State v. Adams

2024 Ohio 174

• Court: Ohio Court of Appeals
• Decided: January 19, 2024
• Docket: 29855
• Status: Published

Opinion

[Cite as State v. Adams, 2024-Ohio-174.]

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT MONTGOMERY COUNTY

STATE OF OHIO : : Appellee : C.A. No. 29855 : v. : Trial Court Case No. 2022 CR 02092 : JOHN ADAMS : (Criminal Appeal from Common Pleas : Court) Appellant : :

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OPINION

Rendered on January 19, 2024

ARVIN S. MILLER, Attorney for Appellant

MATHIAS H. HECK, JR., by LUCAS T. CHRISTENSEN, Attorney for Appellee

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HUFFMAN, J.

{¶ 1} John Adams appeals from his conviction on one count of possession of drugs

following a no contest plea; he argues that the trial court erred in overruling his motion to

suppress. For the following reasons, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

Facts and Procedural History

{¶ 2} Following a citizen report that a man was passed out in a running motor -2-

vehicle at the edge of a driveway, medics and law enforcement officers responded and

found Adams slumped over the steering wheel of his vehicle near the end of his long

driveway, outside of a gate and close to the roadway, with his vehicle running and in drive.

Medics were able to awaken Adams with little medical intervention, and he refused further

care or treatment. Suspecting Adams was under the influence, law enforcement officers

ordered him out of the vehicle and observed heroin on the console in plain view.

{¶ 3} Adams was subsequently indicted on one count of possession of heroin. He

filed a motion to suppress, and the court conducted an evidentiary hearing; the court

overruled the motion. Adams then entered a no contest plea to the single count in the

indictment, was found guilty, and was placed on community control sanctions.

Assignment of Error and Analysis

{¶ 4} In his sole assignment of error, Adams argues that the trial court erred in

overruling his motion to suppress because any emergency that responding officers

encountered ended when Adams was awakened, refused medical treatment, and

medics left the scene. Adams asserts that he was illegally detained without reasonable

suspicion that he was armed and that the officers observed the heroin in his vehicle only

because he was wrongfully removed from his vehicle. According to Adams, the trial

court’s factual findings were not consistent with the testimony of the two police officers

and the body camera evidence presented by the State. Adams argues that the body

camera video clearly showed that the officer only observed the alleged contraband after

Adams was removed from the vehicle and after Officer Paul Land had entered the vehicle

and reached toward the center console. -3-

{¶ 5} The State responds that the evidence discovered by the officers was “in plain

view during a lawful welfare check, which became a lawful investigatory stop.” According

to the State, even if the community caretaking function ends, a police-citizen interaction

may change and become investigatory. The State acknowledges that a responding

officer, Land, observed what he recognized as drugs as Adams was getting out of the

truck. However, according to the State, responding officers had a reasonable, articulable

suspicion that Adams had committed the offense of operating a motor vehicle while under

the influence, and therefore they continued to investigate. The State argues that Land

was lawfully present pursuant to the community caretaking function when he observed

the suspected drugs, regardless of whether the community caretaking aspect of the

situation had been resolved by that time.

{¶ 6} When addressing a motion to suppress, the trial court assumes the role of

the trier of fact and, as such, is in the best position to resolve conflicts in the evidence

and determine the credibility of the witnesses and the weight to be given to their

testimony. State v. Retherford, 93 Ohio App.3d 586, 639 N.E.2d 498 (1994). In

reviewing a suppression decision, an appellate court must accept the trial court's findings

of fact if they are supported by competent, credible evidence in the record. Id.

Accepting those facts as true, we must then independently determine, as a matter of law

and without deference to the trial court's legal conclusion, whether the applicable legal

standard is satisfied. Id.

{¶ 7} “The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution, and Section 14,

Article I of the Ohio Constitution, protect individuals from unreasonable searches and -4-

seizures conducted by police officers.” (Citations omitted.) State v. Ferguson, 2d Dist.

Montgomery No. 28644, 2020-Ohio-4153, ¶ 12. “The law recognizes three types of police-

citizen interactions: 1) a consensual encounter, 2) a brief investigatory stop or detention,

and 3) an arrest.” State v. Weisgarber, 2017-Ohio-8764, 88 N.E.3d 1037, ¶ 15 (2d Dist.),

citing State v. Millerton, 2015-Ohio-34, 26 N.E.3d 317, ¶ 20 (2d Dist.).

{¶ 8} “Searches and seizures conducted without a warrant are per se

unreasonable absent a few, well recognized exceptions.” (Citations omitted.) State v.

McCarthy, 2022-Ohio-4738, 203 N.E.3d 912, ¶ 10 (2d Dist.). “ ‘One such exception is the

community caretaking/emergency-aid exception, which is grounded in interests of public

safety.’ ” Id., citing State v. Glowney, 2d Dist. Montgomery Nos. 27896, 27897, 2019-

Ohio-3390, ¶ 34.

{¶ 9} Under the community-caretaking/emergency-aid exception, a law

enforcement officer with objectively reasonable grounds to believe that there is an

immediate need for his or her assistance to protect life or prevent serious injury may

conduct a community caretaking/emergency-aid stop. State v. Dunn, 131 Ohio St.3d

325, 2012-Ohio-1008, 964 N.E.2d 1037, ¶ 26. “Community caretaking functions are

‘divorced from the detection, investigation, or acquisition of evidence relating to the

violation of a criminal statute.’ ” State v. Warnick, 2d Dist. Miami No. 2019-CA-14, 2020-

Ohio-4240, ¶ 21, quoting Cady v. Dombrowski, 413 U.S. 433, 441, 93 S.Ct. 2523, 37

L.Ed.2d 706 (1973). “Accordingly, * * * police officers are not required to possess

reasonable articulable suspicion of criminal activity when exercising community

caretaking functions/emergency aid.” (Citations omitted.) State v. Klase, 2019-Ohio- -5-

3392, 131 N.E.3d 1054, ¶ 17 (2d Dist.); see also McCarthy at ¶ 11.

{¶ 10} In contrast, pursuant to Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 88 S.Ct. 1868, 20

L.Ed.2d 889 (1968), in an investigatory stop, police officers may temporarily detain

individuals to investigate possible criminal activity if the officers possess a reasonable,

articulable suspicion that criminal activity may be afoot. Weisgarber, 2017-Ohio-8764,

88 N.E.3d 1037, at ¶ 17, citing State v. Swift, 2d Dist. Montgomery No. 27036, 2016-Ohio-

8191, ¶ 17. A Terry stop is “more intrusive than a consensual encounter but less

intrusive than a formal custodial arrest.” State v. Thornton, 2023-Ohio-1404, 213 N.E.3d

808, ¶ 16 (2d Dist.), citing State v. Taylor, 106 Ohio App.3d 741, 748, 667 N.E.2d 60 (2d

Dist.1995).

{¶ 11} “Reasonable suspicion entails some minimal level of objective justification

* * *[,] something more than an inchoate and unparticularized suspicion or ‘hunch,’ but

less than the level of suspicion required for probable cause.” State v. Jones, 70 Ohio

App.3d 554, 556-57, 591 N.E.2d 810 (2d Dist.1990), citing Terry at 27. “We determine

the existence of reasonable suspicion of criminal activity by evaluating the totality of the

circumstances, considering those circumstances ‘through the eyes of the reasonable and

prudent police officer on the scene who must react to events as they unfold.’ ” State v.

Santiago, 195 Ohio App.3d 649, 2011-Ohio-5292, 961 N.E.2d 264, ¶ 13 (2d Dist.), quoting

State v. Heard, 2d Dist. Montgomery No. 19323, 2003-Ohio-1047, ¶ 14, quoting State v.

Andrews, 57 Ohio St.3d 86, 87-88, 565 N.E.2d 1271 (1991). While we defer to the trial

court's factual findings supported by the record, “[w]hether articulable suspicion exists for

the officer's conduct is a question of law and we review the trial court's action ‘de novo’ -6-

or independently.” State v. Van Hoose, 2d Dist. Montgomery No. 18287, 2000 WL

1838764, *3 (Dec. 15, 2000), citing Ornelas v. United States, 517 U.S. 690, 116 S.Ct.

1657, 134 L.Ed.2d 911 (1996).

{¶ 12} It “is well-established that, during the course of a lawful traffic stop, law

enforcement officers are authorized to remove the occupants from the vehicle. State v.

Nelson, 2d Dist. Montgomery No. 22718, 2009-Ohio-2546, ¶ 41, citing Maryland v.

Wilson, 519 U.S. 408, 117 S.Ct. 882, 137 L.Ed.2d 41 (1997) and Pennsylvania v. Mimms,

434 U.S. 106, 111, 98 S.Ct. 330, 54 L.Ed.2d 331 (1977). In other words, “the ordering

of a motorist out of his vehicle during a traffic stop [is] merely an incident to the stop,

requiring no additional justification.” State v. Sarno, 2d Dist. Montgomery No. 25751,

2013-Ohio-5058, ¶ 20.

{¶ 13} Finally, the plain view doctrine is another exception to the search warrant

requirement. State v. Boyd, 2d Dist. Montgomery No. 28490, 2020-Ohio-125, ¶ 16, citing

State v. Hunter, 2d Dist. Montgomery No. 24350, 2011-Ohio-6321, ¶ 31, citing Coolidge

v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 91 S.Ct. 2022, 29 L.Ed.2d 564 (1971). “Under the

plain-view exception, ‘police may seize an article when its incriminating nature is

immediately apparent to an officer who comes in contact with the item through lawful

activity.’ ” Id., citing State v. Thompson, 2d Dist. Montgomery No. 25658, 2013-Ohio-

4825, ¶ 13, quoting State v. Pounds, 2d Dist. Montgomery No. 21257, 2006-Ohio-3040,

¶ 19. “The police officer need not be absolutely certain that the item seen in plain view

is contraband or evidence of a crime. It is sufficient if probable cause exists to associate

the item with criminal activity.” Id., citing Pounds at ¶ 19. -7-

{¶ 14} Once an officer sees contraband in plain view inside a vehicle, he or she

then has probable cause to believe the vehicle contains other items of contraband and

may conduct a warrantless search of the vehicle pursuant to the automobile exception to

the search warrant requirement. Id. at ¶ 17, citing Thompson at ¶ 13, citing Pounds at

¶ 21. “Under the automobile exception, police may warrantlessly search a vehicle that

they have probable cause to believe contains contraband.” Id., citing State v. Moore, 90

Ohio St.3d 47, 51, 734 N.E.2d 804 (2000). “The scope of the search extends to

anywhere in the vehicle that contraband might be hidden.” Id., citing United States v.

Ross, 456 U.S. 798, 825, 102 S.Ct. 2157, 72 L.Ed.2d 572 (1982). This includes a closed

container if there is probable cause to believe it contains evidence related to the crime

under investigation. Id., citing State v. Roberts, 2d Dist. Montgomery No. 21221, 2006-

Ohio-3042, ¶ 18.

{¶ 15} At the suppression hearing, Adams’s attorney asserted that the sole issue

before the court was the search of Adams’s vehicle. Officer Andrew Albrinck of the

Moraine Police Department testified that on May 8, 2022, he was dispatched to a

residence on Pinnacle Road on the report of a man, later identified as Adams, passed out

behind the wheel of a gray Nissan pickup in the driveway of his own residence. The

original 911 call was placed by passersby who noticed Adams slumped over the steering

wheel on their way to get food and then again observed Adams in the same position in

the same area of the driveway on their return. According to Albrinck, the callers reported

that the pickup “wasn’t necessarily all the way up in the driveway. It was closer to the

roadside.” -8-

{¶ 16} The encounter between Moraine Police Officers and Adams was captured

on body camera video, which was admitted into evidence at the suppression hearing.

Albrinck, who had ten years of law enforcement experience, testified that overdose calls

are common in Moraine. Albrinck arrived on the scene less than two minutes after

medics, who were first at the scene; when he arrived, medics were attempting to awaken

Adams, who was “just slumped right over the steering wheel.” The pickup truck was

running and in drive, with Adams’s foot on the brake enough to keep him from rolling

forward. Medical personnel put the vehicle in park and removed the keys for safety.

{¶ 17} Once he was conscious, Adams refused additional medical treatment.

Adams appeared to be inebriated and his speech was slurred. Albrinck attempted to

ascertain Adams’s identity and learn if any medical condition had caused his lack of

consciousness or his condition. Albrinck also asked Adams if there was anything in the

vehicle that would harm him, and Adams “neglected to answer the question,” so Albrinck

ordered him out of the vehicle. Adams initially refused to exit the vehicle and began to

“fiddle around” to try to turn off the ignition, despite the fact that medics had already done

so. As Adams then exited the pickup, Albrinck was advised by Officer Land, who was

standing on the passenger side of the vehicle, that he observed drugs “sitting directly on

top of the center console that were in plain view.” Albrinck had observed a white

substance, “definitely something that we’d be used to seeing” in the officers’ experience

with illegal drugs.

{¶ 18} Albrinck then took Adams into custody. Land completed a search of the

vehicle due to observing suspected drugs in plain view, while Albrinck administered field -9-

sobriety tests to Adams on the suspicion that Adams had operated the vehicle while

impaired. After the investigation, the officers issued Adams a citation for having physical

control of the vehicle while under the influence.

{¶ 19} Officer Land testified, consistently with Albrinck, that he was dispatched to

a Pinnacle Road address around 8:13 p.m. on the report of an unconscious male in the

driver’s seat of a vehicle at the edge of the roadway. Like Albrinck, Land had over ten

years’ of law enforcement experience, and he had had a previous encounter with Adams

involving drug possession. Land approached the front passenger side of the pickup truck

while Albrinck spoke to Adams from the driver’s side of the truck. When Adams lifted his

right elbow from the center console while speaking to Albrinck, Land observed a small

baggie in plain view containing what he suspected were illegal drugs based upon his

training and experience. Land stated that he immediately notified Albrinck of the

presence of suspected drugs.

{¶ 20} After Adams exited the pickup truck, Land searched the vehicle, believing

that more illegal drugs could be present therein. Land testified that, in a cup holder in

the center console, he found a cut straw with residue on it, which he knew to be commonly

used for snorting illegal drugs, and another small baggie of suspected illegal narcotics in

the cigarette case. Finally, after lifting an armrest, Land found a digital scale commonly

used with illegal narcotics and a small baggie of suspected marijuana inside of the

armrest.

{¶ 21} After hearing this evidence and reviewing the body camera video, the trial

court overruled Adams’s motion to suppress and found that, as Land had stood at the -10-

passenger door while Adams spoke to Albrinck, Land saw in plain view a baggie of

suspected narcotics on the console of the vehicle when Adams moved his arm. The

court further found that what began as a welfare check “turned into a[n] investigatory

scenario.” The court found that, upon speaking with Adams to ascertain the nature of his

condition, narcotics were then found in plain view, and “the search was then subject to a

probable cause search.” The court concluded that the police officers very specifically

identified their articulable suspicion upon arriving at the scene and, once they had spoken

to Adams, who seemed incoherent, and in trying to ascertain what was going on, the

officer saw in plain view what appeared to be narcotics based on their training and

experience.

{¶ 22} The body camera video is consistent with both officers’ testimony. While

responding to a report of an unconscious person in a running vehicle near a roadway,

Albrinck and Land approached Adams’s vehicle in the interest of emergency aid and

public safety. After Adams refused medical treatment, medics turned the scene over to

the officers and departed. Contrary to Adams’s argument, he was not, at this point,

entitled to end his encounter with the officers, as the officers had reasonable, articulable

suspicion to continue their encounter with him.

{¶ 23} Adams’s demeanor, slurred speech, slow responses, the location of his

vehicle so close to passing traffic, and his condition upon the arrivals of medics and

officers reasonably suggested to Officers Albrinck and Land that Adams was under the

influence. Under these circumstances, the officers had reasonable articulable suspicion

to continue their investigation and were permitted to order Adams out of the vehicle. -11-

Adams’s assertion that he was illegally detained by the officers is belied by the evidence,

and reasonable suspicion that he was armed was not required to continue the encounter.

While lawfully positioned on the passenger side of the truck, Land observed what, in his

experience, appeared to be an illegal narcotic on the console inside the vehicle, and he

informed Albrinck. The drugs were visible in the video on the console after Adams got

out of the vehicle, thereby justifying the further search of the truck. Thus, there was no

violation of Adams’s Fourth Amendment rights in his interaction with the officers.

{¶ 24} For the foregoing reasons, the trial court did not err in overruling Adams’s

motion to suppress. His assignment of error is overruled.

{¶ 25} The judgment of the trial court is affirmed.

EPLEY, P.J. and WELBAUM, J., concur.