IN THE COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS OF TENNESSEE
AT NASHVILLE FILED MAY SESSION, 1998 September 17, 1999
Cecil Crowson, Jr.
STATE OF TENNESSEE, ) Appellate Court Clerk C.C.A. NO. 01C01-9612-CC-00524 )
Appellee/Cross-Appellant, )
)
) RUTHERFORD COU NTY
VS. )
) HON. J.S. DANIEL
FRANK KENNETH TALLEY, ) JUDGE )
Appellant/Cross-Appellee ) (Direct Appeal - Rape)
FOR THE APPELLANT: FOR THE APPELLEE:
SCOTT DANIEL JOHN KNOX WALKUP 401 W . Main St. Attorney General and Reporter Murfreesboro, TN 37133-0960 KAREN M. YACUZZO
Assistant Attorney General 425 Fifth Avenu e North
Nashville, TN 37243-0493
BILL WHITESELL
District Attorney General
PAU L A. HO LCO MBE , III Assistant District Attorney Rutherford County Judicial Bldg.
Murfreesboro, TN 37130
OPINION FILED ________________________ AFFIRMED JERRY L. SMITH, JUDGE
OPINION
The appellant, Frank Kenneth T alley, Jr., was convicted b y a Rutherford Coun ty jury of three (3) counts of rape, a Class B felony. Th e trial court sentenced Appella nt as a R ange II Multiple Offender to concurrent sentences of thirteen (13) years for each offense. On appeal, Appellant raises several issues for our review:
(1) whether the indictme nt failed to se t forth the es sential elem ents of the crime because it does not aver a culpable mental state;
(2) whether the eviden ce wa s sufficie nt to es tablish Appe llant’s guilt beyond a reaso nable d oubt;
(3) wheth er the tr ial cou rt prop erly denied the admission of evidence regardin g the victim ’s psycho logical trea tment;
(4) whether the trial court erred in allowing the prosecution to ask leadin g que stions and th ereby denie d App ellant a fair trial;
(5) whether the court erred in allowing the state to introduce the medical report of the victim’s emergency room visit and allowing such repo rt to be passed to the jury;
(6) wheth er the tr ial cou rt erred in admitting a photographic line-up;
(7) whether the trial court erred in ruling that the prose cution could cross-examine Appellant as to his prior conviction for the offense of assault with intent to rob , if Appellant chose to testify;
(8) whether the court erred in allowing the state to inform the jury that Appellant had provided a list of alibi witnesses;
(9) whether the court erred in overruling defense counsel’s objection and allow ing the pro secuto r to state to the jury th at wha t the victim told another person was hearsay; and
(10) whether the trial court denied Appellant a fair trial b y allege dly biased rulings during closing argument which unfairly favored the prosecution.
3
The state also appeals, claiming that the trial cour t erred in se ntencing Appella nt. After a thorough review of the record before this Court, we affirm the judgment of the trial cou rt.
FACTS
On April 23, 19 95, D.M.’s 1 car broke down in the parking lot of Kroger grocery store in Murfre esbo ro. A m an, late r identified as the appellan t, approached D.M. and offered his assistance. After examining the vehicle, Appellant told D.M. that he needed to take a friend ho me, bu t would re turn with tools to fix the c ar.
W h ile Appellant was gone, another man, Jerry Goodrich, stopped and offered his assistanc e with th e ma lfunctio ning ve hicle. A ppella nt even tually returned, and he an d Good rich were able to re pair D.M.’s car. Appellant offered to follow D.M. halfway home in case her vehicle stopped again. Instead, Appe llant followed D.M. all of th e way to h er apartm ent.
W hen they arrived at D.M.’s home, Appellant asked if he could use her restroom. D.M. agreed. Upon entering the apartm ent, D.M . offered A ppellant a beer in gratitude for his assistance in repairing her car. He took the beer, sipped it and went to the restroom. Appellant then walked into the kitchen, where D.M. was putting away groceries, and grabbed her around her neck from behind. As he dragged her into the bedroom, the victim asked what he was doing. Appellant replied, “[i]f you just be quiet and don’t fight me, I won’t hurt you.” Appellant took D.M. into the bedroom, put her on the bed, and wrapped the covers around her head. The victim begged Appellant to stop and, although she did not see Appellant with a weapon, believed that App ellant mig ht “blow [he r] brains ou t.”
1 It is the policy of this Court not to reveal the names of victims of sex crimes.
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Appellant again sta ted that he would n ot hurt her if she did not fight him. The victim begged Appellant to rem ove the covers from h er hea d, and he eve ntually comp lied.
Appellant pulled off D.M.’s clothing and, over a period las ting ap proxim ately forty-five (45) min utes, pen etrated her vaginally, forced her to perform oral sex on him, and the n performe d oral sex on he r. Howeve r, Appella nt did not e jaculate as a result of these acts. Appellant then apolo gized for his behavior and left the victim’s home. Before he drove away, however, D.M. observed and wrote down the licens e plate nu mber fro m the ve hicle App ellant was driving.
Subseq uently, D.M. called her son, Joshua, and informed him about the incident. Joshua called the law enforcement authorities, and when the police arrived at the victim’s home, she gave them a description of Appellant as well as his license plate number. The victim was then taken to the emergency room.2 The police ran a check on the license plate number provided by D.M., and the vehicle was registe red to L izzie McGowen, the aunt of Appellant’s wife. The officers went to Appellant’s home and confronted him with the charges against him. Appellant’s wife told the officers, “[Appellant] couldn ’t have done it. He was with me all day.” App ellant also d enied the allegation s mad e by the victim .
The next morning, the victim identified Appellant from a photographic line-
up. Appellant wa s arrested an d gave a statement to police officers wherein he admitted assisting D.M. with her car the previous day, but denied following her to her ho me.
Authorities later recovered Appellant’s fingerprints from a beer bottle found in the victim ’s hom e.
2 No semen or other physical evidence was found as a result of the victim’s physical examination at the hospital. However, the nurse who exam ined the victim observed red m arks on the victim’s forearm s and left low er leg.
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Appe llant’s wife, Belinda Talley, testified for the defense a t trial. She stated that Ap pellan t had b een in her presence the entire day, with the exception of appro ximate ly forty-five (45) m inutes to an h our wh en Ap pellan t left his fa mily to pick up food. T he defense also presente d the testimon y of other family members, who testified as to Appellant’s whereabouts during the day of April 23.
Appe llant did not tes tify at trial.
At the conclusion of the proof, the jury conv icted Appellant of three (3)
counts of rape. The trial court sentence d App ellant as a Ran ge II m ultiple offender to concurrent terms of thirteen (13) years for each offense. From his convictions and sentences, the Appellant and the State of Ten ness ee brin g this appe al.
SUFFICIENCY OF THE INDICTMENT
Appellant argues that his convictions are void because the indictment did not allege a culpable mental state. He claims that the indictment failed to set forth the esse ntial elements of the offense; as a result, the trial court was deprived of jurisdiction, and his convictions for rape are void ab initio .
The indictme nt alleged that “on the 23rd da y of April, 1995, . . . Frank Kenn eth Talley, Jr., us ing force o r coercion to acco mplis h this act, did unlaw fully sexua lly penetrate . . . [D.M.], in violation of T.C.A. 39-13-503. . .” The language in the indictment is similar to that in the case of State v. Hill, 954 S.W.2d 725 (Tenn. 1997). In Hill, the Supreme Court was faced with an identical issue and held that:
for offenses which neither expressly require nor plainly dispense with the requirement for a culpable mental state, an indictment
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which fails to allege such m ental state will be sufficient to sup port prosecution and conviction for that offense so long as
(1) the language of the indictment is sufficient to meet the constitutional requirem ents of notice to the accused of the charge against which the ac cuse d mu st defe nd, ad equa te bas is for entry of a proper judg ment, and protection from d ouble jeopa rdy;
(2) the form of the indictment meets the requirements of Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-13-202; and
(3) the m ental s tate ca n be lo gically inferred from the conduct alleged.
Id. at 726-727.
Under Tenn . Code Ann. § 3 9-13-50 3, the culpable mental state for the offense of rape is neither sp ecifically stated nor plainly dispensed with. Thus, proof of “intent,” “knowledge” or “recklessness” will suffice to establish the culpable m ental state. Ten n. Code A nn. § 39-11-3 01(c).
The indictment in this case provides adequate notice of the charged offenses as well as a bas is for entry of a proper judgment and protection against doub le jeopardy. Furthermore, the indictm ent com plies with requirements stated in Ten n. Co de An n. § 40 -13-2 02. Mo reove r, the m ental s tate ca n be lo gically inferred from the conduct alleged. “Obviously, the act for which the defen dant is indicted, ‘unlawfully se xual pen etrat[ing]’ a p erson . . . is committable only if the principal actor’s mens rea is intentional, knowing , or reckless.” State v. Hill, 954 S.W.2d at 729.
The indictment in the present case clearly meets the requirements set out in Hill and is, the refore, valid. T his issue is without m erit.
SUFFICIENCY OF THE EVIDENCE
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In his next issue, Appellant contends that the evidence is insufficient to support the jury’s finding of guilt on three (3) counts of rape. Specifically, he asserts that the victim’s testimony is incredible, and there is little evidence to corrobo rate her testimony. Furthermore, he claims that the state failed to present sufficient evidence of force or coercion.
A.
When an appellant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence, this Co urt is obliged to review th at challen ge acc ording to certain we ll-settled princ iples. A verdict of guilty by the jury, approved by the trial judge, accredits the testimony of the State’s witnesses and re solves all conf licts in the testim ony in favor of the State. State v. Cazes, 875 S.W.2d 253, 259 (Ten n. 1994). Although an accused is originally cloaked with a presumption of innoc ence , a jury ve rdict rem oves th is presumption and replaces it with one of guilt. State v. Tug gle, 639 S.W.2d 913, 914 (Tenn. 198 2). Hence, on appeal, the burden of proof rests with Appellant to demo nstrate the insufficienc y of the con victing evide nce. Id.
On appeal, the state is entitled to the strongest legitimate view of the evidence as we ll as all rea sona ble and legitimate inferences that may be drawn therefrom. State v. Cabbage, 571 S.W.2d 832, 835 (Tenn. 1978). Where the sufficiency of the evidence is contested on appeal, the relevant question for the reviewing court is whether any rational trier of fact could have found the accused guilty of every element of the offense beyond a reaso nable d oubt. State v. Harris, 839 S.W.2d 54, 75 (Tenn. 1992); Tenn. R. App. P. 13(e). In conducting our evaluation of the convicting evidence, this Court is precluded from reweighing or reconsidering the evide nce. State v. Morgan, 929 S.W.2d 380, 383 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1996). More over, th is Court may not substitute its own inferences “for those
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drawn by the trier of fact from circum stantial evidence.” State v. Matthews, 805 S.W .2d 776, 779 (Tenn. Crim . App. 1990 ).
B.
Rape is defin ed as the “unlawful sexual penetration of a victim by the defendant or of the de fendan t by a victim” a nd “[f]orce o r coercion is used to accomplish the act.” Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-13-503(a)(1) (1991). Unlawful sexual penetra tion “me ans se xual interco urse, cunnilingus, fellatio, anal intercourse, or any oth er intrusion , howeve r slight, of any part of a person’s body . . . into the genital or anal openings of the victim’s, the defendant’s, or any other person ’s body . . .” Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-13-501(7) (1991). “Force” means “compulsion by the use of physical power or violence,” and “coerc ion” is defined as the “threa t of kidnap ping, exto rtion, force, o r violence to be performed imm ediate ly or in the future.” Ten n. Code A nn. §§ 39-11 -106(a)(12), 39-13-501 (1) (1991).
The victim testified that Appellant grabbed her around her neck from behind and dra gged h er into the b edroom . When she asked what he was doing, Appellant replied, “[i]f you just be quiet and don’t fight me, I won’t hurt you.” The victim testified that she was frightened and begged Appellant to stop. Appellant pulled off the victim’s clothing and pene trated her vagina lly, forced her to perform oral sex on him , and then pe rformed ora l sex on her.
The crux of Appellant’s argument is that the victim’s testimony was uncorroborated and unbelievable. However, it is well-settled that a defendant can be convicted of rape based solely upon the uncorroborated testimony of the victim. State v. McKnight, 900 S.W .2d 36, 48 (T enn. Crim. A pp. 1994). Furthermore, questions of the weight and credibility of the witnesses’ testimony are matters entrusted exclusively to the jury as the trier of fact. State v. Goode,
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956 S.W.2d 521, 526 (Tenn. Crim. App. 19 97); State v. Brewer, 932 S.W.2d 1, 19 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1996). The jury obviously accredited the victim’s testimony, and this C ourt is not a t liberty to overtu rn the jury’s a ssessm ent.
After reviewing the testimony in the light most favorable to the state , we conclude there is sufficie nt evidence for a rational trier of fact to find that Appe llant, through force o r coerc ion, un lawfully s exually pene trated th e victim in three (3) separate instances. 3 This issu e has n o merit.
VICTIM’S MENTAL HEALTH RECORDS
Appellant challenges his convictions on the basis of several rulings by the trial court denying him access to information and testimony concerning the victim’s mental health records and history. Appellant allege s that the trial court erred in refus ing to a llow Ap pellan t to cros s-exa mine the victim concerning her mental condition , in refusing the allow in to eviden ce D.M .’s menta l health records, and in quashing a subpoena for Dr. Susan O’Connor, the psychiatrist who was counseling D.M. A ppella nt furthe r argue s that th e trial co urt erre d in ruling that Appellant could not elicit testimony that D.M. had been receiving counseling a t the Rutherford C ounty Guida nce Cen ter.
A. Background
Prior to trial, the defense learned that the victim had been receiving counseling at the Rutherford County G uidance C enter for approxim ately thirty (30) days prior to the incident on April 23. Appellant filed a motion for an independent psychological examination of the victim and req uested that the sta te
3 Although not raised by either party, we have examined the record and find that three (3)
separa te convic tions for ra pe are c onstitutiona lly permiss ible in this cas e. See State v. Barney, S.W.2d (Tenn. 1999).
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produce the victim’s psychiatric records from the Guidance Center. The trial court denied Appellant’s motion for an independent psychological examination of the victim. After conducting an in camera inspe ction o f the victim ’s psyc hiatric records, the trial court also denied Appellant’s motion for production of those records, finding such rec ords to be irrelevan t. Furthermore , the trial court precluded Appellant from cross-examining the witness as to her mental condition on relevancy grounds as well. However, the trial court added, “I mean, if you can tie it in and make it relevant, yes, but general fishing expeditions to embarrass . . . and intimidate” the witness would be prohibited.
B. Access to Victim’s Psychiatric Records Appellant claims that he should have been allowed to exam ine the victim’s psych iatric records for the purpose of impeaching her, and the trial court e rred in denying him access to such records. See State v. Barnes, 703 S.W.2d 611, 617 (Tenn.1985) (holding that it is permiss ible “to cross-examine a k ey accusato ry witness in a criminal case as to his mental state or condition . . . for the purpose of impeaching the witness.”). The trial court conducted an in camera inspection of D.M.’s mental health records to determine the probative value of such records. Howeve r, the trial court determined that the information contained in the records was irrelevant. We agree. The records indicate that D.M. sought counseling for anxiety and pa nic attacks. There is no evidence that D.M. was delusional or prone to fabrication. Nothing in the records pertained to D.M.’s credibility or the probative value of her testimony. Our review of the records shows no information which could reasonably have been helpful to the defense in challenging the victim’s veracity. The trial court prope rly den ied Ap pellan t acce ss to th e victim ’s confidential mental health rec ords. See State v. Middlebrooks, 840 S.W.2d 317, 332-33 (T enn. 1992 ).
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C. Cro ss-Ex amin ation o f Victim Appellant also claims that he was denied his right of confrontation when the court refus ed to allow defens e coun sel to cross-e xamin e the vic tim concerning her men tal con dition. H e furthe r argue s that th e trial co urt imp roper ly restricted his cro ss-exa mina tion of th e victim ’s preliminary hearing testimony and refused to allow him to cross-examine the victim regarding her alleged purchases of illegal drugs.
The confrontation clause of the Sixth Amendment provides two types of pro tection for c riminal de fendan ts: the right to physic ally face thos e who te stify agains t them, a nd the righ t to cross-examine witnesse s. Penn sylvan ia v. Ritc hie, 480 U.S. 39, 51, 107 S.Ct. 98 9, 998, 9 4 L.Ed.2d 40, 53 (19 87). Th e right to cross-examine witnesse s, howe ver, does not includ e the po wer to require the pre trial disclosure of any and all information that might be useful in co ntradicting unfavora ble testim ony. Id., 480 U.S. at 53, 107 S.Ct. at 999, 94 L.Ed.2d at 54. Therefore, the right to confront witnesses is satisfied if defense counsel receives wide latitude at trial to cross-examine, because the confrontation clause only guarantees “an opportunity for effective cross-examination, not cross-examination that is effective in whatever way, and to whatever extent, the defense might wish.” Id. (quoting Delaware v. Fensterer, 474 U.S. 1 5, 20, 106 S.C t. 292, 294, 88 L.E d.2d 15, 19 (1 985)).
State v. Middlebrooks, 840 S.W.2d at 332-33. The United States Sup reme C ourt has recognized that the right to “confront and to cross- e xamine is not abs olute and may, in appropriate cases, bow to accommodate oth er legitima te interests in the criminal trial process .” Chambers v. M ississippi, 410 U.S. 284, 295, 93 S.Ct. 1038, 1046, 35 L.Ed. 297 (1973). For instance, a trial judge has the discretion “to limit reasonably a criminal defendant’s right to cross-examine a witness ‘based on concerns about, among other things, harassment, prejudice, confusion of the issues, the witness’ safety, or interrogation that is repetitive or only marginally relevan t.’” Michigan v. Lucas, 500 U.S. 145, 149, 11 1 S.Ct. 1743, 1746, 114 L.Ed.2d 205 (1991) (quoting Delaware v . Van A rsdall, 475 U.S. 673, 679, 106 S .Ct. 1431, 143 5, 89 L.Ed.2d 674 (1986 )).
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The trial court ruled that Appellant could not cross-examine the victim as to her m ental c onditio n bec ause it was irrelevant. How ever, the trial court noted that Appe llant co uld cro ss-exa mine the victim on her mental state if it became relevant, but “general fishing exp editions” d esigne d to em barrass and intim idate the victim wou ld not be a llowed. This ruling was en tirely prope r. Michigan v. Lucas, 500 U .S. at 149 , 111 S.C t. at 1746; Chambers v. Mississippi, 410 U.S. at 295, 93 S.C t. at 1046. A lthough a crimina l defenda nt has the right to confront and cross-examine witnesses against him, that right is limited by Rule 402 of the Tennessee Rules of Evidence in that neither party “may cross-examine a witness on matters that are irrelevant.” State v. Williams, 929 S.W.2d 385, 389 (Tenn. Crim. App . 1996) (citation om itted).
Furthermore, the trial court did not und uly restrict the cross-examination regarding the victim’s preliminary hearing testimony. Defense counsel thoroughly cross-examined the victim a bout w hy she did no t imm ediate ly call for help during or after the rape, her abusive past relationships, and the inconsistencies between her testimony at trial and her testimony at the preliminary hearing.
Appellant likewise ar gues th at the trial court erred in excluding defense questions to the victim regarding alleged statements made by D.M. that she was buying coca ine for h er boy friend. W e find th is cont ention withou t merit. N ot only was such questioning irrelevant, but it was clearly designed to harass the victim. See Tenn. R. Evid. 402 and 403. “While great latitude in the area of impeachment should be granted, the propriety, scope, and manner of the cross examination still rest with the discretion of the trial court.” State v. Forbes, 918 S.W.2d 431, 450 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1995). This Court will not disturb discretionary limits on cross-exa mination ab sent a show ing of clear and p lain
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abuse. Id. The trial court did not abuse its discretion in excluding such questioning.
D. Motion to Quash
Appellant also claims that he was denied his right to co mpulsory process when the trial court quashed a subpoena for Dr. Susan O’Connor, the psychiatrist who was counseling the victim at the Rutherford County Guidance Center. The trial court, after finding that the victim ’s men tal health h istory was irrelevant, excused Dr. O’Connor from testifying for the defense.
Tenn . Code Ann. § 2 4-1-207 (a) provide s, in pertine nt part:
[c]ommunications between a patient and a licensed physician when practicing as a psych iatrist in the course of and in connection with a therapeutic counseling relationship . . . are priv ileged in proceedings before judicial and quasi-judicial tribunals. Neither the psychiatrist nor any member of the staff may testify or be compelled to testify as to such communications or otherwise reveal the m in such p roceed ings witho ut conse nt of the pa tient excep t:
(1) In proceedings in which the patient raises the issue of the patient's mental or emotional condition;
(2) In proceedings for which the psychiatrist was ordered by the tribunal to ex amine the patien t if the patient w as advise d that communications to the psychiatrist wou ld not be privileged, but testimony as to the communications is admissible only on issues involving the patient's mental or emotional condition; and
(3) In proceedings to involuntarily hospitalize the patient under § 33-6-103 o r § 33-6-104, if the psychiatrist decides that the patient is in need o f care an d treatm ent in a res idential facility. U nless otherwise ordered by the co urt, the exce ption is limite d to disclosures neces sary to es tablish that the patient poses a substantial likelihood of serious harm re quiring involuntary hospitalization under § 33-6-103 or § 33-6-104.
(Emph asis added ).
None of the listed exceptions ap ply in this case. Further, the victim clearly did not consent to Dr. O’Connor testif ying regarding her counseling sessions. Moreover, the trial court previously deemed the victim’s mental health to be
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irrelevant at trial. Therefore, the trial court properly quashed the subpoena for Dr. O’Conn or.
E. Conclusion
After a careful review of the victim’s mental health records submitted under seal to this Court, we agree with the trial court that the victim’s psychiatric histo ry had no bearing on her credibility. We, therefore, conclude that Appellant was not denied the opportu nity “to expo se to the ju ry the facts from w hich ju rors ... co uld appro priately draw inferences relating to the reliab ility of the witnes s.” Davis v. Alaska, 415 U.S. 308, 318, 94 S.Ct. 1105, 1111, 39 L.E d.2d 347, 35 5 (1974); see also State v. Middlebrooks, 840 S.W.2d at 333.
This issu e is withou t merit.
LEADING QUESTIONS
Appellant asserts that he was denied a fair trial when the state asked allege dly improper and highly prejudicial leading questions of a prosecution witness. Gwendolyn Willard, the emergency room nurse who examined D.M. the evening of the ra pe, tes tified tha t she o bserv ed red mark s on th e victim’s forearms and lower left leg. On cross-exam ination, W illard acknowledged that the victim did not attribute the red markings on her body to any force that occurred during the rape. On re-direct examination, the following exchange occurred:
Q. W ell, she never said that’s what happene d to her, but are they [the ma rkings]
not consistent with what
happen ed to her?
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MR. DANIEL: Your Honor, he is leading the witness now, and this is his witness.
THE COURT: Your response.
GEN. HOLCOMBE: I ’ l l rephras e it.
THE COURT: All right.
GEN. HOLCOMBE: You said that you had her
history. And
although she
did not lin k
these, my
question is,
would you tell
us whether o r
not they are
consistent with
that history.
MR. DANIEL: Objection, your Honor, you know, anything could be consistent with anything. I mean tha t doesn’t --
THE COURT: Overruled. You can answer.
A. They could be consistent with this history.
The state concedes that the first question was, in fact, a leading question.
The second question, however, was not leading. “A leading question has been defined as one which ‘suggests the specific answer desired.’” N. Cohen, D. Paine & Shepp eard, Tennessee Law of Evidence § 611.6 (3d ed.1995) (citation omitted). The state’s question, as ultimately posed, did not suggest the answer desired. In any event, Appellant has not shown how he was prejudiced by the alleged leading q uestions and, ther efore, is no t entitled to relie f. State v. Caughron, 855 S.W .2d 526, 538 (Tenn. 199 3).
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This issu e is withou t merit.
INTRODUCTION OF MEDICAL REPORT
In his next issue, Appe llant arg ues th at the tria l court e rred in admitting into evidence the victim’s emergency room report. He insists that the report was hearsay and not admissible under any of the hearsay exceptions. Furthermore, he contend s that the trial court erred in pa ssing such re port to the jury.
During Gwen dolyn W illard’s testim ony, she utilized the emergency room triage assessment report to refresh her memory. In the report, Willard noted that the victim was a patient at the Ruth erford County Guidance Center. During cross-examination, the defense sought to question Willard about the Guidance Center notation4 and requested that the report be submitted as a part of the defense offer of proof regarding the victim’s mental state. The state suggested that the report be admitted as an exhibit which would not be passed to the jury. Defense counsel replied, “[t]hat’s fine.” Subsequently during the trial, the sta te requested that a redacted versio n 5 of the record be passed to the jury, and Appellant objected. The trial court overruled Appe llant’s objection and allowed the redacted record to be passed.
Initially, we note that this issue is waived because Appellant failed to make a contemporaneous objection to the admission of the exhibit. State v. P hilpott, 882 S.W.2d 394, 405 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1994); Tenn. R. App. P. 36(a). Indeed, Appellant actually consented to the report’s admission into evidence.
4 The trial co urt de nied t he re que st ba sed upon prev ious ruling s co nce rning the vic tim’s psychological state.
5 The redacted version de leted the reference to the Rutherford Coun ty Guidance Center.
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Although Appellant claims that he objected to the adm ission of the report, he merely o bjected to the exhib it being pa ssed to the jury. This Court has previo usly stated the jury “is entitled to review those exhibits which have been admitted as evidence in the case.” State v. R ichard A llen Kidd, II, C.C.A. No. 03C01-9607-CC-00272, 1997 WL 789909 at *4, Ande rson C ounty (Tenn. Crim. App. filed Dec ember 2 3, 1997, at Kn oxville).
Furthermore, the hospital records of the victim are admissible under Tenn.
R. Evid. 803 (4), beca use the report (1) was made for the purpose of medical diagn osis and treatment; (2) describes the medical history of the declaran t, i.e., the victim; and (3) is “reaso nably pertinent to diag nosis and trea tment.” State v. Edwards, 868 S.W .2d 682, 699 (Tenn. Crim . App. 1993 ).
Nevertheless, Appellant has not demonstrated how he was prejudiced by the adm ission of this evidence. The information contained in the report was presen ted to the jury through the testimony of Willard, who essentially read the report into the rec ord. Th erefore, a ny error in th e adm ission of the report into evidenc e was a t most ha rmless . See State v. Edwards, 868 S.W.2d at 699.
This issu e has n o merit.
PHOTOGRAPHIC LINE-UP
Appellant claims that the trial court erred in allowing the state to admit the photo graph ic line-up in which the victim identified Appellant as the perpetrator of the rape. He argues that the line-up was irrelevant at trial because he admitted that he assisted the victim with her vehicle on April 23. Further, he asserts that the photographic line-up was unduly prejudicial in that the photograph depicted him as a “perso n accu sed of crim e.”
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W e must note that Appellant did not contemporaneously object to the admission of the pho tograph ic line-up. A s such, this issue is w aived. State v. Gilmore , 823 S.W .2d 566, 570 (Tenn. Crim . App. 1991 ); Tenn. R. A pp. P. 36(a). Although Appellant insists tha t he did object, such objection was untimely. Defense counsel objected to the admission of the line-up at the conclusion of the witness’ testimony. The line-up had already been admitted into evidence, and any objection was, at that point, too late.
Regardless, the photogra phic line-up was properly admitted. “[T]he decision to admit or exclude evidence is left to the sound discretion of the trial judge and the judge’s decision will not be dis turbed unles s it has b een a rbitrarily exercised.” State v. Davis , 872 S.W .2d 950, 955 (Tenn. Crim . App. 1993 ). Evidence that the victim identified Appellant as the perpe trator o f a crim e is high ly relevant. Tenn. R. Evid. 401. Furthe rmore, the pro bative value of such evidence outweighs any prejudicial impact. Certainly, the jury was aware that Appellant had been “accused of crime,” as he was standing trial for a criminal offense.
This issu e is withou t merit.
APPELLANT’S PRIOR CONVICTIONS
In his ne xt issue Appe llant ch alleng es the trial cou rt’s ruling on th e admis sibility of a prior conviction for impe achm ent pu rpose s. He a rgues that his prior conviction for assault with intent to rob is similar to ra pe in that b oth offenses involve “assaultive cond uct.” Further, he asserts tha t the probative value of the prior conviction on the issue of credibility is sligh t, and therefore, is outweighed by its prejud icial impac t.
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Under Rule 609 of the Tennessee Rules of Evidence, there are specific procedures to be followed before prior convictions of a criminal accused may be admitted into evidence for impeachment purposes. The state must provide the accused with written notice prior to trial of the propo sed impe aching con viction(s). Tenn. R. Evid. 609(a)(3 ). Prior to the testi mony of the accused, the trial court must determine that the convic tion’s probative value on credibility outw eighs its unfair prejudicial effect on the substan tive issues . Id.; see also State v. Farmer, 841 S.W.2d 837, 839 (Tenn. Crim. App.1992). In making such a determination, the trial court should “assess the similarity between the crime on trial and the crime underlying the impeaching conviction.” N. Cohen, D. Paine & Sheppeard, Tennessee Law of Evidence § 609.9 at p. 376 (3 d ed.19 95). Secondly, the trial court must “analyze the relevance the impeaching conviction has to the issue of credibility.” Id.
The state gave no tice of its intent to impeach Appellant, should he choose to testify, with a prior c onvictio n in Mic higan of ass ault with the intent to rob. Prior to the defen se proo f, the trial court conducted a jury-out hearing to determine the admissibility of Appellant’s prior co nviction for impea chmen t. The trial court found that the offenses were inherently different, in that the prior conviction involved a robbery whereas Appellant was standing trial for a sexual offense. Furthermore, the trial court found that the probative value on the issue of Appe llant’s credibility outweig hed an y prejudicia l effect. Therefore, the trial court ruled that the state c ould im peac h App ellant w ith the p rior offe nse, if he testified.
W e agree with the trial court that the impeaching conviction was dissimilar to the present offense of rape. Despite the violence inherent in each offense, one offense is sexual in nature while the other involves a robbery. Nevertheless, the fact that the prior offe nse is s imilar to the crime for which a defendant is being
20
tried does not necessarily requ ire that it be ex cluded . State v. Blevins, 968 S.W .2d 888, 893 (Tenn. Crim . App. 1997 ).
Appellant’s prior conviction was highly probative of credibility in that it involved robbery which implicates the critica l elemen t of dishon esty. State v. Carruthers , 676 S.W .2d 935 , 941 (T enn. 19 84); State v. Blevins, 968 S.W.2d at 893. Courts of this state h ave held that the o ffenses of burg lary and theft are “highly probative of credibility,” because these crimes involve dish onesty. State v. Baker, 956 S.W.2d 8, 15 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1997) (citing State v. Crank, 721 S.W.2d 264, 266-67 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1986); State v. Tune, 872 S.W.2d 922, 927 (Tenn . Crim. A pp. 199 3); State v. Miller, 737 S.W.2d 556, 560 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1987 )).
Under this Court’s review, we do not re-evaluate w hether the pro bative value of the defendant’s prior conviction outweighs the poss ible prejudicial effect it might ha ve had. State v. Roberts, 943 S.W.2d 403, 408 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1996). W e may o nly reve rse the decisio n of the trial cou rt if we find that it abused its discretion in admitting the conv ictions. Id.; State v. Tune, 872 S.W.2d at 927. As Appe llant’s prior conviction of assault with intent to rob is probative of credibility, the trial c ourt did not abus e its disc retion in ruling th at the s tate co uld impeach Appellant with this prior co nviction, if he chose to tes tify.
This issu e is withou t merit.
LIST OF WITNESSES
Appellant alleges that the trial court erred in allowing the state to inform the jury that App ellant had provided a list of “alibi witne sses.” He argues that the prose cutor’s statem ent is ana logous to that in State v. Meeks, 876 S.W.2d 121,
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129 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1993), where this Court overtu rned th e defe ndan t’s convictions after finding tha t the state had erroneously referred to the defense of alibi contrary to Ten n. R. Crim. P. 1 2.1(f).
In Meeks, the defense had filed a notice of a pote ntial alib i witnes s, Ron nie Anderson, but withdrew its intent to present an alibi defense during a bench conference at trial. Id. at 128-29. During cross-examination, the prosecutor questioned Anderson as to whether he knew that he had been listed as an alibi witness for the defense. Id. at 129 . The tr ial cou rt susta ined th e defe ndan t’s objection to this question, but allowed further inquiry into the alibi defense by the prosecution. Id. This Court reversed the defendant’s conviction due to a violation of Tenn . R. Crim . P. 12.1(f), w hich proh ibits the ad mission into evidence the defendant’s intent to rely on the alibi defense once that intention has been withdrawn. Id. at 128-29. Th is Court observed that the error was “compounded when the State was allowed in closing argument to make adversarial use of the defendan t’s withdrawal of the alibi defe nse.” Id. at 129.
In the case sub judice, Appellant points to a n excha nge be tween th e state and Belinda Talley where the prosecutor asked if she knew Robert Verge. Mrs. Talley respon ded, “[t]hat’s my d ad. W hich one ? It’s [sic] two R obert Ve rges.” The prosecutor replied, “[t]his is just a list of witnesse s provide d by Mr. D aniel to us.”
W e find the present case to be disting uisha ble from this Cour t’s hold ing in Meeks. First, the holding in Meeks was based upon a violation of Tenn. R. Crim. P. 12.1(f) due to the fact that the defense had withdrawn its intention to use an alibi defense at trial. In this case, Appellant had not withdrawn his notice of alibi. Indeed, the defense presented testimon y as to Ap pellant’s w hereab outs during the time of the offenses, and defens e coun sel ma de an a libi argum ent durin g its
22
closing. Secondly, unlike in Meeks, the prosecution did not refer to the witnesses as “alibi witne sses” bu t merely re ferred to th e list as a “list of w itnesses .”
Furthermore, the question was an isolated incident in that the prose cutor’s comment was the only one which could vaguely be construed as commenting on the de fense ’s change in tactic. We conclude that Appellant was not prejudiced by the pro secution ’s referenc e to a “list of witn esses.”
This issu e is withou t merit.
VICTIM’S HEARSAY STATEMENT
In his next issue, Appellant complains that the state and trial court impro perly characterized certain statements made by the victim to defense witnesses as hearsay. He argues that any statement made by the victim is an admis sion and is admis sible as a n adm ission by a party opponent under Tenn. R. Evid. 803(1.2). We disagree. The parties to a criminal case are the State of Tennessee and the defendant. The victim is a witness, albeit an interested one, in the litigation. Ther efore, th e victim ’s state men ts do n ot fall under the purview of Rule 8 03(1.2). T his issue is without m erit.
CLOSING ARGUMENT
Appellant also argues that the trial c ourt de nied h im a fair trial by making improper and biased rulings during closing argument. Specifically Appellant alleges that the trial court erred in sustaining the state’s objections to defense coun sel’s use of the words “preposterous” and “I guarantee” during closing
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argum ent. Furthe rmor e, he c laims that the trial cou rt cut off d efens e cou nsel’s argument in mid-sentence and refused to allow counsel five seconds to conclude his final sentence, while giving the prosecution an additional thirty (30) seconds for argum ent. Add itionally, he asserts that in the state’s closing argument, the prosecutor erroneously referred to the defense’s failure to present evidence of motive after the defense had been precluded from introducing such evidence. Finally, he contends that the prosecutor improperly injected his personal opinion into his clos ing arg ume nt. W e will take ea ch of these assign men ts of erro r in turn.
A. Defense Closing Argument Appellant claims that the trial court erred in sustaining the state’s objections to defe nse c ouns el’s arg ume nt on th e bas is that defense counsel impro perly asserted his perso nal opinio n. Defense counsel began his argument by stating that the prosecutor “sa id to you [jury] someth ing that is absolutely, in my mind, preposterous.” The state objected, and the trial court sustained the objection. Subsequently, defense counsel stated on two separate occasions, “I guarantee” in conjunction with his a rgume nt. The p rosecu tion’s objec tions to such co mm ents we re sustain ed by the trial court.
An attorne y shou ld not in ject his p erson al opin ions in clo sing argu ment.
State v. Payne, 791 S.W.2d 10, 20 (T enn.19 90); see also State v. Hicks, 618 S.W.2d 510, 516, 517 (Tenn. Crim. App.1981 ); Sup. Ct. Rule 8 , DR 7-106 (C)(4). Each of these contested statements clearly expressed defense counsel’s opinion. The trial court properly sustained the state’s objections to these comments.
Appellant further contend s that the trial court show ed partiality in limiting the time defense counsel was allowed to argu e. W e do no t agree. P rior to argum ent, the trial court clearly stated that both sides would be allowed only thirty
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(30) minute s for argu ment. This was entirely within the court’s discretion. Tenn. R. Crim. Pro 29.1(c). Although Appellant complains that the trial court cu t off defense coun sel in mid-sentence withou t allotting any ad ditiona l time to finish h is sentence, the trial court similarly terminated the state’s argument when the prosecu tion’s time had ended. Furthermore, the additional thirty (30) seconds afforded the state fo r its argum ent was to compensate for the time used by defense coun sel’s repeated objections and subsequent arguments with the trial court’s rulings. “Trial judges are accorded wide discretion in control of the argum ent.” State v. Zirkle, 910 S.W .2d 874 , 888 (T enn. C rim. App . 1995). The trial court did not abuse its discretion.
This issu e has n o merit.
B. Prosecutorial Misconduct Appellant also argues that the state committed prosecutorial misconduct by referring to the lack of proof that the victim had a motive for fabricating the rape when the defense was precluded from going into possible moti ves of the victim. He also claims that the prosecutor improperly asserted his own personal opinion d uring clos ing argu ment.
1.
In its summation, the defense argued that the victim fabricated the rap e in order to gain sympathy from her estrang ed boyfrie nd. In rebuttal, the assistant district attorney stated:
Now, he wan ts you to believe that she is an emotional basket case, that she did this for some m otive. And I subm it to you there really isn’t a m otive, and I’m going to come back to this, but let me ask you this. Did you hear a single witness get up on this sta nd, in all the witnesses that you’ve heard, and say she is the type of person that does this? She’s done this before. She will make up a wild allegation to get some body ba ck. Did Je rry Hunte r say that?
Did Terry Alexander say that? Did anyone else [say] that? In all the supposed boyfriends that she’s had, this person who goes around
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doing this type of thing, did a single person get up here and say that’s the kind of thing s he’d s ay? N o, they d idn’t. No t a sing le person said that about her. Not a single perso n said she w ould make some thing like this up. Now , let’s talk abo ut that.
The prosecution’s argument continued:
Now, why didn’t she immediately call the police? Just like he wants you to be lieve that the re ough t to be a climax in eve ry single rape case, even though that’s not the law, he wan ts you to say every rape victim needs to call 911 immediate ly, or eve ry rape victim needs to run right over and rep ort this. She gave you a very honest answer why sh e didn ’t. She said because everybody knows what a rape victim goes through. And that’s exactly what she’s gone through; isn’t it? A long preliminary hearing, statements, stayed at the hospital for hours that night undergoing a rape examination, had to turn ove r her clothe s, had to tu rn over he r blanket.
....
. . . She sat on this stand for hours and had to be questioned about every single incident, h ad to bring up pas t boyfriend s, every type of slur that could be thrown against her as to why she was doing this.
She was righ t in not doin g that. Did she do it to be vindictive? She didn’t even want to call the police. . . .
(Emph asis added ).6 2.
Both the state and the d efense are afforde d wide latitude in argu ing the ir cases to the jury. State v. Bigbee, 885 S.W.2d 797, 809 (Tenn. 1994); State v. Zirkle, 910 S.W.2d at 888. However, when the prosecution’s argument goes beyond that wid e latitud e afford ed, the test to d eterm ine wh ether r evers al is required is “whether the im propriety ‘affected the verdict to the prejudice of the defen dant.’” State v. Bigbee, 885 S.W.2d at 809 (quoting Harring ton v. State , 215 Tenn. 33 8, 385 S.W .2d 758, 759 (1965)).
In reviewing a claim of prosecutorial misconduct during clo sing argu ment, we are guided by such factors as:
6 Emphasis added to point out specific portions of prosecution’s argument that Appellant finds objectionable.
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1. The conduct complained of viewed in conte xt and in light of the facts and circumstances of the case.
2. The curative m easure s unde rtaken b y the cou rt and the prosec ution.
3. The intent of the prosec ution in m aking the improp er statem ent.
4. The cumulative effect of the improper conduct and any oth er erro rs in the reco rd.
5. The relative strength or weakness of the case.
Judge v. State, 539 S.W .2d 340, 344 (Tenn. Crim . App. 1976 ).
3.
Appellant contends that the prosecution’s reference to Appellant’s lack of evidence of motive was improper because he was precluded from introducing such evidence by the trial court. Ho wever, co ntrary to Appellant’s assertion, the trial court did not restrict the defense’s ability to explore the theory of motive or fabrication through witness testimony or argument. The trial court informed Appellant that he would be able to cross-examine the victim concerning her mental condition, if that condition was relevant to the issues at trial. The trial court mere ly preve nted A ppella nt from delving into the victim’s psych iatric history as a means of embarrassing or harassing the victim.
In any event, the state’s argument was not directed at the victim’s psychological state, but was in response to defense counsel’s argument that the victim fabricated the incident. The state argued that none of the witnesses supported the defense theory. “The bounds of proper argum ent larg ely depend upon the facts in evidence, the character of the trial, and the conduct of opposing counsel.” State v. Coker, 911 S.W .2d 357 , 368 (T enn. C rim. App . 1995). The prosecution’s a rgumen t was not imp roper.
4.
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Appellant also claims that the prosecution improperly asserted a personal opinion during its closing argument. A lawyer must not assert his personal opinion as to the credibility of a witness, or as to the guilt or innocence of the defend ant. State v. Henley, 774 S.W.2d 908, 911 (Tenn. 1989). Furthermore, it is “unprofessional conduct for a prosecu tor in his arg umen t to the jury to express his or h er pers onal b elief or o pinion as to the truth or falsity of any testimony or evide nce, or the guilt of the de fendant.” Id. at 911.
The prosecutor improperly commented upon the victim’s testimony when he stated that she gave “a very honest answer” as he was expressing his personal belief as to the truth of her testimony. However, this was an isolated incident, and taken in context of the argument as a whole, the comment does not appear to have p rejudiced the App ellant. See State v. Henley, 774 S.W.2d at 911. Moreover, the remaining comments cited by Appellant are not personal opinion. The pr osecu tion’s statem ents that the victim had to endure slurs to her character and that she did not want to call the police were proper c omm ents based upon fa cts in the re cord. See Coke r v. State, 911 S.W.2d at 368.
5.
None of the alleged pro secutorial errors during closing argument appear to have affected the verdict to Appellant’s prejudice and do not warrant a reversal of his convic tions. See State v. Bates, 804 S .W .2d 86 8, 881 (Ten n. 199 1). Th is issue ha s no m erit.
SENTENCING
In its cross-appeal, the state argues that the trial court erred in sentencing Appellant to thirteen (13) years, one year above the minimum sentence for a
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Range II offender of a Class B felony. Specifically, the state contends that the trial court erred in failing to apply certain enhancement factors. Therefore, the state claims that the se ntence wa s too lenient, and A ppellant shou ld have received a sentence in the middle of the range.
A.
When a party complains of the sentence imposed at trial, we must conduct a de novo review with a presumption of correctness. Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-35- 401(d). The burden of showing that the sentence is improper is upon the appealing party. Te nn. Co de Ann . § 40-35 -401(d) S entencing Commission Commen ts. This p resum ption, h owev er, is conditioned upon an affirmative showing in the record that the trial court considered the sentencing principles and all the relevant facts and circums tances . State v. Ashby, 823 S.W.2d 166, 169 (Tenn. 1991 ). How ever, if the trial court fails to comply with the statutory principles, there is no presumption of correctness and our review is de novo.
The Sentencing Reform Act of 1989 established specific procedures which must be followed in sentencing. These procedures, codified at Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-35-210, mandated the trial court’s consideration of the following:
(1) The evidence, if any, received at the trial and the sentencing hearing; (2) [t]he presentence report; (3) [t]he principles of sentencing and arguments as to sentencing alternatives; (4) [t]he nature and c harac teristics of the c rimina l cond uct invo lved; (5)
[e]vidence and information offered by the parties on the enhancement and mitigating factors in §§ 40-35-113 and 40-35-114;
and (6) [a]ny statement the defendant wishes to make in his own behalf about sentencing.
Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-35-210(c) further provides that the minimum sentence within the range is the pre sumptive sentence. The trial court must begin with the minimum sentence and enhance that sentence to appropriately reflect any statutory enhan ceme nt factors th at the cou rt finds to be present. Tenn. Code
29
Ann. § 40-35-210(d). After enhancing the sentence, the court must reduce the sentence approp riate to the weight of an y mitigating factors that the court finds. Tenn. Code Ann. § 4 0-35-21 0(e). No particular w eight fo r each factor is prescribed by the statu te, as the w eight given to each fa ctor is left to the discretion of the trial court as long as the trial court complies with the purposes and principles of the sentencing act and its findings are supported by the record. State v. Leggs, 955 S.W.2d 845, 848 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1997); State v. Shelton, 854 S.W.2d 116, 123 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1992); Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-35-210 Sentencing Commission Comm ents.
B.
The trial court found that App ellant was a Ran ge II, multiple offender. The court found as en hanc eme nt facto rs that A ppella nt had a previo us history of criminal behavior in addition to those necessary to establish the range, Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-35-114(1); and Appellant had a h istory of unw illingness to com ply with the conditions of a sentence involving release in the comm unity, Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-3 5-114(8). 7 The trial court rejected two (2) enhancement factors proposed by the state: (1) that the o ffense w as com mitted to g ratify Appe llant’s desire for pleasu re or exciteme nt, Tenn. Co de Ann. § 4 0-35-114(7 ); and (2) that the crime was committed under circumstances under which the potential for bodily injury to a victim was great, Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-3 5-114(16). In mitigation, the trial court found that Appellant had gainful employment, was an excellent worker, had the support of members of the community, had conducted hims elf as an upstanding citizen in the past and had supported his family and
7 The trial court also found as an enhancement factor “the nature and circumstances of the offe nse whic h dea lt with th ree s epa rate p ene tration s of v ariou s type s givin g rise to the offe nse .” Th is enhan cem ent facto r listed is not a s tatutory enh ancem ent facto r and is, the refore, im proper. See State v. Strickland, 885 S.W .2d 85, 89 (Tenn. Crim . App. 1993).
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church. Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-35-113(13). After weighing the enhancement and mitigating factors pre sent in this c ase, the tria l court sen tenced Appella nt to concurrent terms of thirteen (13) years for each conviction of rape.
C.
The state c laims that the trial court erroneously failed to consider two enhancement factors: (1) that the offense was co mm itted to gratify Appe llant’s desire for pleasure or excitement, Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-35-114(7); and (2) that the crime was committed under circumstances under which the potential for bodily injury to a victim was great, Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-35-11 4(16). 8 W e disagree.
1.
In State v. Adams, 864 S.W.2d 31, 34-35 (Tenn. 1993), our Suprem e Court rejected the notion that “as a matter of law, every rape is implicitly committed for the purpose of pleasure or excitement.” The Court recognized that some acts of rape are “simply ac ts of brutality re sulting from hatred o r the des ire to seek revenge, control, intimidate, or are the product of a misguided desire to just abuse another hum an being.” Id. at 35. T he Co urt held that because pleasure or excitement is not an essential element of the offense of rape, Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-35-114(7) m ay be us ed to en hance a defen dant’s se ntence for rape. Id. Howeve r, the state has the burden of dem onstra ting tha t the crim e was sexua lly motivate d. Id.; see also State v. Hoyt, 928 S.W.2d 935, 949 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1995).
8 Neither party contests the applicability of Tenn. Code Ann. §40-35-114(1) and (8) as enhancement factors. We agree. Appellant has a prior record consisting of convictions for gross sexual impo sition and c riminal tres pass in O hio in addition to his felony c onvictions establishin g him a s a Ran ge II offe nde r. Te nn. C ode Ann . § 40 -35- 114 (1). F urthe rm ore, A ppe llant vio lated paro le on a conv iction in Michigan, demonstrating a history of unwillingness to comply with the conditions of a sentence involving release into the comm unity. Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-35-114(8 ).
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In this case the State points to the la ck of b rutality in this rap e, App ellant’s inquiry of the victim as to whether she liked oral sex, and Appellant’s apology to the victim as evidence that the rape wa s com mitted to satisfy Appellant’s de sire for pleasure an d excitement. How ever, this tes timony is s o amb iguous as to Appe llant’s purpose in committing this crime, that we a re not prepared to hold the trial judge in e rror for failing to find that such evidence makes out enhancement factor (7). T his issue is without m erit.
2.
Having just argued that Appellant’s benign behavior in committing this rape indicates it was not a crime of violence, the State, rather inconsistently, argues that Appellant’s actions in holding the victim around the neck, threatening her with injury if sh e did not submit to his advances, and wrapping bedcovers around the victim’s he ad indica te the crime wa s comm itted under circum stances wh ere there was g reat po tential fo r bodily injury to the victim. Tenn. Code Ann. Sec. 40- 35-114(16). Wh ile this behavior is repreh ensible it does no t appear to ha ve subjected the victim to a risk of bodily injury greater than that ordinarily attendant in a rape. We therefore again decline to hold the trial court in error for failing to apply this e nhanc emen t factor. Th is issue is w ithout me rit.
D.
W e find that the trial court properly rejected the two (2) additional enhancement factors proposed by the State when it sentenced Appellant. The state does n ot contes t the applic ability of mitigating factors found by the trial court but suggests tha t such mitigating fac tors are entitled to little we ight. Ho weve r, it
32
is apparent tha t the trial court gave gre at weight to the mitigating factors, as evidenced by Appellant’s sentence of one (1) year above the minimum sentence. This was c ertainly within th e trial co urt’s discretion . State v. Leggs, 955 S.W.2d at 848.9
For the reasons stated, the judgment of the trial court is AFFIRMED.
____________________________________
JERRY L. SMITH, JUDGE
CONCUR:
___________________________________
GARY R. WADE, PRESIDING JUDGE
___________________________________
DAVID G. HAYES, JUDGE
9 The App ellant rece ived a very len ient s ente nce . How ever , the w eight to be given applic able mitigating factors is a matter entrusted to the trial court and we are not ordinarily free to second guess that decision.