Stanley Clayman and Melvin Clayman v. Goodman Properties, Inc

518 F.2d 1026, 171 U.S. App. D.C. 88

• Court: Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit
• Decided: October 8, 1974
• Docket: 71-1238
• Status: Published

Opinions

SPOTTSWOOD W. ROBINSON, III, Circuit Judge:

This appeal challenges a judgment of the District Court halting a suit in which appellants sought damages from appellee for an alleged breach of contract. Stanley and Melvin dayman, the appellants, assert that Goodman Properties, Inc., the appellee, dishonored an agreement entitling them to acquire a half interest in an apartment project. Goodman Properties says it justifiably terminated the agreement. At the conclusion of the parties’ evidentiary presentations over four days of trial, the District Court directed a verdict for Goodman Properties, and the daymans assign that action as error. We affirm.

I

Goodman Properties owns a 140-unit garden-type apartment project in Bladensburg, Maryland, formerly known as Gateway Apartments.¹ In the 1960’s, the project had fallen into poor physical and financial condition. Until his death in August. 1969, the principal officer and stockholder of Goodman Properties was Reuben Goodman, a dermatologist and an investor, primarily in the stock market. For many years Dr. Goodman had known the daymans,² who were dentists and also investors, mainly in real estate.³ The daymans had built several garden-type apartments, and were associated in the ownership and management of other similar properties.

In early 1968, Dr. Goodman and the Drs. dayman conducted a series of talks centering on the problems of Gateway Apartments, which Dr. Goodman attributed to faulty management. The Clay-mans inspected Gateway Apartments, made recommendations to Dr. Goodman, and a business proposition soon emerged. It was, in the main, a proposal that the daymans take over the management and rehabilitation of Gateway Apartments on a fee basis with an option to purchase a half interest therein, During the course of the negotiations, the daymans introduced Dr. Goodman to David H. Hillman, and informed Dr. Goodman that they desired to bring him into the transaction. Hillman was a certified public accountant with some experience in property management, and in those capacities had performed satisfactorily for the daymans in the past.⁴ Dr. Goodman concurred, and Hillman became a participant along with the daymans.⁵

The negotiations culminated in a written contract, dated April 1, 1968. The parties thereto were Goodman Properties, on the one side, and the daymans and Hillman on the other.⁶ The agreement required the latter to manage and renovate ⁷ Gateway Apartments, awarded them a fee on gross income,⁸ and extended to them a one-year option to buy a 50 percent interest in the enterprise.⁹ The term of the contract was one year initially and thereafter until canceled by one side or the other, subject to earlier termination on occurrence of any of certain specified contingencies.

During the months ensuing, the resuscitation of Gateway Apartments, both physically and financially, went forward. The premises were improved, rent scales were restructured and leases to tenants were strengthened. Although the project continued to operate at a deficit, the vacancy rate dropped,¹⁰ gross receipts rose,¹¹ and cash distributions to Goodman Properties increased.¹² These were results of planning and execution in which the daymans and Hillman each played some part.¹³

During the latter part of 1968, however, the arrangement began to deteriorate. As we have stated, Dr. Goodman died in August. In October, Hillman told counsel for Goodman Properties, that he would be terminating his association with the daymans with respect to Gateway Apartments.¹⁴ In late December or early January, counsel was informed that Hillman had dissolved his relationship with the daymans, and that event marked the beginning of the end.

On or about January 7, 1969, counsel advised the daymans of Goodman Properties’ view that Hillman’s disaffiliation constituted a breach of the contract between the parties. The contract, said the letter, “was entered into in reliance upon the performance of duties by the three parties as an entity.” ¹⁵ Goodman Properties, the letter continued, was willing to commit the management of Gateway Apartments to the daymans, but under a new contract mutually agreeable to those concerned. The letter inquired as to the wishes of the day-mans in that regard and suggested a meeting if they were interested. Subsequent correspondence between attorneys for the parties failed to resolve the matter, and no new contract eventuated. In late February, Goodman Properties served formal notice terminating the contract 60 days thereafter¹⁶

The daymans then instituted suit. Their theory is that they fulfilled their contractual obligations to Goodman Properties and became entitled, by an alleged exercise of the option, to acquire the agreed-upon half interest in Gateway Apartments. Because Goodman Properties refused to convey that interest, the complaint claimed damages for loss of the bargain. Goodman Properties, on the other hand, has insisted not only that Hillman’s withdrawal violated the contract but also that the daymans’ failure to join Hillman as a party to the litigation was fatal.¹⁷

In its answer to the complaint, Goodman Properties first asserted that Hill-man was an indispensible but unjoined party.¹⁸ On the day before trial commenced, Goodman Properties filed a motion to dismiss the action on that ground. At the conclusion of opening statements, the District Court denied the motion without prejudice, and when the daymans rested their case in chief, denied a motion for a directed verdict.¹⁹ When, however, all of the evidence was in, the court directed a verdict in favor of Goodman Properties.²⁰ So it was that Hillman’s disassociation with the daymans in the Gateway Apartments venture exacted its full toll.

II

In this court, the daymans advance two grounds for their contention that the District Court erred in directing the verdict for Goodman Properties. The first is that, as a matter of law, Hillman’s withdrawal from the Gateway Apartments venture was legally innocuous because the contract did not specifically require Hillman to personally perform anything in particular. The second ground is that, as a matter of fact, the circumstances surrounding formation of the contract show that the day-mans’ expected contributions to the enterprise was its vital concern and that Hillman’s participation was not a condition material to exercise of the option. So, the daymans argue, the District Court should either have directed a verdict in their favor or submitted the case to the jury for determinations as to the intentions of the parties and the substantiality of any breach caused by Hill-man’s departure. Goodman Properties, on the other hand, reasserts its position that the absence of Hillman as a litigant requires dismissal of the suit, a premise which the District Court accepted.²¹ The question initially confronting us is whether the contract summoned the daymans and Hillman to a standard of performance which less than all three could not possibly meet.²²

In the language of the contract, it is “between Goodman Properties, Inc.,” which “hereinafter [is] called the ‘Owner,’ ” and “Melvin dayman, Stanley dayman, and David Hillman, jointly hereinafter called ‘Prospective Purchaser’ ” or “ ‘purchaser.’ ” Goodman Properties says the word “jointly” removes any doubt as to the parties’ purpose to benefit and burden the daymans and Hillman integrally rather than severally.²³ The daymans say, however, that “jointly,” taken in conjunction with the language immediately following, “merely describes the three parties and does not mean that all three had to do everything as a group.”²⁴ We do not pause to resolve the dispute on this aspect of the contract for we are satisfied that for a more important reason the contract was substantively joint as to the daymans and Hillman.²⁵

We have had occasion in the fairly recent past to point out that “[t]he general rule is ‘that the obligation created by the promise of several persons is joint unless the contrary is made evident.’ ” ²⁶ The contract before us falls squarely within the ambit of that principle. Throughout the contract, Goodman Properties is referred to by the word “owner.” Similarly, the Clay-mans and Hillman are invariably referred to collectively by the words “prospective purchaser” or “purchaser,” always in the singular. Nowhere does the contract distinguish the three in any way, or separate the rights and obligations among them. On the contrary, the contract uniformly treats the three as a team, without so much as a whisper that they are to be differentiated in any wise for any purpose.

That, which is so true of the contract in general is equally so of the option provisions in particular. “The owner hereby grants to the purchaser an option to purchase,” it reads, upon the terms and conditions laid upon “the purchaser.” ²⁷ This formulation, devoid of any language of severance,²⁸ plainly binds the daymans and Hillman together to a performance of conditions precedent to exercise of the option.²⁹ To be sure, the option provision does not in so many words characterize the obligation to perform as entire and indivisible. The point, however, is not whether the contract expressly describes an obligation of two or more as joint, but whether it makes it manifest that the obligation is several.³⁰ Here the completely undivided nature of the performance called for refutes the thesis that it could legitimately be undertaken by only two of the three.³¹

We are mindful that the common law requirement that joint contractors sue and be sued jointly has been altered in the District of Columbia by statute,³² but that change has no bearing on the substantive aspects of this litigation. The District statute provides merely that “[f]or the purpose of action thereon” contracts and obligations entered into by two or more persons are “deemed to be joint and several.” ³³ As the quoted language indicates and our decisions make evident, the statute does not affect the substantive rights and duties of the parties. Many years ago this court, addressing a predecessor provision, admonished that

It merely affects the remedy. It relates only to procedure. It does not convert a joint instrument into a joint and several instrument, or change a joint obligor into a joint and several obligor. The contract and the relations of the obligations of the contractors remain unchanged.³⁴

More recently, we cautioned that another — a later — predecessor did “not determine, of course, whether each co-promisor has agreed to be liable for the entire performance or only for a part thereof” ³⁵ “That determination,” we said, “is governed by the terms of the contract.” ³⁶

It cannot be doubted that the current statute embodies the same limitation. It is but a recodification of earlier versions,³⁷ and in terms it applies only “[f]or the purposes of action.” ³⁸ Consequently, it has no bearing on the present discussion. We have long been wedded to, the proposition that “any number of persons may bind themselves jointly for the performance of one entire duty, and so become sureties for one another for the performance of the thing contracted to be done.” ³⁹ Whether they do or not depends upon the contract they choose to make.⁴⁰ We reaffirm these principles today.

In these views, we perceive no basis for resort to evidence depicting the circumstances surrounding the making of the contract before us. We need do little more than reiterate that “[t]he parol evidence rule requires that ‘[w]hen two parties have made a contract and have expressed it in a writing to which they have both assented as the complete and accurate integration of that contract, evidence, whether parol or otherwise, of antecedent understandings and negotiations will not be admitted for the purpose of varying or contradicting the writing.’ ” ⁴¹ The consequences which the law attaches to a written contract are as much a part of it as the terms it sets forth, and the legal effect of the contract can no more be changed or modified by parol evidence than it could have had it been made express.⁴² The law ascribes to the contractual obligation of two or more a joint character unless the contract makes evident an intention that a several performance is to be indulged.⁴³ That legal incident of the option in suit cannot be abrogated by recourse to evidence extrinsic to the contract.⁴⁴

We conclude, then, that in the case at bar the jury had no function to perform with respect to ascertainment of the joint or several nature of the contract. Construction of unambiguous features of a written contract is a problem for the court, not the jury.⁴⁵ Put another way, the legal effect of reasonably clear terms of a contract is a question of law for judges ⁴⁶ The admissibility of extrinsic evidence, and possible need for the jury to assess it, depend upon the existence of an ambiguity in the contract⁴⁷ Only if its meaning is dubious, and the evidence of the parties’ intention is uncertain or conflicting, is there appropriate occasion ter seek the conclusion of jurors as to what was in mind.⁴⁸ Moreover, the question whether the contract is ambiguous or not is one of law to be determined by the court.⁴⁹ A contract is not ambiguous simply because the parties disagree on its interpretation,⁵⁰ and we see nothing in this case beyond that.

Ill

There remains, however, the question whether Hillman’s disaffiliation with the Gateway Apartments project was an event sufficiently material to justify the refusal of Goodman Properties to accept the dayman’s effort to exercise the option. Although the contract enumerates several contingencies furnishing ground for terminating the contract, we find none specifically referable to withdrawal of one of the optionees. We turn, then, to well settled legal principles for assistance in the resolution of this facet of the litigation.⁵¹

In the main, a party to a bilateral contract is entitled to the performance he bargained for. He may insist upon a performance by the other party which conditions his own duty to perform.⁵² In any case, he may demand, in the way of the other’s performance, substantial compliance with the terms of the contract.⁵³ In most cases — perhaps all but a relatively few- — a promisor’s tender in good faith of a performance fully in compliance with the contract save for minor and unimportant deviations avoids a breach enabling the promisee to escape his obligations thereunder.⁵⁴

When, however, the contract stipulates a performance involving a highly personal element, it is obvious that a performance lacking that element does not measure up. Contracts calling for professional services as an attorney⁵⁵ or a physician ⁵⁶ exemplify performances too personal to permit imposition of the services of another upon the promisee.⁵⁷ Similarly, contracts extending financial credit or trust to a contracting party are of such a personal nature that substitution of another in his stead does not legally suffice.⁵⁸ “[E]very one,” says the Supreme Court, “has a right to select and determine with whom he will contract, and cannot have another person thrust upon him without his consent.”⁵⁹ He also, says the Court, has “the right to the benefit [he] anticipate [s] from the character, credit and substance of the party with whom [he] contract[s].” ⁶⁰ Moreover, says another court, “ [i] t is competent for the parties to make any contract a personal one no matter what the subject-matter.”⁶¹ Professional skill and financial integrity are qualities as to which everyone is prone to exercise a high degree of selectivity- — a prerogative upon which all would-be contractors may insist. The opinion neither of judge nor juror as to the capabilities of a replacement is acceptable as a substitute for the promisee’s own judgment and tastes in the matter.⁶²

We need not assay Hillman’s disassociation in terms of its effect upon the management and rehabilitation of Gateway Apartments, notwithstanding that otherwise he presumably would have contributed some personal service toward those activities.⁶³ Nor need we consider the disassociation in relation to cash payments⁶⁴ which the contract bound the optionees to make to Goodman Properties upon consummation of the option.⁶⁵ There is, however, an option condition which, as a matter of law, the daymans cannot satisfy without a concurrent performance by Hillman, and that is catastrophic to their lawsuit.⁶⁶

The contract requires the optionees, upon an exercise of the option, to assume one-half of a large mortgage indebtedness on the property.⁶⁷ We carefully note that the requirement is an assumption of half of the outstanding balance, as distinguished from acceptance of a half interest in Gateway Apartments subject to the mortgage.⁶⁸ Upon such an assumption, the optionees would, become personally liable along with Goodman Properties for repayment of half of the indebtedness.⁶⁹ They would, too, become personally liable to Goodman Properties in the event that it had to pay any more than the' remaining half.⁷⁰ Thus, as a precondition to availing themselves of the option, the optionees —all three, we have held⁷¹ — would pledge their credit, to the tune of half of the debt, primarily to further secure the mortgagee and secondarily to protect Goodman Properties against payment exceeding the other half.

The question, then, becomes whether, in light of these considerations, a tender of performance of the option conditions by but two of the three optionees triggered the obligation of Goodman Properties to abide the option. Stated somewhat differently, the question is whether the performance tendered could legally comply with one of the terms upon which the option was conferred. We think the answer must clearly be in the negative. It was the personal credit of Hillman as well as the credit of the daymans on the mortgage assumption that Goodman Properties agreed to, and which the contract entitled it to receive. When the daymans sought to exercise the option alone, they could not give the performance for which their adversary had contracted. Goodman Properties has the right to stand on its contract. It cannot be compelled to accept what plainly is considerably less than what the contract requires.

We are advertent to the fact that most of the cases dealing with contractual extensions of financial credit have involved situations wherein one contracting party attempted to assign his right to purchase on credit to another who was not a party to the contract.⁷² But the basic principle controlling decision of those cases has also been applied— properly, we think — where one party assigned his rights to another party on the debtor side of a contract extending credit.⁷³ We are unable to distinguish a case — the one here — in which one of three parties whose credit was bargained for as a contract term declines to participate in its performance.⁷⁴ In each situation the contract demands the credit of particular contractors, and must be given its just due.

The daymans have repeatedly emphasized that Hillman was young, relatively inexperienced, and unknown to Dr. Goodman prior to commencement of the negotiations leading to the contract. All of this seems to be true, but it is of no moment. When we are dealing with a contract, we are not at liberty to inquire as to why the contractors chose to contract the way they did. Here the parties cast their option agreement in terms exacting the joint performance of all three of the optionees. It is not our function to ferret out their reasons for doing so, or to rewrite their agreement when dissatisfaction develops. Our duty is to enforce the contract as made.

The judgment appealed from is

Affirmed.

1 . Now known as Capital View Apartments.

2 . The daymans had been boyhood friends of Dr. Goodman’s son, and Dr. Goodman advised Dr. Melvin dayman in stock investments.

3 . In the building in which they conducted a joint dental practice, the daymans also maintained a separate office and staff for the management of their real estate interests. By devoting three days apiece to dentistry and three days to their real estate interests weekly, they were able to pursue both successfully. The daymans were not licensed real estate brokers, and they engaged in real estate management and development only when they had a proprietary interest therein. See note 63, infra.

4 . Hillman was the daymans’ accountant, the successful manager of property for them, and a i>artner in one of their real estate ventures.

5 . See note 25, infra.

6 . See text infra following note 22.

7 . Among other duties, the daymans and Hillman were “to rent, lease, operate and manage the” project; “[t]o make or cause to be made and supervise repairs and alterations, and to do decorating on” the premises ; and to “renovat[e] . . . the premises with regard to signs, painting, landscaping, kitchen remodeling, etc., as shall in [their] discretion be required,” for which latter purpose Goodman Properties bound itself to make the sum of $20,000 available.

8 . The fee was 5% of monthly gross collections from rents, laundry machines and other sources except the swimming pool, subject to reduction to 4% in the event of exercise of the option. See note 27, infra.

9 . Relevant details appear in text infra at notes 23-25, 27-28.

10 . In March, 1968, the vacancy rate was 32%. By March, 1969, Gateway Apartments neared full occupancy.

11 . The increase in gross receipts for the year ending March 31, 1969, was about 8% above the preceding year.

12 . The distributions were three times larger than those prior to April, 1968.

13 . Some activities were - those of the day-mans alone and others followed consultation with Hillman. The latter also handled the accounting and other matters. The Clay-mans paid the salary of an employee who assisted Hillman in these respects, and also reimbursed Hillman for his overhead. A resident manager handled day-to-day matters.

14 . By letter dated October 1, 1968, Hillman also notified the daymans that after December 31 he would not participate as a general partner in another of their real estate enterprises. The letter stated that an increase in the demands of his accounting practice curtailed other activities and that “[i]n addition, the partnership’s liabilities, which I have personally endorsed have seriously hampered my credit and borrowing ability.” Hillman offered to turn his 10% interest in that enterprise over to the day-mans, and they accepted.

15 . The letter makes unmistakable the reference to the daymans and Hillman as “the three parties.”

16 . This was fully in conformity with the provision of the contract governing termination.

17 . Before this suit was filed, the daymans discussed with Hillman the possibility of his joinder. Hillman refused unless the day-mans would indemnify him against any counterclaims and litigation expense. That was not doin', so Hillman did not join, nor lias lio sought to intervene in the litigation. The record discloses that iu late April, 1969— after expiration of the. contract in suit— Goodman Properties engaged as manager of Gateway Apartments a realty company in which Hillman is a 50% partner.

18 . See Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(7), 12(b)(3), 19.

19 . See Fed.R.Civ.P. 50(a).

20 . See note 21, infra, and accompanying text.

21 . While direction of the verdict was predicated' on that ground, the colloquy between court and counsel attests the court’s awareness that Hillman’s indispensability to tbe lawsuit portended his indispensability to performance of tbe option conditions. Without intimating a view on tbe procedural problem, we rest our decision on tbe substantive considerations.

22 . In the process of interpreting tbe contract, and to tbe extent that legal principles influence the interpretation, we apply the law of the District of Columbia. While the Gateway Apartments project is situated just outside the District in Maryland, it is the District, on the issue of contract construction, that bears the more significant relationship to tbe parties and tbe transaction. See Fowler v. A & A Co., 262 A.2d 344, 348 (D.C.App.1970) ; Restatement. (Second) of Conflict of Laws §§ 188, 204 (1971). Goodman Properties, a moving spirit in the transaction, is a District corporation, and its principal place of business is in the District. The daymans, the other prime movers, likewise maintain their place of business in the District. The record discloses that the contract negotiations occurred predominantly in the District; the contract was hammered out by lawyers practicing in the District, and seemingly was executed in the District. The subject of the contract is not the ordinary sale and purchase of real estate but rather tbe formation of a business venture,; the issues in litigation concern not the essential validity of the contract but rather its meaning. So the contacts possessing by far tbe greater importance to tbe task of interpretation are those with tbe District. Compare Maloney v. E. I. Du Pont de Nemours & Co., 122 U.S.App.D.C. 268, 270, 352 F.2d 936, 938, cert. denied, 383 U.S. 948, 86 S.Ct. 1201, 16 L.Ed.2d 210 (1965).

23 . “Co-promisors are liable (1) jointly if all of them have promised the entire performance ; or (2) severally if they have promised separate performances.” Welch v. Sherwin, 112 U.S.App.D.C. 124, 126 n. 3, 300 F.2d 716, 718 n. 3 (1962).

24 . Brief for Appellants 20. Thus the argument seeks to capitalize on the absence of a comma after “jointly.” But punctuation “is a most fallible guide by which to interpret a writing,” Ewing’s Lessee v. Burnett, 36 U.S. (11 Pet.) 41, 53, 9 L.Ed. 624 (1837) ; see also Holmes v. Phenix Ins. Co., 98 F. 240, 241, 47 L.R.A. 308 (8th Cir. 1899) ; Casriel v. King, 2 N.J. 45, 65 A.2d 514, 516 (1949), and it never prevails over a meaning which emerges plainly from a consideration of the entire document. Ewing’s Lessee v. Burnett, supra, 36 U.S. (11 Pet.) at 41, 9 L.Ed. 624; Holmes v. Phenix Ins. Co., supra, 98 F. at 241; Casriel v. King, supra, 65 A.2d at 516.

25 . We note in passing the strong indication by the record that the jury could hardly have failed to find that the parties unmistakably intended that the obligations of the daymans and Hillman were indivisible. The evidence at trial shows that when the Clay-mans informed Dr. Goodman that they planned to bring Hillman into the transaction, Dr. Goodman made it known that “[h]is prior experiences with other property managers [hadl led to the conclusion that the property would never become a financial success, unless the person actually running the day-to-day operations of the project had some personal interest in the same.” The evidence further discloses that the original draft of the contract designated Goodman Properties as the party of one part and the daymans and Hillman “jointly and severally” as parties of the other part; that Dr. Goodman insisted that the words “and severally” be deleted to require that all three act jointly in the matter; and that the three and their attorney agreed to the change without debate. Counsel who had represented Goodman Properties in the contract negotiations testified:

Q. Did you tell specifically . . . why Dr. Goodman wanted to deal with all three of these people?

A. I’m sure I did. I’m sure I told him as I told the others that Dr. Goodman had experienced bad management problems in this property by virtue of having a company which was a little bit unrelated to the property itself. ... We never really had a continuity of interest on behalf of the management of the property, and it was Dr. Goodman’s desire to have someone involved in this property who was directly related to the property, who had an interest in it, and not merely title holders and never know who he would be dealing with. And, therefore, there was insistence on the use of the word “jointly” because we were dealing with these people as a unit.

In similar vein, Hillman testified :

Q. Now, in negotiating for this contract, ... do you recall whether or not there was any discussion between the parties relative to the words “jointly and severally,” which were contained in the original contract and stricken?

A. There was some discussion.

Q. What was the discussion?

A. The discussion was that the Goodman interests wanted the parties jointly liable, because they were interested in making sure that there were three persons responsible, and that they were dealing with three people, and intended to deal with three people throughout.

Since this testimony was uncontradicted, there is no reason to assume that the jury would not have readily accepted it.

26 . Welch v. Sherwin, supra note 23, 112 U.S.App.D.C. at 126, 300 F.2d at 718, quoting 2 Williston, Contracts § 323 (1936). Accord, St. Regis Paper Co. v. Stuart, 214 F.2d 762, 766 (1st Cir. 1954), cert. denied, 348 U.S. 915, 75 S.Ct. 296, 99 L.Ed. 717 (1955) ; Tradewell Foods v. New York Credit Men’s Adjustment Bureau, 179 F.2d 567, 569 (2d Cir. 1950) ; United States Printing & Lithograph Co. v. Powers, 233 N.Y. 143, 152, 135 N.E. 225, 227 (1922) ; Morrison v. American Sur. Co., 224 Pa. 41, 73 A. 10, 11 (1909) ; Restatement of Contracts § 112 (1932).

27 . The option provision, in its entirety, reads:

The owner hereby grants to the purchaser an option to purchase at any time during the first twelve months following the date hereof one-half (%) of the subject premises for the sum of Ten and no/100 ($10.00) Dollars and the purchaser’s assumption one-half (l/>) of the outstanding mortgage indebtedness together with an assumption of one-half (%) of all costs and expenses incident to the maintaining and operating of the premises from tlie date of exercising option. In the event the purchaser elects to exercise the option herein granted, the purchaser warrants as additional consideration therefor to reduce the purchaser’s commission of five percent (5%) herein designated to four percent (4%) and to reimburse to the owner one-half (i/>) of such portion of the Twenty Thousand and no/100 ($20,000.00) Dollars capital funds as shall have been actually spent under the provisions of this agreement. In the event the purchaser shall elect to exercise the option herein provided, all costs and expenses incident to the recordation or transfer of the property to the combined ownership of owner and purchaser shall be borne by the owner and purchaser equally.

28 . Compare Welch v. Sherwin, supra note 23, 112 U.S.App.D.C. at 126, 300 F.2d at 718.

29 . That is, in the event of election to exercise the option.

30 . See text supra at note 26.

31 . Compare Welch v. Sherwin, supra note 23, 112 U.S.App.D.C. at 126, 300 F.2d at 718.

32 . D.C.Code § 16-2101 (1973) provides:

For the purposes of action thereon, a contract or obligation entered into by two or more persons, whether :

(1) the persons are partners or joint contractors;

(2) the contract is under seal or not;

(3) it is written or verbalor

(4) it is expressed to be joint and several or not — is deemed to be joint and several.

33 . See note 32, supra.

34 . White v. Connecticut Gen. Life Ins. Co., 34 App.D.C. 460, 468 (1910).

35 . Welch v. Sherwin, supra note 23, 112 U.S.App.D.C. at 126 n. 3, 300 F.2d at 718 n. 3.

36 . Id.

37 . See revision notes to D.C.Code § 16-2101 (1973).

³⁸

39 . Love v. Stidham, 18 App.D.C. 306, 314 (1901) (emphasis in original).

40 . See Welch v. Sherwin, supra note 23, 112 U.S.App.D.C. at 126 n. 3, 300 F.2d at 718 n. 3; Hensler v. City of Los Angeles, 124 Cal.App.2d 71, 268 P.2d 12, 18 (1954).

41 . Murray v. Lichtman, 119 U.S.App.D.C. 250, 252, 339 F.2d 749, 751 (1964). See also Gibson v. United States, 106 U.S.App.D.C. 10, 12-13, 268 F.2d 586, 588-589 (1959).

42 . Calpetro Producers’ Syndicate v. Charles M. Woods Co., 206 Cal. 246, 274 P. 65, 68 (1929) ; Colorado Woman’s College v. Bradford-Robinson Printing Co., 114 Colo. 237, 157 P.2d 612, 614 (1945) ; Paul v. University Motor Sales Co., 283 Mich. 587, 278 N.W. 714, 719 (1938) ; Jimmerson v. Troy Seed Co., 236 Minn. 395, 53 3NT.W.2d 273, 277 (1952) ; Ross v. Stricker, 275 P.2d 991, 994 (Okl.Sup.Ct.1953) ; King v. Commercial Fin. Co., 163 Va. 260, 175 S.E. 733, 735 (1934).

⁴³

44 . A common application of the controlling principle is found in instances of contracts which omit specification of a time for performance. Since the legal effect of such a contract is that it is to be performed within a reasonable time, parol evidence is inadmissible to show an understanding that it would be performed at a particular time. Colorado Woman’s College v. Bradford-Robinson Printing Co., supra note 42, 157 P.2d at ; Gluckman v. Holzman, 30 Del.Ch. 60, 53 A.2d 246, 247 (1947) ; Dries v. Trenton Oil Co., 17 N.J.Super. 591, 86 A.2d 427, 429 (1952) ; Brazil v. Dupree, 197 Or. 581, 254 P.2d 1041, 1044 (1953).

45 . Battista v. Horton, Myers & Raymond, 76 U.S.App.D.C. 1, 3, 128 F.2d 29, 31 (1942) ; McReynolds v. Mortgage & Acceptance Corp., 56 App.D.C. 342, 343, 13 F.2d 313, 314 (1926) ; Turner v. Mertz, 55 App.D.C. 177, 180, 3 F.2d 348, 351, 39 A.L.R. 1140 (1925) ; Cowal v. Hopkins, 229 A.2d 452, 454 (D.C.App.1967) ; Rich v. Sills, 130 A.2d 920, 922 (D.C.Mun.App.1957) ; Arsenault v. Angle, 43 A.2d 709, 711 (D.C.Mun.App.1945).

46 . See Turner v. Mertz, supra note 45, 55 App.D.C. at 180, 3 F.2d at 351; Arsenault v. Angle, supra note 45, 43 A.2d at 711.

47 . News Union of Baltimore v. NLRB, 129 U.S.App.D.C. 272, 277, 393 F.2d 673, 678 (1968) ; Vakas v. Manuel, 114 U.S.App.D.C. 368, 369, 316 F.2d 369, 370 (1963) ; H. Herfurth, Jr., Inc. v. United States, 66 App.D.C. 220, 225, 85 F.2d 719, 724 (1936) ; Downs v. Bankhead, 44 App.D.C. 101, 105 (1915) ; Tyssowski v. F. H. Smith Co., 35 App.D.C. 403, 407 (1910) ; Atlantic Ref. Co. v. Wyoming Nat’l Bank, 356 Pa. 226, 51 A.2d 719, 723 (1947).

48 . Rich v. Sills, supra note 45, 130 A.2d at 922; Roberts v. Veterans Cooperative Housing Ass’n, 88 A.2d 324, 326 (D.C.Mun.App.1952) ; Bovello v. Falvey Granite Co., 71 A.2d 536, 537-538 (D.C.Mun.App.1950) ; Knowles Foundry & Mach. Co. v. National Plate Glass Co., 301 Ill.App. 128, 21 N.E.2d 913, 930 (1939) ; Montauk Corp. v. Seeds, 215 Md. 491, 138 A.2d 907, 910 (1958) ; Terminal Constr. Corp. v. Bergen County Hackensack River Sanitary Sewer Dist. Authority, 18 N.J. 294, 113 A.2d 787, 795 (1955).

49 . Pipkin v. FMC Corp., 427 F.2d 353, 356 (5th Cir. 1970) ; Tennessee Consol. Coal Co. v. UMW, 416 F.2d 1192, 1198 (6th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 964, 90 S.Ct. 999, 25 L.Ed.2d 256 (1970) ; Whiting Stoker Co. v. Chicago Stoker Corp., 171 F.2d 248, 251 (7th Cir. 1.948), cert. denied, 337 U.S. 915, 69 S.Ct. 1155, 93 L.Ed. 1725 (1949) ; Eastmount Constr. Co. v. Transport Mfg. & Equip. Co., 301 F.2d 34, 41 (8th Cir. 1962) ; Airborne Freight Corp. v. McPherson, 427 F.2d 1283, 1285 (9th Cir. 1970) ; Dixon v. Wilson, 192 A.2d 289, 291 (D.C.App.1963) ; Friedman v. Thomas J. Fisher & Co., 88 A. 2d 321, 322 (D.C.Mun.App.1952).

50 . Dixon v. Wilson, supra note 49.

51 . See note 22, supra.

52 . Merando v. Mathy, 80 U.S.App.D.C. 281, 282, 152 F.2d 21, 22 (1945), cert. denied, 327 U.S. 804, 66 S.Ct. 966, 90 L.Ed. 1029 (1946) ; Friedman v. Decatur Corp., 77 U.S.App.D.C. 326, 328, 135 F.2d 812, 814 (1943) ; Miller v. Schwinn, Inc., 72 App.D.C. 282, 284, 113 F.2d 748, 753 (1940) ; Burke v. Thomas J. Fisher & Co., 127 F.Supp. 1, 3 (D.D.C.), aff’d, 95 U.S.App.D.C. 85, 219 F.2d 767 (1955) ; Minmar Builders, Inc. v. Beltway Excavators, Inc., 246 A.2d 784, 787-788 (D.C.App.1968) ; Royal McBee Corp. v. Bryant, 217 A.2d 603, 607 (D.C.App.1966).

53 . Turner v. Henning, 49 App.D.C. 183, 184, 262 F. 637. 638 (1920) ; Ballou v. Basic Constr. Co., 407 F.2d 1137, 1140-1141 (4th Cir. 1969) ; United States v. E. J. Briggs Constr. Co., 116 F.2d 768, 774 (7th Cir. 1941) ; Cox v. Fremont County Pub. Bldg. Authority, 415 F.2d 882, 885-887 (10th Cir. 1969) ; Baer Bros. Land & Cattle Co. v. Reed, 197 F.2d 569, 572-573 (10th Cir. 1952) ; Matthew A. Welch & Sons, Inc. v. Bird, 193 A.2d 736, 738 (D.C.App.1963).

54 . See cases cited supra note 53.

55 . 10. g., Sloan v. Williams, 138 Ill. 43, 27 N.E. 531, 532 (1891) ; Corson v. Lewis, 77 Neb. 446, 109 N.W. 735, 736 (1906).

56 . E. g., Deaton v. Lawson, 40 Wash. 486, 82 P. 879, 880 (1905).

57 . See also Walker Elec. Co. v. New York Shipbuilding Co., 241 F. 569, 572-575 (3d Cir. 1917) ; Standard Chautauqua System v. Gift, 120 Kan. 101, 242 P. 145, 146 (1926) ; Citizens’ Bank & Trust Co. v. Barthet, 177 La. 652, 148 So. 906, 908 (1933) ; Eastern Advertising Co. v. McGaw, 89 Md. 72, 42 A. 923, 924-926 (1899) ; New England Cabinet Works v. Morris, 226 Mass. 246, 115 N.E. 315, 316-317 (1917) ; De Atley v. Streit, 81 Mont. 382, 263 P. 967, 971 (1928).

58 . Arkansas Valley Smelting Co. v. Belden Mining Co., 127 U.S. 379, 387-388, 8 S.Ct. 1308, 32 L.Ed. 246 (1888) ; Wetherell Bros. Co. v. United States Steel Co., 105 F.Supp. 81, 85-86 (D.Mass.1952), aff’d, 200 F.2d 761 (1st Cir. 1953) ; Sims v. Cordele Ice Co., 119 Ga. 597, 46 S.E. 841, 843 (1904) ; Harney v. Hellgren, 322 Ill. 126, 152 N.E. 481, 483 (1926) ; Salmon Lake Seed Co. v. Frontier Trust Co., 130 Me. 69, 153 A. 671, 673-674 (1931) ; E. M. Loews, Inc. v. Deutschmann, 344 Mass. 765, 184 N.E.2d 55, 56 (1962) ; D. C. Hardy Implement Co. v. South Bend Iron Works, 129 Mo. 222, 31 S. W. 599 (1895) ; Kutschinski v. Thompson, 101 N.J.Eq. 649, 138 A. 569, 571 (1927) ; New York Bank Note Co. v. Hamilton Bank Note Engraving & Printing Co., 180 N.Y. 280, 73 N.E. 48, 51-52 (1905) ; Menger v. Ward, 87 Tex. 622, 30 S.W. 853, 854-855 (1895) ; Kinman v. Howard, 465 S.W.2d 400, 401 (Tex.Civ.App.1971) ; J. Maury Dove Co. v. New River Coal Co., 150 Va. 796, 143 S.E. 317, 327 (1928).

59 . Arkansas Valley Smelting Co. v. Belden Mining Co., supra note 58, 127 U.S. at 387, 8 S.Ct. at 1309. See also Kinman v. Howard, supra note 58, 465 S.W.2d at 401.

60 . Humble v. Hunter, 116 Eng.Rep. 885, 887 (Ex. 1848).

61 . Frissell v. Nichols, 94 Fla. 403, 114 So. 431, 434 (1927)

62 . “In the relation of debtor and creditor there is more than simply the financial ability of the debtor and value of the security given. The character of the man is oftentimes worth more than his property as an assurance of prompt payment, and security of that which he holds upon which the lien exists. But it is useless to speculate upon reasons that might be assigned why a creditor might prefer one man to another as his debtor. It is his right to make his own contracts, with which courts cannot interfere except to enforce them as made.” Menger v. Ward, supra note 58, 30 S.W. at 855.

63 . The contact does not require continuing management of Gateway Apartments by the optionees after exercise of the option. It provides “that the ‘prospective purchasers’ are not licensed real estate brokers and” that “the management aspect involved in this agreement is in effect a trial period to permit them to attempt to improve the property and to determine adviseability [sic] to exercise the option to purchase a one-half (%) interest therein.”

64 . See note 27, supra.

65 . Sims v. Cordele Ice Co., supra note 58, 46 S.E. at 843. Compare Koehler Hinrichs Mercantile Co. v. Illinois Glass Co., 143 Minn. 344, 173 N.W. 703, 704-705 (1919) ; Carluccio v. 607 Hudson Street Holding Co., 141 N.J.Eq. 449, 57 A.2d 452, 454 (1948) ; Cochran v. Taylor, 273 N.Y. 172, 7 N.E.2d 89, 92-93 (1937).

66 . This problem, which we are about to discuss, was not treated in the parties’ briefs, but was raised by us during oral argument. The parties had the opportunity to address it during argument. They might also have filed post-argument memoranda by leave of court, which in such circumstances we grant freely. Compare Truck Drivers Local 413 v. NLRB, 159 U.S.App.D.C. 228, 241, 487 F.2d , 1099, 1112 (1973).

67 . gee note 27, supra. The record indicates that the unpaid principal balance of the mortgage at the time of attempted exercise of the option was slightly above $1 million.

⁶⁸

69 . Reid v. Whisenant, 161 Ga. 503, 131 S.E. 904, 906-908, 44 A.L.R. 599 (1926) ; Wright v. Wagner, 182 Md. 483, 34 A.2d 441, 445 (1943) ; Guardian Depositors Corp. v. Brown, 290 Mich. 433, 287 N.W. 798, 799-800 (1939) ; McLeod v. Building & Loan Ass’n, 168 Miss. 457, 151 So. 151, 152 (1933) ; Brown v. Turner, 202 N.C. 227, 162 S.E. 608, 609 (1932); Rendine v. Catoia, 52 R.I. 140, 158 A. 712, 713 (1932).

70 . Teas v. Kimball, 257 F.2d 817, 825 (5th Cir. 1958) ; Evans v. Sperry, 12 F.2d 438, 439 (E.D.Ill.1926) ; Malone v. United States, 326 F.Supp. 106, 111 (N.D.Miss.1971), aff’d, 455 F.2d 502 (5th Cir. 1972) ; Duke v. Kilpatrick, 231 Ala. 51, 163 So. 640, 641 (1935) ; Rosenthal v. Heft, 155 Md. 410, 142 A. 598, 602 (1928) ; Cecil v. Dollar, 147 Tex. 541, 218 S.W.2d 448, 450. (1949). See also Brown v. Brown, 58 Ariz. 333, 119 P.2d 938, 939-940 (1941) ; Thorsen v. Poe, 123 Ark. 77, 184 S.W. 427, 428 (1916) ; In re Keil’s Estate, 51 Del. 351, 145 A.2d 563, 565 (1958).

71 . See Part II, supra.

72 . See note 58, supra.

73 . D. C. Hardy Implement Co. v. South Bend Iron Works, supra note 58, 31 S.W. at 599; Paige v. Faure, 229 N.Y. 114, 127 N.E. 898, 899 (1920).

74 . IVe note, in addition to the principles discussed, that the contract expressly prohibited assignment by the purchasers without the written consent of Goodman Properties. It seems obvious that even without a formal assignment of Hillman’s interest to the daymans, enforcement of the option without his performance of the option conditions would have precisely that effect.