TAMM, Circuit Judge.
Appellant Southern Mutual Help Association (SMHA) commenced this action in the United States District Court for the District of Columbia, challenging a decision by the appellee Secretary of Health, Education and Welfare (HEW) to disapprove, after three years of federal support, an annual application submitted to obtain continued funding for appellant’s migrant worker health care facility in Franklin, Louisiana. The Secretary took this action without providing SMHA the opportunity for a hearing. The district court granted the appel-lee’s motion for summary judgment, holding that neither HEW regulations nor the due process clause of the fifth amendment required HEW to hold a hearing. We vacate the order of the district court, and remand to that court with the instruction to remand to the Secretary for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
I
Under authority of the Migrant Health Act (section 310 of the Public Health Service Act), 42 U.S.C. § 242h (1970),1 the Secretary of HEW awards grants to public and other nonprofit organizations to establish and operate family health service clinics for domestic agricultural migratory workers. Generally, the “Project Period System” is used to obligate funds for such grants. Under this system, projects are approved for multi-year support, but are funded in annual increments called budget periods. Grantees must file annual, noncompeting applications for continued funding, and HEW “is committed to fund the project in succeeding budget periods, subject to the availability of funds, unless the grantee fails to comply with the terms and conditions of the grant or [HEW] determines that continued funding is not in the best interest of the Government.”2
[520]*520In 1971, SMHA, a nonprofit Louisiana Corporation, was awarded a grant to provide health services to migrant farm workers and sugarcane cutters in southwestern Louisiana. Attached to the letter informing SMHA of its grant was an HEW form entitled “Notice of Grant Awarded.”3 In pertinent part, it contained the following data:
Project Period 7/1/71-6/30/76
Grant Period 7/1/71-6/30/76
* * * * * *
Budget Period 7/1/71 through 6/30/72
* * * * * Total Approved Budget $204,584
******
Future Support Recommended
Budget Period Amount
(72) 7/1/72-6/30/73 $286,060
(73) 7/1/73-6/30/74 321,966 ***
(74) 7/1/74-6/30/75 341,162 ***
(75) 7/1/75-6/30/76 363,328 ***
******
In 1972 and 1973, SMHA filed the required applications for continued funding, and each was approved. A revised “Notice of Grant Award” form was attached to each, and in pertinent part, the 1973 document indicated the following:4
Project Period 7/1/71 through 6/30/76
Budget Period 7/1/73 through 6/30/74
******
Total Approved Budget $298,403
******
Recommended Future Support (Subject to availability of funds)
Budget Period Total Direct Costs
7/1/74-6/30/75 $341,162
7/1/75-6/30/76 341,162
******
Significantly, there is no mention on the document of “grant,” “grant period,” or “grant expiration date.” The document does, however, indicate HEW’s concern over the fact that SMHA had not yet established a project policy board, designed to promote greater community participation in the project, as required by HEW regulations.5
In November 1973, HEW instituted its first comprehensive fiscal audit of SMHA. The results of this audit were released on May 22, 1974, and SMHA was advised that it had thirty days to present “any comments or additional information that [it] believe[d] may have a bearing on [HEW’s] final determination.”6 On June 6, 1974, SMHA was notified that its 1974 application for continued funding was not being approved, and that the funds instead were to be awarded to a competing applicant, Teche Action Board (TAB).
Stating that it was “unable to find sufficient merit in the continuation of the somewhat cumbersome and unresponsive project administration through SMHA,” HEW listed six principal areas of major concern that prompted its decision:7
1. It is apparent from the considerable amount of correspondence this office has received from individuals and groups located in the Saint Mary Parish area, telephone communications and personal discussion between my staff and interested citizens from the target area that the community has lost confidence in SMHA.
2. SMHA has failed to reconstitute its Board of Directors or to make appropriate provision for the community at large, particularly the target population, to participate in the planning, development and implementation of the project.
3. The sponsor has failed to give consideration to the advice and counsel of the medical and dental committees on Saint Mary Parish, the primary focus of the project’s activities.
4. There appears to have been usurpation of the Project Director’s administrative and management authority by the Executive Staff of the Southern [521]*521Mutual Help Association in respect to the negotiation of contracts, i. e., purchase of film, obtaining consultants for staff and board training. Also it is apparent that employment procedures and practices have not been consistent with program guidelines and requirements.
5. The Farm Workers Advisory Board, Professional Advisory Committee and project staff have indicated that they have had virtually no communication with the SMHA Executive Staff or the governing board of SMHA.
6. Of particular concern is the practice of SMHA which allows members of the Board and/or relatives of Board members to work as salaried staff for SMHA-sponsored programs and projects. This creates a basic conflict of interest.
On June 11, SMHA notified HEW that it intended to challenge and appeal the denial decision.8 On June 25, HEW gave final approval to the TAB proposal,9 and the next day informed SMHA that “our administrative decision not to renew this grant at the end of the budget period does not constitute grant termination. Therefore, those rules and regulations governing grant termination procedures ... do not apply in this instance.”10 On July 16, representatives of SMHA met with the HEW regional health administrator to discuss the denial decision, and thereafter this official informed SMHA that the decision would not be altered.11
SMHA then formally applied for review to the HEW Grant Appeals Board,12 but was informed that
the decision being appealed is not subject to the jurisdiction of the Board. For the purposes of 45 CFR Part 16 the failure to issue an additional grant in support of a project is not a termination of an existing grant. It is viewed rather as a pre-award decision related to an application for the additional grant . . . .13
On August 28, 1974, SMHA filed its complaint in the district court, seeking, under 28 U.S.C. § 1331(a) (1970), declaratory and injunctive relief and money damages.14 Among other causes of action, SMHA maintained that departmental regulations, the •Administrative Procedure Act (APA), and the due process clause of the fifth amendment required HEW to provide a hearing prior to deciding not to provide funds for fiscal years 1975 and 1976.15 The court disagreed with SMHA and granted HEW’s motion for summary judgment, stating that it appeared SMHA “was not entitled to an evidentiary hearing before [HEW] on its entitlement to funding of its migrant health services program past June 30, 1974 . .”16 This appeal ensued.
[522]*522II
Before beginning our analysis in this case, a few preliminary comments appear to be in order. In the two decades immediately preceding the award to SMHA, federal expenditures for grants increased tenfold, from $2.4 billion in 1951 to $27.6 billion in fiscal year 1971.17 In the next four years, the grant total almost doubled, reaching approximately $52 billion in 1975.18 The number and variety of federal assistance programs have also expanded, with estimates as to the number of individual domestic grant programs ranging from 500 to over 1000.19
This spectacular expansion of both the size and scope of grant programs has engendered surprisingly little case law on the administration of federal grants. However, there is no doubt that an ever increasing number of cases in this area will be presented,20 especially to this court with its unique jurisdiction over many grant-dispensing agencies. While there currently is a need for a fuller body of law concerning this slumbering giant, we must exercise the restraint required of us and continue to apply the law then extant to the facts of each individual case. With these prefatory comments in mind, we turn now to the issues presented in this appeal.
III
With a high degree of acumen, but seemingly little conviction, HEW has, in a single sentence and footnote, challenged SMHA’s standing to bring this suit.21 HEW correctly notes that the program in’ question was created primarily to benefit migrant workers. The issue, therefore, as pursued in exacting detail by Judge Wilkey at oral argument, is whether SMHA can demonstrate standing in a situation where health services for the migrant workers continued without interruption when TAB was substituted for SMHA. Since the question of standing goes to this court’s jurisdiction, we must decide the issue even though the district court did not comment on it. Jenkins v. McKeithen, 395 U.S. 411, 421, 89 S.Ct. 1843, 23 L.Ed.2d 404 (1969) (principal opinion) (Marshall, J.), citing Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 94-101, 88 S.Ct. 1942, 20 L.Ed.2d 947 (1968). See also Tileston v. Ullman, 318 U.S. 44, 46, 63 S.Ct. 493, 87 L.Ed. 603 (1943).
In Simon v. Eastern Kentucky Welfare Rights Organization, 426 U.S. 26, 96 S.Ct. 1917, 48 L.Ed.2d 450 (1976), the Supreme Court reemphasized the constitutional limitation of federal court jurisdiction to actual cases or controversies. Standing, of course, is a vital part of this limitation, and “when a plaintiff’s standing is brought into issue the relevant inquiry is whether, assuming justiciability of the claim, the plaintiff has shown an injury to himself that is likely to be redressed by a favorable decision.” Id. at 38, 96 S.Ct. at 1924.
The only claim before us in this appeal concerns SMHA’s entitlement to a hearing. Although the final fiscal year indicated on the various grant documents ended over seventeen months ago, providing SMHA with a hearing would not be an idle gesture, for reasons that follow.22
[523]*523SMHA brought this action, in part, under section 10 of the APA, 5 U.S.C. § 702 (1970), which gives a right to judicial review to any person “adversely affected or aggrieved by agency action within the meaning of a relevant statute . . . .” In Association of Data Processing Service Organizations, Inc. v. Camp, 397 U.S. 150, 90 S.Ct. 827, 25 L.Ed.2d 184 (1970), the Supreme Court “held the constitutional standing requirement under this section to be allegations which, if true, would establish that the plaintiff had been injured in fact by the action he sought to have reviewed.” Simon v. Eastern Kentucky Welfare Rights Organization, 426 U.S. at 38, 96 S.Ct. 1917. In the Data Processing decision, the Court also established a nonconstitutional, prudential standing requirement that the interest sought to be protected by the plaintiff is “arguably within the zone of interests to be protected or regulated” by the statute in question. 397 U.S. at 153, 90 S.Ct. at 830. Although this “second prong” of the Data Processing standing test has been the subject of much criticism,23 it has never been expressly repudiated by the Supreme Court, and it is certainly not for us to ignore a holding of that Court. We will first address the “zone” test, then proceed to a discussion of injury in fact.
In Tax Analysts & Advocates v. Blumenthal, 184 U.S.App.D.C. 238 at 248, 566 F.2d 130, 140 (1977), cert. denied,-U.S.-, 98 S.Ct. 1280, 55 L.Ed.2d 791 (1978), this court noted that, while the zone test is obviously meant to serve as a limitation on those who can use the federal courts to challenge agency actions, it is “a quite generous standard,” using as it does the terms “arguably” and “zone.” The statutory framework to be scrutinized under this generous standard in the instant case includes the Migrant Health Act, 42 U.S.C. § 242h (1970), and HEW regulations issued under authority of that Act. The statute states that migrant health grants are to be made “to public and other nonprofit agencies, institutions, and organizations . . . ” (emphasis added). This explicit reference to nonprofit groups indicates that, while Congress clearly intended that migrant workers should benefit from the funds appropriated under this Act, it also recognized that conduit organizations such as SMHA were necessary to deliver the services contemplated. In consideration of this fact, HEW promulgated regulations, 45 C.F.R. Part 16, establishing a departmental grant appeals process designed “to afford to aggrieved grantees maximum due process . in disputes [with] the agency.”24 Because organizations such as SMHA are such an integral part of the migrant health program, therefore, we have no trouble concluding that SMHA’s interest is arguably within that zone of interests protected or regulated by the statutory framework under scrutiny here.
As is usually the case, however, the injury in fact requirement presents a more difficult question. The characteristics of an injury in fact, although not always amenable to facile application, are relatively well established.25 While the injury cannot be abstract, O’Shea v. Littleton, 414 U.S. 488, 494, 94 S.Ct. 669, 38 L.Ed.2d 674 (1974), it need not be significant; an identifiable trifle will suffice. United States v. Students Challenging Regulatory Agency Procedures, 412 U.S. 669, 689 n.14, 93 S.Ct. 2405, 37 L.Ed.2d 254 (1973). However, the injury must be specifically alleged by the plaintiff, see Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727, 735, 92 S.Ct. 1361, 31 L.Ed.2d 636 (1972), it must be particularized, Schlesinger v. Reservists [524]*524Committee to Stop the War, 418 U.S. 208, 220-22, 94 S.Ct. 2925, 41 L.Ed.2d 706 (1974), and it must be capable of direct redress by the court through the requested remedy, see Linda R. S. v. Richard D., 410 U.S. 614, 617-19, 93 S.Ct. 1146, 35 L.Ed.2d 536 (1973). Finally, the injury must be fairly traceable to the challenged action of the defendant. Simon v. Eastern Kentucky Welfare Rights Organization, 426 U.S. at 41, 96 S.Ct. 1917.
While SMHA has alleged a number of particularized injuries,26 the one that is capable of direct redress by this court through the requested remedy, and clearly traceable to the action by HEW, is the assertion by SMHA that its good name and reputation have been damaged.27 For an organization such as SMHA, dependent as it is upon grants for its very existence, a good reputation is perhaps its most valuable asset. Reputation, especially that established by past performance, is a key element in agency grant decisions, and an organization that acquires a bad reputation in the grant community based on poor performance will have a difficult burden to overcome in securing new grants.28
The fact that an injury to the reputation of an organization such as SMHA can serve as a basis for standing has been recognized at least since Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee Committee v. McGrath, 341 U.S. 123, 71 S.Ct. 624, 95 L.Ed. 817 (1951) (plurality opinion). In that case, the Supreme Court stated that the effect of designating the complaining organizations as “Communist” was to “cripple the functioning and damage the reputation of those organizations in their respective communities and in the nation.” Id. at 139, 71 S.Ct. at 632 (principal opinion) (Burton, J.); see id. at 140 — 41, 71 S.Ct. 624. See also Kukatush Mining Corp. v. SEC, 114 U.S.App.D.C. 27, 32, 309 F.2d 647, 652 (1962) (Bazelon, C. J., dissenting).
HEW’s action in this case could have a similar crippling effect on SMHA’s ability to obtain future grants.29 While SMHA has in the past obtained grants from agencies other than HEW,30 most of its programs are of the type supported by appropriations channeled through HEW. It is not difficult to imagine the inhospitable reception that would be given to future applications from an organization that has been accused of violating departmental regulations, misusing grant funds, and engaging in activities that create conflicts of interest.31 The effect of HEW’s action in this case, therefore, is to endanger SMHA’s ability to obtain future grants, the very lifeblood of its existence. We believe this demonstrates that SMHA has been injured in fact, and coupled with its meeting of the “zone of interests” requirement, establishes that SMHA has standing to challenge the action by HEW.
[525]*525As we cautioned in Part II of this opinion, however, one must be careful not to interpret this standing holding too broadly. Specifically, this opinion should not be read as supporting.the contention that disappointed grant applicants have standing to challenge agency grant decisions. There is a distinct difference between a grantee engaged in an existing relationship with the government and an applicant initially seeking a government grant. Interrupting the existing relationship, especially for reasons as damaging as those cited by HEW in this case, places the grantee in a significantly different posture from that of the applicant, whose application denial will have little, if any, effect on its good name and reputation; by itself, the denial of a grant application would not constitute, as a matter of law, an injury to reputation. See Gonzalez v. Freeman, 118 U.S.App.D.C. 180, 184, 334 F.2d 570, 574 (1964).32 Similarly, a grantee engaged in an existing relationship with the government generally would not have standing to challenge a decision to diminish or withhold future funds based solely upon the failure of Congress to appropriate full funding. See National Consumer Information Center v. Gallegos, 179 U.S.App.D.C. 120, 125-26, 549 F.2d 822, 827-28 & n.7 (1977).
IV
Determining that SMHA has standing to challenge the action by HEW does not lead automatically to the conclusion that it was entitled to a hearing to protest the action. SMHA has contended that departmental regulations, the APA, and the due process clause of the fifth amendment entitle it to a hearing.33 Observing our duty to avoid deciding constitutional questions unless essential to the proper disposition of a case, Harmon v. Brucker, 355 U.S. 579, 581, 78 S.Ct. 433, 2 L.Ed.2d 503 (1958) (per curiam), we look first to SMHA’s claim that departmental regulations required HEW to provide a hearing prior to taking the action it did in this case.34
As mentioned above, HEW has established a grant appeals process “designed to afford to aggrieved grantees maximum due process . . .”35 The Departmental Grant Appeals Board has jurisdiction over several adverse determinations, most notably: 36
Termination, in whole or in part, of a grant for failure of the grantee to carry out its approved project proposal in accordance with the applicable law and the terms of such assistance or for failure of the grantee otherwise to comply with any law, regulation, assurance, term, or condition applicable to the grant.37
At first glance, this-definition appears to describe precisely the action taken by HEW, and it is on this basis that SMHA claims entitlement to a hearing. More specifically, SMHA contends that in 1971 it was awarded a five-year grant, divided into five individual budget periods. Under this interpretation, the action taken by HEW in 1974, with two years remaining on the [526]*526grant, must logically be viewed as a termination. SMHA supports this conclusion by reference to the definition of “termination” applicable to the grant appeals process:
“Termination” of a grant means the termination of the grantee’s authority to charge allowable costs to a grant prior to the grant expiration date in the grant award document.38
As noted in Part I above, the only mention of a “grant expiration date in [a] grant award document” was in the initial grant award document, and it lists the grant expiration date as “6/30/76.”39
However, HEW argues that the action taken was not a “termination,” but rather a “pre-award decision related to an application for the additional grant,”40 and therefore was not subject to the jurisdiction of the Board. HEW’s position is that in 1971 SMHA was approved for a five-year project, but that this project was composed of five individual one-year grants (and corresponding budget periods), for which SMHA had to apply each year. Thus, the HEW decision in 1974 not to re-fund SMHA did not result in the termination of a grant, since the existing grant for fiscal year 1974 was not affected and the grants for fiscal years 1975 and 1976 had not been made. HEW supports its position by referring to 42 C.F.R. § 56.107(e) (1974),41 which states that:
Neither the approval of any project nor any grant award shall commit or obligate the United States in any way to make any additional, supplemental, continuation, or other award with respect to any approved project or portion thereof. For continuation support, grantees must make separate application anually ....
It is settled law that great deference is to be given to an agency’s interpretations of its regulations: “the ultimate criterion is the administrative interpretation, which becomes of controlling weight unless it is plainly erroneous or inconsistent with the regulation.” Bowles v. Seminole Rock Co., 325 U.S. 410, 414, 65 S.Ct. 1215, 1217, 89 L.Ed. 1700 (1945); accord, Udall v. Tallman, 380 U.S. 1, 16-18, 85 S.Ct. 792, 13 L.Ed.2d 616 (1965). However, it is important to remember that the primary rationale for this doctrine is that deference is accorded to agency expertise, Wilderness Society v. Morton, 156 U.S.App.D.C. 121, 145, 479 F.2d 842, 866 (en banc) cert. denied, 411 U.S. 917, 93 S.Ct. 1550, 36 L.Ed.2d 309 (1973), and an “[a]dministrative construction is less potent than it otherwise would be where it does not rest upon matters peculiarly within the administrator’s field of expertise.” Thompson v. Clifford, 132 U.S.App.D.C. 351, 364, 408 F.2d 154, 167 (1968). Also, in both Bowles and Udall, the Supreme Court was impressed by the fact that the interpretations under scrutiny had been consistently utilized by the agencies concerned for a significant period of time; indeed, in Udall, the Secretary’s interpretation had “been a matter of public record and discussion.” 380 U.S. at 17, 85 S.Ct. at 802; see Northern Indiana Public Service Co. v. Porter County Chapter of the Izaak Walton League of America, Inc., 423 U.S. 12, 14, 96 S.Ct. 172, 46 L.Ed.2d 156 (1975) (per curiam). In later cases, the Court has distinguished Udall in instances where the “notoriety” present in that case, id. at 18, 96 S.Ct. 172, was not readily apparent. See, e. g., Zuber v. Allen, 396 U.S. 168, 194, 90 S.Ct. 314, 24 L.Ed.2d 345 (1969). See also United States v. National Association of Securities Dealers, Inc., 422 U.S. 694, 718-19, 95 S.Ct. 2427, 45 L.Ed.2d 486 (1975).
In this instance, neither notoriety of interpretation nor a subject peculiarly within agency expertise is present. There is no indication that HEW had ever in the past been required to interpret the word “termi[527]*527nation” as it applied to grants.42 Also, “grant termination” is a term of interest to virtually all agencies, and the fact that it was here applied to a grant under HEW’s “Project Period System” does not lead to the conclusion that the term is subject to HEW’s special expertise.
There is a further reason for this court to accord somewhat less weight to the HEW interpretation. As we have noted twice before, the underlying reason for establishing the grant appeals process was to afford grantees maximum due process in disputes with HEW. It appears to us, therefore, that the Secretary was bound to interpret the term “grant termination” in the light most favorable to the grantee. In our view, he has not done so in this case, and while we have given proper deference to his arguments, we reach an opposite conclusion from that reached by both the Secretary and district court.
The most telling argument in favor of SMHA’s position is that HEW, in its own regulations, has chosen the “grant expiration date in the grant award document ” as its benchmark in defining grant termination under 45 C.F.R. Part 16. As demonstrated above, however, a grant expiration date can be found only on the initial award document, and that date, June 30, 1976, clearly comports with SMHA’s position. The second and third grant award documents do not contain grant expiration dates, and since HEW has stated that these documents supersede the initial award documents only in that they authorize the grantee to request an indirect cost rate,43 then the grant expiration date in the first award document must be viewed as the controlling date.
While it is true that 42 C.F.R. § 56.107(e) (1974) lends support to HEW’s interpretation,44 we think that the weight of the evidence contained outside 45 C.F.R. Part 16 tilts in favor of the SMHA position. In the same title 45 in which the first definition of “grant termination” appears is a second definition, which the district court conceded would, if applicable, lead to the conclusion that SMHA had suffered a termination: 45
“Termination” means the cancellation of Federal assistance, in whole or in part, under a grant at any time prior to the date of completion.46
While this definition applies primarily where the grantee is a state or local government, it may also be applied to other grants.47 In any event, this definition, standing as it does in such close proximity to the primary definition, can certainly be used as support in interpreting that former definition, and we agree with the district court’s suggestion that it adds weight to SMHA’s position.
Further, in the HEW Grants Administration Manual in force at the time of the key events in this case, grant period is defined as “[t]he period for which funds have been awarded; i. e,, the remainder of the project period ”.48 It is significant to note that this was the definition in force when the revised [528]*528grant award document appeared in June 1972. As previously noted, there was no grant period specified on that document, but there was a project period, extending until June 30, 1976.
Finally, the Grants Administration Manual indicates that there are two basic methods for ending support of a project: “(1) withholding support (failing to fund noncompeting continuation applications) and (2) withdrawing support (termination).”49 Since HEW has conceded that SMHA and TAB were viewed as competing applicants for the fiscal year 1975 funds,50 then the action taken by HEW must logically be considered as withdrawing support from, and therefore terminating, SMHA.
For the foregoing reasons, we hold that the action taken by HEW was a termination, and, therefore, that by its own regulations, HEW was obliged to provide SMHA with a hearing. We intimate no position on whether HEW, by more carefully drafted regulations,51 could have denied SMHA a hearing, because that inquiry necessarily would lead to a constitutional determination. We hold only that, under the regulatory framework in existence at the appropriate stages of this case, SMHA was entitled to a hearing prior to termination.52
V
For the foregoing reasons, we vacate the judgment of the district court and remand to that court with the instruction to remand to the Secretary so that a formal hearing can be held before the Grant Appeals Board.53 At this hearing, SMHA should be given the opportunity to rebut, on the record, the allegations made by HEW in its letter of June 6, 1974. If the allegations cannot be effectively rebutted, they can, and should, remain part of the permanent record, fully capable of consideration in future applications by SMHA. If the allegations prove to be partially or wholly without basis, however, they should be stricken from the record, in whole or in part. In either event, SMHA will have been provided the “maximum due process” sought by the HEW regulations.
Vacated and remanded.
Future support is subject to the availability of funds.