State v. Feagin

• Court: Ohio Court of Appeals
• Decided: April 21, 2026
• Docket: 2025 CA 0055
• Status: Published

Opinion

[Cite as State v. Feagin, 2026-Ohio-1437.]

COURT OF APPEALS RICHLAND COUNTY, OHIO FIFTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

STATE OF OHIO, Case No. 2025 CA 0055

Plaintiff - Appellee Opinion And Judgment Entry

-vs- Appeal from the Richland County, Ohio, Court of Common Pleas, Case No. 2024 CR 0562N CHARLES R. FEAGIN, Judgment: Affirmed Defendant - Appellant Date of Judgment Entry: April 21, 2026

BEFORE: Robert G. Montgomery; Kevin W. Popham; David M. Gormley, Judges

APPEARANCES: JODIE M. SCHUMACHER, Richland County Prosecuting Attorney by MICHELLE FINK, for Plaintiff-Appellee; WESLEY A. JOHNSTON, for Defendant- Appellant.

Montgomery, J.

STATEMENT OF FACTS AND THE CASE

{¶1} Detective Liggett of the Richland County Sheriff’s Department was

conducting undercover surveillance on Appellant who was suspected of illegal drug

activity. While on surveillance, Detective Liggett witnessed Appellant commit a traffic

infraction.

{¶2} Detective Liggett radioed the information regarding the traffic violation to

Patrolman Oblak of the Mansfield Police Department. Based on the information he

received, Patrolman Oblak charged Appellant with violating R.C. 4511.33(A)(1) which states, “A vehicle or trackless trolley shall be driven, as nearly as is practicable, entirely

within a single lane or line of traffic and shall not be moved from such lane or line until

the driver has first ascertained that such movement can be made with safety.”

{¶3} As a result of events following the traffic stop, Appellant was indicted on

twelve counts:

• Count One: Trafficking in Cocaine in violation of R.C. 2925.03(A)(2) and R.C. 2925.03(C)(4)(g); • Count Two: Possession of Cocaine in violation of R.C. 2925.11(A) and R.C. 2925.11(C)(4)(f); • Count Three: Aggravated Possession of Drugs in violation of R.C. 2925.11(A) and R.C. 2925.11(C)(1)(a); • Count Four: Trafficking in Cocaine in violation of R.C. 2925.03 (A)(2) and R.C. 2925.03(C)(4)(g); • Count Five: Possession of Cocaine in violation of R.C. 2925.11(A) and R.C. 2925.11(C)(4)(f); • Count Six: Trafficking in Cocaine in violation of R.C. 2925.03 (A)(2) and R.C.2925.03(C)(4)(g); • Count Seven: Possession of Cocaine in violation of R.C. 2925.11(A) and R.C. 2925.11(C)(4)(f); • Count Eight: Aggravated Trafficking in Drugs in violation of R.C. 2925.03 (A)(2) and R.C. 2925.03(C)(1)(d); • Count Nine: Aggravated Possession of Drugs in violation of R.C. 2925.11(A) and R.C. 2925.11(C)(1)(c); • Count Ten: Possessing Criminal Tools in violation of R.C. 2923.24(A) and R.C. 2923.24(C); • Count Eleven: Possessing Criminal Tools in violation of R.C. 2923.24(A) and R.C. 2923.24(C); and • Count Twelve: Possessing Criminal Tools in violation of R.C. 2923.24(A) and R.C. 2923.24(C).

{¶4} Appellant filed a Motion to Suppress with the trial court on December 5,

2024.

{¶5} An oral hearing was held and the trial court issued a Judgment Entry that

overruled Appellant’s motion. {¶6} Appellant subsequently entered pleas of no contest to all twelve counts

contained in the indictment and was found guilty on all of them. Admission of

Guilt/Judgment Entry.

{¶7} The trial court merged counts one and two, four and five, six and seven, and

eight and nine for purposes of final conviction and sentencing and elected to proceed on

counts one, four, six and eight. Sentencing Entry, p. 3.

{¶8} Appellant was sentenced to the following:

• Count One: 11 year minimum, 16.5 year maximum mandatory prison term to be served consecutively to counts 3, 4, 6, 8 and 10; • Count Two: Merged with Count One; • Count Three: 12 months prison term to be served consecutively to Counts 1, 4, 6, 8 and 10; • Count Four: 11 years mandatory prison term to be served consecutively to Counts 1, 3, 6, 8, and 10; • Count Five: Merged with Count Four; • Count Six: 11 years mandatory prison term to be served consecutively to Counts 1, 3, 4, 8, and 10; • Count Seven: Merged with Count Six; • Count Eight: 2 years mandatory prison term to be served consecutively to Counts 1, 3, 4, 6 and 10; • Count Nine: Merged with Count Eight; • Count Ten: 12 months prison term to be served concurrently with Counts 11 and 12; • Count Eleven: 12 months prison term to be served concurrently with Counts 10 and 12; and • Count Twelve: 12 months prison term to be served concurrently with Counts 10 and 11. • These sentences reflect a total aggregate minimum term of 37 years to a maximum term of 42.5 years in prison. Id. {¶9} Appellant filed an appeal and asserts five assignments of error for our

review: {¶10} “I. THE TRIAL COURT’S FINDING OF FACTS WAS IMPROPER IN

THAT IN THIS CASE THE SOLE RELIANCE ON OFFICER’S TESTIMONY FEAGIN’S

TIRE WENT ACROSS THE LANE IN TURN WAS IMPROPER AND ERRED WHEN IT

CONCLUDED THAT THE OFFICER HAD A REASONABLE, ARTICULABLE

SUSPICION TO INITIATE THE TRAFFIC STOP.” [sic]

{¶11} “II. THE TRIAL COURT WAS IMPROPER THAT BY OFFICER WAS

JUSTIFIED IN REMOVING FEAGIN FROM THE VEHICLE, AND ERRED WHEN IT

CONCLUDED THAT THE OFFICER WAS JUSTIFIED IN REMOVING FEAGIN FROM

VEHICLE.” [sic]

{¶12} “III. THE TRIAL COURT WAS IMPROPER THAT BY TESTIMONY

OFFICER INVESTIGATORY TACTICS-CALLING IN BACKUP TO ASSIST WITH THE

WRITING OF THE TRAFFIC CITATION AND REMOVING THE OCCUPANT FROM

THE VEHICLE TO PREPARE FOR AN INVESTIGATORY SWEEP BY THE CANINE DID

NOT UNCONSTITUTIONALLY PROLONG THE TRAFFIC STOP, AND ERRED WHEN

IT CONCLUDED THAT THE TRAFFIC STOP WAS NOT UNCONSTITUTIONALLY

PROLONGED.” [sic]

{¶13} “IV. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED WHEN IT SENTENCED WRIGHT TO

CONSECUTIVE PRISON TERMS WHEN IT CLEARLY AND CONVINCINGLY THE

RECORD FAILED TO SUPPORT ITS FINDINGS.” [sic]

{¶14} “V. FEAGIN WAS DENIED EFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL

AS GUARANTEED BY SECTION 10, ARTICLE I, OF THE OHIO CONSTITUTION AND

SIXTH AND FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT[S] OF THE UNITED STATES

CONSTITUTION.” LAW AND ANALYSIS

{¶15} Appellant argues in his first assignment of error that the trial court erred

when it relied on officer testimony during the oral hearing on Appellant’s motion to

suppress. Appellant argues in his brief that the trial court’s factual finding that Appellant

committed a traffic infraction was improper because there was no video evidence.

Appellant Brief, p. 8. We disagree.

{¶16} The Ohio Supreme Court has stated, “Appellate review of

a motion to suppress presents a mixed question of law and fact. When considering

a motion to suppress, the trial court assumes the role of trier of fact and is therefore in

the best position to resolve factual questions and evaluate the credibility of witnesses.”

State v. Burnside, 2003-Ohio-5372, ¶ 8, quoting State v. Mills, 62 Ohio St.3d 357, 366

(1992).

{¶17} Consequently, an appellate court must accept the trial court's findings of

fact if they are supported by competent, credible evidence. Id., citing State v. Fanning,

1 Ohio St.3d 19 (1982).

{¶18} Appellant’s motion to suppress alleged that the investigating officers did not

have probable cause to stop Appellant’s vehicle. Appellant’s sole argument in his motion

was “[o]fficers indicated that they saw a vehicle fail to maintain lanes in an area that had

no centerline at the time of the stop.” Motion to Suppress, p. 1.

{¶19} An oral hearing was held on said motion wherein Detective Ligget testified,

“I observed a marked lanes violation after the Defendant passed over Cline Avenue when

he immediately - - the intersection of Cline went over the yellow marked center lines on

Marion Ave.” Suppression Hearing Transcript, p. 13. Detective Liggett went on to say,

“[t]he driver’s side of the vehicle both tires were approximately over the center line, approximately six to eight inches and went over that center line for approximately three

seconds before returning to his lane.” Id.

{¶20} Patrolman Oblak also testified at the hearing. Patrolman Oblak stated that

on the day in question there were painted lines at the intersection of Cline Avenue and

Marion Avenue. Id., p. 35.

{¶21} The trial court found both officers’ testimony was credible and that a traffic

violation had occurred. Judgment Entry Overruling Motion to Suppress, p. 2.

{¶22} The appellant in State v. Hrytsyak, 2020-Ohio-920, ¶ 43 (8th Dist.) made

an argument that is similar to that which Appellant is arguing in his first assignment of

error. The Appellant in Hyrtsyak argued that the trial court erred in overruling his motion

to suppress when an officer’s dash cam video failed to show a traffic infraction. The Eighth

District Court found, “To the extent that appellant argues that his motion to suppress

should have been granted because the dash-camera video did not capture any traffic

violations, this argument is misplaced.” Id. The court went on to say, "When the trial

court rules on a motion to suppress, the credibility of the witness is a matter for the judge

acting as the trier of fact." Id., at citing State v. Fanning, 1 Ohio St.3d 19 (1982).

{¶23} Appellant in the case at hand does not argue that the officers’ testimony was

not credible. Appellant argues that since there was no video footage of the traffic

infraction, the trial court erred in finding that a traffic violation occurred. Appellant’s brief

fails to cite a single case to support his position that there must be video footage in order

for the trial court to find that a traffic violation has occurred.

{¶24} In the case at hand, the trial judge found both officers’ testimony to be

credible and we defer to the trial court’s factual finding. This Court has reviewed the

record and finds that the trial court’s findings related to the motion to suppress were supported by competent, credible evidence. Appellant’s first assignment of error is

overruled.

{¶25} Appellant’s second and third assignments of error set forth arguments that

were not stated in Appellant’s motion to suppress nor addressed during the oral hearing

on said motion. Appellant argues that the trial court erred when it concluded that the

officer was justified in removing Appellant from his vehicle and that the stop was

unconstitutionally prolonged.

{¶26} The sole issue set forth in Appellant’s motion to suppress was that there was

no evidence that Appellant committed a traffic violation. Appellant did not argue in his

motion or at the hearing that his removal from the vehicle was improper or that the stop

was unconstitutionally prolonged.

{¶27} Since these arguments were not made in the trial court, this Court will not

address these arguments on appeal. "This Court will not address arguments for the first

time on appeal." State v. Lee, 2020-Ohio-4970, ¶ 15 (9th Dist.), citing State v. Robinson,

2017-Ohio-7380, ¶ 12 (9th Dist.). To preserve a suppression challenge for appeal, a

defendant must “develop [his] argument in his motion to suppress or at the [suppression]

hearing.” State v. Keagle, 2019-Ohio-3975, ¶ 12 (9th Dist.).

{¶28} Appellant failed to preserve his arguments set forth in his second and third

assignments of error since he did not raise them in the lower court. Therefore, he is

precluded from raising them on appeal.

{¶29} Appellant’s second and third assignments of error are overruled.

{¶30} Appellant’s fourth assignment of error alleges that the record fails to

support the trial court’s decision to impose consecutive prison terms. Appellant Brief,

p. 12. {¶31} An appellate court may vacate or modify a felony sentence on appeal only if

it determines by clear and convincing evidence that the record does not support the trial

court’s findings under the relevant statutes or that the sentence is otherwise contrary to

law. State v. Marcum, 146 Ohio St.3d 516 (2016).

{¶32} R.C. 2929.14(C)(4) sets forth the requirements a court must make prior to

imposing consecutive sentences.

{¶33} Under R.C. 2929.14(C), a court must engage in a three-step analysis before

it imposes consecutive sentences. R.C. 2929.14(C)(4) states:

If multiple prison terms are imposed on an offender for convictions of

multiple offenses, the court may require the offender to serve the prison

terms consecutively if the court finds that the consecutive service is

necessary to protect the public from future crime or to punish the offender

and that consecutive sentences are not disproportionate to the seriousness

of the offender’s conduct and to the danger the offender poses to the public,

and if the court also finds any of the following:

(a) The offender committed one or more of the multiple offenses

while the offender was awaiting trial or sentencing, was under a sanction

imposed pursuant to section 2929.16, 2929.17, or 2929.18 of the Revised

Code, or was under post-release control for a prior offense.

(b) At least two of the multiple offenses were committed as part

of one or more courses of conduct, and the harm caused by two or more of

the multiple offenses so committed was so great or unusual that no single

prison term for any of the offenses committed as part of any of the courses

of conduct adequately reflects the seriousness of the offender’s conduct. (c) The offender’s history of criminal conduct demonstrates that

consecutive sentences are necessary to protect the public from future crime

by the offender.

{¶34} The Ohio Supreme Court has stated, “Under R.C. 2929.14(C)(4), the

‘consecutive-sentencing statute,’ a trial court may impose consecutive sentences only if it

makes certain findings. Under R.C. 2953.08(G)(2), the ‘appellate-review statute,’ an

appellate court may modify or vacate the imposition of consecutive sentences when it

‘clearly and convincingly finds’ that ‘the record does not support the sentencing court's

findings.’” State v. Glover, 178 Ohio St.3d 509, 2024-Ohio-5195, ¶ 2.

{¶35} The Glover Court further explained appellate review of consecutive

sentences stating, “Ohio law presumes that a defendant convicted of multiple crimes will

serve his sentences concurrently.” Id., at ¶ 38. “A court may impose consecutive sentences

only when some law specifically permits it to do so.” Id.

{¶36} In the case at hand, the trial judge made the findings required by R.C.

2929.14(C)(4) on the record during the sentencing hearing and said findings were also

stated in the Sentencing Entry filed on March 20, 2024. This Court finds that the record

supports the trial court’s findings and that Appellant’s sentence is not contrary to law.

{¶37} Appellant’s fourth assignment of error is overruled.

{¶38} In his final assignment of error, Appellant argues he was denied effective

assistance of counsel during his no contest plea. Appellant Brief, p. 12.

{¶39} Appellant argues that he did not understand the legal concepts he was

waiving when he entered his pleas of no contest. Id., p. 13.

{¶40} We review alleged claims of ineffective assistance of counsel under the two-

part analysis set forth in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984), which the Ohio Supreme Court adopted in State v. Bradley, 42 Ohio St.3d 136 (1989). To prevail on an

ineffective assistance claim the Stickland Court stated, “First, the defendant must show

that counsel's performance was deficient. This requires showing that counsel made errors

so serious that counsel was not functioning as the ‘counsel’ guaranteed the defendant by

the Sixth Amendment. Second, the defendant must show that the deficient performance

prejudiced the defense. This requires showing that counsel's errors were so serious as to

deprive the defendant of a fair trial, a trial whose result is reliable.” Strickland, at 687.

{¶41} In the case at hand, Appellant cites State v. Zupancic, 2013-Ohio-3072, ¶ 4

(9th Dist.) for his claim that, “Ineffective assistance cannot be established through

speculation about the prejudicial effects of counsel’s performance.” Appellant Brief, p. 13.

The Zupancic court went on to say, “[A] claim of ineffective assistance of counsel on direct

appeal cannot be premised on decisions of trial counsel that are not reflected in the record

of proceedings . . . . “ Id.

{¶42} Appellant’s brief makes a conclusory statement that the legal concepts

explained to him by his counsel were insufficient. However, Appellant fails to make a

single citation to the record to support his claim. Appellant has also failed to argue how

his counsel’s performance was deficient or how his counsel’s performance prejudiced his

defense. For these reasons, Appellant’s fifth assignment of error is overruled. CONCLUSION

{¶43} For the reasons stated in our accompanying Opinion, the judgment of the

Richland County Court of Common Pleas is Affirmed.

{¶44} Costs to Appellant.

By: Montgomery, P.J.

Popham, J. and

Gormley, J. concur.