State v. Jones

2025 Ohio 168

• Court: Ohio Court of Appeals
• Decided: January 23, 2025
• Docket: 113927
• Status: Published

Opinion

[Cite as State v. Jones, 2025-Ohio-168.]

COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO

EIGHTH APPELLATE DISTRICT COUNTY OF CUYAHOGA

STATE OF OHIO, :

Plaintiff-Appellee, : No. 113927 v. :

ALPHONSO JONES, :

Defendant-Appellant. :

JOURNAL ENTRY AND OPINION

JUDGMENT: AFFIRMED RELEASED AND JOURNALIZED: January 23, 2025

Criminal Appeal from the Cuyahoga County Court of Common Pleas Case No. CR-23-684880-A

Appearances:

Michael C. O’Malley, Cuyahoga County Prosecuting Attorney, and Gregory M. Paul, Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, for appellee.

Susan J. Moran, for appellant.

MARY J. BOYLE, J.:

Defendant-appellant, Alphonso Jones (“Jones”), appeals his

convictions for the murder of Jonathan Lanum (“victim”) and felonious assault of

Lakeisha Reynolds (“Lakeisha”), arguing that he acted in self-defense. For the

reasons that follow, we affirm. I. Facts and Procedural History

At the time of the victim’s death, he was 23 years old and living in his

SUV with his girlfriend, Lakeisha, who was pregnant with their child. Jones and his

girlfriend, Quaisha Jones (“Quaisha”), were living in a duplex on Earlwood Avenue,

in Cleveland, Ohio with their 17-month-old daughter, and Quaisha’s 15-year-old son.

On July 7, 2023, Quaisha received a call from the victim, her favorite cousin, stating

that he was coming over to “chill” with her. (Tr. 427.) The victim and Lakeisha

arrived at approximately 11:30 p.m. Quaisha and the victim smoked marijuana and

drank alcohol. Jones and Lakeisha did not drink or smoke.

Later that evening, Jones went upstairs to check on his daughter.

When he returned to the living room Jones began to argue with Quaisha about her

parenting skills. Lakeisha attempted to diffuse the situation, however, Jones said

“shut the f*** up. I wasn’t talking to you.” (Tr. 435.) The victim then “got into

[Jones’s] face [and t]hey started like tussling.” (Tr. 435.) The victim dragged Jones

out onto the porch. Quaisha testified that she tried to break up the fight and kept

telling the victim and Lakeisha to leave. The victim threw Jones off the porch. Jones

got up and tried to reenter the house, but Quaisha blocked him because she thought

he wanted to retrieve his gun. Jones bit Quaisha on the back of her shoulder to get

past her. Meanwhile, the victim and Lakeisha walked toward their vehicle.

Quaisha testified that Jones went in the house and came out shooting.

He ran towards the victim’s SUV shooting. Quaisha testified that Jones stopped

shooting, and she observed Lakeisha drive away in their SUV. Jones ran back into the house and Quaisha tried to call the police. She testified that Jones tried to take

the phone from her, but she was able to call the police. Jones packed a bag, left the

house, and never returned. She testified that Jones contacted her a few times to see

his daughter, but she would not allow him.

Lakeisha testified that after the fight on the porch, she and the victim

headed towards their vehicle. The victim handed her the keys and she entered the

driver’s side. Within seconds, the victim entered the passenger side. Lakeisha

testified that “as soon as [the victim] got in the car the bullets started going in the

window and stuff and it was like as the bullets was like breaking the window and

stuff, I was . . . still trying to get away.” (Tr. 676.) She felt glass hitting her; she heard

the victim scream. Lakeisha testified that she did not know the victim had been shot

until he told her. He was holding his chest, and he told her that he thought he was

going to die. She drove him to the hospital where he was immediately taken into

surgery and later died. The medical examiner testified that the victim’s cause of

death was gunshot wounds to the chest and right buttock and the manner of death

was homicide. The victim tested positive for amphetamines and

methamphetamines.

Lakeisha testified that the victim defended his cousin, Quaisha, but

did not punch Jones. She testified that the victim did not have a gun and did not

threaten Jones at any time during the evening. No gun was recovered from the

victim’s SUV. The City of Cleveland had a surveillance camera located near the

shooting, and the recording was played for the jury. In the video, the victim and

Lakeisha can be observed walking toward their SUV, which is parked in the street.

The victim hands something to Lakeisha and then walks back towards the house.

Lakeisha walks to the SUV and enters. The video then shows the victim running to

the SUV and entering the passenger side. Within seconds, Jones can be observed

running up to the SUV and firing multiple shots into the passenger door. The SUV

can be observed speeding away, while Jones can be observed running back to the

house.

Jones testified on his own behalf. He testified that he was 30 years

old, did not have a criminal record, and legally owned a firearm. Jones testified that

he knew the victim had an assault conviction and owned a firearm. Jones testified

that he weighed 120 pounds and was 5′11,″ and that the victim was taller and

weighed approximately 200 pounds. The autopsy report indicates that the victim

was 5′8″ and 203 pounds.

Jones testified that when the victim arrived that evening, he was

“hyped up” on ecstasy and offered Jones some, which Jones declined. (Tr. 795.)

Jones testified that when he and Quaisha were arguing, the victim threatened him

saying “[W]atch how you are talking to her. You are going to mess around and get

hurt.” (Tr. 800.) Jones testified that he told the victim and Lakeisha to “get the f***

out,” but they would not leave. (Tr. 801.) The victim then charged Jones and

dragged him out onto the porch. Jones testified that the victim was on top of Jones, holding him down, and Jones could not get up until he hit the victim in the testicles.

He said the victim was enraged, so Jones tried to get in the house, but Quaisha

blocked him. He testified that the victim grabbed him and lifted him up and

slammed him over the balcony. He said he landed on his face and neck and

shoulder. He testified that he was weak and groggy and had to crawl up the porch

steps. He said he begged Quaisha to let him in the house, and when she would not

move out of his way, he bit her shoulder.

According to Jones, he went inside, grabbed his gun, put it in his

pocket, and then went back outside. He testified that the victim was still enraged

and ran back towards Jones and said, “I got something for you.” (Tr. 806.) Jones

testified that the victim ran to his vehicle and got inside, but “the car didn’t pull off,

but he started going under the driver’s seat. . . . I took that as he was getting that

weapon, so I ran — I got up closer to actually like confirm that’s what he was doing,

and he was really bent over under the driver’s seat. Once I seen that I just fired my

weapon.” (Tr. 807.) Jones testified that he fired twice because he was afraid and he

thought the victim was going to shoot him, his daughter, or Quaisha.

After the shooting, Jones went back into his house. He testified that

Quaisha was hysterical and told him he was going to die for shooting at her cousin,

implying that her family would kill him. Jones testified that he packed a few things,

including the gun, said goodbye to his daughter and left the house. He testified that

he walked to his mother’s house. Jones testified he stayed with his cousin on

Lakeshore until he was arrested on September 11, 2023. He alleged that all of his belongings, including the gun, were stolen along with his brother’s vehicle in August.

Jones did not make a police report.

The jury found Jones guilty of one count of felony-murder, three

counts of felonious assault, and one count of discharge of a firearm on or near

prohibited premises, along with the one- and three-year firearm specifications

attached to each count.1 The trial court sentenced Jones to 21 years to life in prison.

Jones now appeals and raises the following assignment of error for review:

The jury erred in concluding that the State met its burden of production in disproving Mr. Jones acted in self-defense and rendered a verdict against the manifest weight of the evidence.

II. Law and Analysis

In Jones’s sole assignment of error, he argues that the jury verdict is

against the manifest weight of the evidence because the State failed to meet their

burden of production and disprove that he acted in self-defense. We disagree.

“When considering a manifest weight claim, a reviewing court must

examine the entire record, weigh the evidence, and consider the credibility of

witnesses.” State v. Bowden, 2009-Ohio-3598, ¶ 13 (8th Dist.), citing State v.

Thomas, 70 Ohio St.2d 79, 80 (1982). A manifest-weight challenge questions

whether the prosecution has met its burden of persuasion. Id., citing State v.

Thompkins, 78 Ohio St.3d 380, 386 (1997). “The court may reverse the judgment

of conviction if it appears that the factfinder “‘clearly lost its way and created such a

1 At the close of the State’s case, the trial court granted Jones’s Crim.R. 29 motion

dismissing the aggravated murder count and the attempted murder count. manifest miscarriage of justice that the conviction must be reversed, and a new trial

ordered.”’” Id., quoting Thompkins at 387, quoting State v. Martin, 20 Ohio App.3d

172, 175 (1st Dist. 1983). A judgment should be reversed as against the manifest

weight of the evidence “‘only in the exceptional case in which the evidence weighs

heavily against the conviction.’” Thompkins at 387, quoting Martin at 175.

In State v. Messenger, 2022-Ohio-4562, the Ohio Supreme Court

held that when a defendant claims self-defense the defendant “has the burden of

producing legally sufficient evidence that the defendant’s use of force was in self-

defense.” Id. at ¶ 25. “[I]f the defendant’s evidence and any reasonable inferences

about that evidence would allow a rational trier of fact to find all the elements of a

self-defense claim when viewed in the light most favorable to the defendant, then

the defendant has satisfied the burden,” and the State must then disprove self-

defense. Id. The defendant’s burden of production is “not a heavy one and one that

might even be satisfied through the State’s own evidence.” Id. at ¶ 22.

In order to disprove the claim of self-defense, the State must prove

beyond a reasonable doubt any one of the following elements: (1) that Jones was at

fault in creating the situation giving rise to the affray; or (2) that Jones did not have

reasonable grounds to believe or an honest belief that he was in imminent danger of

bodily harm; or (3) that Jones violated a duty to retreat or avoid danger. State v.

Scales, 2024-Ohio-2171, ¶ 25 (8th Dist.); State v. Walker, 2021-Ohio-2037, ¶ 13 (8th

Dist.). Upon review, the State disproved at least two of the three elements. “[W]hether the defendant was at fault in creating the situation giving

rise to the affray — asks, in essence, whether the defendant was the initial

aggressor.” State v. Gardner, 2022-Ohio-381, ¶ 25 (8th Dist.), citing State v. Batie,

2015-Ohio-762, ¶ 8 (8th Dist.). Here, the evidence at trial established that the victim

was the initial aggressor during the first altercation; however, that altercation ended

when Jones entered the house and the victim headed to his vehicle. Unfortunately

for everyone involved, Jones came back outside with a gun. Although the evidence

established that the victim returned to the house and may have said something to

Jones, the evidence also established that, at this point, there was no new altercation,

that the victim did not have a gun, and that the victim ran back to his vehicle and

entered the passenger side. Jones was the initial aggressor and the only participant

in the second encounter. Even if, however, we were to conclude that the victim was

the initial aggressor and the altercation was continuous, we find that the State

disproved the second element of self-defense.

Jones argues that he had reasonable grounds to believe or an honest

belief that he was in imminent danger of bodily harm because the victim was

physically larger and stronger than Jones; the victim had a prior assault conviction;

the victim had a gun in his vehicle; and the victim threatened Jones with, “I’ve got

something for you.” (Tr. 806.) We find Jones’s argument unpersuasive.

“The second element of self-defense involves both objective and

subjective considerations.” State v. Hughkeith, 2023-Ohio-1217, ¶ 56, quoting State

v. Thomas, 77 Ohio St.3d 323, 330 (1997); Parma v. Treanor, 2018-Ohio-3166, ¶ 25 (8th Dist.). A defendant’s belief that he was in immediate danger of death or great

bodily harm must be objectively reasonable, and the defendant must have an honest

belief that he was in such danger. Id. “[I]f the objective standard is met, the jury

must determine if, subjectively, this particular defendant had an honest belief that

[he] was in imminent danger.” Thomas at 326. The State may disprove self-defense

by demonstrating that the defendant’s belief was not objectively reasonable or that

he did not have an honest subjective belief that he faced imminent death or great

bodily harm. State v. Smith, 2020-Ohio-4976, ¶ 56 (1st Dist.).

In this case, we cannot say that Jones’s belief that he was in imminent

danger of death or great bodily was objectively reasonable. The victim did not have

a gun, and he retreated to his vehicle after Jones came outside with a gun. If Jones

believed that the victim was retrieving his gun, Jones could have gone in his house,

locked his doors, and called police. Instead, Jones pursued the victim to his vehicle

and then fired his weapon — at close range — into the passenger side window and

door where the victim was ducking to avoid being shot.

It is well settled that “‘a conviction is not against the manifest weight

of the evidence simply because the [trier of fact] rejected the defendant’s version of

the facts and believed the testimony presented by the state.’” State v. Jallah, 2015-

Ohio-1950, ¶ 71 (8th Dist.), quoting State v. Hall, 2014-Ohio-2959, ¶ 28 (4th Dist.).

Here, the jury heard all the evidence and believed the State’s version of the facts over

Jones’s. After reviewing the entire record, we cannot say that the jury lost its way when it concluded that Jones did not act in self-defense. Nor can we say that his

convictions were against the manifest weight of the evidence.

Accordingly, Jones’s sole assignment of error is overruled.

Judgment is affirmed.

It is ordered that appellee recover from appellant costs herein taxed.

The court finds there were reasonable grounds for this appeal.

It is ordered that a special mandate issue out of this court directing the

common pleas court to carry this judgment into execution. The appellant’s

conviction having been affirmed, any bail pending appeal is terminated. Case

remanded to the trial court for execution of sentence.

A certified copy of this entry shall constitute the mandate pursuant to Rule 27

of the Rules of Appellate Procedure.

________________________ MARY J. BOYLE, JUDGE

EILEEN A. GALLAGHER, A.J., and EILEEN T. GALLAGHER, J., CONCUR