‘objective inquiry.’ ” State v. Raber, 189 Ohio App.3d 396, 2010-Ohio-
4066, 938 N.E.2d 1060, ¶ 17 (9th Dist.), quoting Davis at 459. “Further, a suspect’s alleged
invocation must be examined ‘not in isolation but in context.’ ” Raber at ¶ 17, quoting State v.
Murphy, 91 Ohio St.3d 516, 520-521, 747 N.E.2d 765 (2001).
{¶ 37} “[I]f we find that the accused did invoke his right to counsel, we ‘may admit his
responses to further questioning only on finding that he (a) initiated further discussions with the
police, and (b) knowingly and intelligently waived the right he had invoked.’ ” Jacobs at ¶ 19,
quoting Smith at 95, citing Edwards. “ ‘[A]n accused * * * having expressed his desire to deal
with the police only through counsel, is not subject to further interrogation by the authorities
until counsel has been made available to him, unless the accused himself initiates further
communication, exchanges, or conversations with the police.’ ” Jacobs at ¶ 19, quoting Edwards
at 484-485.
{¶ 38} During Trooper Lewis’s questioning, Gurley stated, “Is there anybody I can call-
someone, a lawyer or anything, because I don’t - I still don’t - I still don’t understand.” Trooper
Lewis then asked Gurley, “What are you having a problem with?” Gurley continued asking
Trooper Lewis why she was being detained; specifically asking about the prior stop and the dog
hit on her vehicle. Trooper Lewis eventually stated that he was not going to debate with Gurley;
that she had been given her options. Gurley then stated, “Right. And I asked if I can talk to
someone because I still- -.” Trooper Lewis responded, “Well, I don’t want you calling anybody.” Scioto App. No. 14CA3646 20
{¶ 39} In Raber, supra, the Ninth District Court of Appeals held that defendant’s
question, “[C]an I have an attorney?” to a detective did not invoke her right to counsel. Id. at ¶
20-23. In Raber, the investigating officer arrested Raber, read Raber her Miranda rights, then
walked her to his police car. Id at ¶ 21. Raber then became emotional and asked, “[C]an I have
an attorney?” along with multiple questions about what would happen to her children. Id. at ¶ 21.
The Ninth District concluded, “Given that Raber did not initially offer a response when read her
Miranda warnings and that she coupled her question about an attorney with questions about her
children, it is entirely reasonable that Officer Chuhi thought Raber was asking for clarification
about her situation, not asserting her right to counsel.” Id. citing State v. Curtis, 10th Dist.
Franklin No. 05AP-795, 2006-Ohio-4230, ¶ 14; State v. Foster, 11th Dist. Trumbull No. 2000-T-
0333, 2001-Ohio-8806, *9.
{¶ 40} The Ninth District cited analyses by the Ohio Tenth District Court of Appeals and
the United States Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals regarding whether defendants’ questions were
inquiring about the right to counsel or actually invoking their right to counsel. In Curtis, the
Tenth District reasoned:
In the case at bar, defendant did not unambiguously, unequivocally request an
attorney. Defendant’s question, “[c]an I [get] a public defender?” can be
interpreted in two different ways: either defendant was asking whether his rights,
as he had just read them, included the right to a public defender or he was asking
for access to a public defender. [The officer’s] response—that defendant would be
entitled to a public defender if he could not afford to hire an attorney—indicates
that he believed defendant wanted a clarification of his rights, not that he sought
to invoke his right to counsel. Given the ambiguity inherent in defendant’s Scioto App. No. 14CA3646 21
question, we find that a reasonable police officer would come to the same
conclusion, and thus, [the officer’s] decision to question defendant without
counsel present did not violate defendant’s right to counsel.
Raber at ¶ 20, citing Curtis at ¶ 14
{¶ 41} The Eighth Circuit similarly stated in Dormire v. Wilkinson, 249 F.3d 801 (8th
Cir.2001):
Considering the question in context, it is not clear that [the defendant] was
actually requesting the presence of an attorney when he asked “Could I call my
lawyer?” [The defendant] had just asked whether he could contact his girlfriend,
and [an officer] had informed him that he could not. [The officer] could have
reasonably believed in these circumstances that [the defendant] was merely
inquiring whether he had the right to call a lawyer, rather than believing that [the
defendant] was actually requesting counsel.
Raber at ¶ 21 citing Dormire at 805.
{¶ 42} The Ninth District in Raber also cited multiple cases from Ohio courts that found
certain statements or questions failed to amount to an unambiguous and unequivocal request for
counsel. The following are analogous to the case before us:
* * * State v. Knight, 2d Dist. No. 04–CA–35, 2008-Ohio-4926, 2008 WL
4369764, ¶ 9, 112 (defendant’s inquiry “Well, can I talk to my lawyer then if
there is something wrong like that? Do I need one or something?” held to be, “at
best, * * * two equivocal requests for counsel”); * * * State v. Wellman, 10th Dist.
No. 05AP–386, 2006-Ohio-3808, 2006 WL 2057895, ¶ 26 (“appellant’s equivocal
statement ‘I think I need a lawyer, ‘cause I don't know what you’re talking about Scioto App. No. 14CA3646 22
DNA,’ does not amount to an invocation of counsel”); * * * State v. Williams,
10th Dist. No. 03AP–4, 2003-Ohio-7160, 2003 WL 23024526, ¶ 51 (“appellant’s
asking [police], ‘Where’s my lawyer?’ is not the same as saying, ‘I want a
lawyer.’ It is, in and of itself, an equivocal statement”); * * * State v. Metz (Apr.
21, 1998), 4th Dist. No. 96 CA 48, 1998 WL 199944, at *13 (defendant did not
assert his right to counsel when he stated, “Maybe I should talk to an attorney.”);
State v. Greene (Dec. 14, 1993), 4th Dist. No. 92 CA 32, 1993 WL 525008, at *2
(defendant did not unambiguously and unequivocally request counsel where he
followed the question “Do you want a lawyer present with you right here at this
time?” with the response “Well, if you got one available.”)
Id. at ¶ 19.
{¶ 43} The case before us presents a close question as to whether or not Gurley invoked
her Miranda right to counsel. In addition to the above listed cases, in Davis, the United States
Supreme Court found that the suspect’s statement, “maybe I should talk to a lawyer” failed to
amount to an invocation of counsel. Also, the Ohio Supreme Court, in State v. Henness, 79 Ohio
St.3d 53, 679 N.E.2d 686 (1997), found that the suspect’s statement, “I think I need a lawyer”
was not sufficiently clear to require the termination of questioning. The Ohio Supreme Court has
found that a suspect’s statement, “don’t I supposed to have a lawyer present” was “at best
ambiguous.” State v. Brown, 100 Ohio St.3d 51, 2003-Ohio-5059, 796 N.E.2d 506, ¶ 19. In
contrast, this Court recently held that a suspect’s statement, “I want a lawyer” was an
unequivocal request for counsel. State v. Gerald, 4th Dist. Scioto No. 12CA3519, 2014-Ohio-
3629, ¶ 80. Scioto App. No. 14CA3646 23
{¶ 44} It is clear that there are no magic words a defendant is required to state in order to
invoke her/his Miranda right to counsel. Instead, the law demands that a suspect must convey a
clear, present desire to consult with counsel so that a reasonable police officer in the
circumstances would understand the statement to be a request for an attorney. Davis at 459.
Here, we find that Gurley’s statement, “Is there anybody I can call- someone, a lawyer or
anything, because I don’t - I still don’t - I still don’t understand” was, on its face, ambiguous.
While it might be interpreted as Gurley asking Trooper Lewis if she can call an attorney, it might
also be interpreted as a request to call, “someone” or “anybody”.
{¶ 45} Also, Gurley’s question is followed by a statement that she does not understand.
Examining the context of Gurley’s statements, Trooper Lewis could have reasonably believed
that Gurley was inquiring about her rights, as opposed to actually requesting counsel. In fact,
Trooper Lewis asked Gurley, “What are you having a problem with?” While, Gurley’s later
assertion, “Right. And I asked if I can talk to someone because I still- -” may reference her
earlier question, we do not find that it adds clarity to it. If anything, the statement indicates
Gurley desired to talk to someone other than an attorney. On the other hand, Trooper Lewis’s
response: “Well, I don’t want you calling anybody” indicates that he subjectively understood
Gurley’s desire to, at the very least, call someone because she clearly did not understand her
situation. In context, Trooper Lewis’s statement presents a potentially difficult issue as to
whether he knew Gurley wanted to get legal advice.
{¶ 46} Ultimately, however, it is not enough that Gurley might be invoking the right to
counsel. Davis at 459. The United States Supreme Court has declined to require police officers to
clarify a suspect’s equivocal or ambiguous statement regarding the right to counsel. Id. (stating
“If the statement fails to meet the requisite level of clarity, Edwards does not require that the Scioto App. No. 14CA3646 24
officer stop questioning the suspect.”) The Supreme Court has stated: “[W]hen a suspect makes
an ambiguous or equivocal statement it will often be good police practice for the interviewing
officers to clarify whether or not he actually wants an attorney.” Id. at 461. While Trooper Lewis
may not have engaged in good police practice when he stated, “I don’t want you calling
anybody,” the law does not require him to cease his questioning in light of Gurley’s equivocal
and ambiguous statements.
{¶ 47} Accordingly, we must find that Gurley did not unequivocally and unambiguously
invoke her right to counsel. We need not address whether or not Gurley reinitiated questioning
since she did not invoke her right to counsel. Accordingly, the trial court did not err by failing to
find that Gurley invoked her right to counsel. Gurley’s first assignment of error is overruled.
IV. Conclusion
{¶ 48} Having overruled both of Gurley’s assignments of error for the reasons stated
above, we find that the trial court did not err by denying Gurley’s motion to suppress. Therefore,
the judgment of the trial court is affirmed.
JUDGMENT AFFIRMED. Scioto App. No. 14CA3646 25
JUDGMENT ENTRY
It is ordered that the JUDGMENT IS AFFIRMED. Appellant shall pay the costs herein taxed.
The Court finds that reasonable grounds existed for this appeal.
It is ordered that a special mandate issue out of this Court directing the Scioto County Common Pleas Court to carry this judgment into execution.
IF A STAY OF EXECUTION OF SENTENCE AND RELEASE UPON BAIL HAS BEEN PREVIOUSLY GRANTED BY THE TRIAL COURT OR THIS COURT, it is temporarily continued for a period not to exceed sixty days upon the bail previously posted. The purpose of a continued stay is to allow Appellant to file with the Supreme Court of Ohio an application for a stay during the pendency of the proceedings in that court. If a stay is continued by this entry, it will terminate at the earliest of the expiration of the sixty day period, or the failure of the Appellant to file a notice of appeal with the Supreme Court of Ohio in the forty- five day appeal period pursuant to Rule II, Sec. 2 of the Rules of Practice of the Supreme Court of Ohio. Additionally, if the Supreme Court of Ohio dismisses the appeal prior to the expiration of sixty days, the stay will terminate as of the date of such dismissal.
A certified copy of this entry shall constitute the mandate pursuant to Rule 27 of the Rules of Appellate Procedure.
Harsha, J. and Abele, J.: Concur in Judgment and Opinion.
For the Court
By: Marie Hoover, Presiding Judge
NOTICE TO COUNSEL
Pursuant to Local Rule No. 14, this document constitutes a final judgment entry and the time period for further appeal commences from the date of filing with the clerk.