State v. Feagin

2025 Ohio 665

• Court: Ohio Court of Appeals
• Decided: February 21, 2025
• Docket: 2024 CA 0044
• Status: Published

Opinion

[Cite as State v. Feagin, 2025-Ohio-665.]

COURT OF APPEALS RICHLAND COUNTY, OHIO FIFTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

STATE OF OHIO, : JUDGES: : Hon. Craig R. Baldwin, P.J. Plaintiff - Appellee : Hon. William B. Hoffman, J. : Hon. Andrew J. King, J. -vs- : : ULYSSES L. FEAGIN, II : Case No. 2024 CA 0044 : Defendant - Appellant : OPINION

CHARACTER OF PROCEEDING: Appeal from the Richland County Court of Common Pleas, Case No. 20CR0467N

JUDGMENT: Affirmed

DATE OF JUDGMENT: February 21, 2025

APPEARANCES:

For Plaintiff-Appellee For Defendant-Appellant

JODIE M. SCHUMACHER ULYSSES L. FEAGIN, Pro Se Prosecuting Attorney #783-954 Richland County, Ohio Belmont Correctional Institution P.O. Box 540 By: MEGAN HOBART St. Clairsville, Ohio 43950 Assistant Prosecuting Attorney Richland County, Ohio 38 South Park Place Mansfield, Ohio 44902 Baldwin, P.J.

{¶1} The appellant, Ulysses L. Feagin, II, appeals the trial court’s decision

denying his Motion Requesting Leave to Request Public Records. The appellee is the

State of Ohio. The relevant facts leading to this appeal are as follows.

STATEMENT OF THE FACTS AND THE CASE

{¶2} On September 3, 2020, the Richland County Grand Jury indicted the

appellant on twenty-two counts as follows: Count 1: Trafficking in Heroin in violation of

R.C. §2925.03(A)(2) and R.C. §2925.03(C)(6)(e); Count 2: Possession of Heroin in

violation of R.C. §2925.11(A) and R.C. §2925.11(C)(6)(d); Count 3: Trafficking in Cocaine

in violation of R.C. §2925.03(A)(2) and R.C. §2925.03(C)(4)(c); Count 4: Possession of

Cocaine in violation of R.C. §2925.11(A) and R.C. §2925.11(C)(4)(b); Count 5:

Aggravated Trafficking in Drugs in violation of R.C. §2925.03(A)(2) and R.C.

§2925.03(C)(1)(a); Count 6: Aggravated Trafficking in Drugs in violation of R.C.

§2925.03(A)(2) and R.C. §2925.03(C)(1)(a); Count 7: Aggravated Possession of Drugs

in violation of R.C. §2925.11(A) and R.C. §2925.11(C)(1)(a); Count 8: Aggravated

Possession of Drugs in violation of R.C. §2925.11(A) and R.C. §2925.11(C)(1)(a); Count

9: Aggravated Trafficking in Drugs in violation of R.C. §2925.03(A)(2) and R.C.

§2925.03(C)(2)(a); Count 10: Aggravated Trafficking in Drugs in violation of R.C.

§2925.03(A)(2) and R.C. §2925.03(C)(2)(a); Count 11: Aggravated Trafficking in Drugs

in violation of R.C. §2925.03(A)(2) and R.C. §2925.03(C)(2)(a); Count 12: Aggravated

Trafficking in Drugs in violation of R.C. §2925.03(A)(2) and R.C. §2925.03(C)(2)(a); Count

13: Aggravated Possession of Drugs in violation of R.C. §2925.11(A) and R.C.

§2925.11(C)(2)(a); Count 14: Aggravated Possession of Drugs in violation of R.C. §2925.11(A) and R.C. §2925.11(C)(2)(a); Count 15: Aggravated Possession of Drugs in

violation of R.C. §2925.11(A) and R.C. §2925.11(C)(2)(a); Count 16: Aggravated

Possession of Drugs in violation of R.C. §2925.11(A) and R.C. §2925.11(C)(2)(a); Count

17: Having Weapons Under Disability in violation of R.C. §2923.13(A)(3) and R.C.

§2923.13(B); Count 18: Having Weapons Under Disability in violation of R.C.

§2923.13(A)(3) and R.C. §2923.13(B); Count 19: Improperly Handling Firearms in a

Motor Vehicle in violation of R.C. §2923.16(B) and R.C. §2923.16(I); Count 20: Improperly

Handling Firearms in a Motor Vehicle in violation of R.C. §2923.16(B) and R.C.

§2923.16(I); Count 21: Carrying a Concealed Weapon in violation of R.C. §2923.12(A)(2)

and R.C. §2923.12(F)(1); and Count 22: Carrying a Concealed Weapon in violation of

R.C. §2923.12(A)(2) and R.C. §2923.12(F)(1).

{¶3} Counts one through sixteen each carried two one-year firearm

specifications pursuant to R.C. §2941.141(A) and two specifications for forfeiture of a gun

in a drug case pursuant to R.C. §2941.1417(A). Counts seventeen through twenty-two

each carried two specifications for forfeiture of a gun in a drug case pursuant to R.C.

§2941.1417(A).

{¶4} The appellant entered a plea of not guilty to the indictment on December 1,

2020.

{¶5} On September 20, 2021, the matter proceeded to trial. The jury found the

appellant guilty on all charges.

{¶6} On December 13, 2021, the appellant filed a direct appeal of his conviction

wherein he raised five assignments of error. State v. Feagin, 2022-Ohio-3641 (5th Dist.).

{¶7} On October 12, 2022, this Court affirmed the Judgment of the trial court. Id. {¶8} On October 24, 2022, the appellant filed a motion for reconsideration, which

was denied by this Court on November 7, 2022.

{¶9} On November 30, 2022, the appellant filed a Notice of Appeal to the

Supreme Court.

{¶10} On January 19, 2023, the appellant filed a delayed application for reopening

pursuant to App.R. 26(B), which this Court denied on January 31, 2023.

{¶11} On February 23, 2023, the Supreme Court of Ohio declined jurisdiction.

{¶12} On March 3, 2023, the appellant filed a notice of appeal with the Supreme

Court of Ohio, appealing this Court’s judgment entry denying the appellant’s application

for reopening pursuant to App.R. 26(B). The Supreme Court of Ohio declined jurisdiction

on May 23, 2023.

{¶13} On December 1, 2022, the appellant filed a Petition to Vacate or Set Aside

Judgment of Conviction or Sentence.

{¶14} On January 13, 2023, the trial court denied the appellant’s Petition to Vacate

or Set Aside Judgment of Conviction or Sentence.

{¶15} On May 6, 2024, the appellant filed a Motion for the Release of Public

Records requesting dash camera video and documentation from his arrest on July 6,

{¶16} On June 26, 2024, the trial court denied the appellant’s Motion for the

Release of Public Records.

{¶17} The appellant timely filed a notice of appeal and herein raises the following

two assignments of error: {¶18} “I. APPELLANT’S MEMORANDUM TO SUPPORT THAT THE TRIAL

COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION WHEN IT DENIED THE APPELLANT’S MOTION

REQUESTING LEAVE TO REQUEST RECORDS.”

{¶19} “II. TRIAL COURTS [sic] ABUSED ITS DISCRETION AND GIVES THE

APPEARANCE OF IMPROPRIETY TO PURPOSELY IMPEDE THE APPELLANT BY

USING THE FACT FINDINGS AND CONCLUSION [sic] OF THE LAW TO MODIFY THE

FINDINGS OF FACTS OF THE PREVIOUS POST-CONVICTION AND ARE OUTSIDE

THE SCOP OF THE MOTION FOR LEAVE TO FILE PUBLIC RECORDS REQUEST.”

I.

{¶20} In the appellant’s first assignment of error, the appellant argues that the trial

court abused its discretion, denying his motion requesting leave to request records. We

disagree.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

{¶21} “Abuse of discretion” implies an unreasonable, arbitrary, or unconscionable

attitude on the part of the court. Blakemore v. Blakemore, 5 Ohio St.3d 217, 219 (1983).

ANALYSIS

{¶22} R.C. §149.43(B)(8) states:

A public office or person responsible for public records is not required

to permit a person who is incarcerated pursuant to a criminal conviction or

a juvenile adjudication to inspect or to obtain a copy of any public record

concerning a criminal investigation or prosecution or concerning what would

be a criminal investigation or prosecution if the subject of the investigation or prosecution were an adult, unless the request to inspect or to obtain a

copy of the record is for the purpose of acquiring information that is subject

to release as a public record under this section and the judge who imposed

the sentence or made the adjudication with respect to the person, or the

judge’s successor in office, finds that the information sought in the public

record is necessary to support what appears to be a justiciable claim of the

person.

{¶23} The Ohio Supreme Court has described R.C. §149.43(B)(8) as “broad and

encompassing” and as “clearly set[ting] forth heightened requirements for inmates

seeking public records.” State ex rel. Russell v. Thornton, 2006-Ohio-5858, ¶14. A

justifiable claim does not exist where an inmate fails to identify “any pending proceedings

with respect to which the requested documents would be material * * *.” State v. Atakpu,

2013-Ohio-4392 (2nd Dist.), ¶9, citing State v. Gibson, 2007-Ohio-7161 (2nd Dist.), ¶14.

{¶24} “ ‘[I]t is the responsibility of the person who wishes to inspect and/or copy

records to identify with reasonable clarity the records at issue.’ ” State ex rel. Morgan v.

New Lexington, 2006-Ohio-6365, ¶29, quoting State ex. rel. Fant v. Tober, 1993 WL

173743 (8th Dist.).

{¶25} In the case sub judice, the appellant failed to identify a pending proceeding

with respect to which the requested records would be material. Therefore, the trial court

did not abuse its discretion by denying the appellant’s Motion for the Release of Public

Records.

{¶26} Accordingly, the appellant’s first assignment of error is overruled. II.

{¶27} In the appellant’s second assignment of error, the appellant argues the trial

court abused its discretion by modifying findings of fact in a previous post-conviction

entry. We disagree.

{¶28} It appears the appellant is arguing that a footnote in the trial court’s June

26, 2024, Judgment Entry amended its prior judgment entry, which denied the appellant’s

petition for post-conviction relief. The trial court never issued a new judgment entry

denying the appellant’s petition for post-conviction relief. Crim.R. 36 grants the trial court

the authority to issue a nunc pro tunc entry to correct a final judgment in a criminal case

when the judgment contains a clerical error. State v. Holling, 2025-Ohio-385 (5th Dist.),

¶28; State v. Mitchell, 2020-Ohio-3417 (11th Dist.), ¶81.

{¶29} In the case sub judice, the trial court does note an inaccuracy in the

judgment entry denying the appellant’s petition for post-conviction relief. However, the

trial court did not issue a nunc pro tunc entry modifying its judgment entry. As the trial

court never issued a new judgment entry, denying the appellant’s petition for post-

conviction relief, it did not abuse its discretion.

{¶30} Accordingly, the appellant’s second assignment of error is overruled. CONCLUSION

{¶31} Based on the foregoing, the decision of the Richland County Court of

Common Pleas is, hereby, affirmed.

By: Baldwin, P.J.

Hoffman, J. and

King, J. concur.