SMITH, Justice.
In May, 1978, appellants Glen E. Roney, Vernon F. Neuhaus, Jr., Paul G. Veale, Jack A. Whetsel, Joseph V. LaMantia, and Van-nie E. Cook, Jr., filed application with appellant State Banking Board for a charter for the proposed Texas State Bank of McAllen, Texas.
A hearing on the application was held in September, 1978. At that time, appellees, Valley National Bank of McAllen and Metropolitan National Bank of McAllen, appeared and protested the application on the grounds that there was no public necessity or justification for the proposed bank and that it was not in the public interest “. . .to give another bank to the individuals who already control more than a majority of the banking in McAllen.”
In December, 1978, the Banking Board determined that applicants had met their burden by proving the existence of the statutory criteria prerequisite to the granting of a charter and entered an order approving the application.
After appellees’ motion for rehearing was overruled by the Banking Board, this suit for judicial review of the Board’s action was instituted in the district court of Travis County in March, 1979.
In December, 1979, the district court rendered judgment that the State Banking Board’s order granting the application for charter of the proposed bank was not supported by substantial evidence that the proposed directors had sufficient banking experience, ability and standing to render success of the proposed bank probable, nor that the applicants were acting in good faith. In addition, the district court found that the Board’s order did not contain the requisite recitation of underlying facts with regard to the statutory requirement of experience, ability and standing or the statutory requirement of action in good faith. The case was remanded to the Banking Board with instructions to deny the application for a charter for the proposed bank.
In essence, the district court concluded that, absent substantial evidence to the contrary, dual service by the four proposed directors also serving on the Board of the McAllen State Bank precluded a finding of experience, ability and standing to render success of the proposed bank probable or a finding of good faith by the Banking Board.
By crosspoints, appellees contend that applicants had the burden of proving by substantial evidence that this same dual service did not negate the statutory requirements of public necessity and probability of profitable operation. We disagree.
A director of a bank occupies the position of a fiduciary toward the banking corporation.
First State Bank of Temple v. Metropolitan Casualty Insurance Company of New York,
125 Tex. 113, 79 S.W.2d 835, 98 A.L.R. 1256 (1935). Directors of corporations are not strictly trustees, however, and the character and consequences of their acts have been determined on the basis of the facts of each case.
Paddock v. Siemoneit,
147 Tex. 571, 218 S.W.2d 428, 7 A.L.R.2d 1062 (1949). In general, the fiduciary relationship requires a high degree of care and loyalty by the director toward the corporation.
Kinzbach Tool Co.
v.
Corbett-Wallace Corporation,
138 Tex. 565, 160 S.W.2d 509 (1942).
It is well established that a director of one business corporation may sit on the board of a competing business corporation. Furthermore, subject to a “jealous” review for fairness by the courts, such an interlocking director may even vote on transactions between those corporations without violating any fiduciary duty to either.
Geddes v. Anaconda Copper Mining Company,
254 U.S. 590, 41 S.Ct. 209, 65 L.Ed. 425 (1920);
Crook v. Williams Drug Co., Inc.,
558 S.W.2d 500 (Tex.Civ.App.—Tyler 1977, writ ref’d n. r. e.);
Reynolds-Southwestern Corporation v. Dresser Industries, Inc.,
438 S.W.2d 135 (Tex.Civ.App.— Houston [14th Dist.] 1969, writ ref’d n. r. e.); Hamilton, Business Organizations § 715 (1973). As interlocking directorships are permissible between business corporations, we see no reason why they should not also be permissible between banking corporations.
Texas Rev.Civ.Stat.Ann. art. 342-305(A) (1973) sets out the criteria prerequisite to the granting of a state bank charter in Texas:
“Applications for a State bank charter shall be granted only upon good and sufficient proof that all of the following conditions presently exist:
(1) A public necessity exists for the proposed bank;
(2) The proposed capital structure is adequate;
(3) The volume of business in the community where such proposed bank is to be established is such as to indicate profitable operation of the proposed bank;
(4) The proposed officers and directors have sufficient banking experience, ability and standing to render success of the proposed bank probable; and
(5) The applicants are acting in good faith.
The burden to establish said conditions shall be upon the applicants.”
Texas Rev.Civ.Stat.Ann. art. 342-101,
et seq.
(1973), has been held to provide a complete system of laws governing the organization of state banks in Texas.
Robertson v. State,
406 S.W.2d 90 (Tex.Civ.App.—Fort Worth 1966, writ ref’d n. r. e.). Consequently, the
only
criteria that must be shown to exist before a charter may be granted are those specifically listed in Article 342-305(A). As dual service is not prohibited by the statute, its existence is not required to be negated before the charter may be granted.
This is not to say that dual service may not be considered by the Banking Board in arriving at a decision as to whether to grant or to deny a charter. Dual service is certainly a factor to be considered when determining the existence of the statutory criteria of public necessity, capital structure, probability of profitable operation, banking experience, ability and standing, or good faith. However, it is
only
a factor and, like the many other factors that may figure into a final decision, it may be ascribed a greater or a lesser significance in comparison to the other evidence before the Board.
See: State Banking Board v. Airline National Bank,
398 S.W.2d 805 (Tex.Civ.App.—Austin 1966, writ ref’d n. r. e.).
Appellees cite us to no eases that have held that the mere fact that proposed directors will serve simultaneously as directors of another bank is sufficient to deny a charter to a proposed bank.
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SMITH, Justice.
In May, 1978, appellants Glen E. Roney, Vernon F. Neuhaus, Jr., Paul G. Veale, Jack A. Whetsel, Joseph V. LaMantia, and Van-nie E. Cook, Jr., filed application with appellant State Banking Board for a charter for the proposed Texas State Bank of McAllen, Texas.
A hearing on the application was held in September, 1978. At that time, appellees, Valley National Bank of McAllen and Metropolitan National Bank of McAllen, appeared and protested the application on the grounds that there was no public necessity or justification for the proposed bank and that it was not in the public interest “. . .to give another bank to the individuals who already control more than a majority of the banking in McAllen.”
In December, 1978, the Banking Board determined that applicants had met their burden by proving the existence of the statutory criteria prerequisite to the granting of a charter and entered an order approving the application.
After appellees’ motion for rehearing was overruled by the Banking Board, this suit for judicial review of the Board’s action was instituted in the district court of Travis County in March, 1979.
In December, 1979, the district court rendered judgment that the State Banking Board’s order granting the application for charter of the proposed bank was not supported by substantial evidence that the proposed directors had sufficient banking experience, ability and standing to render success of the proposed bank probable, nor that the applicants were acting in good faith. In addition, the district court found that the Board’s order did not contain the requisite recitation of underlying facts with regard to the statutory requirement of experience, ability and standing or the statutory requirement of action in good faith. The case was remanded to the Banking Board with instructions to deny the application for a charter for the proposed bank.
In essence, the district court concluded that, absent substantial evidence to the contrary, dual service by the four proposed directors also serving on the Board of the McAllen State Bank precluded a finding of experience, ability and standing to render success of the proposed bank probable or a finding of good faith by the Banking Board.
By crosspoints, appellees contend that applicants had the burden of proving by substantial evidence that this same dual service did not negate the statutory requirements of public necessity and probability of profitable operation. We disagree.
A director of a bank occupies the position of a fiduciary toward the banking corporation.
First State Bank of Temple v. Metropolitan Casualty Insurance Company of New York,
125 Tex. 113, 79 S.W.2d 835, 98 A.L.R. 1256 (1935). Directors of corporations are not strictly trustees, however, and the character and consequences of their acts have been determined on the basis of the facts of each case.
Paddock v. Siemoneit,
147 Tex. 571, 218 S.W.2d 428, 7 A.L.R.2d 1062 (1949). In general, the fiduciary relationship requires a high degree of care and loyalty by the director toward the corporation.
Kinzbach Tool Co.
v.
Corbett-Wallace Corporation,
138 Tex. 565, 160 S.W.2d 509 (1942).
It is well established that a director of one business corporation may sit on the board of a competing business corporation. Furthermore, subject to a “jealous” review for fairness by the courts, such an interlocking director may even vote on transactions between those corporations without violating any fiduciary duty to either.
Geddes v. Anaconda Copper Mining Company,
254 U.S. 590, 41 S.Ct. 209, 65 L.Ed. 425 (1920);
Crook v. Williams Drug Co., Inc.,
558 S.W.2d 500 (Tex.Civ.App.—Tyler 1977, writ ref’d n. r. e.);
Reynolds-Southwestern Corporation v. Dresser Industries, Inc.,
438 S.W.2d 135 (Tex.Civ.App.— Houston [14th Dist.] 1969, writ ref’d n. r. e.); Hamilton, Business Organizations § 715 (1973). As interlocking directorships are permissible between business corporations, we see no reason why they should not also be permissible between banking corporations.
Texas Rev.Civ.Stat.Ann. art. 342-305(A) (1973) sets out the criteria prerequisite to the granting of a state bank charter in Texas:
“Applications for a State bank charter shall be granted only upon good and sufficient proof that all of the following conditions presently exist:
(1) A public necessity exists for the proposed bank;
(2) The proposed capital structure is adequate;
(3) The volume of business in the community where such proposed bank is to be established is such as to indicate profitable operation of the proposed bank;
(4) The proposed officers and directors have sufficient banking experience, ability and standing to render success of the proposed bank probable; and
(5) The applicants are acting in good faith.
The burden to establish said conditions shall be upon the applicants.”
Texas Rev.Civ.Stat.Ann. art. 342-101,
et seq.
(1973), has been held to provide a complete system of laws governing the organization of state banks in Texas.
Robertson v. State,
406 S.W.2d 90 (Tex.Civ.App.—Fort Worth 1966, writ ref’d n. r. e.). Consequently, the
only
criteria that must be shown to exist before a charter may be granted are those specifically listed in Article 342-305(A). As dual service is not prohibited by the statute, its existence is not required to be negated before the charter may be granted.
This is not to say that dual service may not be considered by the Banking Board in arriving at a decision as to whether to grant or to deny a charter. Dual service is certainly a factor to be considered when determining the existence of the statutory criteria of public necessity, capital structure, probability of profitable operation, banking experience, ability and standing, or good faith. However, it is
only
a factor and, like the many other factors that may figure into a final decision, it may be ascribed a greater or a lesser significance in comparison to the other evidence before the Board.
See: State Banking Board v. Airline National Bank,
398 S.W.2d 805 (Tex.Civ.App.—Austin 1966, writ ref’d n. r. e.).
Appellees cite us to no eases that have held that the mere fact that proposed directors will serve simultaneously as directors of another bank is sufficient to deny a charter to a proposed bank. In fact, past cases demonstrate that dual service has been accepted as a matter of course both by the Board and the courts.
See: State Banking Board v. Airline National Bank, supra; Chimney Rock National Bank of Houston v. State Banking Board,
376 S.W.2d 595 (Tex.Civ.App.—Austin 1964, no writ).
In summary, to affirm the action of the district court would be to engraft onto Article 342-305(A) an additional requirement that no proposed director have any interest in another banking institution. Such action is clearly beyond the jurisdiction of this Court.
State v. Reyna,
160 Tex. 404, 333 S.W.2d 832 (1960).
By crosspoint, appellees claim that the district court erred in refusing to admit into evidence a previous order of the Banking Board denying a charter to the proposed First State Bank of Killeen. In that case, the Board allegedly attached some importance to the dual service of the proposed directors. The district court refused to consider the Killeen order because it was not introduced into evidence before the Board but merely attached as an exhibit to the motion for rehearing.
Texas Rev.Civ.Stat.Ann. art. 6252-13a, Section 19(d)(3) (Supp. 1980) confines review of agency action to the record made before the agency, “except that the court may receive evidence of procedural irregularities alleged to have occurred before the agency but which are not reflected in the record.” The record in an administrative appeal includes the motion for rehearing filed before the agency, but it does not necessarily include exhibits attached thereto.
Under Rules 371, 376 and 377,
Texas Rules of Civil Procedure
(Supp.1980), an exhibit must be tendered and admitted into evidence in order to become a part of the record on appeal. Exhibits tendered but not admitted into evidence are not a part of the record and cannot be considered on appeal.
City of Mission v. Popplewell,
156
Tex. 269, 294 S.W.2d 712 (1956);
Lone Star Cotton Mills v. Thomas,
227 S.W.2d 300 (Tex.Civ.App.—El Paso 1949, no writ).
See: Brown v. American Transfer & Storage Company,
601 S.W.2d 931, 23 Tex.Sup. Ct.J. 426 (June 18, 1980).
The legislature is presumed to have taken notice of prior court decisions construing these rules when it enacted the Administrative Procedure Act.
United Savings Association of Texas v. Vandygriff,
594 S.W.2d 163 (Tex.Civ.App.—Austin 1980, writ ref'd n. r. e.);
Humble Pipe Line Co. v. State,
2 S.W.2d 1018 (Tex.Civ.App.—Austin 1928, writ ref’d). As the legislature did not provide to the contrary in the Administrative Procedure Act, we hold that exhibits must be admitted into evidence at the hearing before the agency in order to become a part of the record on appeal. Merely attaching an exhibit to a motion for rehearing will not suffice to make that exhibit a part of the record.
Accordingly, as merely attaching the Kil-leen order to the motion for rehearing did not make the exhibit a part of the record and failure of appellees to introduce the evidence before the Board cannot be considered “procedural irregularity,” the district court properly refused to consider that order on appeal.
The district court also found that the Banking Board failed to support its ultimate findings of experience, ability and standing and action in good faith with an adequate recitation of underlying facts. Likewise, appellees, by crosspoints of error, raised this same issue with respect to the findings of public necessity and probability of profitable operation.
In essence, the issue before this Court is whether the Board was required to recite the facts underlying its
rejection
of appel-lees’ dual service arguments in its order.
Ultimate findings of the Banking Board that are couched in statutory language must be accompanied by a “concise and explicit statement of the underlying facts
supporting
the findings.” Tex.Rev.Civ. Stat.Ann. art. 6252-13a, Section 16(b) (Supp.1980);
Gage v. Railroad Commission,
582 S.W.2d 410 (Tex.1979). (Emphasis added.)
The purposes in requiring underlying facts are to require a full consideration of the evidence and serious appraisal of the facts on the part of the administrative agency; to inform the protestants of the facts found so that they may intelligently prepare and present an appeal to the courts; and to assist the courts in properly exercising their function of reviewing the order.
Security Savings and Loan Ass’n of Dickinson v. Lewis,
515 S.W.2d 392 (Tex.Civ.App.—Austin),
subsequent opinion,
547 S.W.2d 710,
rev’d on other grounds,
560 S.W.2d 930 (Tex.1978).
The Board is not required to comment on every aspect of the record that may be relevant to its ultimate findings.
Mutual Building and Loan Association v. Lewis,
572 S.W.2d 771 (Tex.Civ.App.—Austin 1978, no writ). However, its underlying facts must “be such that a reviewing court can fairly and reasonably say that they
support
the ‘ultimate findings of fact required for the decision.’ ”
Gage v. Railroad Commission, supra.
(Emphasis added).
Section 16(b) of Article 6252-13a, requires the Board to state
only
those findings that
support
its ultimate statutory findings. The Board is not required to state facts that it
rejected
and upon which it did
not
rely for support of its ultimate findings.
As we have previously pointed out, possible dual service by the proposed directors was merely a factor before the Board for its consideration in determining the ultimate question of the existence of the statutory criteria listed in Article 342-305(A). It appears from both the record and the order that the Board found the other evidence presented by the applicants to outweigh the counterevidence of dual service presented by appellees. As the order reveals that the Board supported its ultimate conclusions on those other grounds, the Board was not required to state the reasons why it rejected appellees’ dual service arguments.
The only remaining issues before this Court are whether the order of the State Banking Board granting the application for charter of the proposed Texas State Bank is supported by substantial evidence and whether that order adequately recites the factors underlying its ultimate statutory conclusions.
It is now firmly established that appeal from orders of the State Banking Board are governed by the substantial evidence rule. Tex.Rev.Civ.Stat.Ann. art. 342-115(4) (1973);
Chemical Bank & Trust Company
v.
Falkner,
369 S.W.2d 427 (Tex.1963).
See:
McCalla,
The Administrative Procedure and Texas Register Act,
28 Baylor L.Rev. 445, 469 (1976).
“Substantial evidence” need not be much evidence, and though “substantial” means more than a mere scintilla, or some evidence, it is less than is required to sustain a verdict being attacked as against the great weight and preponderance of the evidence.
Purolator Courier Corp. v. Railroad Commission,
548 S.W.2d 486 (Tex.Civ.App.—Austin 1977, writ ref’d n. r. e.);
State Banking Board v. Proposed Central Park Bank of Dallas,
522 S.W.2d 717 (Tex.Civ.App.—Austin 1975, writ ref’d n. r. e.).
See :
Reavley,
Substantial Evidence and Insubstantial Review in Texas,
23 Sw.L.J. 239 (1969).
To determine whether the Board’s decision finds reasonable support in substantial evidence, we must determine whether the evidence as a whole is such that reasonable minds could not have reached the conclusion that the Board must have reached in order to justify its action.
Hardy Street Investors v. Texas Water Rights Commission,
536 S.W.2d 85 (Tex.Civ.App.—Waco 1976, writ ref’d n. r. e.).
As the Banking Board’s order is presumed to be supported by substantial evidence, appellees had the burden before the district court to demonstrate that reasonable minds could not have reached the same conclusion as that of the Board.
United Savings Association of Texas v. Vandygriff, supra; First National Bank, Grapevine v. State Banking Board of Texas,
419 S.W.2d 878 (Tex.Civ.App.—Austin 1967, writ ref’d n. r. e.).
All things considered, if there exists evidence which would support either granting or denying the application, the Board’s order is entitled to be given full effect.
Texas Aeronautics Commission v. Braniff Airways, Inc.,
454 S.W.2d 199 (Tex.1970); Min
eola State Bank v. First National Bank of Mineola,
574 S.W.2d 246 (Tex.Civ.App.—Austin 1978, writ ref’d n. r. e.).
In relation to the statutory criteria of public necessity and probability of profitable operation, there is evidence in the record that McAllen’s economy is growing and expanding; that the labor force is growing; that the economy shows increased earnings and gross taxable sales; that there exists a strong commercial retail environment; that there has been an increase in housing construction permits; and that the financial community has benefited from the economic prosperity. The evidence also shows that the McAllen State Bank holds approximately 56% of all McAllen bank deposits, 57% of all McAllen bank loans, and 56% of all McAllen bank assets; that McAllen State Bank’s dominance in the marketplace is on the increase; and that four of the proposed directors of the Texas State Bank are on the board of the McAllen State Bank. There is also testimony that the Valley National Bank and the Metropolitan National Bank have experienced a decline in total assets during the last year.
Our study of the record and the Board’s order demonstrates that the Board considered all the evidence before it but concluded that the financial, economic and demographic evidence of McAllen’s growth was more persuasive. There is substantial evidence in the record to justify their action.
Texas Aeronautics Commission v. Braniff Airways, Inc., supra.
The Board’s
findings in this regard are fairly and reasonably supported by underlying facts contained in its order.
Gage v. Railroad Commission, supra.
As to the statutory criteria of sufficient banking experience, ability and standing and of action in good faith, the record firmly establishes the business, church, civic and professional credentials of each proposed director. In addition, the record also establishes that the charter application, executed under oath, stated that it was “made in good faith, with the purpose and intent that the affairs and business of the proposed
bank shall be honestly conducted upon good and sound business principles”; that the proposed directors believed another bank was needed in the area; that they were subscribing to purchase stock for long-term investment; that they had good reputations for honesty in the community; and that they intended to devote the time necessary to discharge their duties as directors. There was also evidence that the interlocking directors might not have the capacity to serve both banks simultaneously and that potential loyalty problems might arise if a dual director were called upon for business referrals.
Again, it is apparent from the record and the Board’s order that it considered all the evidence and found that presented by the applicants to be more convincing. The Board’s action is justified by substantial evidence contained in the record, and such action is fairly and reasonably supported by underlying facts contained in the order.
Gage v.
Railroad Commission, supra.
As we have determined that there is substantial evidence in the record supporting the criteria set out in Article 342-305(A) and that there is an adequate recitation of facts underlying those statutory criteria contained in the order, we reverse the judgment of the district court and here render judgment that the order of the State Banking Board granting a charter to the proposed Texas State Bank of McAllen be in all things affirmed.
PHILLIPS, C. J., not sitting.