State v. Ballein

2025 Ohio 1240

• Court: Ohio Court of Appeals
• Decided: April 3, 2025
• Docket: 24CA18
• Status: Published

Opinion

[Cite as State v. Ballein, 2025-Ohio-1240.]

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT ROSS COUNTY

STATE OF OHIO, :

Plaintiff-Appellant, : CASE NO. 24CA18

v. :

ARIEL BALLEIN, : DECISION AND JUDGMENT

Defendant-Appellee. : _________________________________________________________________

APPEARANCES:

Jeffrey C. Marks, Ross County Prosecuting Attorney, and Pamela C. Wells, Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, Chillicothe, Ohio, for appellant.

Craig M. Jaquith, Assistant State Public Defender, Columbus, Ohio, for appellee.1 ___________________________________________________________________ CRIMINAL APPEAL FROM COMMON PLEAS COURT DATE JOURNALIZED:4-3-25 ABELE, J.

{¶1} The State of Ohio, pursuant to R.C. 2945.67(A) and

Crim.R. 12(J), appeals a Ross County Common Pleas Court judgment

that suppressed evidence found during the search of a vehicle

driven by Misty Lansing, a co-defendant below, and occupied by

Ariel Ballein, defendant below and appellee herein. Appellant

assigns the following error for our review:

1 Different counsel represented appellee during the trial court proceedings. ROSS, 24CA18

2 ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR:

“THE TRIAL COURT ERRED BY GRANTING THE MOTION TO SUPPRESS.”

{¶2} During a March 2024 traffic stop, Ohio State Highway

Patrol Trooper Tyler Boetcher discovered methamphetamine in a

vehicle driven by co-defendant Misty Lansing and occupied by

passenger appellee Ariel Ballein. A Ross County Grand Jury later

returned an indictment that charged both Lansing and appellee with

(1) one count of aggravated possession of drugs in an amount equal

to or exceeding 100 times the bulk amount in violation of R.C.

2925.11, and (2) one count of aggravated trafficking in drugs in an

amount equal or exceeding 100 times the bulk amount in violation of

R.C. 2925.03, both first-degree felonies. Lansing and appellee

entered not guilty pleas.

{¶3} Subsequently, Lansing and appellee filed motions to

suppress the evidence discovered during the traffic stop. At the

suppression hearing, Trooper Boetcher testified that at

approximately 10:00 p.m. on February 23, 2024, he worked in the

drug interdiction unit when dispatch notified him of a call

regarding a “reckless, possibly impaired driver.” Boetcher ROSS, 24CA18

3 obtained the description of a gold Ford sedan and registration

number, drove to the area, and searched for the vehicle. After

Boetcher observed the Ford traveling in a group of three vehicles,

he “checked all three at a speed above the posted speed limit, but

not blazing speeds, and I performed a U-turn . . . and proceeded to

follow the three vehicles not knowing - at the time I did not know

that center vehicle was the vehicle I was dispatched to.” After

the rear car turned off the roadway, Boetcher identified the gold

Ford sedan and observed it pass the lead vehicle. Boetcher checked

the Ford’s speed at 68 miles per hour using radar. Boetcher

testified that 65 miles per hour “is ten miles an hour over the

posted speed limit.”

{¶4} Appellant played Trooper Boetcher’s body camera video at

the suppression hearing. At minute 1:30 of the video, Lansing’s

vehicle stops. At 1:47, Trooper Boetcher first speaks with Lansing

on the vehicle’s driver’s side. Lansing states, “I’m just trying

to find my wallet,” and asks Boetcher, “how are you this evening?”

Boetcher replies, “not too bad.”

{¶5} At 2:17, Trooper Boetcher states, “find it?” and Lansing ROSS, 24CA18

4 replies, “Yes.” Boetcher asks, “car belong to you, ma’am?”

Lansing replies, “Yes.” At 2:24, Boetcher asks, “where ya coming

from tonight?” Lansing replies, “from my sister’s up in

Marysville.” When asked where she is headed, Lansing said, “Pike

county ... my house.” When asked, “are you in a hurry tonight?”

Lansing responded that her daughter in Pike County had to go to

work in the morning and she needed to watch her granddaughter.

When asked, how long were you up in Marysville, Lansing hesitated

and replied, “like two hours.” When asked, “what were you up there

for,” Lansing hesitated and said, “what was I up there for?” When

Boetcher said, “yes,” Lansing said, “just visiting.” Boetcher

asked, “just visiting?” Lansing replied, “yeah.” The conversation

ends at 3:15.

{¶6} Trooper Boetcher and Lieutenant Melanie Provenzano

reenter the cruiser at 3:30 of the video. Provenzano asks, “wonder

how old she is,” and Boetcher says, “45.” At 4:00 of the video,

Boetcher says, “carried on a good conversation with me . . . I mean

. . . don’t have anything in her eyes . . . normal reactions.” At

4:08, Boetcher says, “I’ll get her out of here, be right back.” At ROSS, 24CA18

5 4:10, Boetcher exits his cruiser.

{¶7} At 4:21 of the video, Trooper Boetcher again approached

Lansing’s vehicle and said, “Alright, is there anything in the

vehicle the K-9 is going to indicate to?” Lansing hesitates,

shakes her head, looks away, and says, “No.” Boetcher said, “No?”

Lansing looks at Boetcher and says, “no, not that I know of.” At

4:30, Boetcher says, “go ahead and hop out for me for a minute.”

At 4:36, Lansing exits the vehicle and, at 4:40, Boetcher tells her

to “go back there at the front of my car.” As Lansing starts to

walk toward Boetcher’s cruiser, at 4:42, Boetcher says, “Hey ma’am,

ma’am come here. See that pipe and that twist baggie?” Lansing

returns, looks in the vehicle, and says, “oh.” Boetcher says,

“yeah,” and at 5:02, Boetcher advises Lansing of her Miranda

rights. After that, he questioned Lansing and she admitted that

the vehicle contained methamphetamine, and told him, “I just had

what’s in my pipe.”

{¶8} At 8:15 of the video, Trooper Boetcher removed passenger

appellee from the vehicle. At 9:14, Boetcher informed appellee

that the traffic stop had turned into a criminal investigation ROSS, 24CA18

6 “because there is drugs and paraphernalia in plain view in the

vehicle.” Boetcher handcuffed appellee and searched her. Boetcher

then searched the vehicle. Initially, appellee refused to reveal

her identity. However, after Boetcher told her she would go to

jail if she did not identify herself, appellee gave her name and

admitted she had outstanding warrants. Part of the video does not

contain audio, so it is unclear when or whether Trooper Boetcher or

Lieutenant Provenzano advised appellee of her Miranda rights.

After a full search of the vehicle, officers found a large amount

of methamphetamine.

{¶9} Trooper Boetcher testified that his primary reason for

the stop originated with the “reckless impaired driver” report, and

the secondary reason “speeding.” Boetcher testified that “from the

time of the traffic stop until the time that I pulled the defendant

out of the vehicle was less than three minutes. From the time of

my first contact, I think just over - less than four minutes from

the time. . . I turned my lights on.” When asked how long “it

usually takes for you to issue a traffic citation or warning,”

Boetcher replied, “written warning, possibly five to seven minutes. ROSS, 24CA18

7 Citation seven to ten?” Boetcher stated that the average traffic

stop is “seven to fifteen minutes.” However, if the driver is

impaired, “it’s an hour or two.” Boetcher testified that “every

one of my traffic stops is different. You can - one thing if

criminal activity is afoot, one thing we are trained to do is

separate the parties involved, but you can also question them

together. Each - each traffic stop is fluid and different.”

{¶10} When asked at what point he decided to have the driver

exit the vehicle, Trooper Boetcher replied, “I decided to pull the

driver from the vehicle was the - the moment I asked her to step

out of the vehicle.” When asked why, Boetcher explained,

I was dispatched there . . . to investigate a reckless possibly impaired driver, one. Two the - the defendant had stated that she was enroute from Marysville to Pike County and then she further states her home. Knowing the . . . State Route 104 is not a direct route from Marysville or any sub areas around Marysville to the Latham area. . . the direct route does not even bring you through the northern . . . portion of Ross County. . . so that’s another reason. Also, as I reapproached the vehicle I had realized, taking a step back and realized that the passenger of the vehicle had not spoken to my Lieutenant that was standing at her window during the traffic stop, nor - nor myself. She had stared straight ahead throughout the entirety of the traffic stop. Which is abnormal. And then the drivers questions - or when I would ask the driver a question on two separate occasions that I can recall she ROSS, 24CA18

8 either prolonged or re-asked the question. Which is not in [and] of itself abnormal but can be evasive on questioning.

{¶11} Trooper Boetcher testified that he generally removes

drivers from their vehicles when he investigates an impaired

driver. Boetcher explained that he and his Lieutenant “were

working a detail in the City of Chillicothe” that night, so they

“were in a rush” at the beginning of the stop. Boetcher also

stated that Lansing’s answer, “not that I can think of,” is “not an

normal answer.” “Through my experience, a ‘not that I can think

of’ is indicative of there either has been or is something in the

vehicle that a K-9 is going to indicate to.” Boetcher testified

that, although he said to his Lieutenant that he was going to “get

her out of here,” he did not say that to the driver, and only made

that statement because “I was in a hurry trying to get back to the

- the detail we were assigned to work.” Lieutenant Provenzano did

not testify.

{¶12} On cross-examination, Trooper Boetcher acknowledged that

he initiated the traffic stop at 10:32 p.m. Boetcher stated that,

although at the 4:08 minute mark of the bodycam video he said ROSS, 24CA18

9 “let’s get her out of here,” Boetcher asserted that between the

time he exited his patrol car and walked to Lansing’s vehicle, he

continued to investigate.

{¶13} On cross-examination by appellee’s attorney, counsel

asked, “and you never asked the passenger at any time, up to this

point when you pull Ms. Lansing out, you had not asked Ms. Ballein

any questions.” Trooper Boetcher responded, “I had not.” When

asked whether his Lieutenant asked any questions of appellee,

Boetcher responded, “I - she - she did not.” When asked if his

reason for “pulling Ms. Lansing out of the vehicle was that - one

of the reasons I should say was that Ms. Ballein had not spoken to

you or your lieutenant?,” Boetcher replied, “No Ma’am. She was -

she was staring straight ahead, which is not normal through my

experience when stopping vehicles. The passenger is not locked,

staring just straight ahead in a - in a motor vehicle.” Boetcher

conceded that because of the relatively brief stop, appellee only

stared straight ahead “a couple of minutes.”

{¶14} The trial court granted appellee’s suppression motion

after the parties submitted written closing arguments. Although ROSS, 24CA18

10 the court made no findings of fact or conclusions of law in its

entry, at the June 3, 2024 status conference hearing the court

stated that Trooper Boetcher made a valid traffic stop because

Lansing exceeded the posted speed limit. The court observed,

however, that after Lansing’s driver’s license and registration

check and Boetcher’s statement to his Lieutenant that he “was going

to get them out of here,” the traffic stop had ended and Boetcher

extended the stop for “an impermissible period of time.” The court

specifically noted that it found no significance in appellee’s

silence and stated that nothing suggested appellee’s impairment or

that she committed any infraction other than sitting quietly and

staring straight ahead.

{¶15} This appeal followed.

I.

{¶16} Appellant asserts in its assignment of error that the

trial court erred when it granted the motion to suppress evidence.

In particular, appellant contends that the trial court: (1) made

findings not based on all competent, credible evidence in the

record relevant to a reasonable suspicion/totality of the ROSS, 24CA18

11 circumstances analysis; (2) applied an incorrect analysis and

erroneously determined that Trooper Boetcher completed the initial

stop’s mission, failed to consider the totality of the

circumstances and the duration of the stop, (3) failed to assess

what a reasonably prudent officer would do, and (4) failed to

consider that an officer may briefly ask questions before releasing

a motorist, then request a driver to exit a vehicle when the

answers are dubious.

{¶17} In general, appellate review of a trial court's ruling on

a motion to suppress evidence involves a mixed question of law and

fact. State v. Gurley, 2015-Ohio-5361, ¶ 16 (4th Dist.), citing

State v. Roberts, 2006-Ohio-3665, ¶ 100; State v. Jones, 2022-Ohio-

561, ¶ 15 (4th Dist.). At a suppression hearing, a trial court

acts as the trier of fact and is best positioned to resolve factual

questions and evaluate witness credibility. Gurley; State v.

Burnside, 2003-Ohio-5372, ¶ 8. Therefore, appellate courts “ ‘must

accept the trial court's findings of fact if they are supported by

competent, credible evidence.’ ” State v. Leak, 2016-Ohio-154, ¶

12, quoting Burnside at ¶ 8. Accepting those facts as true, ROSS, 24CA18

12 reviewing courts “ ‘independently determine as a matter of law,

without deference to the conclusion of the trial court, whether the

facts satisfy the applicable legal standard.’ ” Id., quoting

Burnside at ¶ 8; State v. Dunbar, 2024-Ohio-1460, ¶ 21 (4th Dist.).

{¶18} The Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States

Constitution and Section 14, Article I of the Ohio Constitution

protect individuals against unreasonable governmental searches and

seizures. State v. Shrewsbury, 2014-Ohio-716, ¶ 14 (4th Dist.),

citing State v. Emerson, 2012-Ohio-5047, ¶ 15; Delaware v. Prouse,

440 U.S. 648 (1979). “This constitutional guarantee is protected

by the exclusionary rule, which mandates the exclusion of the

evidence obtained from the unreasonable search and seizure at

trial.” Shrewsbury, citing Emerson at ¶ 15; State v. Harper, 2022-

Ohio-4357, ¶ 23 (4th Dist.).

{¶19} A traffic stop initiated by a law enforcement officer

constitutes a seizure within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment.

Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 809–810 (1996). Thus, a

traffic stop must comply with the Fourth Amendment's general ROSS, 24CA18

13 reasonableness requirement. Id. An officer's decision to stop a

vehicle is reasonable when the officer has probable cause or

reasonable suspicion to believe that a traffic violation has

occurred. Id. at 810, 116 S.Ct. 1769 (citations omitted); accord

State v. Mays, 2008-Ohio-4539, ¶ 23; Dayton v. Erickson, 76 Ohio

St.3d 3, 11–12 (1996). Law enforcement officers also may stop a

vehicle if they have reasonable suspicion “that criminal activity “

‘may be afoot.’ ” ” United States v. Arvizu, 534 U.S. 266, 273

(2002), quoting United States v. Sokolow, 490 U.S. 1, 7 (1989),

quoting Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 30 (1968); accord State v.

Tidwell, 2021-Ohio-2072, ¶ 19 (officer may “make an investigatory

stop, including a traffic stop, of a person if the officer has

reasonable suspicion to believe that the person is or is about to

be engaged in criminal activity”).

{¶20} Relevant to the case at bar, a police officer who

observes a de minimis violation of traffic laws may stop a driver.

State v. Debrossard, 2015-Ohio-1054, ¶ 13 (4th Dist.), citing State

v. Guseman, 2009-Ohio-952, ¶ 20 (4th Dist.), citing State v. Bowie,

2002-Ohio-3553, ¶ 8, 12, and 16 (4th Dist.), citing Whren; see also ROSS, 24CA18

14 Harper at ¶ 24. Moreover, the Supreme Court of Ohio has held,

“Where a police officer stops a vehicle based on probable cause

that a traffic violation has occurred or was occurring, the stop is

not unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment to the United States

Constitution even if the officer had some ulterior motive for

making the stop[.]” Dayton at paragraph one of the syllabus.

{¶21} In general, a traffic stop may last no longer than

necessary to accomplish the initial goal of the stop:

[T]he tolerable duration of police inquiries in the traffic-stop context is determined by the seizure’s “mission” - to address the traffic violation that warranted the stop and attend to related safety concerns. Because addressing the infraction is the purpose of the stop, it may “last no longer than is necessary to effectuate tha[at] purpose.” Authority for the seizure thus ends when tasks tied to the traffic infraction are - or reasonably should have been - completed.

Rodriguez v. United States, 575 U.S. 348, 354 (2015). The United

States Supreme Court explained that tasks tied to traffic

infractions include: (1) determining whether to issue a traffic

ticket, (2) checking the driver’s license, (3) determining the

existence of outstanding warrants, (4) inspecting the vehicle’s

registration, and (5) examining proof of insurance. “These checks ROSS, 24CA18

15 serve the same objective as enforcement of the traffic code:

ensuring that vehicles on the road are operated safely and

responsibly.” Id. at 355.

{¶22} Similar to a Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968) stop, the

tolerable duration of police inquiries in a traffic-stop context is

determined by the seizure’s “mission” - to address the traffic

violation that warranted the stop, Illinois v. Caballes, 543 U.S.

405, 407 (2005), and attend to related safety concerns. State v.

Kincaid, 2024-Ohio-2668, ¶ 15 (4th Dist.); see also United States

v. Sharpe, 470 U.S. 675, 685 (1985); Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S.

491, 500 (1983)(plurality opinion)(“The scope of the detention must

be carefully tailored to its underlying justification.”). Because

addressing the infraction is the purpose of the stop, it may “last

no longer than is necessary to effectuate th[at] purpose.” Id.

See also Caballes, 543 U.S. at 407. Authority for the seizure thus

ends when tasks tied to the traffic infraction are - or reasonably

should have been - completed. See Sharpe, 470 U.S. at 686 (in

determining the reasonable duration of a stop, “it [is] appropriate ROSS, 24CA18

16 to examine whether the police diligently pursued [the]

investigation”). Rodriguez, 575 U.S. 348 at 354.

{¶23} Thus, after a reasonable time for the purpose of the

original traffic stop to elapse, an officer must then have “ ‘a

reasonable articulable suspicion of illegal activity to continue

the detention.’ ” State v. Jones, 2022-Ohio-561, ¶ 22 (4th Dist.),

quoting State v. Ramos, 2003-Ohio-6535, ¶ 13 (2d Dist.)

When a police officer’s objective justification to continue detention of a person stopped for a traffic violation for the purpose of searching the person’s vehicle is not related to the purpose of the original stop, and when that continued detention is not based on any articulable facts giving rise to a suspicion of some illegal activity justifying an extension of the detention, the continuing detention to conduct a search constitutes an illegal seizure.

State v. Robinette, 80 Ohio St.3d 234 (1997), paragraph one of the syllabus.

{¶24} Therefore, if, after talking with a driver, a reasonable

police officer would be satisfied that no unlawful activity had

occurred, the driver must be permitted to continue on his or her

way. State v. Venham, 96 Ohio App.3d 649, 656 (4th Dist. 1994). ROSS, 24CA18

17 However, if an officer “ascertained reasonably arcticulable facts

giving rise to the suspicion of criminal activity, the officer may

then further detain and implement a more in-depth investigation of

the individual.” Robinette at 241. The detention of the motorist

may last as long as the reasonable suspicion of criminal activity

continues. “However, the lawfulness of the initial stop will not

support a ‘fishing expedition’ for evidence of another crime.”

Venham, supra, at 655.

{¶25} Thus, “[t]he detention of a stopped driver may continue

beyond [the normal] time frame when additional facts are

encountered that give rise to a reasonable, articulable suspicion

of criminal activity beyond that which prompted the initial stop.”

State v. Bathchili, 2007-Ohio-2204, ¶ 15, citing State v. Myers, 63

Ohio App.3d 765, 771 (2d Dist. 1990); Venham, 96 Ohio App.3d 649,

655, State v. Howard, 2006-Ohio-5656, ¶ 16. The “reasonable and

articulable” standard applied to a prolonged traffic stop

encompasses the totality of the circumstances.” Id. at ¶ 17,

citing United States v. Arvizu, 534 U.S. 266, 274 (2002). However,

Rodriguez v. United States, supra, prohibits seizures that result ROSS, 24CA18

18 from inquiries unrelated to the purpose of a traffic stop that

“measurably extend[s] the duration of the stop.” See also State v.

Chatton, 11 Ohio St.3d 59, 63 (1984)(“Once the suspicion which gave

rise to the initial stop evaporated, any additional intrusion or

detention had to have been supported by specific and articulable

facts demonstrating the reasonableness of the continued

detention.”)

{¶26} The Supreme Court of Ohio has also instructed: “The

‘reasonable and articulable’ standard applied to a prolonged

traffic stop encompasses the totality of the circumstances, and a

court may not evaluate in isolation each articulated reason for the

stop.” Batchili, paragraph two of the syllabus. Again, “[i]n

determining whether a detention is reasonable, the court must look

at the totality of the circumstances.” State v. Matteucci, 2003-

Ohio-702, ¶ 30 (11th Dist.). The totality of the circumstances

approach “allows officers to draw on their own experience and

specialized training to make inferences from and deductions about

the cumulative information available to them that ‘might well elude

an untrained person.’ ” Arvizu, 534 U.S. at 273, quoting United ROSS, 24CA18

19 States v. Cortez, 449 U.S. 411, 418 (1981). Thus, the pertinent

question in the case sub judice is whether, at the three-minute

mark of the traffic stop, Trooper Boetcher’s decision to ask,

“Alright, is there anything in the vehicle the K-9 is going to

indicate to?,” impermissibly extended the stop.

{¶27} As a threshold matter, we note that in the instant case

the trial court made no findings of fact in its entry that granted

the motion to suppress evidence. Moreover, Crim.R. 12(F) provides:

Where factual issues are involved in determining a motion, the

court shall state its essential findings on the record, and a trial

court speaks through its journal entries. State v. Schulz, 2014–

Ohio–1037, ¶ 3 (9th Dist.). However, we have the suppression

hearing transcript, as well as the parties’ arguments and can

properly review the issues on appeal. State v. Steed, 2016-Ohio-

8088, ¶ 26 (6th Dist.).

{¶28} Turning to the merits of appellant’s appeal, to evaluate

the propriety of an investigative stop a reviewing court must

examine the totality of the circumstances that surround the stop as

“viewed through the eyes of the reasonable and prudent police ROSS, 24CA18

20 officer on the scene who must react to events as they unfold.”

State v. Andrews, 57 Ohio St.3d 86, 87–88 (1991). Here, neither

party disputes the justification for the initial traffic stop.

Thus, the relevant inquiry is whether Trooper Boetcher possessed

the authority to ask Lansing to exit her vehicle.

{¶29} The status conference hearing transcript reveals that, in

determining to grant the suppression motion, the trial court

appears to have attached great significance to Trooper Boetcher’s

statement, “I’ll get her out of here, be right back,” and noted,

“perhaps if he hadn’t made the statement to the Lieutenant sitting

next to him we wouldn’t of known what his intentions were, but he

made them very clear when he made the statement,” “so I find that

based upon that he extended the stop for an impermissible period of

time, and therefore everything after that stop should be

suppressed.” In addition, the court emphasized, “I’m at a loss of

how the passenger’s actions . . . that didn’t involve intoxication,

inebriation, clearly had nothing to do with the reckless driver . .

. how the passengers response to the traffic stop, of staring

straight ahead and remaining silent is . . . indicative of anything ROSS, 24CA18

21 to do with the traffic stop or illegal behavior.” The court went

on to note that it is “every American’s constitutional right when

faced with law enforcement, to stare straight ahead and be quite

[sic.] if that’s what they want to do, especially if they’re not

the driver of the vehicle, who is required to provide at least some

information.” Appellant, however, asserts that the trial court

erred when it did not utilize the required totality of the

circumstances analysis, isolated one factor (the silence and

staring of the passenger), failed to consider whether the officer

diligently pursued the investigation, and failed to consider the

duration of the traffic stop.

{¶30} First, we begin with the premise that during a traffic

stop, an officer may order all occupants to step out of a vehicle

pending completion of the traffic stop. Maryland v. Wilson, 519

U.S. 408, 414 (1997); accord State v. Grubbs, 2017-Ohio-41, ¶ 29

(6th Dist.). See also Pennsylvania v. Mimms, 434 U.S. 106, 111, n.

6 (1977) (“once a motor vehicle has been lawfully detained for a

traffic violation, the police officers may order the driver to get

out of the vehicle without violating the Fourth Amendment's ROSS, 24CA18

22 proscription of unreasonable seizures.”); State v. Maddux, 2010-

Ohio-941, ¶ 6 (officer may order a motorist to step out of vehicle

which has been properly stopped for a traffic violation); State v.

Kilbarger, 2012-Ohio-1521, ¶ 16 (4th Dist.)(once an officer

lawfully stops a driver, the officer may order the driver to exit

the vehicle without additional justification); State v. Alexander-

Lindsey, 2016-Ohio-3033, ¶ 14 (4th Dist.)(“officers can order a

driver and a passenger to exit the vehicle, even absent any

additional suspicion of a criminal violation”). However, we again

recognize that “the officer must ‘carefully tailor’ the scope of

the stop ‘to its underlying justification,’ and the stop must ‘last

no longer than is necessary to effectuate the purpose of the stop.’

” State v. Marcinko, 2007-Ohio-1166, ¶ 26 (4th Dist.), quoting

Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491, 500 (1983); State v. Dunbar, 2024-

Ohio-1460, ¶ 28 (4th Dist.).

{¶31} In the case sub judice, appellee asserts that Mimms

should not apply because, she argues, the initial traffic stop

concluded when Trooper Boetcher privately stated to Lieutenant

Provenzano that he planned to “get her out of here.” However, we ROSS, 24CA18

23 point out that in Mimms the officer testified regarding his

practice to require a defendant exit the car during every traffic

stop. Mimms at 111. In the case at bar, Trooper Boetcher also

testified that he generally removes drivers from their vehicles

when he investigates an impaired driver. Moreover, the United

States Supreme Court characterized the “additional intrusion” of

exiting a vehicle as “de minimis” — “a mere inconvenience [that]

cannot prevail when balanced against legitimate concerns for the

officer's safety.” Id. at 111. See also State v. Evans, 67 Ohio

St.3d 405, 408 (1993) (“[A] Mimms order does not have to be

justified by any constitutional quantum of suspicion.”).

Additionally, regardless of Boetcher’s private statement to his

Lieutenant, Boetcher testified that, as he reapproached the

vehicle, other factors also arose that caused him to suspect

possible criminal activity. Batchili at ¶ 15.

{¶32} Recently, in State v. Holler, 2023-Ohio-2528 (9th Dist.),

an officer stopped Holler’s vehicle for a traffic violation,

approached the vehicle, requested driver's license and

registration, and returned briefly to the cruiser to determine ROSS, 24CA18

24 whether outstanding warrants existed. The officer, who had not yet

processed a citation, again approached the vehicle and shined his

flashlight in the backseat and asked Holler whether he had any

contraband. Holler acknowledged that he “had consumed one beer and

that he was nervous about receiving a citation.” After the officer

asked Holler to exit the vehicle, the officer asked whether Holler

possessed anything illegal. Holler told the deputy that he had an

open beer in a cooler, the officer asked permission to search the

car. Holler also acknowledged that he had a firearm in the car and

he did not have a concealed-carry permit. At that point, the

officer informed Holler that he would be detained, discovered an

Adderall tablet during a pat-down, and found additional contraband

when he searched Holler's vehicle. Id. at ¶ 2-3.

{¶33} On appeal, Holler argued that Mimms did not apply and the

trial court incorrectly concluded that sufficient justification

existed to ask Holler to exit the vehicle. The Ninth District,

however, noted that after Mimms, the United States Supreme Court

further concluded that “[s]ubjective intentions play no role in

ordinary, probable-cause Fourth Amendment analysis.” Holler at ¶ [Cite as State v. Ballein, 2025-Ohio-1240.]

11, citing Whren, 517 U.S. at 813. The court further observed that

this principle also applies when an officer orders a driver to exit

a vehicle once a traffic stop is in progress. Id., citing Ohio v.

Robinette, 519 U.S. 33, 38-39.

{¶34} Holler explained that the Ohio Supreme Court has observed

that under Whren and Mimms, “the officers’ subjective motivation

for continuing the detention is irrelevant.” Holler at ¶ 11,

citing State v. Robinette, 80 Ohio St.3d 234, 239 (1997)

(“Robinette II”). Thus, the court held:

In this case, as in Robinette, the deputy obtained Mr. Holler's driver's license and returned to his cruiser. When the deputy approached for a second time, without having prepared a citation in the meantime, he asked Mr. Holler to step from the vehicle for the purpose of determining why he appeared to be more nervous than a driver might usually be. The deputy's subjective rationale in asking Mr. Holler to step from the vehicle was “irrelevant” for purposes of the Fourth Amendment. Robinette II at 239. See also Whren at 813. Mr. Holler's contention that “Pennsylvania v. Mimms does not apply” is, therefore, incorrect, and the trial court did not err by denying his motion to suppress.

Holler at ¶ 12. We believe Holler is instructive in the case sub

judice. Here, Trooper Boetcher’s subjective rationale in ordering

appellee and Lansing to exit the vehicle should be deemed

irrelevant for Fourth Amendment purposes.

{¶35} Appellees contend that any investigation that occurred

after Trooper Boetcher privately told his colleague that he [Cite as State v. Ballein, 2025-Ohio-1240.]

intended to allow Lansing and appellee to leave had to be supported

by a reasonable, articulable suspicion that either Lansing or

appellee possessed illicit drugs and, therefore, Boetcher’s inquiry

regarding the K-9 impermissibly extended the stop. Appellant,

however, points out that the trial court did not make any finding

regarding the duration of the stop, other than to conclude that

Trooper Boetcher extended the stop “for an impermissible time.” In

Arizona v. Johnson, 129 S. Ct. 781 (2009), the United States

Supreme Court reaffirmed its holding that an expanded inquiry of a

lawfully stopped motorist about other crimes does not violate the

Fourth Amendment: “An officer's inquiries into matters unrelated to

the justification for the traffic stop, this Court has made plain,

do not convert the encounter into something other than a lawful

seizure, so long as those inquiries do not measurably extend the

duration of the stop.” Id. at 788.

{¶36} Here, appellant asserts that the officer “had an aha

moment” as he returned to Lansing’s vehicle “in which the

circumstances of the entire stop came together in his head, less

than three minutes from pulling the driver over.” Appellant quotes

Trooper Boetcher’s testimony: “When I was reapproaching the vehicle

I kind of took a step back and - realized what I was seeing and

then just asked the question, is there anything in the vehicle a K-

9 is going to indicate to.” In particular, appellant points to (1) [Cite as State v. Ballein, 2025-Ohio-1240.]

the odd indirect route Lansing had been driving (especially given

that Lansing indicated her attempt to hurry), (2) the evasiveness

and peculiarity of Lansing’s reasons for speeding, (3) the

“slouching passenger’s failure to make eye contact or even move

when an officer stood outside her door, which a trained nine-year

veteran found to be peculiar,” and (4) the trooper’s knowledge that

another motorist had called regarding suspicion of impaired

driving.

{¶37} Appellant points out that this court has previously

examined the duration of a traffic stop in the light of what

constitutes a reasonable time for the purpose of the original

traffic stop to elapse. However, appellees argue that this court’s

recent decision in State v. Netter, 2024-Ohio-1068 (4th Dist.),

held that Rodriguez “prohibits seizures that result from inquires

unrelated to the purpose of a traffic stop that ‘measurably extend

the duration of the stop.’” Id. at ¶ 22.

{¶38} In Netter, during a traffic stop an officer continued to

request and enter information from the driver at minute 8:30 of the

dash camera video, while another officer approached the vehicle at

10:00 to explain the canine walk-around protocol. At 11:10, the

canine approached the vehicle and, by 11:27, the canine alerted to

the presence of drugs in the vehicle. Id. at ¶ 26. We emphasized

that while officers awaited the canine, the trooper “diligently [Cite as State v. Ballein, 2025-Ohio-1240.]

checked the driver’s license, registration, and criminal history,”

and concluded that the canine sniff did not unconstitutionally

prolong the stop. Id. at ¶ 27. Importantly, we also examined

specific stop durations concerning the constitutionality of

extending a legitimate traffic stop for a canine sniff. We wrote:

[O]ther Ohio courts have concluded that a very brief stop, similar to the duration of the stop in the present case, does not violate the Fourth Amendment. See State v. Johnson, 2d Dist. Montgomery No. 20624, 2005-Ohio-1367, 2005 WL 678922 (no violation when officer testified typical stop requires 15-20 minutes to complete and sniff occurred 7 minutes into stop), State v. Blatchford, 2016-Ohio-8456, 79 N.E.3d 97 (12th Dist.)(no violation when officer testified normal traffic stop between 15-20 minutes, dog arrived within ten minutes and alerted within 12 ½ minutes), State v. Cook, 65 Ohio St.3d 516, 521-522, 605 N.E.2d 70 (1992) (15 minute detention reasonable). See also United States v. Sharpe, 470 U.S. 675, 105 S.Ct. 1568, 84 L.Ed.2d 605 (1985) (20 minute detention reasonable); Illinois v. Caballes, 543 U.S. 405, 410, 125 S.Ct. 834, 160 L.Ed.2d 842 (2005) (no constitutional violation when canine sniff less than 10 minutes after initiation of stop, defendant placed in cruiser and officer not yet issued a citation); Batchili, 113 Ohio St.3d 403, 2007-Ohio-2204, 865 N.E.2d 1282, at ¶ 14 (no evidence to suggest detention for traffic violation of sufficient length to make it constitutionally dubious when dog alerted 8 minutes and 56 seconds into the stop and neither background check nor traffic citation had been completed); State v. Brown, 183 Ohio App.3d 337, 2009-Ohio-3804, 916 N.E. 2d 1138, ¶ 23 (6th Dist.)(no violation when canine sniff within 15 minutes of stop, a reasonable time to process a traffic citation).

Id. at ¶ 25.

{¶39} Unlike Netter, the case sub judice did not involve a

canine sniff. Here, Trooper Boetcher’s stated to Lieutenant [Cite as State v. Ballein, 2025-Ohio-1240.]

Provenzano, “carried on a good conversation with me . . . I mean .

. . don’t have anything in her eyes . . . normal reactions . . .

I’ll get her out of here, be right back.” Like Netter, Trooper

Boetcher diligently pursued the stop’s purpose and, in light of

Boetcher’s typical stop duration, this three-minute traffic stop

did not extend beyond a reasonable time for a traffic stop.

Boetcher testified that the time expended for an average traffic

stop is 7-15 minutes; a typical traffic stop takes 5 to 7 minutes

for a written warning, 7-10 minutes for a citation, and “an hour or

two” to investigate an impaired driver. In the case sub judice,

Boetcher testified that “from the time of the traffic stop until

the time that I pulled the defendant out of the vehicle was less

than three minutes.” Thus, although Boetcher did not issue a

citation or warning, we see nothing to suggest that Lansing and

appellee’s three-minute detention for the traffic violation

extended beyond the permissible time to make the stop

constitutionally dubious. Batchili at ¶ 14.

{¶40} In addition, appellant cites State v. Landers, 2007-Ohio-

7146 (10th Dist.) in support. In Landers, the officer stopped the

driver suspected of impaired driving, obtained identification, and

returned to his cruiser to speak with his sergeant. During the

next ten minutes, the officer performed background checks on the

driver and passenger and discussed how to proceed, given his [Cite as State v. Ballein, 2025-Ohio-1240.]

concern that the driver acted “nervous and figety.” Id. at ¶ 2.

The background check revealed that the vehicle’s plates had

expired. After writing a warning, the officer wished to further

investigate the driver’s possible impairment, so he asked the

driver to exit the vehicle. As the driver complied, a plastic tube

fell from the driver’s lap onto the road. The officer placed the

warning on top of the driver’s vehicle and, when the officer

recognized the item as drug paraphernalia, he immediately arrested

the driver. Id. at ¶ 3.

{¶41} Landers noted that during a valid traffic stop an officer

may order the driver to exit the car pending completion of the

stop, even without suspicion of criminal activity. Pennsylvania v.

Mimms, 434 U.S. 106 (1977); State v. Evans, 67 Ohio St.3d 405, 408

(1993). However, the court underscored that an officer has no

right to detain a driver, or to order a driver to exit a vehicle

after the purpose of the stop had been accomplished and no

articulable facts exist to justify the continued detention.

Landers at ¶ 11, citing State v. Robinette, 80 Ohio St.3d 234

(1997). The Tenth District concluded that the officer “had not

completed the purpose of the stop when he ordered [Landers] out of

the car. Therefore, the case at bar is distinguishable from

Robinette. Because [the officer] had not completed the purpose of

the stop, he had the right to order appellee out of the car.” Id. [Cite as State v. Ballein, 2025-Ohio-1240.]

at ¶ 13.

{¶42} Relevant to the case sub judice, appellee argues that the

trial court properly granted the motion to suppress because the

officer admitted that he requested the driver to exit the vehicle

“to further investigate whether appellee was under the influence of

some substance.” Id. at ¶ 14. The Tenth District, however, noted

that an officer’s purported purpose in asking a driver to exit a

vehicle is irrelevant.

The United States Supreme Court has “‘flatly dismissed the idea that an ulterior motive might serve to strip the [police] of their legal justification.’” State v. White, Wayne App. No. 05CA0060, 2006-Ohio-2966, at ¶ 10, quoting Whren, at 812; see, also State v. Trembly (June 30, 2000), Washington App. No. 99CA 03 (noting that officer’s subjective intentions play no role in probable cause analysis or investigative stops). Pursuant to Mimms, Officer Cahill was justified in asking appellee out of the car, regardless of his motive for doing so. State v. Henderson, Lake App. No. 2006-L-110, 2007-Ohio-2315, at ¶ 28 (not considering officer’s motive in asking driver out of car); State v. Coleman, Cuyahoga App.No. 79816, 2002- Ohio-2387, at ¶ 20 (affirming officer’s request for driver to get out of car).

Landers at ¶ 14. Further, the Landers court found the length of

detention reasonable, and noted that it took approximately ten

minutes to check the driver’s and passenger’s licenses and to write

the warning, and the entire incident took less than 15 minutes.

Thus, the court held that the officer did not unreasonably prolong

the traffic stop. Id. at ¶ 16. In addition, the Landers court [Cite as State v. Ballein, 2025-Ohio-1240.]

cited this court’s decision in State v. Trembly, 2000 WL 875948

(4th Dist. June 30, 2000), that held that an officer’s subjective

intentions “play no role in probable cause analysis.” Id. at * 3,

citing Whren, 517 U.S. at 813. “This concept applies equally to

investigative stops.” Id., citing State v. Thompson, 1997 WL

120212 (4th Dist. March 12, 1997).

{¶43} Appellant highlights the similarities between Landers and

the case at bar, and asserts that in this case the trooper

consulted with his supervisor and, while still investigating driver

impairment, asked one additional question, received a dubious

response, then asked Lansing to exit the car. Appellant points out

that the trial court made no findings regarding the duration of

time between the stop, the question regarding whether a K-9 would

alert, and when Boetcher asked Lansing to exit the vehicle. Thus,

appellant argues that, although the trial court characterized the

stop’s purpose as complete, it did not consider the totality of all

the evidence regarding whether all of the trooper’s suspicions

about the driver’s impairment had been dispelled. Consequently,

appellant requests this court to conclude that the trial court

erred when it found that Trooper Boetcher’s statement to his

supervisor is dispositive because (1) an officer’s subjective

intent is not determinative, and (2) the trial court failed to

consider all relevant factors or to apply a totality of the [Cite as State v. Ballein, 2025-Ohio-1240.]

circumstances analysis.

{¶44} In the case at bar, unlike Landers, Trooper Boetcher did

not decide to write a warning or issue a traffic citation.

However, like Landers Trooper Boetcher testified it typically takes

him 5-7 minutes to write a warning, 7-10 minutes to write a

citation, and an average stop is 7-15 minutes, but if the driver is

impaired, “it’s an hour or two.” Here, Trooper Boetcher approached

the vehicle at 1:45 of the video and at 4:42 of the video spotted

drug paraphernalia and drugs with the entire encounter taking less

than 3 minutes.

{¶45} In State v. Gurley, 2015-Ohio-5361 (4th Dist.), the

officer stopped the defendant for a traffic violation and

discovered that the defendant possessed a suspended license with

limited driving privileges. A canine alerted 5 minutes into the

stop. The stop lasted approximately 30 minutes. Id. at ¶ 25. The

officer testified it typically takes 10-12 minutes to issue a

citation during a routine traffic stop. Thus, we held that the

officer possessed reasonable suspicion to expand the traffic stop’s

scope and in view of those facts the 30-minute stop constituted a

reasonable duration. Id. at ¶ 28.

{¶46} Appellant further contends that, even if the original

traffic stop had ended, Trooper Boetcher nevertheless possessed a [Cite as State v. Ballein, 2025-Ohio-1240.]

reasonable, articulable suspicion of illegal activity to continue

the detention because the court failed to apply the totality of the

circumstances test. Once again, appellant argues that the officer

testified (1) regardless of his private statement to his

Lieutenant, Boetcher continued to investigate Lansing’s suspected

impairment, (2) that “State Route 104 is not a direct route from

Marysville or any sub areas around Marysville to the Latham area,”

so Boetcher found the route suspicious, (3) when his Lieutenant

approached the passenger side of the vehicle, appellee stared

straight ahead, and the video shows appellee “slouched down a ways

in her seat” and did not speak to either officer which is abnormal

in Boetcher’s experience, (4) Lansing’s reasons for speeding seemed

to be evasive, (5) when Boetcher investigates an allegation of an

impaired driver, he routinely asks the driver to exit the vehicle

(6) Boetcher knew the call to dispatch involved possible

impairment, (7) the stop occurred at night, (8) Lansing “looked

down and did not make eye contact when asked if anything was in the

vehicle, and (9) Lansing answered suspiciously and hesitantly when

prompted if a K-9 would alert (“not that I know of”).

{¶47} Appellant also argues that a series of acts, each viewed

in isolation perhaps innocent, may nonetheless, when viewed

together, give a police officer justification to conduct further

investigation. State v. Shaibi, 2021-Ohio-1352, ¶ 42 (12th Dist.), [Cite as State v. Ballein, 2025-Ohio-1240.]

citing State v. Ramey, 129 Ohio App.3d 409, 414 (1st Dist.).

Appellant also cites State v. Steed, 2016-Ohio-80808 (6th Dist.)

when the court noted the officer observed Steed display “unusual

actions” and asserted that Steed “did not respond correctly to her

questions.” Id. at ¶ 3. The Sixth District observed that,

although the trial court did not specifically address the duration

of the traffic stop, Id. at ¶ 26, the trial court properly denied

the motion to suppress evidence and concluded that the officer

possessed a reasonable articulable suspicion to prolong the traffic

stop and to require Steed to exit the vehicle to continue her

impairment investigation. Id. at ¶ 33. In Steed, however, the

driver (1) stopped his car in the middle of the highway, (2) put

the car in reverse, actively looking in the rearview mirror, (3)

did not provide correct or complete answers, and (4) failed to

timely comply with the officer’s request for him to exit the

vehicle until the officer ordered him more than six times. Id. at

¶ 30-31. In the case sub judice, Lansing did not maintain

consistent eye contact, appeared evasive when asked if a K-9 would

indicate to her vehicle, offered a travel route that appeared to be

inconsistent with her stated travel plans, her reasons for speeding

made no sense, the call to dispatch involved Lansing’s suspected

impairment, and Boetcher believed it also suspicious when during

the entire encounter appellee slouched in her seat and stared [Cite as State v. Ballein, 2025-Ohio-1240.]

straight ahead.

{¶48} Once again, in the case sub judice Trooper Boetcher

testified that Lansing did not maintain eye contact during the stop

and the body camera video shows that, although initially Lansing

looked at Boetcher to answer questions and then looked back and

forth at Boetcher while she searched her wallet for her license

until she handed it to him at 2:37 of the video, Lansing looked

away four times during the discussion of her travel plans.

Moreover, after Boetcher returned to Lansing’s vehicle and asked,

“Is there anything in the vehicle the K-9 is going to indicate

to?,” Lansing looked away from Boetcher and hesitated before

saying, “No.” Then, when Boetcher asked, “No?” Lansing looked at

him and said, “No, not that I know of.” Boetcher testified that in

his years of nine years of experience, “not that I know of” “is not

a normal answer,” . . . and is indicative of there either has been

or is something in the vehicle that a K-9 is going to indicate to.”

At that point, Boetcher ordered Lansing to exit the vehicle and

within seconds, observed the pipe and baggie in plain sight.

{¶49} Regarding the trial court’s observation that appellee

staring straight ahead does not necessarily indicate suspicious

conduct, the Third District recently addressed this issue in State

v. Lawler, 2020-Ohio-849 (3d Dist.). Although appellee is a

passenger, the Third District noted that some courts consider that [Cite as State v. Ballein, 2025-Ohio-1240.]

a driver staring straight ahead while passing an officer may be,

under certain circumstances, “appropriately considered as a

potential indicator of criminal activity.” Id. at ¶ 38, citing

State v. Stephenson, 2015-Ohio-233, ¶ 23 (12th Dist.)(driver’s arms

“locked out” and driver and passenger “staring straight ahead” and

had rigid postures as factors supporting reasonable suspicion).

However, the Third District found it “dubious that . . . failure to

look at Trooper Prather constituted highly suspicious behavior.”

Id. The court characterized this behavior as “relevant to the

formation of reasonable suspicion,” although a “relatively weak

indicator of criminal activity generally and of drug-related

activity specifically.” Id. Here, Boetcher discovered contraband

in far less time than the average traffic stop (less than four

minutes into the stop). Consequently, we do not believe that in

the case sub judice the officer “measurably extend the duration of

the stop.” Rodriguez at 354.

{¶50} Moreover, as we noted above, Trooper Boetcher testified

that Lansing’s travel plans did not make sense. Lansing stated

that she “was enroute from Marysville to Pike County. . . knowing

State Route 104 is not a direct route from Marysville or any sub

areas around Marysville to the Latham area . . . the direct route

does not even bring you through the northern . . . portion of Ross

County.” Generally, questions about travel plans are ordinary [Cite as State v. Ballein, 2025-Ohio-1240.]

inquiries incident to a traffic stop. See United States v. Dion,

859 F.3d 114, 125 (1st Cir. 2017)(“[O]ur case law allows an officer

carrying out a routine traffic stop * * * to inquire into the

driver's itinerary.”); United States v. Bowman, 660 F.3d 338, 343

(8th Cir. 2011)(tasks related to a traffic violation include

“inquiring about the occupants’ destination, route, and purpose”);

United States v. Brigham, 382 F.3d 500 (5th Cir. 2004)(absence of

authorized driving, inconsistent explanation regarding reason for

trip and passenger's fake ID justified continued detention); State

v. Dunbar, 2024-Ohio-1460, ¶ 32 (dubious travel plans, rental

vehicle, travel along known drug corridor and defendant not knowing

front seat passenger’s name contributed to reasonable suspicion.);

State v. Butcher, 2020-Ohio-3524, ¶ 13 (9th Dist.)(although

defendant claimed to be heading home, officer noted that his

direction of travel did not make sense.); but see State v. Byrd,

2022-Ohio-4635 (8th Dist.)(officer's observation of driver's

nervousness and belief that the driver's account of her travels did

not “add up” did not constitute specific facts to support

reasonable suspicion to justify officer extending traffic stop).

{¶51} In conclusion, after our review of the evidence adduced

at the suppression hearing we believe that Trooper Boetcher

properly stopped appellee after a call regarding an impaired driver

that, in turn, led him to a traffic stop for speeding. At the [Cite as State v. Ballein, 2025-Ohio-1240.]

three-minute mark of the traffic stop, Boetcher properly requested

Lansing to exit her car before he completed the traffic stop. When

Lansing exited her vehicle, Boetcher observed a drug pipe and a

baggie that contained methamphetamine. A subsequent vehicle search

uncovered a large quantity of methamphetamine. In light of the

foregoing, we cannot conclude that the very short duration of this

traffic stop was unreasonably long or that the trooper’s question

added measurably to the stop’s duration. Moreover, we recognize

that the detention of a stopped driver may continue beyond the

normal time frame when the officer encounters additional facts that

give rise to a reasonable, articulable suspicion of criminal

activity beyond that which prompted the initial stop. Here, the

officer received responses that raised additional concerns.

Batchili, 2007-Ohio-2204, at ¶ 15, citing Myers, 63 Ohio App.3d at

771.

{¶52} Consequently, in the case at bar we conclude that under

these facts, when viewed in total and taken together with rational

inferences from those facts, during this traffic stop Trooper

Boetcher properly asked a driver to exit the vehicle. When the

driver exited the vehicle, Boetcher observed the contraband.

Moreover, the facts adduced at the suppression hearing could also

be viewed to have created a reasonable suspicion that criminal

activity could be afoot and could have warranted a brief extension [Cite as State v. Ballein, 2025-Ohio-1240.]

of the stop. Burnside at ¶ 8. Therefore, we believe the trial

court erred when it granted appellee’s motion to suppress such

evidence.

{¶53} Accordingly, for all the foregoing reasons, we sustain

appellant’s assignment of error and reverse the trial court’s

judgment.

JUDGMENT REVERSED AND CAUSE REMANDED FOR FURTHER PROCEEDINGS CONSISTENT WITH THIS OPINION. [Cite as State v. Ballein, 2025-Ohio-1240.]

JUDGMENT ENTRY

It is ordered that the judgment be reversed and the cause remanded for further proceedings. Appellant shall recover of appellee the costs herein taxed.

The Court finds there were reasonable grounds for this appeal.

It is ordered that a special mandate issue out of this Court directing the Ross County Common Pleas Court to carry this judgment into execution.

A certified copy of this entry shall constitute that mandate pursuant to Rule 27 of the Rules of Appellate Procedure.

Smith, P.J. & Hess, J.: Concur in Judgment & Opinion

For the Court

BY:_____________________________ Peter B. Abele, Judge

NOTICE TO COUNSEL

Pursuant to Local Rule No. 14, this document constitutes a final judgment entry and the time period for further appeal commences from the date of filing with the clerk.