[Cite as State v. Lansing, 2025-Ohio-1241.]
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT ROSS COUNTY
STATE OF OHIO, :
Plaintiff-Appellant, : CASE NO. 24CA19
v. :
MISTY LANSING, : DECISION AND JUDGMENT
Defendant-Appellee. :
_________________________________________________________________
APPEARANCES:
Jeffrey C. Marks, Ross County Prosecuting Attorney, and Pamela C. Wells, Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, Chillicothe, Ohio, for appellant.
Jeffrey M. Blosser, Chillicothe, Ohio, for appellee. ___________________________________________________________________ CRIMINAL APPEAL FROM COMMON PLEAS COURT DATE JOURNALIZED:4-3-25 ABELE, J.
{¶1} The State of Ohio, pursuant to R.C. 2945.67(A) and
Crim.R. 12(J), appeals a Ross County Common Pleas Court judgment
that suppressed evidence found during a search of a vehicle driven
by Misty Lansing, defendant below and appellee herein, and occupied
by Ariel Ballein, a co-defendant below. Appellant assigns the
following error for review: ROSS, 24CA19
2 ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR:
“THE TRIAL COURT ERRED BY GRANTING THE MOTION TO SUPPRESS.”
{¶2} During a March 2024 traffic stop, Ohio State Highway
Patrol Trooper Tyler Boetcher discovered methamphetamine in a
vehicle driven by appellee and occupied by passenger co-defendant
Ariel Ballein. A Ross County Grand Jury later returned an
indictment that charged both appellee and Ballein with (1) one
count of aggravated possession of drugs in an amount equal to or
exceeding 100 times the bulk amount in violation of R.C. 2925.11,
and (2) one count of aggravated trafficking in drugs in an amount
equal or exceeding 100 times the bulk amount in violation of R.C.
2925.03, both first-degree felonies. Appellee and Ballein entered
not guilty pleas.
{¶3} Subsequently, appellee and Ballein filed motions to
suppress the evidence discovered during the traffic stop. At the
suppression hearing, Trooper Boetcher testified that at
approximately 10:00 p.m. on February 23, 2024, he worked in the
drug interdiction unit when dispatch notified him of a call ROSS, 24CA19
3 regarding a “reckless, possibly impaired driver.” Boetcher
obtained the description of a gold Ford sedan and registration
number, drove to the area, and searched for the vehicle. After
Boetcher observed the Ford traveling in a group of three vehicles,
he “checked all three at a speed above the posted speed limit, but
not blazing speeds, and I performed a U-turn . . . and proceeded to
follow the three vehicles not knowing - at the time I did not know
that center vehicle was the vehicle I was dispatched to.” After
the rear car turned off the roadway, Boetcher identified the gold
Ford sedan and observed it pass the lead vehicle. Boetcher checked
the Ford’s speed at 68 miles per hour using radar. Boetcher
testified that 65 miles per hour “is ten miles an hour over the
posted speed limit.”
{¶4} Appellant played Trooper Boetcher’s body camera video at
the suppression hearing. At minute 1:30 of the video, appellee’s
vehicle stops. At 1:47, Trooper Boetcher first speaks with
appellee on the vehicle’s driver’s side. Appellee states, “I’m
just trying to find my wallet,” and asks Boetcher, “how are you
this evening?” Boetcher replies, “not too bad.” ROSS, 24CA19
4 {¶5} At 2:17, Trooper Boetcher states, “find it?” and appellee
replies, “Yes.” Boetcher asks, “car belong to you, ma’am?,”
appellee replies, “Yes.” At 2:24, Boetcher asks, “where ya coming
from tonight?” Appellee replies, “from my sister’s up in
Marysville.” When asked where she is headed, appellee said, “Pike
county ... my house.” When asked, “are you in a hurry tonight?”
Appellee responded that her daughter in Pike County had to go to
work in the morning and she needed to watch her granddaughter.
When asked, how long were you up in Marysville, appellee hesitated
and replied, “like two hours.” When asked, “what were you up there
for,” appellee hesitated and said, “what was I up there for?” When
Boetcher said, “Yes,” appellee said, “just visiting.” Boetcher
asked, “just visiting?” Appellee replied, “yeah.” The
conversation ends at 3:15.
{¶6} Trooper Boetcher and Lieutenant Melanie Provenzano
reenter the cruiser at 3:30 of the video. Provenzano asks, “wonder
how old she is,” and Boetcher says, “45.” At 4:00 of the video,
Boetcher says, “carried on a good conversation with me . . . I mean
. . . don’t have anything in her eyes . . . normal reactions.” At ROSS, 24CA19
5 4:08, Boetcher says, “I’ll get her out of here, be right back.” At
4:10, Boetcher exits his cruiser.
{¶7} At 4:21, Trooper Boetcher again approached appellee’s
vehicle and said, “Alright, is there anything in the vehicle the K-
9 is going to indicate to?” Appellee hesitates, shakes her head,
looks away, and says, “No.” Boetcher said, “No?” Appellee looks
at Boetcher and says, “no, not that I know of.” At 4:30, Boetcher
says, “go ahead and hop out for me for a minute.” At 4:36,
appellee exits the vehicle and at 4:40, Boetcher tells her to “go
back there at the front of my car.” As appellee starts to walk
toward Boetcher’s cruiser, at 4:42 Boetcher says, “Hey ma’am, ma’am
come here. See that pipe and that twist baggie?” Appellee
returns, looks in the vehicle, and says, “oh.” Boetcher says,
“yeah,” and at 5:02, Boetcher advises appellee of her Miranda
rights. After that, he questioned appellee and she admitted that
the vehicle contained methamphetamine, and told him, “I just had
what’s in my pipe.”
{¶8} At 8:15 of the video, Trooper Boetcher removed passenger
Ballein from the vehicle. At 9:14, Boetcher informed Ballein that ROSS, 24CA19
6 the traffic stop had turned into a criminal investigation “because
there is drugs and paraphernalia in plain view in the vehicle.”
Boetcher handcuffed Ballein and searched her. Boetcher then
searched the vehicle. Initially, Ballein refused to reveal her
identity. However, after Boetcher told her she would go to jail if
she did not identify herself, Ballein gave her name and admitted
she had outstanding warrants. Part of the video does not contain
audio, so it is unclear when or whether Trooper Boetcher or
Lieutenant Provenzano advised Ballein of her Miranda rights. After
a full search of the vehicle, officers found a large amount of
methamphetamine.
{¶9} Trooper Boetcher testified that his primary reason for
the stop originated with the “reckless impaired driver” report, and
the secondary reason “speeding.” Boetcher testified that “from the
time of the traffic stop until the time that I pulled the defendant
out of the vehicle was less than three minutes. From the time of
my first contact, I think just over - less than four minutes from
the time. . . I turned my lights on.” When asked how long “it
usually takes for you to issue a traffic citation or warning,” ROSS, 24CA19
7 Boetcher replied, “written warning, possibly five to seven minutes.
Citation seven to ten?” Boetcher stated that the average traffic
stop is “seven to fifteen minutes.” However, if the driver is
impaired, “it’s an hour or two.” Boetcher testified that “every
one of my traffic stops is different. You can - one thing if
criminal activity is afoot, one thing we are trained to do is
separate the parties involved, but you can also question them
together. Each - each traffic stop is fluid and different.”
{¶10} When asked at what point he decided to have the driver
exit the vehicle, Trooper Boetcher replied, “I decided to pull the
driver from the vehicle was the - the moment I asked her to step
out of the vehicle.” When asked why, Boetcher explained,
I was dispatched there . . . to investigate a reckless possibly impaired driver, one. Two the - the defendant had stated that she was enroute from Marysville to Pike County and then she further states her home. Knowing the . . . State Route 104 is not a direct route from Marysville or any sub areas around Marysville to the Latham area. . . the direct route does not even bring you through the northern . . . portion of Ross County. . . so that’s another reason. Also, as I reapproached the vehicle I had realized, taking a step back and realized that the passenger of the vehicle had not spoken to my Lieutenant that was standing at her window during the traffic stop, nor - nor myself. She had stared straight ahead throughout the entirety of the traffic stop. Which is abnormal. And ROSS, 24CA19
8 then the drivers questions - or when I would ask the driver a question on two separate occasions that I can recall she either prolonged or re-asked the question. Which is not in [and] of itself abnormal but can be evasive on questioning.
{¶11} Trooper Boetcher testified that he generally removes
drivers from their vehicles when he investigates an impaired
driver. Boetcher explained that he and his Lieutenant “were
working a detail in the City of Chillicothe” that night, so they
“were in a rush” at the beginning of the stop. Boetcher also
stated that appellee’s answer, “not that I can think of,” is “not
an normal answer.” “Through my experience, a ‘not that I can think
of’ is indicative of there either has been or is something in the
vehicle that a K-9 is going to indicate to.” Boetcher testified
that, although he said to his Lieutenant that he was going to “get
her out of here,” he did not say that to the driver, and only made
that statement because “I was in a hurry trying to get back to the
- the detail we were assigned to work.” Lieutenant Provenzano did
not testify.
{¶12} On cross-examination, Trooper Boetcher acknowledged that
he initiated the traffic stop at 10:32 p.m. Boetcher stated that, ROSS, 24CA19
9 although at the 4:08 minute mark of the bodycam video he said
“let’s get her out of here,” Boetcher asserted that between the
time he exited his patrol car and walked to appellee’s vehicle, he
continued to investigate.
{¶13} On cross-examination by Ballein’s attorney, counsel
asked, “and you never asked the passenger at any time, up to this
point when you pull Ms. Lansing out, you had not asked Ms. Ballein
any questions.” Trooper Boetcher responded, “I had not.” When
asked whether his Lieutenant asked any questions of Ballein,
Boetcher responded, “I - she - she did not.” When asked if his
reason for “pulling Ms. Lansing out of the vehicle was that - one
of the reasons I should say was that Ms. Ballein had not spoken to
you or your lieutenant?,” Boetcher replied, “No Ma’am. She was -
she was staring straight ahead, which is not normal through my
experience when stopping vehicles. The passenger is not locked,
staring just straight ahead in a - in a motor vehicle.” Boetcher
conceded that because of the relatively brief stop, Ballein only
stared straight ahead “a couple of minutes.” ROSS, 24CA19
10 {¶14} The trial court granted appellee’s suppression motion
after the parties submitted written closing arguments. Although
the court made no findings of fact or conclusions of law in its
entry, at the June 3, 2024 status conference hearing the court
stated that Trooper Boetcher made a valid traffic stop because
appellee exceeded the posted speed limit. The court observed,
however, that after appellee’s driver’s license and registration
check and Boetcher’s statement to his Lieutenant that he “was going
to get them out of here,” the traffic stop had ended and Boetcher
extended the stop for “an impermissible period of time.” The court
specifically noted that it found no significance in the passenger
Ballein’s silence and stated that nothing suggested Ballein’s
impairment or that she committed any infraction other than sitting
quietly and staring straight ahead.
{¶15} This appeal followed.
I.
{¶16} Appellant asserts in its assignment of error that the
trial court erred when it granted the motion to suppress evidence.
In particular, appellant contends that the trial court: (1) made ROSS, 24CA19
11 findings not based on all competent, credible evidence in the
record relevant to a reasonable suspicion/totality of the
circumstances analysis; (2) applied an incorrect analysis and
erroneously determined that Trooper Boetcher completed the initial
stop’s mission, (3) failed to consider the totality of the
circumstances and the duration of the stop, (4) failed to assess
what a reasonably prudent officer would do, and (5) failed to
consider that an officer may briefly ask questions before releasing
a motorist, then request a driver to exit a vehicle when the
answers are dubious.
{¶17} In general, appellate review of a trial court's ruling on
a motion to suppress evidence involves a mixed question of law and
fact. State v. Gurley, 2015-Ohio-5361, ¶ 16 (4th Dist.), citing
State v. Roberts, 2006-Ohio-3665, ¶ 100; State v. Jones, 2022-Ohio-
561, ¶ 15 (4th Dist.). At a suppression hearing, a trial court
acts as the trier of fact and is best positioned to resolve factual
questions and evaluate witness credibility. Gurley; State v.
Burnside, 2003-Ohio-5372, ¶ 8. Therefore, appellate courts “ ‘must
accept the trial court's findings of fact if they are supported by ROSS, 24CA19
12 competent, credible evidence.’ ” State v. Leak, 2016-Ohio-154, ¶
12, quoting Burnside at ¶ 8. Accepting those facts as true,
reviewing courts “ ‘independently determine as a matter of law,
without deference to the conclusion of the trial court, whether the
facts satisfy the applicable legal standard.’ ” Id., quoting
Burnside at ¶ 8; State v. Dunbar, 2024-Ohio-1460, ¶ 21 (4th Dist.).
{¶18} The Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States
Constitution and Section 14, Article I of the Ohio Constitution
protect individuals against unreasonable governmental searches and
seizures. State v. Shrewsbury, 2014-Ohio-716, ¶ 14 (4th Dist.),
citing State v. Emerson, 2012-Ohio-5047, ¶ 15; Delaware v. Prouse,
440 U.S. 648 (1979). “This constitutional guarantee is protected
by the exclusionary rule, which mandates the exclusion of the
evidence obtained from the unreasonable search and seizure at
trial.” Shrewsbury, citing Emerson at ¶ 15; State v. Harper, 2022-
Ohio-4357, ¶ 23 (4th Dist.).
{¶19} A traffic stop initiated by a law enforcement officer
constitutes a seizure within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment. ROSS, 24CA19
13 Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 809–810 (1996). Thus, a
traffic stop must comply with the Fourth Amendment's general
reasonableness requirement. Id. An officer's decision to stop a
vehicle is reasonable when the officer has probable cause or
reasonable suspicion to believe that a traffic violation has
occurred. Id. at 810, 116 S.Ct. 1769 (citations omitted); accord
State v. Mays, 2008-Ohio-4539, ¶ 23; Dayton v. Erickson, 76 Ohio
St.3d 3, 11–12 (1996). Law enforcement officers also may stop a
vehicle if they have reasonable suspicion “that criminal activity “
‘may be afoot.’ ” ” United States v. Arvizu, 534 U.S. 266, 273
(2002), quoting United States v. Sokolow, 490 U.S. 1, 7 (1989),
quoting Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 30 (1968); accord State v.
Tidwell, 2021-Ohio-2072, ¶ 19 (officer may “make an investigatory
stop, including a traffic stop, of a person if the officer has
reasonable suspicion to believe that the person is or is about to
be engaged in criminal activity”).
{¶20} Relevant to the case at bar, a police officer who
observes a de minimis violation of traffic laws may stop a driver.
State v. Debrossard, 2015-Ohio-1054, ¶ 13 (4th Dist.), citing State ROSS, 24CA19
14 v. Guseman, 2009-Ohio-952, ¶ 20 (4th Dist.), citing State v. Bowie,
2002-Ohio-3553, ¶ 8, 12, and 16 (4th Dist.), citing Whren; see also
Harper at ¶ 24. Moreover, the Supreme Court of Ohio has held,
“Where a police officer stops a vehicle based on probable cause
that a traffic violation has occurred or was occurring, the stop is
not unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment to the United States
Constitution even if the officer had some ulterior motive for
making the stop[.]” Dayton at paragraph one of the syllabus.
{¶21} In general, a traffic stop may last no longer than
necessary to accomplish the initial goal of the stop:
[T]he tolerable duration of police inquiries in the traffic-stop context is determined by the seizure’s “mission” - to address the traffic violation that warranted the stop and attend to related safety concerns. Because addressing the infraction is the purpose of the stop, it may “last no longer than is necessary to effectuate tha[at] purpose.” Authority for the seizure thus ends when tasks tied to the traffic infraction are - or reasonably should have been - completed.
Rodriguez v. United States, 575 U.S. 348, 354 (2015). The United
States Supreme Court explained that tasks tied to traffic
infractions include: (1) determining whether to issue a traffic
ticket, (2) checking the driver’s license, (3) determining the ROSS, 24CA19
15 existence of outstanding warrants, (4) inspecting the vehicle’s
registration, and (5) examining proof of insurance. “These checks
serve the same objective as enforcement of the traffic code:
ensuring that vehicles on the road are operated safely and
responsibly.” Id. at 355.
{¶22} Similar to a Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968) stop, the
tolerable duration of police inquiries in a traffic-stop context is
determined by the seizure’s “mission” - to address the traffic
violation that warranted the stop, Illinois v. Caballes, 543 U.S.
405, 407 (2005), and attend to related safety concerns. State v.
Kincaid, 2024-Ohio-2668, ¶ 15 (4th Dist.); see also United States
v. Sharpe, 470 U.S. 675, 685 (1985); Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S.
491, 500 (1983)(plurality opinion)(“The scope of the detention must
be carefully tailored to its underlying justification.”). Because
addressing the infraction is the purpose of the stop, it may “last
no longer than is necessary to effectuate th[at] purpose.” Id.
See also Caballes, 543 U.S. at 407. Authority for the seizure thus
ends when tasks tied to the traffic infraction are - or reasonably ROSS, 24CA19
16 should have been - completed. See Sharpe, 470 U.S. at 686 (in
determining the reasonable duration of a stop, “it [is] appropriate
to examine whether the police diligently pursued [the]
investigation”). Rodriguez, 575 U.S. 348 at 354.
{¶23} Thus, after a reasonable time for the purpose of the
original traffic stop to elapse, an officer must then have “ ‘a
reasonable articulable suspicion of illegal activity to continue
the detention.’ ” State v. Jones, 2022-Ohio-561, ¶ 22 (4th Dist.),
quoting State v. Ramos, 2003-Ohio-6535, ¶ 13 (2d Dist.)
When a police officer’s objective justification to continue detention of a person stopped for a traffic violation for the purpose of searching the person’s vehicle is not related to the purpose of the original stop, and when that continued detention is not based on any articulable facts giving rise to a suspicion of some illegal activity justifying an extension of the detention, the continuing detention to conduct a search constitutes an illegal seizure.
State v. Robinette, 80 Ohio St.3d 234 (1997), paragraph one of the syllabus.
{¶24} Therefore, if, after talking with a driver, a reasonable
police officer would be satisfied that no unlawful activity had ROSS, 24CA19
17 occurred, the driver must be permitted to continue on his or her
way. State v. Venham, 96 Ohio App.3d 649, 656 (4th Dist. 1994).
However, if an officer “ascertained reasonably arcticulable facts
giving rise to the suspicion of criminal activity, the officer may
then further detain and implement a more in-depth investigation of
the individual.” Robinette at 241. The detention of the motorist
may last as long as the reasonable suspicion of criminal activity
continues. “However, the lawfulness of the initial stop will not
support a ‘fishing expedition’ for evidence of another crime.”
Venham, supra, at 655.
{¶25} Thus, “[t]he detention of a stopped driver may continue
beyond [the normal] time frame when additional facts are
encountered that give rise to a reasonable, articulable suspicion
of criminal activity beyond that which prompted the initial stop.”
State v. Bathchili, 2007-Ohio-2204, ¶ 15, citing State v. Myers, 63
Ohio App.3d 765, 771 (2d Dist. 1990); Venham, 96 Ohio App.3d 649,
655, State v. Howard, 2006-Ohio-5656, ¶ 16. The “reasonable and
articulable” standard applied to a prolonged traffic stop
encompasses the totality of the circumstances.” Id. at ¶ 17, ROSS, 24CA19
18 citing United States v. Arvizu, 534 U.S. 266, 274 (2002). However,
Rodriguez v. United States, supra, prohibits seizures that result
from inquiries unrelated to the purpose of a traffic stop that
“measurably extend[s] the duration of the stop.” See also State v.
Chatton, 11 Ohio St.3d 59, 63 (1984)(“Once the suspicion which gave
rise to the initial stop evaporated, any additional intrusion or
detention had to have been supported by specific and articulable
facts demonstrating the reasonableness of the continued
detention.”)
{¶26} The Supreme Court of Ohio has also instructed: “The
‘reasonable and articulable’ standard applied to a prolonged
traffic stop encompasses the totality of the circumstances, and a
court may not evaluate in isolation each articulated reason for the
stop.” Batchili, paragraph two of the syllabus. Again, “[i]n
determining whether a detention is reasonable, the court must look
at the totality of the circumstances.” State v. Matteucci, 2003-
Ohio-702, ¶ 30 (11th Dist.). The totality of the circumstances
approach “allows officers to draw on their own experience and
specialized training to make inferences from and deductions about ROSS, 24CA19
19 the cumulative information available to them that ‘might well elude
an untrained person.’ ” Arvizu, 534 U.S. at 273, quoting United
States v. Cortez, 449 U.S. 411, 418 (1981). Thus, the pertinent
question in the case sub judice is whether Trooper Boetcher’s
decision to ask at the three-minute mark of the traffic stop,
“Alright, is there anything in the vehicle the K-9 is going to
indicate to?,” impermissibly extended the stop.
{¶27} As a threshold matter, we note that in the instant case
the trial court made no findings of fact in its entry that granted
the motion to suppress evidence. Moreover, Crim.R. 12(F) provides:
Where factual issues are involved in determining a motion, the
court shall state its essential findings on the record, and a trial
court speaks through its journal entries. State v. Schulz, 2014–
Ohio–1037, ¶ 3 (9th Dist.). However, we have the suppression
hearing transcript, as well as the parties’ arguments, and can
properly review the issues on appeal. State v. Steed, 2016-Ohio-
8088, ¶ 26 (6th Dist.).
{¶28} Turning to the merits of appellant’s appeal, to evaluate
the propriety of an investigative stop, a reviewing court must ROSS, 24CA19
20 examine the totality of the circumstances that surround the stop as
“viewed through the eyes of the reasonable and prudent police
officer on the scene who must react to events as they unfold.”
State v. Andrews, 57 Ohio St.3d 86, 87–88 (1991). Here, neither
party disputes the justification for the traffic stop. Thus, the
relevant inquiry is whether Trooper Boetcher possessed the
authority to ask the appellee to exit her vehicle.
{¶29} The status conference hearing transcript reveals that, in
determining to grant the suppression motion, the trial court
appears to have attached great significance to Trooper Boetcher’s
statement, “I’ll get her out of here, be right back,” and noted,
“perhaps if he hadn’t made the statement to the Lieutenant sitting
next to him we wouldn’t of known what his intentions were, but he
made them very clear when he made the statement,” “so I find that
based upon that he extended the stop for an impermissible period of
time, and therefore everything after that stop should be
suppressed.” In addition, the court emphasized, “I’m at a loss of
how the passenger’s actions . . . that didn’t involve intoxication,
inebriation, clearly had nothing to do with the reckless driver . . ROSS, 24CA19
21 . how the passengers response to the traffic stop, of staring
straight ahead and remaining silent is . . . indicative of anything
to do with the traffic stop or illegal behavior.” The court went
on to note that it is “every American’s constitutional right when
faced with law enforcement, to stare straight ahead and be quite
[sic.] if that’s what they want to do, especially if they’re not
the driver of the vehicle, who is required to provide at least some
information.” Appellant, however, asserts that the trial court
erred when it did not utilize the required totality of the
circumstances analysis, isolated one factor (the silence and
staring of the passenger), failed to consider whether the officer
diligently pursued the investigation, and failed to consider the
duration of the traffic stop.
{¶30} First, we begin with the premise that during a traffic
stop, an officer may order all occupants to step out of a vehicle
pending completion of the traffic stop. Maryland v. Wilson, 519
U.S. 408, 414 (1997); accord State v. Grubbs, 2017-Ohio-41, ¶ 29
(6th Dist.). See also Pennsylvania v. Mimms, 434 U.S. 106, 111, n.
6 (1977) (“once a motor vehicle has been lawfully detained for a ROSS, 24CA19
22 traffic violation, the police officers may order the driver to get
out of the vehicle without violating the Fourth Amendment's
proscription of unreasonable seizures.”); State v. Maddux, 2010-
Ohio-941, ¶ 6 (officer may order a motorist to step out of vehicle
which has been properly stopped for a traffic violation); State v.
Kilbarger, 2012-Ohio-1521, ¶ 16 (4th Dist.)(once an officer
lawfully stops a driver, the officer may order the driver to exit
the vehicle without additional justification); State v. Alexander-
Lindsey, 2016-Ohio-3033, ¶ 14 (4th Dist.)(“officers can order a
driver and a passenger to exit the vehicle, even absent any
additional suspicion of a criminal violation”). However, we again
recognize that “the officer must ‘carefully tailor’ the scope of
the stop ‘to its underlying justification,’ and the stop must ‘last
no longer than is necessary to effectuate the purpose of the stop.’
” State v. Marcinko, 2007-Ohio-1166, ¶ 26 (4th Dist.), quoting
Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491, 500 (1983); State v. Dunbar, 2024-
Ohio-1460, ¶ 28 (4th Dist.).
{¶31} In the case sub judice, appellee asserts that Mimms
should not apply because the initial traffic stop concluded when ROSS, 24CA19
23 Trooper Boetcher privately stated to Lieutenant Provenzano that he
planned to “get her out of here.” However, we point out that in
Mimms the officer testified regarding his practice to require a
defendant exit the car during every traffic stop. Mimms at 111.
In the case at bar, Trooper Boetcher also testified that he
generally removes drivers from their vehicles when he investigates
an impaired driver. Moreover, the United States Supreme Court
characterized the “additional intrusion” of exiting a vehicle as
“de minimis” — “a mere inconvenience [that] cannot prevail when
balanced against legitimate concerns for the officer's safety.”
Id. at 111. See also State v. Evans, 67 Ohio St.3d 405, 408 (1993)
(“[A] Mimms order does not have to be justified by any
constitutional quantum of suspicion.”). Additionally, regardless
of Boetcher’s private statement to his Lieutenant, Boetcher
testified that, as he reapproached the vehicle, other factors also
arose that caused him to suspect possible criminal activity.
Batchili at ¶ 15.
{¶32} Recently, in State v. Holler, 2023-Ohio-2528 (9th Dist.),
an officer stopped Holler’s vehicle for a traffic violation, ROSS, 24CA19
24 approached the vehicle, requested driver's license and
registration, and returned briefly to the cruiser to determine
whether outstanding warrants existed. The officer, who had not yet
processed a citation, again approached the vehicle and shined his
flashlight in the backseat and asked Holler whether he had any
contraband. Holler acknowledged that he “had consumed one beer and
that he was nervous about receiving a citation.” After the officer
asked Holler to exit the vehicle, the officer asked whether Holler
possessed anything illegal. Holler told the deputy that he had an
open beer in a cooler and the officer asked permission to search
the car. Holler also acknowledged that he had a firearm in the car
and he did not have a concealed-carry permit. At that point, the
officer informed Holler that he would be detained, discovered an
Adderall tablet during a pat-down, and found additional contraband
when he searched Holler's vehicle. Id. at ¶ 2-3.
{¶33} On appeal, Holler argued that Mimms did not apply and the
trial court incorrectly concluded that sufficient justification
existed to ask him to exit the vehicle. The Ninth District,
however, noted that after Mimms, the United States Supreme Court ROSS, 24CA19
25 further concluded that “[s]ubjective intentions play no role in
ordinary, probable-cause Fourth Amendment analysis.” Holler at ¶
11, citing Whren, 517 U.S. at 813. The court further observed that
this principle also applies when an officer orders a driver to exit
a vehicle once a traffic stop is in progress. Id., citing Ohio v.
Robinette, 519 U.S. 33, 38-39.
{¶34} Holler explained that the Ohio Supreme Court has observed
that under Whren and Mimms, “the officers’ subjective motivation
for continuing the detention is irrelevant.” Holler at ¶ 11,
citing State v. Robinette, 80 Ohio St.3d 234, 239 (1997)
(“Robinette II”). Thus, the court held:
In this case, as in Robinette, the deputy obtained Mr. Holler's driver's license and returned to his cruiser. When the deputy approached for a second time, without having prepared a citation in the meantime, he asked Mr. Holler to step from the vehicle for the purpose of determining why he appeared to be more nervous than a driver might usually be. The deputy's subjective rationale in asking Mr. Holler to step from the vehicle was “irrelevant” for purposes of the Fourth Amendment. Robinette II at 239. See also Whren at 813. Mr. Holler's contention that “Pennsylvania v. Mimms does not apply” is, therefore, incorrect, and the trial court did not err by denying his motion to suppress.
Holler at ¶ 12. We believe Holler is instructive in the case sub [Cite as State v. Lansing, 2025-Ohio-1241.]
judice. Here, Trooper Boetcher’s subjective rationale in ordering
appellee and Ballein to exit the vehicle should be deemed
irrelevant for Fourth Amendment purposes.
{¶35} Appellees contend that any investigation that occurred
after Trooper Boetcher privately told his colleague that he
intended to allow appellee and Ballein to leave had to be supported
by a reasonable, articulable suspicion that either appellee or
Ballein possessed illicit drugs and, therefore, Boetcher’s inquiry
regarding the K-9 impermissibly extended the stop. Appellant,
however, points out that the trial court did not make any finding
regarding the duration of the stop, other than to conclude that
Trooper Boetcher extended the stop “for an impermissible time.”
However, in Arizona v. Johnson, 129 S. Ct. 781 (2009), the United
States Supreme Court reaffirmed its holding that an expanded
inquiry of a lawfully stopped motorist about other crimes does not
violate the Fourth Amendment: “An officer's inquiries into matters
unrelated to the justification for the traffic stop, this Court has
made plain, do not convert the encounter into something other than
a lawful seizure, so long as those inquiries do not measurably
extend the duration of the stop.” Id. at 788.
{¶36} Here, appellant asserts that the officer “had an aha
moment” as he returned to appellee’s vehicle “in which the
circumstances of the entire stop came together in his head, less [Cite as State v. Lansing, 2025-Ohio-1241.]
than three minutes from pulling the driver over.” Appellant quotes
Trooper Boetcher’s testimony: “When I was reapproaching the vehicle
I kind of took a step back and - realized what I was seeing and
then just asked the question, is there anything in the vehicle a K-
9 is going to indicate to.” In particular, appellant points to (1)
the odd indirect route Lansing had been driving (especially given
that Lansing indicated her attempt to hurry), (2) the evasiveness
and peculiarity of Lansing’s reasons for speeding, (3) the
“slouching passenger’s failure to make eye contact or even move
when an officer stood outside her door, which a trained nine-year
veteran found to be peculiar,” and (4) the trooper’s knowledge that
another motorist had called regarding suspicion of impaired
driving.
{¶37} Appellant points out that this court has previously
examined the duration of a traffic stop in the light of what
constitutes a reasonable time for the purpose of the original
traffic stop to elapse. However, appellees argue that this court’s
recent decision in State v. Netter, 2024-Ohio-1068 (4th Dist.),
held that Rodriguez “prohibits seizures that result from inquires
unrelated to the purpose of a traffic stop that ‘measurably extend
the duration of the stop.’” Id. at ¶ 22.
{¶38} In Netter, during a traffic stop an officer continued to
request and enter information from the driver at minute 8:30 of the [Cite as State v. Lansing, 2025-Ohio-1241.]
dash camera video, while another officer approached the vehicle at
10:00 to explain the canine walk-around protocol. At 11:10, the
canine approached the vehicle and, by 11:27, the canine alerted to
the presence of drugs in the vehicle. Id. at ¶ 26. We emphasized
that while officers awaited the canine, the trooper “diligently
checked the driver’s license, registration, and criminal history,”
and concluded that the canine sniff did not unconstitutionally
prolong the stop. Id. at ¶ 27. Importantly, we also examined
specific stop durations concerning the constitutionality of
extending a legitimate traffic stop for a canine sniff. We wrote:
[O]ther Ohio courts have concluded that a very brief stop, similar to the duration of the stop in the present case, does not violate the Fourth Amendment. See State v. Johnson, 2d Dist. Montgomery No. 20624, 2005-Ohio-1367, 2005 WL 678922 (no violation when officer testified typical stop requires 15-20 minutes to complete and sniff occurred 7 minutes into stop), State v. Blatchford, 2016-Ohio-8456, 79 N.E.3d 97 (12th Dist.)(no violation when officer testified normal traffic stop between 15-20 minutes, dog arrived within ten minutes and alerted within 12 ½ minutes), State v. Cook, 65 Ohio St.3d 516, 521-522, 605 N.E.2d 70 (1992) (15 minute detention reasonable). See also United States v. Sharpe, 470 U.S. 675, 105 S.Ct. 1568, 84 L.Ed.2d 605 (1985) (20 minute detention reasonable); Illinois v. Caballes, 543 U.S. 405, 410, 125 S.Ct. 834, 160 L.Ed.2d 842 (2005) (no constitutional violation when canine sniff less than 10 minutes after initiation of stop, defendant placed in cruiser and officer not yet issued a citation); Batchili, 113 Ohio St.3d 403, 2007-Ohio-2204, 865 N.E.2d 1282, at ¶ 14 (no evidence to suggest detention for traffic violation of sufficient length to make it constitutionally dubious when dog alerted 8 minutes and 56 seconds into the stop and neither background check nor traffic citation had been completed); State v. Brown, 183 Ohio App.3d 337, 2009-Ohio-3804, 916 N.E.2d 1138, ¶ 23 (6th [Cite as State v. Lansing, 2025-Ohio-1241.]
Dist.)(no violation when canine sniff within 15 minutes of stop, a reasonable time to process a traffic citation).
Id. at ¶ 25.
{¶39} Unlike Netter, the case sub judice did not involve a
canine sniff. Here, Trooper Boetcher stated to Lieutenant
Provenzano, “carried on a good conversation with me . . . I mean .
. . don’t have anything in her eyes . . . normal reactions . . .
I’ll get her out of here, be right back.” Like Netter, Trooper
Boetcher diligently pursued the stop’s purpose and, in light of
Boetcher’s typical stop duration, this three-minute traffic stop
did not extend beyond a reasonable time for a traffic stop.
Boetcher testified that the time expended for an average traffic
stop is 7-15 minutes; a typical traffic stop takes 5 to 7 minutes
for a written warning, 7-10 minutes for a citation, and “an hour or
two” to investigate an impaired driver. In the case sub judice,
Boetcher testified that “from the time of the traffic stop until
the time that I pulled the defendant out of the vehicle was less
than three minutes.” Thus, although Boetcher did not issue a
citation or warning, we see nothing to suggest that appellee’s and
Ballein’s three-minute detention for the traffic violation extended
beyond the permissible time to make the stop constitutionally
dubious. Batchili at ¶ 14. [Cite as State v. Lansing, 2025-Ohio-1241.]
{¶40} In addition, appellant cites State v. Landers, 2007-Ohio-
7146 (10th Dist.) in support. In Landers, the officer stopped the
driver suspected of impaired driving, obtained identification, and
returned to his cruiser to speak with his sergeant. During the
next ten minutes, the officer performed background checks on the
driver and passenger and discussed how to proceed, given his
concern that the driver acted “nervous and figety.” Id. at ¶ 2.
The background check revealed that the vehicle’s plates had
expired. After writing a warning, the officer wished to further
investigate the driver’s possible impairment, so he asked the
driver to exit the vehicle. As the driver complied, a plastic tube
fell from the driver’s lap onto the road. The officer placed the
warning on top of the driver’s vehicle and, when the officer
recognized the item as drug paraphernalia, he immediately arrested
the driver. Id. at ¶ 3.
{¶41} Landers noted that during a valid traffic stop an officer
may order the driver to exit the car pending completion of the
stop, even without suspicion of criminal activity. Pennsylvania v.
Mimms, 434 U.S. 106 (1977); State v. Evans, 67 Ohio St.3d 405, 408
(1993). However, the court underscored that an officer has no
right to detain a driver, or to order a driver to exit a vehicle
after the purpose of the stop had been accomplished and no
articulable facts exist to justify the continued detention. [Cite as State v. Lansing, 2025-Ohio-1241.]
Landers at ¶ 11, citing State v. Robinette, 80 Ohio St.3d 234
(1997). The Tenth District concluded that the officer “had not
completed the purpose of the stop when he ordered [Landers] out of
the car. Therefore, the case at bar is distinguishable from
Robinette. Because [the officer] had not completed the purpose of
the stop, he had the right to order appellee out of the car.” Id.
at ¶ 13.
{¶42} Relevant to the case sub judice, appellee argues that the
trial court properly granted the motion to suppress because the
officer admitted that he requested the driver to exit the vehicle
“to further investigate whether appellee was under the influence of
some substance.” Id. at ¶ 14. The Tenth District, however, noted
that an officer’s purported purpose in asking a driver to exit a
vehicle is irrelevant.
The United States Supreme Court has “‘flatly dismissed the idea that an ulterior motive might serve to strip the [police] of their legal justification.’” State v. White, Wayne App. No. 05CA0060, 2006-Ohio-2966, at ¶ 10, quoting Whren, at 812; see, also State v. Trembly (June 30, 2000), Washington App. No. 99CA 03 (noting that officer’s subjective intentions play no role in probable cause analysis or investigative stops). Pursuant to Mimms, Officer Cahill was justified in asking appellee out of the car, regardless of his motive for doing so. State v. Henderson, Lake App. No. 2006-L-110, 2007-Ohio-2315, at ¶ 28 (not considering officer’s motive in asking driver out of car); State v. Coleman, Cuyahoga App. No. 79816, 2002- Ohio-2387, at ¶ 20 (affirming officer’s request for driver to get out of car). [Cite as State v. Lansing, 2025-Ohio-1241.]
Landers at ¶ 14. Further, the Landers court found the length of
detention reasonable, and noted that it took approximately ten
minutes to check the driver’s and passenger’s licenses and to write
the warning, and the entire incident took less than 15 minutes.
Thus, the court held that the officer did not unreasonably prolong
the traffic stop. Id. at ¶ 16. In addition, the Landers court
cited this court’s decision in State v. Trembly, 2000 WL 875948
(4th Dist. June 30, 2000), that held that an officer’s subjective
intentions “play no role in probable cause analysis.” Id. at * 3,
citing Whren, 517 U.S. at 813. “This concept applies equally to
investigative stops.” Id., citing State v. Thompson, 1997 WL
120212 (4th Dist. March 12, 1997).
{¶43} Appellant highlights the similarities between Landers and
the case at bar, and asserts that in this case the trooper
consulted with his supervisor and, while still investigating driver
impairment, asked one additional question, received a dubious
response, then asked Lansing to exit the car. Appellant points out
that the trial court made no findings regarding the duration of
time between the stop, the question regarding whether a K-9 would
alert, and when Boetcher asked appellee to exit the vehicle. Thus,
appellant argues that, although the trial court characterized the
stop’s purpose as complete, it did not consider the totality of all
the evidence regarding whether all of the trooper’s suspicions [Cite as State v. Lansing, 2025-Ohio-1241.]
about the driver’s impairment had been dispelled. Consequently,
appellant requests this court to conclude that the trial court
erred when it found that Trooper Boetcher’s private statement made
to his supervisor is dispositive because (1) an officer’s
subjective intent is not determinative, and (2) the trial court
failed to consider all relevant factors or to apply a totality of
the circumstances analysis.
{¶44} In the case at bar, unlike Landers, Trooper Boetcher did
not decide to write a warning or issue a traffic citation.
However, like Landers Trooper Boetcher testified that it typically
takes him 5-7 minutes to write a warning, 7-10 minutes to write a
citation, and an average stop is 7-15 minutes, but if the driver is
impaired, “it’s an hour or two.” Here, Trooper Boetcher first
approached Lansing at 1:45 of the video and at 4:42 of the video
spotted drug paraphernalia and drugs, with the entire encounter
taking less than 3 minutes.
{¶45} In State v. Gurley, 2015-Ohio-5361 (4th Dist.), the
officer stopped the defendant for a traffic violation and
discovered that the defendant possessed a suspended license with
limited driving privileges. A canine alerted 5 minutes into the
stop while the stop lasted approximately 30 minutes. Id. at ¶ 25.
The officer testified it typically takes 10-12 minutes to issue a
citation during a routine traffic stop. Thus, we held that the [Cite as State v. Lansing, 2025-Ohio-1241.]
officer possessed reasonable suspicion to expand the traffic stop’s
scope and in view of these facts the 30-minute stop constituted a
reasonable duration. Id. at ¶ 28.
{¶46} Appellant further contends that, even if the purpose of
the original traffic stop had ended, Trooper Boetcher nevertheless
possessed a reasonable, articulable suspicion of illegal activity
to continue the detention. Once again, appellant argues that the
officer testified (1) regardless of his private statement to his
Lieutenant, he continued to investigate Lansing’s suspected
impairment, (2) State Route 104 is not a direct route from
Marysville to appellee’s stated destination, so the route appeared
to be suspicious, (3) when his Lieutenant approached the vehicle’s
passenger side, Ballein stared straight ahead, and the video shows
Ballein “slouched down a ways in her seat” and she did not speak to
either officer which is abnormal in Boetcher’s experience, (4)
appellee’s reasons for speeding seemed to be evasive, (5) when
Boetcher investigates an allegation of an impaired driver, he
routinely asks the driver to exit the vehicle (6) Boetcher knew the
call to dispatch involved appellee’s possible impairment, (7) the
stop occurred at night, (8) appellee “looked down and did not make
eye contact” when asked about contraband in the vehicle, and (9)
appellee answered suspiciously and hesitantly when prompted if a K-
9 would alert (“not that I know of”). [Cite as State v. Lansing, 2025-Ohio-1241.]
{¶47} Appellant also argues that a series of acts, each viewed
in isolation perhaps innocent, may nonetheless, when viewed
together, give a police officer justification to conduct further
investigation. State v. Shaibi, 2021-Ohio-1352, ¶ 42 (12th Dist.),
citing State v. Ramey, 129 Ohio App.3d 409, 414 (1st Dist.).
Appellant also cites State v. Steed, 2016-Ohio-80808 (6th Dist.)
when the court noted the officer observed Steed display “unusual
actions” and asserted that Steed “did not respond correctly to her
questions.” Id. at ¶ 3. The Sixth District observed that,
although the trial court did not specifically address the duration
of the traffic stop, Id. at ¶ 26, the trial court properly denied
the motion to suppress evidence and concluded that the officer
possessed a reasonable articulable suspicion to prolong the traffic
stop and to require Steed to exit the vehicle to continue her
impairment investigation. Id. at ¶ 33. In Steed, however, the
driver (1) stopped his car in the middle of the highway, (2) put
the car in reverse, actively looking in the rearview mirror, (3)
did not provide correct or complete answers, and (4) failed to
timely comply with the officer’s request for him to exit the
vehicle until the officer ordered him more than six times. Id. at
¶ 30-31. In the case sub judice, appellee did not maintain
consistent eye contact, appeared evasive when asked if a K-9 would
indicate to her vehicle, offered her travel route that appeared to [Cite as State v. Lansing, 2025-Ohio-1241.]
be inconsistent with her stated travel plans, her reasons for
speeding made no sense, the call to dispatch involved appellee’s
suspected impairment, and Boetcher believed it also suspicious when
during the entire encounter the passenger slouched in her seat and
stared straight ahead.
{¶48} Once again, in the case sub judice Trooper Boetcher
testified that appellee did not maintain eye contact during the
stop and the body camera video shows that, although initially
appellee looked at Boetcher to answer questions and then looked
back and forth at Boetcher while she searched her wallet for her
license until she handed it to him at 2:37 of the video, appellee
looked away four times during the discussion of her travel plans.
Moreover, after Boetcher returned to appellee’s vehicle and asked,
“Is there anything in the vehicle the K-9 is going to indicate
to?,” appellee looked away from Boetcher and hesitated before
saying, “No.” Then, when Boetcher asked, “No?” Appellee looked at
him and said, “No, not that I know of.” Boetcher testified that in
his years of nine years of experience, “not that I know of” “is not
a normal answer,” . . . and is indicative of there either has been
or is something in the vehicle that a K-9 is going to indicate to.
At that point, Boetcher ordered appellee to exit the vehicle and,
within seconds, observed the pipe and baggie in plain sight.
{¶49} Regarding the trial court’s observation that the [Cite as State v. Lansing, 2025-Ohio-1241.]
passenger stared straight ahead does not necessarily indicate
suspicious conduct, the Third District recently addressed this
issue in State v. Lawler, 2020-Ohio-849 (3d Dist.). The Third
District noted that some courts consider that a driver staring
straight ahead while passing an officer may be, under certain
circumstances, “appropriately considered as a potential indicator
of criminal activity.” Id. at ¶ 38, citing State v. Stephenson,
2015-Ohio-233, ¶ 23 (12th Dist.)(driver’s arms “locked out” and
driver and passenger “staring straight ahead” and had rigid
postures as factors supporting reasonable suspicion). However, the
Third District found it “dubious that [the driver and passenger’s]
failure to look at Trooper Prather constituted highly suspicious
behavior.” Id. The court characterized this behavior as “relevant
to the formation of reasonable suspicion,” although a “relatively
weak indicator of criminal activity generally and of drug-related
activity specifically.” Id. Here, Boetcher discovered contraband
in far less time than the average traffic stop (less than four
minutes into the stop). Consequently, we do not believe that in
the case sub judice the officer “measurably extend the duration of
the stop.” Rodriguez at 354.
{¶50} Moreover, as we noted above, Trooper Boetcher testified
that appellee’s travel plans did not make sense. Appellee stated
she “was enroute from Marysville to Pike County. . . knowing State [Cite as State v. Lansing, 2025-Ohio-1241.]
Route 104 is not a direct route from Marysville or any sub areas
around Marysville to the Latham area . . . the direct route does
not even bring you through the northern . . . portion of Ross
County.” Generally, questions about travel plans are ordinary
inquiries incident to a traffic stop. See United States v. Dion,
859 F.3d 114, 125 (1st Cir. 2017)(“[O]ur case law allows an officer
carrying out a routine traffic stop * * * to inquire into the
driver's itinerary.”); United States v. Bowman, 660 F.3d 338, 343
(8th Cir. 2011)(tasks related to a traffic violation include
“inquiring about the occupants’ destination, route, and purpose”);
United States v. Brigham, 382 F.3d 500 (5th Cir. 2004)(absence of
authorized driving, inconsistent explanation regarding reason for
trip and passenger's fake ID justified continued detention); State
v. Dunbar, 2024-Ohio-1460, ¶ 32 (dubious travel plans, rental
vehicle, travel along known drug corridor and defendant not knowing
front seat passenger’s name contributed to reasonable suspicion.);
State v. Butcher, 2020-Ohio-3524, ¶ 13 (9th Dist.)(although
defendant claimed to be heading home, officer noted that his
direction of travel did not make sense.); but see State v. Byrd,
2022-Ohio-4635 (8th Dist.)(officer's observation of driver's
nervousness and belief that the driver's account of her travels did
not “add up” did not constitute specific facts to support
reasonable suspicion to justify officer extending traffic stop). [Cite as State v. Lansing, 2025-Ohio-1241.]
{¶51} In conclusion, after our review of the evidence adduced
at the suppression hearing we believe that Trooper Boetcher
properly stopped appellee after a call regarding an impaired driver
that, in turn, led him to stop appellee for speeding. At the
three-minute mark of the traffic stop, Boetcher properly requested
appellee to exit her car before he completed the traffic stop.
When appellee exited her vehicle, Boetcher observed a drug pipe and
a baggie that contained methamphetamine. A subsequent vehicle
search uncovered a large quantity of methamphetamine. In light of
the foregoing, we cannot conclude that the very short duration of
this traffic stop was unreasonably long or that the trooper’s
question added measurably to the stop’s duration. Moreover, we
also recognize that the detention of a stopped driver may continue
beyond the normal time frame when the officer encounters additional
facts that give rise to a reasonable, articulable suspicion of
criminal activity beyond that which prompted the initial stop.
Here, the officer received responses that raised additional
concerns. Batchili, 2007-Ohio-2204, at ¶ 15, citing Myers, 63 Ohio
App.3d at 771.
{¶52} Consequently, in the case at bar we conclude that under
these facts, when viewed in total and taken together with rational
inferences from those facts, during this traffic stop Trooper
Boetcher properly asked driver, appellee, to exit the vehicle. [Cite as State v. Lansing, 2025-Ohio-1241.]
When appellee exited the vehicle, Boetcher then observed the
contraband. Moreover, the facts adduced at the suppression hearing
could also be viewed to have created a reasonable suspicion that
criminal activity could be afoot and could have warranted a brief
extension of the stop. Burnside at ¶ 8. Therefore, we believe the
trial court erred when it granted appellee’s motion to suppress
such evidence.
{¶53} Accordingly, for all the foregoing reasons, we sustain
appellant’s assignment of error and reverse the trial court’s
judgment.
JUDGMENT REVERSED AND CAUSE REMANDED FOR FURTHER PROCEEDINGS CONSISTENT WITH THIS OPINION. [Cite as State v. Lansing, 2025-Ohio-1241.]
JUDGMENT ENTRY
It is ordered that the judgment be reversed and the cause remanded for further proceedings. Appellant shall recover of appellee the costs herein taxed.
The Court finds there were reasonable grounds for this appeal.
It is ordered that a special mandate issue out of this Court directing the Ross County Common Pleas Court to carry this judgment into execution.
A certified copy of this entry shall constitute that mandate pursuant to Rule 27 of the Rules of Appellate Procedure.
Smith, P.J. & Hess, J.: Concur in Judgment & Opinion
For the Court
BY:_____________________________ Peter B. Abele, Judge
NOTICE TO COUNSEL
Pursuant to Local Rule No. 14, this document constitutes a final judgment entry and the time period for further appeal commences from the date of filing with the clerk.