SHANNON, Justice.
Stephenville Savings and Loan Association filed an application with the Savings and Loan Commissioner of Texas to establish a branch office in Weatherford, Parker County, Texas. The Commissioner after hearing entered an order approving the branch application.
Appellant, Mutual Building and Loan Association, a protestant before the Commissioner, filed suit in the district court of Travis County to set aside the order of the Commissioner. Appellees are Stephenville Savings and Loan Association and the Commissioner. The district court entered judgment affirming the Commissioner’s order. We will affirm the judgment of the district court.
Appellant’s first point of error is that the judgment is erroneous in that the Commissioner failed to set forth in the order a concise and explicit statement of the underlying facts supporting the findings on the ultimate statutory and regulatory criteria.
Texas Rev.Civ.Stat.Ann. art. 852a, § 11.-11(4) (1964) provides that the Commissioner’s order “. . . shall include findings of fact and conclusions of law, separately stated, on all issues material to the decision reached. Findings of fact, if set forth in statutory language, shall be accompanied by a concise and explicit statement of the underlying facts supporting the findings.”
Likewise,, the Administrative Procedure and Texas Register Act, Tex.Rev.Civ.Stat. Ann. art. 6252-13a, § 16(b) (Supp.1978), provides in part, “A final decision must include findings of fact and conclusions of law, separately stated. Findings of fact, if set forth in statutory language, must be accompanied by a concise and explicit statement of the underlying facts supporting the findings.”
The Commissioner’s findings of fact concerning statutory requirements and the underlying facts supporting findings of fact are set out below.
The “underlying facts”
are set out in the footnote for a better understanding of appellant’s points of error and not as a model of draftsmanship.
Appellant claims the Commissioner’s findings violate Art. 852a, § 11.11(4) in several respects: (1) the findings are, in part,
summaries of testimony instead of findings of “fact”; (2) some of the findings consist of the opinions of expert witnesses rather than “specific facts” to which they testified; (3) there are no findings with respect to the number of savings and loan facilities in the community or the level of existing services offered by those facilities or the competition among them; and (4) the findings are “so vague, hazy and conclusionary” as to fail to apprise the court and others of the Commissioner’s specific findings of fact.
If the Commissioner’s ultimate findings are stated in statutory language, Art. 852a, § 11.11(4) requires a
concise
and
explicit
statement of the underlying facts (proof) supporting them. Facts or proof in an administrative proceeding, as in a conventional trial, usually consist of testimony or documents. Much of appellees’ proof consisted of testimony of three witnesses, Stanley Allen Self, H. T. Latham, and James Ramsay. In deciding the ultimate facts as he did, the Commissioner necessarily relied upon much of their testimony. Article 852a, § 11.11(4) required the Commissioner to set out germane portions of the proof supporting the ultimate findings. The fact that the Commissioner identified the witnesses who produced the proof does not somehow make that proof less an underlying fact supportive of an ultimate finding.
The Commissioner’s statement of underlying proof refers to opinion testimony by appellees’ economic expert. The Commissioner was entitled to rely upon opinion evidence in the preparation of the order, at least in the absence of objection.
Gonzales County Savings and Loan Association
v.
Lewis,
486 S.W.2d 176 (Tex.Civ.App. 1972, writ ref’d n. r. e.). In that connection, appellant has preserved no complaint on appeal as to the admission of the opinion evidence.
Appellant’s third complaint of the judgment is that the Commissioner’s findings do not mention the number of savings and loan facilities in the community or the level of existing service offered by those facilities or the competition prevailing among them. We agree with appellees’ argument that Art. 852a § 11.11(4) does not require that the Commissioner comment upon every aspect of the record that may be relevant. In a given contest, there may be scores of factors that support or at least influence the judgment of the Commissioner. The omission of two or three factors should not be basis for reversal in face of the fact that the order contains numerous references to other significant factors that do sufficiently support the ultimate facts reached by the Commissioner.
“The mere presence of a generalization in the order does not render it invalid. Basic facts by their very nature are often in the form of ‘generalizations’ or ‘conclusions.’ ”
Citizens of Texas Savings and Loan Association v. Lewis,
483 S.W.2d 359, 363 (Tex.Civ.App.1972, writ ref’d n. r. e.). Although the Commissioner’s statement of underlying facts may be “vague, hazy and conclusionary,” the path which the Commissioner followed can be discerned.
Citizens of Texas Savings and Loan Association v. Lewis, supra.
The remaining two points of error are that the district court erred in entering judgment sustaining the order of the Commissioner for the reason that the order was not supported by substantial evidence. More specifically, appellant charges in point of error two that the order and findings of the Commissioner on the ultimate issues of public need, profitable operation, and absence of undue harm to other associations are not reasonably supported by substantial evidence. Point of error three is that the judgment is erroneous in that the finding of the Commissioner that appellee, Stephen-ville Savings and Loan Association, had a profitable operation for a three-year period next preceding the filing of its branch office application is not reasonably supported by substantial evidence.
An appeal from an order of the Savings and Loan Commissioner is governed by the substantial evidence rule. Because the Commissioner’s order is presumed to be supported by substantial evidence, it
was appellant’s burden to overcome that presumption.
City of San Antonio v. Texas Water Commission,
407 S.W.2d 752 (Tex.1966). To set aside the Commissioner’s order, it was appellant’s burden to demonstrate that the evidence, as a whole, was such that reasonable minds could not have concluded to grant the branch application.
Trapp v. Shell Oil Co.,
198 S.W.2d 424 (Tex.1946).
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SHANNON, Justice.
Stephenville Savings and Loan Association filed an application with the Savings and Loan Commissioner of Texas to establish a branch office in Weatherford, Parker County, Texas. The Commissioner after hearing entered an order approving the branch application.
Appellant, Mutual Building and Loan Association, a protestant before the Commissioner, filed suit in the district court of Travis County to set aside the order of the Commissioner. Appellees are Stephenville Savings and Loan Association and the Commissioner. The district court entered judgment affirming the Commissioner’s order. We will affirm the judgment of the district court.
Appellant’s first point of error is that the judgment is erroneous in that the Commissioner failed to set forth in the order a concise and explicit statement of the underlying facts supporting the findings on the ultimate statutory and regulatory criteria.
Texas Rev.Civ.Stat.Ann. art. 852a, § 11.-11(4) (1964) provides that the Commissioner’s order “. . . shall include findings of fact and conclusions of law, separately stated, on all issues material to the decision reached. Findings of fact, if set forth in statutory language, shall be accompanied by a concise and explicit statement of the underlying facts supporting the findings.”
Likewise,, the Administrative Procedure and Texas Register Act, Tex.Rev.Civ.Stat. Ann. art. 6252-13a, § 16(b) (Supp.1978), provides in part, “A final decision must include findings of fact and conclusions of law, separately stated. Findings of fact, if set forth in statutory language, must be accompanied by a concise and explicit statement of the underlying facts supporting the findings.”
The Commissioner’s findings of fact concerning statutory requirements and the underlying facts supporting findings of fact are set out below.
The “underlying facts”
are set out in the footnote for a better understanding of appellant’s points of error and not as a model of draftsmanship.
Appellant claims the Commissioner’s findings violate Art. 852a, § 11.11(4) in several respects: (1) the findings are, in part,
summaries of testimony instead of findings of “fact”; (2) some of the findings consist of the opinions of expert witnesses rather than “specific facts” to which they testified; (3) there are no findings with respect to the number of savings and loan facilities in the community or the level of existing services offered by those facilities or the competition among them; and (4) the findings are “so vague, hazy and conclusionary” as to fail to apprise the court and others of the Commissioner’s specific findings of fact.
If the Commissioner’s ultimate findings are stated in statutory language, Art. 852a, § 11.11(4) requires a
concise
and
explicit
statement of the underlying facts (proof) supporting them. Facts or proof in an administrative proceeding, as in a conventional trial, usually consist of testimony or documents. Much of appellees’ proof consisted of testimony of three witnesses, Stanley Allen Self, H. T. Latham, and James Ramsay. In deciding the ultimate facts as he did, the Commissioner necessarily relied upon much of their testimony. Article 852a, § 11.11(4) required the Commissioner to set out germane portions of the proof supporting the ultimate findings. The fact that the Commissioner identified the witnesses who produced the proof does not somehow make that proof less an underlying fact supportive of an ultimate finding.
The Commissioner’s statement of underlying proof refers to opinion testimony by appellees’ economic expert. The Commissioner was entitled to rely upon opinion evidence in the preparation of the order, at least in the absence of objection.
Gonzales County Savings and Loan Association
v.
Lewis,
486 S.W.2d 176 (Tex.Civ.App. 1972, writ ref’d n. r. e.). In that connection, appellant has preserved no complaint on appeal as to the admission of the opinion evidence.
Appellant’s third complaint of the judgment is that the Commissioner’s findings do not mention the number of savings and loan facilities in the community or the level of existing service offered by those facilities or the competition prevailing among them. We agree with appellees’ argument that Art. 852a § 11.11(4) does not require that the Commissioner comment upon every aspect of the record that may be relevant. In a given contest, there may be scores of factors that support or at least influence the judgment of the Commissioner. The omission of two or three factors should not be basis for reversal in face of the fact that the order contains numerous references to other significant factors that do sufficiently support the ultimate facts reached by the Commissioner.
“The mere presence of a generalization in the order does not render it invalid. Basic facts by their very nature are often in the form of ‘generalizations’ or ‘conclusions.’ ”
Citizens of Texas Savings and Loan Association v. Lewis,
483 S.W.2d 359, 363 (Tex.Civ.App.1972, writ ref’d n. r. e.). Although the Commissioner’s statement of underlying facts may be “vague, hazy and conclusionary,” the path which the Commissioner followed can be discerned.
Citizens of Texas Savings and Loan Association v. Lewis, supra.
The remaining two points of error are that the district court erred in entering judgment sustaining the order of the Commissioner for the reason that the order was not supported by substantial evidence. More specifically, appellant charges in point of error two that the order and findings of the Commissioner on the ultimate issues of public need, profitable operation, and absence of undue harm to other associations are not reasonably supported by substantial evidence. Point of error three is that the judgment is erroneous in that the finding of the Commissioner that appellee, Stephen-ville Savings and Loan Association, had a profitable operation for a three-year period next preceding the filing of its branch office application is not reasonably supported by substantial evidence.
An appeal from an order of the Savings and Loan Commissioner is governed by the substantial evidence rule. Because the Commissioner’s order is presumed to be supported by substantial evidence, it
was appellant’s burden to overcome that presumption.
City of San Antonio v. Texas Water Commission,
407 S.W.2d 752 (Tex.1966). To set aside the Commissioner’s order, it was appellant’s burden to demonstrate that the evidence, as a whole, was such that reasonable minds could not have concluded to grant the branch application.
Trapp v. Shell Oil Co.,
198 S.W.2d 424 (Tex.1946). Substantial evidence need not be much evidence, and although “substantial” means more than a mere scintilla, or some evidence, it is less than is required to sustain a verdict being attacked as against the great weight and preponderance of the evidence. Reavley,
Substantial Evidence and Insubstantial Review in Texas,
23 Sw.L.J. 239 (1969). If there existed substantial evidence which would have supported either the grant or denial of the application, the Commissioner’s order is entitled to full effect.
Texas Aeronautics Commission v. Braniff Airways, Inc.,
454 S.W.2d 199 (Tex.1970).
Before the judgment of the district court may be reversed, we must hold that the order of the Commissioner is not supported by substantial evidence and that the evidence so conclusively required a negative finding with respect to public need or profitable operation or absence of undue harm or profitable operation for a three-year period that the Commissioner’s refusal to make a negative finding of one or more of those ultimate facts was arbitrary or capricious.
Gerst v. Cain,
388 S.W.2d 168 (Tex.1965). To the contrary, we are of the opinion that there existed substantial evidence at the time of the entry of the Commissioner’s order that would have supported the granting of the branch application. The posture of the record being such, it follows that the order of the Commissioner granting the application for branch office should be given effect and that the judgment of the district court should be affirmed.
Texas Aeronautics Commission v. Braniff Airways, Inc., supra.
In the order granting the branch application, the Commissioner set out the underlying facts supporting the ultimate findings on public need, profitable operation, absence of undue harm, and profitable operation by Stephenville Savings and Loan Association for a three-year period next preceding the filing of the application. The underlying facts have been set out in the footnote, and no good purpose would be served by again summarizing those facts. We are satisfied that there existed substantial evidence which supported the Commissioner’s order.
Appellant points out two occurrences in the late 1960’s and early 1970’s that argue against the Commissioner’s finding on public need: (1) The Department of Defense closed Fort Wolters, a military base located in Parker and Palo Pinto Counties and (2) General Dynamics reduced its employment force. These occurrences resulted in a population decrease of nearly one thousand persons in Parker County between 1970 and 1974 and a decrease in the total earnings in Parker County for the same period of time.
We agree that appellant’s argument pertaining to Fort Wolters and General Dynamics is of significance concerning public need, but “[w]here there is substantial evidence which would support either affirmative or negative findings, the order must stand, notwithstanding the Commissioner may have struck a balance with which the court might differ.”
Gerst v. Goldsbury,
434 S.W.2d 665, 667 (Tex.1968).
The judgment is affirmed.