[370] Justice Brennan
delivered the opinion of the Court.†
South Carolina invokes the Court’s original jurisdiction1 and asks leave to file a complaint against Donald T. Regan, the Secretary of the Treasury of the United States. The State seeks an injunction and other relief, on the ground that § 103(j)(l) of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954, 26 U. S. C. §103(j)(l) (1982 ed.), as added by § 310(b)(1) of the Tax Equity and Fiscal Responsibility Act of 1982 (TEFRA), Pub. L. 97-248, 96 Stat. 596, is constitutionally invalid as violative of the Tenth Amendment and the doctrine of intergovernmental tax immunity.
The Secretary objects to the motion on the ground that the Anti-Injunction Act, 26 U. S. C. § 7421(a), bars this action2 and, alternatively, that the Court should exercise its discretion to deny leave to file. We are not persuaded that either is a ground for denying the motion, and therefore grant the motion for leave to file the complaint.
I — I
Section 103(a) of the Internal Revenue Code (IRC) exempts from a taxpayer’s gross income the interest earned on the obligations of any State.3 In 1982, however, as part of [371] TEFRA, Congress amended § 103 to restrict the types of bonds that qualify for the tax exemption granted by that section. Specifically, § 310(b)(1) of TEFRA added a new provision, §103(j)(l), to the Code. Section 103(j)(l) requires that certain obligations, termed “registration-required obligation^],” be issued in registered,4 rather than bearer, form to qualify for the § 103(a) exemption.5 For purposes of § 103 (j)(l), registration-required obligations are defined broadly to include most publicly issued obligations with maturities greater than one year.6 If an obligation that is registration-required is issued in bearer, rather than registered, form, then § 103(j)(l) provides that the interest on that obligation is taxable.
Because the imposition of a tax on bearer bonds would require a State to pay its bondholders a higher rate of interest on such bonds, South Carolina argues that the practical effect of § 103(j)(l) is to require it to issue its obligations in registered form. For that reason, South Carolina argues that the [372] section destroys its freedom to issue obligations in the form that it chooses. Viewing its borrowing power as essential to the maintenance of its separate and independent existence, South Carolina contends that the condition imposed by § 103 (j)(l) on the exercise of that power violates the Tenth Amendment. In addition, relying on Pollock v. Farmers’ Loan & Trust Co., 157 U. S. 429 (1895), South Carolina argues that Congress may not tax the interest earned on the obligations of a State. Because § 103(j)(l) imposes a tax on the interest earned on state obligations issued in bearer form, the State argues that the section is unconstitutional. Accordingly, South Carolina asks that its motion to file the complaint be granted and that this Court award declaratory, injunctive, and other appropriate relief.7
The Secretary does not address the merits of the State’s constitutional claims. Rather, he argues that we may not grant the motion to file because this action is barred by the Anti-Injunction Act. The Act provides, in pertinent part, that “no suit for the purpose of restraining the assessment or collection of any tax shall be maintained in any court by any person, whether or not such person is the person against whom such tax was assessed.”8 Characterizing this action as a suit to “restrain] the assessment or collection of” a tax, the Secretary contends that this suit is barred by the statute. The Secretary argues that Enochs v. Williams Packing & Navigation Co., 370 U. S. 1 (1962), establishes the single judicially created exception to the Act and that this action does not fall within that exception. We need not address [373] whether this case falls within the Williams Packing exception for we hold that the Act was not intended to bar an action where, as here, Congress has not provided the plaintiff with an alternative legal way to challenge the validity of a tax.9
II
When enacted in 1867, the forerunner of the current Anti-Injunction Act provided that “no suit for the purpose of restraining the assessment or collection of tax shall be maintained in any court.” Act of Mar. 2,1867, § 10,14 Stat. 475.10 Although the Act apparently has no recorded legislative history, Bob Jones University v. Simon, 416 U. S. 725, 736 (1974), the circumstances of its enactment strongly suggest that Congress intended the Act to bar a suit only in situations in which Congress had provided the aggrieved party with an alternative legal avenue by which to contest the legality of a particular tax.
The Act originated as an amendment to a statute that provided that
“[n]o suit shall be maintained in any court for the recovery of any tax alleged to have been erroneously or illegally assessed or collected, until appeal shall have been duly made to the commissioner of internal revenue . . . and a decision of said commissioner shall be had thereon, unless such suit shall be brought within six months from the time of said decision . . . .” Internal Revenue Act of July 13, 1866, § 19, 14 Stat. 152.
The Anti-Injunction Act amended this statute by adding the prohibition against injunctions. Act of Mar. 2, 1867, § 10, 14 [374] Stat. 475. The Act, therefore, prohibited injunctions in the context of a statutory scheme that provided an alternative remedy. As we explained in Snyder v. Marks, 109 U. S. 189, 193 (1883), “[t]he remedy of a suit to recover back the tax after it is paid is provided by statute, and a suit to restrain its collection is forbidden.” This is cogent evidence that the 1867 amendment was merely intended to require taxpayers to litigate their claims in a designated proceeding.
The Secretary argues that, regardless of whether other remedies are available, a plaintiff may only sue to restrain the collection of taxes if it satisfies the narrow exception to the Act enunciated in Williams Packing, supra. Williams Packing did not, however, ever address, let alone decide, the question whether the Act applies when Congress has provided no alternative remedy. Indeed, as we shall see, a careful reading of Williams Packing and its progeny supports our conclusion that the Act was not intended to apply in the absence of such a remedy.
Williams Packing was a taxpayer’s suit to enjoin the District Director of the Internal Revenue Service from collecting allegedly past-due social security and unemployment taxes. The Court concluded that the Anti-Injunction Act would not apply if the taxpayer (1) was certain to succeed on the merits, and (2) could demonstrate that collection would cause him irreparable harm. 370 U. S., at 6-7. Finding that the first condition had not been met, the Court concluded that the Act barred the suit. Significantly, however, Congress had provided the plaintiff in Williams Packing with the alternative remedy of a suit for a refund. Id., at 7.
In each of this Court’s subsequent cases that have applied the Williams Packing rule, the plaintiff had the option of paying the tax and bringing a suit for a refund. Moreover, these cases make clear that the Court in Williams Packing and its progeny did not intend to decide whether the Act would apply to an aggrieved party who could not bring a suit for a refund.
[375] For example, in Bob Jones, supra, the taxpayer sought to prevent the Service from revoking its tax-exempt status under IRC § 501(c)(3). Because the suit would have restrained the collection of income taxes from the taxpayer and its contributors, as well as the collection of federal social security and unemployment taxes from the taxpayer, the Court concluded that the suit was an action to restrain “the assessment or collection of any tax” within the meaning of the Anti-Injunction Act. 416 U. S., at 738-739. Applying the Williams Packing test, the Court found that the Act barred the suit because the taxpayer failed to demonstrate that it was certain to succeed on the merits. 416 U. S., at 749. In rejecting the taxpayer’s challenge to the Act on due process grounds, however, the Court relied on the availability of a refund suit, noting that “our conclusion might well be different” if the aggrieved party had no access to judicial review. Id., at 746. Similarly, the Court left open the question whether the Due Process Clause would be satisfied if an organization had to rely on a “friendly donor” to obtain judicial review of the Service’s revocation of its tax exemption. Id., at 747, n. 21.11
In addition, in Alexander v. “Americans United” Inc., 416 U. S. 752 (1974), decided the same day as Bob Jones, the Court considered a taxpayer’s action to require the Service to reinstate its tax-exempt status.12 The Court applied the Williams Packing test and held that the action was barred [376] by the Act. Finally, in United States v. American Friends Service Committee, 419 U. S. 7 (1974) (per curiam), the taxpayers sought to enjoin the Government from requiring that a portion of their wages be withheld. The taxpayers argued that the withholding provisions violated their First Amendment right to bear witness to their religious beliefs. The Court again applied the Williams Packing rule and found that the suit was barred by the Anti-Injunction Act. In both of these cases, the taxpayers argued that the Williams Packing test was irrelevant and the Act inapplicable because they did not have adequate alternative remedies. In rejecting this argument, the Court expressly relied on the availability of refund suits. 416 U. S., at 761; 419 U. S., at 11. This emphasis on alternative remedies would have been irrelevant had the Court meant to decide that the Act applied in the absence of such remedies. We therefore turn to that question.
The analysis in Williams Packing and its progeny of the purposes of the Act provides significant support for our holding today. Williams Packing expressly stated that the Act was intended to protect tax revenues from judicial interference “and to require that the legal right to the disputed sums be determined in a suit for refund.” 370 U. S., at 7 (emphasis added). Similarly, the Court concluded that the Act was also designed as “protection of the collector from litigation pending a suit for refund,” id., at 7-8 (emphasis added). The Court’s concerns with protecting the expeditious collection of revenue and protecting the collector from litigation were expressed in the context of a procedure that afforded the taxpayer the remedy of a refund suit.13
Nor is our conclusion inconsistent with the 1966 amendment to the Anti-Injunction Act. In 1966, in § 110(c) of the Federal Tax Lien Act, Pub. L. 89-719, 80 Stat. 1144, Congress amended the Anti-Injunction Act to read, in pertinent [377] part, that “no suit for the purpose of restraining the assessment or collection of any tax shall be maintained in any court by any person, whether or not such person is the person against whom such tax was assessed.” Ibid. The central focus of the added phrase, “by any person, whether or not such person is the person against whom such tax was assessed,” was on third parties whose property rights competed with federal tax liens. Bob Jones, 416 U. S., at 732, n. 6. Prior to the adoption of the Tax Lien Act, such parties were often unable to protect their property interests. Ibid.; H. R. Rep. No. 1884, 89th Cong., 2d Sess., 27-28 (1966).14 Section 110(a) of the Tax Lien Act gave such third parties a right of action against the United States.15 The amendment to the Anti-Injunction Act was primarily designed to insure that the right of action granted by § 110(a) of the Federal Tax Lien Act was exclusive. 416 U. S., at 732, n. 6. The language added to the Anti-Injunction Act by the 1966 amendment is, therefore, largely irrelevant to the issue before us today.16
[378] In sum, the Anti-Injunction Act’s purpose and the circumstances of its enactment indicate that Congress did not intend the Act to apply to actions brought by aggrieved parties for whom it has not provided an alternative remedy.17 In this [379] case, if the plaintiff South Carolina issues bearer bonds, its bondholders will, by virtue of § 103(j)(l), be liable for the tax on the interest earned on those bonds. South Carolina will [380] incur no tax liability. Under these circumstances, the State will be unable to utilize any statutory procedure to contest the constitutionality of § 103(j)(l). Accordingly, the Act cannot bar this action.
The Secretary suggests that the State may obtain judicial review of its claims by issuing bearer bonds and urging a purchaser of those bonds to bring a suit contesting the legality of § 103(j)(l). But the nature of this proposed remedy only buttresses our conclusion that the Act was not intended to apply to this kind of action. First, instances in which a third party may raise the constitutional rights of another are the exception rather than the rule. Singleton v. Wulff, 428 U. S. 106, 114 (1976). More important, to make use of this remedy the State “must first be able to find [an individual] willing to subject himself to the rigors of litigation against the Service, and then must rely on [him] to present the relevant arguments on [its] behalf.” Bob Jones, 416 U. S., at 747, n. 21. Because it is by no means certain that the State would be able to convince a taxpayer to raise its claims,18 reliance on the remedy suggested by the Secretary would create [381] the risk that the Anti-Injunction Act would entirely deprive the State of any opportunity to obtain review of its claims. For these reasons, we should not lightly attribute to Congress an intent to require plaintiff to find a third party to contest its claims. Here, the indicia of congressional intent — the Act’s purposes and the circumstances of its enactment — demonstrate that Congress did not intend the Act to apply where an aggrieved party would be required to depend on the mere possibility of persuading a third party to assert his claims. Rather, the Act was intended to apply only when Congress has provided an alternative avenue for an aggrieved party to litigate its claims on its own behalf.19 Because Congress did not prescribe an alternative remedy for the plaintiff in this case, the Act does not bar this suit.
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The Secretary argues that if we conclude that the Anti-Injunction Act is not a bar to this suit, we should in any event exercise our discretion to deny leave to file. He notes that the Court’s jurisdiction over this suit is not exclusive and that the Court exercises its “original jurisdiction sparingly and [is] particularly reluctant to take jurisdiction of a suit where the [382] plaintiff has another adequate forum in which to settle his claim.” United States v. Nevada, 412 U. S. 534, 538 (1973) (per curiam). The State has, however, alleged that the application of § 103(j)(1) will “materially interfere with and infringe upon the authority of South Carolina to borrow funds.” Motion for Leave to File Complaint 16; see supra, at 371-372. Additionally, 24 States have jointly submitted an amicus ' brief urging this Court to grant the motion to file. Unquestionably, the manner in which a State may exercise its borrowing power is a question that is of vital importance to all 50 States. Under these circumstances, we believe that it is appropriate for us to exercise our discretion in favor of hearing this case. At present, however, the record is not sufficiently developed to permit us to address the merits. We shall therefore appoint a Special Master to develop the record.
Accordingly, plaintiff’s motion for leave to file a complaint is granted and a Special Master will be appointed.
It is so ordered.
Similarly, we stated in “Americans United" that “a suit to enjoin the assessment or collection of anyone’s taxes triggers the literal terms” of the Act. 416 U. S., at 760. Of course, this statement was meant to apply only if the aggrieved party has an alternative remedy.
Justice O’Connor relies heavily on Assistant Treasury Secretary Surrey’s statement to the House Ways and Means Committee to support her view that the 1966 amendment to the Anti-Injunction Act was intended to prohibit third parties from suing to restrain the collection of taxes regardless of whether Congress has provided them with an alternative remedy. Post, at 389-390. This reliance is misplaced.
Although the Assistant Secretary described the amendment as a restriction on third-party suits, when read in context, it is unclear whether he was referring to all third parties, including those without alternative remedies, as Justice O’Connor believes, or only to those third parties who were granted a right of action by § 110(a) of the Federal Tax Lien Act. See Statement by the Hon. Stanley S. Surrey, Assistant Secretary of the Treasury, reprinted in Hearings on H. R. 11256 and H. R. 11290, supra, at 58.
Even if Assistant Secretary Surrey viewed the 1966 amendment as prohibiting suits by third parties who had no alternative remedies, there is nothing in the legislative history of that amendment to support the view that Congress shared that belief. Justice O’Connor relies on the statements in the House and Senate Reports that “ ‘[ujnder present law. . . the United States cannot be sued by third persons where its collection activities interfere with their property rights,’ ” post, at 389, quoting H. R. Rep. No. 1884, 89th Cong., 2d Sess., 27 (1966); S. Rep. No. 1708, 89th Cong., 2d Sess., 29 (1966). Since the Anti-Injunction Act had been widely construed not to bar such suits, see n. 14, supra, however, this statement simply could not have been intended as a description of the effect of that Act.
Justice O’Connor relies on statements in the legislative history of IRC § 7478 indicating that Congress believed that, prior to the enactment of that section, prospective issuers of state and local bonds had no means to determine whether the interest on their bonds would be tax exempt. Post, at 391-392. In her view, these statements are strong evidence that Congress intended the Anti-Injunction Act to apply regardless of the availability of an alternative remedy.
We find these statements unpersuasive. To the extent that these statements, which do not even refer to the Anti-Injunction Act, may be read as expressing the view that the Act should be construed to bar suits regardless of the availability of alternative remedies, they are the views of a subsequent Congress and, therefore, at best, “ ‘form a hazardous basis for inferring the intent of an earlier one.’ ” Consumer Product Safety Comm’n v. GTE Sylvania, Inc., 447 U. S. 102, 117 (1980), quoting United States v. Price, 361 U. S. 304, 313 (1960).
Justice O’Connor, relying on Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U. S. 367, 380-381 (1969), and FHA v. The Darlington, Inc., 358 U. S. 84, 90 (1958), argues that these statements should be given “ ‘great weight’ ” in construing the Anti-Injunction Act. This reliance is misplaced. In Red Lion we stated that “[subsequent legislation declaring the intent of an earlier statute is entitled to great weight.” 395 U. S., at 380 (emphasis added). The Darlington stands for the same proposition. We have previously rejected the argument that the Red Lion rule should be applicable to the Committee Reports that accompany subsequent legislation. In Consumer Product Safety Comm’n, supra, at 118, n. 13, we stated: “With respect to subsequent legislation. . . Congress has proceeded formally through the legislative process. A mere statement in a conference report of such legislation as to what the Committee believes an earlier statute meant is obviously less weighty.”
Indeed, Justice O’Connor does not consistently accord “great weight” to the legislative history of § 7478. In Part I of her opinion, she states that the legislative history of § 7478 represents Congress’ “belief that the Tax [380] Anti-Injunction Act generally bars nontaxpayers from bringing the kind of injunctive action the State of South Carolina asks leave to file today.” Post, at 392. Under this view, the statement in the Senate Report accompanying § 7478 that “present law does not allow the State . . . government to go to court,” S. Rep. No. 95-1263, p. 150 (1978), must mean that Congress believed that the Anti-Injunction Act barred original actions in this Court as well as actions in lower courts. Yet, in reaching her conclusion that the Act does not apply to bar original actions in this Court, Justice O’Connor apparently accords no weight at all to this legislative history. Post, at 399.
For similar reasons, we find the remaining postenactment history upon which Justice O’Connor relies, post, at 390-391, to be unconvincing. Whatever the weight to which these statements are entitled, they are ultimately unpersuasive in light of the other evidence of congressional intent discussed above.
Justice O’Connor also appears to suggest that our holding today renders the Act a restatement of the equitable principles governing the issuance of injunctions at the time the statute was enacted. Post, at 388, n. 5. This argument is without merit since these equitable principles did not require that injunctions issue only when no alternative remedy was available. See, e. g., Dows v. Chicago, 11 Wall. 108, 109-110 (1871) (suit to restrain collection of taxes will lie if plaintiff shows that enforcement will cause irreparable harm or lead to a multiplicity of suits); Hannewinkle v. Georgetown, 15 Wall. 547, 548-549 (1873) (same).