Knox v. Lee

79 U.S. 457, 20 L. Ed. 287, 12 Wall. 457, 1870 U.S. LEXIS 1220

• Court: Supreme Court of the United States
• Decided: May 18, 1871
• Status: Published

Opinions

Mr. Justice STRONG

delivered the opinion of the court.

The controlling questions in these cases are the following: Are the acts of Congress, known as the legal tender acts, constitutional when applied to contracts made before their passage; and, secondly, are they valid as applicable to debts contracted since their enactment? These questions have been elaborately argued, and they have received from the court that consideration which their great importance- demands. ' It- would be difficult to overestimate the consequences which must follow7 our decision. They will affect the entire business of .the country, and take hold of the possible continued existence of the government. If it be held! by this court that Congress has no constitutional power, under any circumstances, or iu any emergency, to make-treasury notes a legal tender for the‘pay.ment of all debts (a.’power confessedly possessed by every independent sovereignty other than the United States),'the government is without those means of self-preservation which, all must admit, may, in certain contingencies, become indispensable,, even if they were not when the acts of Congress now called, in qnestiou w7ere'enacted. It is also clear that if we” hold the acts invalid as applicable to debts incurred, or transactions which have taken place since their enactment, our decision must cause, throughout thq country, great business derangement, widespread distress, and the rankest injustice. The debts which have'been contracted since February 25th, 1862, constitute, doubtless, by far the greatest portion of the-existing indebtedness of the country. ' They have been contracted in’ view of the acts of Congress declaring treasury notes a legal tender, and in reliance upon that declaration. Men have bought and sold, borrowed and lent, and assumed every variety of obligations contemplating that payment might be made with such notes. Indeed, legal tender treasury notes have become the universal measure of values. If now, by our decision, it be established that these debts and obligations can be discharged only by gold coin; if, contrai’y tó the expectation of all parties to these contracts, legal tender notes are rendered unavailable, the government has become an instrument of the grossest injustice; all debtors are loaded with an obligation it was never contemplated they should assume; a large percentage is added to every debt, and such must become the demand for gold to satisfy contracts, that ruinous sacrifices, general distress, and bankruptcy may be expected. These consequences are too obvions to admit of question. And there is no well-founded distinction to bo made between-the constitutional validity of an act of Congress declaring treasury notes a legal tender for the payment of debts contracted after its.passage and that of an. act making them a legal tender for-the discharge of all debts, as well those incurred before as those made after its enactment. There may be a difference in the effects produced by the acts, and in the hardship of their operation, but in both cases the fundamental question, that which tests the validity of the legislation, is, can Congress constitutionally give to treasury notes the character and qualities of money ? Can such notes be constituted a legitimate circulating medium, having a defined legal value? .If they can, then such notes must be available to fulfil all contracts (not expressly excepted) solvable in money, without reference' to the time when the contracts were made. Hence it is not ■strange that those who hold the legal tender acts unconstitutional when applied to contracts made before February, 1.862, find themselves compelled also' to hold that the acts ■ate invalid as to debts created after that time, and to hold that both classes of debts alike can be .discharged only by gold and silver coin.

The consequences of which we have spoken, serious as they are, must be accepted, if there is a clear incompatibility between the Constitution and the legal tender acts. Eut we are unwilling to precipitate them upon thm country unless such an incompatibility plainly appears. A decent respect for a co-ordinate branch of the government demands that the judiciary should presume, until the coutrary is clearly shown, that there has been no transgression of power by Congress — all the members of which act'Under the obligation of an oath of fidelity to the Constitution. Such has always been the rule. In Commonwealth v. Smith

* the language of the court was, “ It must be remembered that, for weighty reasons, it has been assumed as a principle, in construing constitutions, by the Supreme Court of the United States, by this court, and by every other court of reputation in the United States, that an act of the legislature is not to be declared void unless the violation of the Constitution is so manifest as to leave no room for reasonable doubt;” and, in Fletcher v. Peck,† Chief Justice Marshall said, “It is irot on slight implication and vague conjecture that the legislature is to be pronounced to have transcended its powers and its acts to be considered void. The opposition between the Constitution and the law should be such that the judge feels a clear and strong conviction of their incompatibility with each other.” It is incumbent, therefore, upon those who affirm the uncoustitutionality of an act of Congress to show clearly that it is in violation of the provisions of the Constitution.. It is not sufficient for them that they succeed in raising a doubt.

Nor can it be questioned that, when investigating the nature and extent of the powers conferred by the Constitution upon Congress, it is indispensable to keep in view the objects for which those powers were- granted. - This is a universal rule of construction applied alike to statutes, wills, contracts, aud constitutions. If the general purpose of the instrument is ascertained, the language of its provisions must be'construed with reference to that purpose and so as-to subserve it. Iu no other way can the intent of the framers of the instrument be discovered. And there are more urgent reasons for looking to the ultimate purpose in examining the powers conferred by a constitution than there are iu construing a statute, a will, or a contract. We do not expect to find in a constitution.minute details. It is necessarily brief aud comprehensive. It prescribes outlines, leaving tlie filling up to be deduced from the outlines. In Martin v. Hunter,* it was said,-“The Constitution unavoidably deals in general language. It did not suit the purpose of the people in framing this great charter of our liberties to provide for minute specifications of its powers, or to declare the means by which those powers should be carried into execution.’.’ And ivith singular clearness was it said by Chief Justice Marshall, in McCulloch v. The State of Maryland,† “A constitution, to contain an accurate detail of all the subdivisions of which its great powers will admit, and of all the means by which it may be carried into execution, would partake of the prolixity of q political code, and would scarcely be embraced by the human mind. It would probably never be understood by the public. Its nature, therefore, requires that only its groat outlines shoirld be marked, its important objects designated, and the minor ingredients which compose those objects be deduced from the nature of the objects themselves.” If these are correct -principles, if they are proper views of the manner in which the Constitution is to be understood, the pouters conferred upon Congress must be regarded as related to each other, and all. means for a common end. Each is but part of a system, a constituent of one'whole. No single -power is the ultimate end-for which the Constitution was adopted. It may, in a very proper sense, be treated as a means for the accomplishment of a subordinate object, but that object is itself a means designed for an ulterior purpose. Thus the power to levy and collect taxes, to coin money and regulate its value, to raise and support armies, or to provide for and maintain a navy, are instruments for the paramount object, which was to establish a government, sovereign within its sphere, with capability of self-preservation, thereby forming a union rqore perfect than that which existed under the old Confederacy.

The same may be asserted also of all the nou-enumerated' powers included in the authority expressly given “to make all laws which shall be necessary and proper for carrying into execution the specified powers vested in Congress, and all other powers vested by the Constitution in the government of the United States, or in any department or officer thereof.” It is impossible to know what those non-enumerated powers are, and what is their nature and extent, without considering the purposes they were intended to subserve. Those purposes, it must be noted, reach beyond the mere-execution of all powers definitely intrusted to Congress aud mentioned in detail. They embrace the execution of all other powers vested by the Constitution in the government of the United States, or iu any department or officer thereof. It certainly was intended to confer upon, tii-e government the power'of self-preservation. Said Chief Justice Marshall, iu Cohens v. The Bank of Virginia* “America has chosen to be, in many respects and to many purposes, a nation, and for all these purposes-her •government is.complete;’for all these objects it is supreme. It can then, in effecting these objects, legitimately control all individuals or governments within the American territory.” He added, in the same ease: “A’ constitution is framed for agés to come, aud is designed to approach'immortality as. near as mortality can approach it. . Its course cannot always be tranquil. It is exposed to storms and tempests, and its framers must be Unwise statesmen indeed, if they have not provided it, as far as its nature will permit, with the means of self-preservation from .the perils it is sure to encounter.” ■ That would appear, then, to be a most unreasonable construction of the Constitution ■ which denies to the government created- by it, the right to employ freely every means, not prohibited, necessary for its preservation, and for the fulfilment of its acknowledged duties. Such a right, we hold, was given by the last clause of the eighth section of its first article. The means or instrumentalities referred to in that clause, and authorized, are not enumerated or defined. In the nature of things enumeration and specification were impossible. But they were left to the discretion of Congress, subject only to the restrictions that they be not prohibited, and be necessary and proper for carrying into execution the enumerated powers given to Congress, and all other powers vested in the-government of the United States, or in any department or officer thereof.

And here it is to be observed it is not indispensable to the' existence of any power claimed for the Federal government that it can be found specified in the words of the Constitution, or clearly and directly traceable to some one of the specified powers. Its existence may be deduced fairly from more than one of the substantive powers expressly defined, or from them all combined. It is allowable to group together any number of them and infer from them all that the power claimed has been conferred. Such a treatment of the Constitution is recognized by its own provisions. This is well illustrated in its language respecting the writ of habeas corpus. The power to.suspend the privilege of that writ is not expressly given, nor can it be deduced from any one of the particularized grants of power. Yet it is provided that the privileges of the writ shall not be suspended except in certain defined contingencies. This is no express grant of power. It is a restriction. But it shows irresistibly that somewhere in the Constitution power to suspend the privilege of the writ was granted, cither by some one or more of the specifications of power, or by them all combined. And, that important powers were-understood by the" people who adopted the Constitution to have been created by it, powers not enumerated, and not included incidentally in any one of those enumerated, is shown by the amendments. The first ten of these were suggested in the conventions of the States, and proposed at the first session of the first Congress, before any complaint was made of a disposition to assume doubtful powers. The preamble to the resolution submitting'them for adoption recited that the '“ conventions of a number of the States had, at the time of their adopting the Constitution, expressed a desire, in order, to prevent misconstruction or abuse of its powers, that further declaratory and restrictive clauses should be added.” This was the origin of the amendments, and they are significant. They tend plainly to show that., in the judgment of those who;, adopted the Constitution, there were powers created by it, neither expressly specified nor deducible from'any one specified power, or ancillary to it alone, but which grew out of the aggregate of powers conferred upon- tlie government, or out of the sovereignty instituted. Most of these amendments are denials of power which had not been expressly granted, and which cannot be said to have been necessary and proper for carrying .into execution any other powers. Such, for example, is the prohibition of any laws respecting the establishment of religion, prohibiting the free exercise thereof, or abridging the freedom of speech or of the press.

And it is of importance to observe that Congress has often exercised, without question, powers /that are not expressly' given nor ancillary to any single enumerated power. Powers thus exercised are what are called by Judge Story in his Commentaries on the. Constitution, resulting powers, arising from the aggregate powers of the government. He instances .the right to sue and make contracts. Many others might be. given. The oath required bylaw from officers of the government is one. So is building a capitol or a presidential mansion, and so also is the penal code. This last is worthy of brief notice. Congress is expressly authorized “ to provide for the punishment of counterfeiting the securities and current coin of the United States, and to define and punish piracies and felonies committed on the high seas and offences against the laws of nations.” It is also, empowered to declare the punishment of treason, and provision is made for impeachments. This is 'the extent of power to punish crime expressly conferred. It might be argued that the expression of those limited powers implies an exclusion of all other subjects of criminal legislation. Such is the argument in the present cases. It is said because Congress is authorized to coin money and regulate its value it cannot declare a ny? thing other than gold and silver to be money or make it a legal tender. Yet Congress, by,the act of April 30, 1790, entitled “An act more effectually to provide for the punishment of certain crimes against-the United States,” and the supplementary act of March 3d, 1825, defined and provided for the punishment of a large class of crimes .other than those mentioned in the Constitution, and some of the punishments prescribed are manifestly not in aid of any single substantive power. No one doubts that this was rightfully done, and the power thus exercised has been affirmed by this court in United States v. Marigold.* This case shows that a power may exist as au aid to the execution of an express power, or an aggregate of such powers, though there is another express power'given relating in part to the same subject but less extensive. Another illustration of this may be found in connection with the provisions respecting a census. The Constitution orders an enumeration of free*'persons hi’ the different States' every ten years. The direction extends no further. Yet Congress has repeatedly directed an.enumeration not only of free persons in the States but of free persons in the Territories, and not only an enumeration of •persons but the collection of statistics respecting age, sex, and production. Who questions the power to do this?

Indeed the whole history of the government and of congressional legislation has exhibited the use of a very wide discretion, even in times of peace and in the absence of any trying emergency, in the selection of the necessary and proper means to carry into effect the great objects for which the "government was framed, and this discretion has geuer.ally been unquestioned, or, if questioned, sanctioned by this court. Tlii? is true not only when an attempt has been made to execute a single power specifically given, but equally true when the means adopted have been appropriate to the execution, not of a single authority, but of.all the powers created by the Constitution. Under the power to establish post-offices and post-roads Congress has provided for carrying the mails, punishing theft of letters and mail robberies, and even for transporting the mails to foreign countries. Under the power to regulate commerce, provision has been made by law for the improvement of .harbors, the establishment of observatories, the erection of lighthouses, breakwaters, and buoys, the registry, enrolment, and construction of ships, and a code has been enacted for the government of seamen. Under the same power and other powers over the revenue and the currency of the country, for the convenience of the treasury and internal commerce, a corporation known as the United States- Balde was early created. To its capital the government subscribed one-fifth of its stock. But the corporation was a private one, doing business for its own profit. Its incorporation was a constitutional exercise of congressional power for no other reason than that it was deemed to be a convenient instrument or meanv for accomplishing one or more of the ends for which the government was established, or, in the language of the first article, already quoted, “ necessary and proper” for carrying into execution some or all the powers vested in the government. Clearly this necessity, if any existed, was not a direct and obvious one, Yet this court, in McCulloch v. Maryland* unanimously ruled that in authorizing the bank, Congress had not transcended its powers. So debts due to the United States have been declared by acts of Congress entitled to priority of payment over debts duo to other creditors, and this court has held .such acts warranted by the Constitution.†

This is enough to show how, from the earliest period of 'our existence as a nation, the powers conferred by the Constitution have been construed by Congress and by this court whenever such action by Congress has been called in question. Happily the true meaning of the clause authorizing the enactment of all laws necessary and proper for carrying into execution the express powers conferred upon Congress, and all other powers vested in the government of the United States, or in any of its departments or officers, has long since been settled. In Fisher v. Blight* this court, speaking by Chief Justice Marshall, said that in construiug it “it would be incorrect and would produce endless difficulties if the opinion should be maintained that no law was authorized which was not indispensably necessary to give effect to a specified power. Where various systems might be adopted for that purpose it might be said with respect to each that it was not necessary because the end might be obtained by other means.” “ Congress,” said this court, “ must possess the choice of means, and must be empowered to use any means which are in fact conducive to the exercise of.a power granted by the Constitution. The government is to pay the debt of the Union and must be authorized to use the means which appear to itself most eligible to effect that object. It has, consequently, a right to make remittances by bills or otherwise, and to take those precautions, which will render the transaction safe.” It was in this case, as “we have already remarked, that a law giving priority to debts due to the United States was ruled to be constitutional lor the reason that it appeared to Congress to be an eligible means to enable the government to pay the debts of the Union.

It was, however, in McCulloch v. Maryland that the fullest consideration was given to this clause of the Constitution granting auxiliary powers, and a construction adopted that has ever since been accepted as determining its true meaning. We shall not now go over the ground there trodden. It is familiar to the legal profession, and, indeed, to the whole country. Suffice it to say; in that case it was finally settled that in the gift by the Constitution to Congress of authority jo enact laws “ necessary and proper” for the execution of all the powers created by it, the necessity spoken of is not to be understood as an absolute one. On the contrary, this court then held that the sound construction of the Constitution must allow to the national legislature that discretion with respect to the means by which the powers it confers are to be carried into execution, which will enable that body to perform the high duties assigned to it in the manner most beneficial to the people. Said Chief Justice Marshall, in delivering the opinion of the court: “Let the end be legitimate, let it be within the scope of the Constitution, and all means which are appropriate, which are plainly adapted to that end, which are not prohibited, but consist with the letter and spirit of the Constitution, are constitutional.” The ease also marks out with admirable precision the province of this court. It declares that “ when the law (enacted by Congress) is not prohibited and is really calculated to effect any of the objects intrusted to the government, to undertake here to inquire into the degree of its necessity would be to pass the line which circumscribes the judicial department and to tread on legislative ground. This court (it was said) disclaims all pretensions to such a power.” It is hardly necessary to say that these principles are received with universal assent. Even in Hepburn v. Griswold* both the majority and minority of the court concurred in accepting the doctrines of McCulloch v. Maryland as sound expositions of the Constitution, though disagreeing in their application.

With these rules of constitutional construction before us, settled at an early period in the history of the government, hitherto universally accepted, and not even now doubted, we have a safe guide to. a right decision of the questions before us. Before' we can hold the legal tender acts unconstitutional, we must be convinced they were not appropriate means, or means” conducive to the .execution of any or all of the powers of Congress, or of the government, not appropriate in any degree (for we are not judges of the degree of appropriateness), or wc must hold that, they were prohibited. This brings us to the inquiry whether they were, when enacted, appropriate instrumentalities for carrying into effect, or executing any of. the known powers of Congress, or of any department of the government. Plainly to this inquiry'; a consideration of the time when they were enacted, and of the circumstances in which the government then stood, is important. It is not to be denied that acts may be adapted to the exercise of lawful power, and appropriate to-it, in seasons of exigency, which would be inappropriate at other times.

We do not propose to dilate at length' upon the circumstances in which the country was placed, when Congress attempted to make treasury notes a legal tender. They are of too recent occurrence to. justify enlarged ’ description. Suffice it to'saj' that a civil war was then raging which seri-. ously threatened the overthrow of the government and the destruction of the Constitution itself. It demanded the equipment ánd support of large armies and navies, and the employmentof money to an 'extent beyond the capacity of all ordinary sources of supply. Meanwhile the public treasury was nearly empty, and the credit of the government, if not stretched to its utmost tension, had become nearly exhausted. Moneyed institutions had advanced! largely of. their means, and more could not be expected of them. They had been compelled to suspend specie payments. Taxation was inadequate to pay even the interest oh the debt already incurred, and it was impossible to await the income of additional taxes. The necessity was immediate and pressing. The army was unpaid. • There was then due to the soldiers in the field nearly a score of millions of dollars. The requisitions from the War and Navy Departments for supplies exceeded fifty millions, and the current expenditure was over one million per day. The entire amount of coin in the country, including that in private hands, as well as that in banking institutions, was insufficient to supply the need of the government three months, had it all been poured into the treasury. Foreign credit we had none. We say nothing of .the overhanging paralysis of trade, and of business generally, which threatened loss of confidence in the ability of the government to maintain its continued existence, and therewith the complete destruction of all remaining national credit.

It was at such a time and in such circumstances that Congress was called upon to devise means for maintaining the army and navy, for securing the large supplies of money needed, and, indeed, for the preservation of the government created by the Constitution. It was at such a time and in such an emergency that the legal tender acts were passed. Now, if it were certain that nothing else would have supplied the absolute necessities of the treasury, that nothing else would have enabled the government to maintain its armies and navy, that nothing else would have saved the government and the Constitution from destruction, while' the legal tender acts would, could any one be bold enough to assert that Congress transgressed its powers ? Or if these enactments did work these results, can it be maintained now that they were not for a legitimate end, or “ appropriate and adapted'to that end,” in the language of Chief Justice Marshall ? That they did work such results is not to he doubted. Something revived the drooping faith of the people; something brought immediately to the government’s aid the resources of'the nation, and something euabled the successful prosecution of the war, and the preservation of the national life. What was it, if not the legal fender enactments ?

But if it be conceded that some other means might have been chosen for the accomplishment of these legitimate and necessary ends, the' concession does not weaken the argument. It is urged now, after the lapse of nine years, and when the emergency has passed, that treasury notes without the legal tender clause might have been issued, and that the necessities of the government might thus have been supplied. Hence it is inferred there was no necessity for giving to the notes issued the capability of paying private debts. At best this is mere conjecture. But admitting it to be true, what does it prove? Nothing more than that Congress had the choice of means for a legitimate end, each appropriate, and adapted to that end, though, perhaps, in different degrees. What then? Can this court say that it ought to have adopted one rather than the other ? Is it our province to decide that the means selected were beyond the constitutional power of Congress, because we may think that other means to the same ends would have beeu more appropriate and equally efficient? That would be to assume legislative power, and. to disregard the accepted rules for construing the Constitution. The degree of the necessity for any congressional enactment, or the relative degree of its appropriateness, if it have any appropriateness, is for consideration in Congress, not here. Said Chief Justice Marshall, in McCulloch v. Maryland, as already stated, “When the law is not prohibited, and is really calculated to effect any of the objects intrusted to the government, to undertake here to inquire into the degree of its necessity, would be to pass the line which circumscribes the judicial department, and to-tread on legislative ground.”

It is plain to our view, however, that none of those measures which it is now conjectured might have been substituted for the legal tender acts, could have met the exigencies of the case,,at the time when those acts were passed. Wo have said that the credit of the government had been tried to its utmost endurance. Every new issue of notes which had nothing more to rest upon than government credit, must have paralyzed it more and more, and rendered it increasingly difficult to keep the army in the field, or the navy afloat. It is an historical fact that many persons and institutions refused to reeeivd and pay those notes that had been issued, and even the head of the treasury represented to Congress the necessity of making the new issues legal tenders, or rather, declared it impossible to avoid the necessity. The vast body of men in the 'military service was composed of citizens who had left their farms, their workshops, and their business with families and debts to be provided for. ' The government could not pay them with ordinary treasury notes, nor could they discharge their debts with such a currency. Something more was needed, something that had all the uses of money. And as no one could be compelled to take common treasury notes in payment of debts, and as the prospect of ultimate redemption was remote and contingent, it is not too much to say that they must have depreciated in the market long before the war closed, as did the currency of the Confederate States. Making the notes legal tenders gave them a new use, and it needs no argument to show that the value of things is in proportion to the uses to which they may be applied.

It may be conceded that Congress is not authorized to enact laws in furtherance even of a legitimate end, merely because they are useful, or because they make the government stronger. There must be some relation between the means and the end; some adaptedness or appropriateness of the laws to carry into execution the powers created by the Constitution. But when a statute has proved effective dn the execution of powers confessedly existing, it is not too much to say that it must have had some appropriateness to the execution of those powers. The rules of construction heretofore adopted, do not demand that the relationship between the means and the end shall be direct and immediate. Illustrations of this may bo found in several of the eases above cited. The charter of a Bank of the United States, the priority given to debts due the government over private debts, and the exemption of Federal loans from liability to State taxation, are only a few of the many which might be given.' The case of Veazie Bank v. Fenno* presents a suggestive illustration. There a tax of ten per cent, on State bank notes in circulation was h^ld constitutional, not merely because it w,as a means of raising revenue, but as an instrument to put out of existence such a circulation in competition with notes issued by the government. There, this court, speaking through the Chief Justice, avowed that it is the constitutional right of Congress to provide a currency for the whole country; that this might be done by coin, or United States notes, or notes of National banks; and that it cannot be questioned Congress may constitutionally secure the benefit of such a currency to the people by appropriate legislation. It was said there can 'be no question of the power of this government to emit bills of credit; to make them receivable in payment of debts to itself; to fit them for use by those who see fit to use them in all the transactions of'commerce; to make-them a currency uniform in value and description, and convenient and useful for circulation. Here the substantive power to tax was allowed to be employed for improving the currency. It is not easy to see why, if State bank notes can be taxed out of existence for the purposes of indirectly making United States notes more convenient and useful for commercial purposes, the same end may not be secured directly by making them a legal tender.

Concluding, then, that the provision which made treasury notes a legal tender for the payment of all debts other than those expressly excepted, was not an inappropriate means for carrying into execution the legitimate powers, of the government, we proceed to inquire whether it was forbidden by the letter or spirit of the Constitution. It is not claimed that any -express prohibition exists, but it is insisted that the spirit of the Constitution was- violated by the enactment. Here those who assert the unconstitutionality of the acts mainly rest their argument. They claim that the clause which conferred upon Congress power “ to coin money, regulate the value thereof, and of foreign coin-,” contains an implication that nothing but that which is the subject of coinage, nothing but the precious metals can ever be declared by law to be money, or to have the uses of mouey. .If by this is meant that because certain powers over the currency are expressly given to Congress, all other powers relating to the same subject are impliedly forbidden, we need only remark that such is not the manner in which the Constitution- has always been construed.. On the contrary it has been ruled that power over a particular subject may be exercised as auxiliary to an express power, though there is another express power re'lating to the same subject, less comprehensive.* There an express power to punish a certain class of crimes (the only direct reference to criminal legislation contained in the Constitution), was not regarded as an objection to deducing authority to punish other crimes from another substantive and defined grant of power. There are other decisions to the same effect. To assert, then, that the clause enabling Congress to coin money and regulate its value tacitly implies a denial of all other power over the currency of the nation, is an attempt to introduce a new rule of construction against the solemn decisions of this court. So far from its containing a lurking prohibition, many have thought it was intended to confer upon Congress that general' power over the currency which has always been an acknowledged attribute of sovereignty in every other civilized nation than our own, especially when considered in .connection with the other'clause which denies to the States the power to coin money, emit bills of credit, or make anything but gold and silver coin a tender in payment of debts. We do not assert this now, but there are some considerations touching these-clauses which tend to show that if any implications are to-be deduced from them, (hey are of an enlarging rather than-a restraining character. The Constitution was intended to frame a government as distinguished from a league or compact, a government supreme in some particulars over States and people. It was designed to provide the same currency,, having a uniform legal value in all the States. It was forth is reason- the power to coin money and regulate its value was conferred upon the Federal government, while the same-power as well as the power to emit bills of credit was withdrawn from the States. The States can no longer declare what shall be money, or regulate its value. Whatever power there is over the currency is vested in Congress. If the power to declare what is money is not in Congress, it is annihilated. This may indeed have been intended. Some powers that usually belong to sovereignties were extinguished, but .their extinguishment was not left to inference. In most cases, if not in all, when it was intended that governmental powers, commonly acknowledged as such, should cease to exist, both in the States and in the Federal government, it was expressly denied to both, as well to the United States as to the individual. States.- And generally, when one of such powers was expressly denied to the States only, it was for the purpose of rendering the Federal power more complete and: exclusive. Why, then, it may be asked, if the. design was to prohibit to the new government, as well as to the States, that general power over the currency which the States had when the Constitution was framed, was such denial not expressly extended, to the new government, as it was to the States ? Iii view of this it might .be argued with much force that when it is considered in what brief and comprehensive terms, the Constitution speaks, how sensible its framers must have been that emergencies might arise when the precious metals (then more scarce than now) might prove inadequate to the necessities of the government and the demands of the. people — when it .is remembered that paper money was almost exclusively in use in the States as the medium of exchange, and when the.gteat evil sought to be remedied was the want of uniformity in the current value of money, it might be argued, .we say, that the giffc-of power to coin money and regulate the value thereof,-was understood as conveying general power over the currency, the power which had belonged to the States, and which they surrendered.. Such a construction, it might be said, would be in close analogy fo the mode of construing other substantive powers granted to Congress. They have never been construed literally, and the government could not exist if they were. Thus the power to carry on war is conferred by the power to “declare war.” The whole system of the-transportation of the mails is built upon the power to establish post-offices and post-roads. The power to regulate eom- ■ meree has also been extended far beyond the letter of the .-grant. Even the advocates of a strict literal construction of .the phrase, “to coin money and regulate the value thereof,” while’ insisting that it defines the material to be coined as metal, are compelled to concede to Congress large discretion in all pther particulars. The Constitution does not ordain what metals may be coined, or prescribe that the legal value of the metals, when coined, shall correspond at all with their intrinsic value in the market. Nor does it even affirm that Congress may declare anything to be a legal tender for the payment of debts. Confessedly the power to regulate the value of money coined, and of foreign coins, is not exhausted by the first regulation. More than once in our history has the regulation been changed without any denial of the power of Congress to. change it, and it seems to have been left to Congress to determine alike what metal shall be coined, its purity, and how far its statutory value, as money, shall correspond, from time to time, with the market value of the same metal as bullion. How then can the grant of a power to coin money and regulate its value, made in terms so liberal and unrestrained, coupled also with a denial to the States of all power over the currency, be regarded asan implied prohibition to.Congress against declaring treasury notes a legal tender, if such declaration is .appropriate, and-adapted, to carrying into execution the admitted powers of the government?

We do not, however., rest our assertion of the power of Congress to enact legal tender laws upon this grant. We assert only that the grant can, in no just sense, be regarded as.containing au implied prohibition against their enactment, and that, if it raises any' implications, they are of complete power over the currency, rather than restraining.

We come next to the argument much used, and, indeed, the main reliance of those who assert the unconstitutionality of the legal tender acts. It is that they are prohibited by the spirit of the Constitution because.they indirectly impair the obligation of contracts. The argument, of course, relates only to those contracts which were made before February, 1862, when the first act was passed, and it has no bearing upon the question whether the acts are valid when applied to contracts made after their passage. The argument assumes two■ things,, — first, that the acts do, in effect, impair the obligation of contracts, and second, that Congress is prohibited from taking any action which may indirectly have that effect. Neither of these assumptions can be accepted. It is true that under the acts, a debtor, who became such before they were passed, may discharge his debt with the notes authorized by them, and the creditor is compellable to receive such notes in discharge of his claim. But wdiether the obligation of the contract is thereby weakened can be determined only after considering what was the contract obligation. It was not a duty to pay gold or silver, or the kind of 'money recognized by law at the time when the contract -was made, nor was it a duty to pay money of equals intrinsic value in the market. (We speak now of contracts to pay money generally, not contracts to pay some specifically defined species of money.) The expectation of the creditor and the anticipation of the debtor may have been that the contract would be discharged by the payment of coined metals, but neither the expectation of one party to the contract respecting its fruits,, nor the anticipation of the other ■constitutes its obligation. There is a well-recognized distinction between, the expectation of the parties to a contract and the duty imposed by it.* Were it not so the expectation of results would be always equivalent to a’bihding eu-_ gagement that they should follow. But the obligation of a contract to pay money is to pay that which the law shall recognize as-money when'the-payment is to be made. If there is anything settled by decision it is this, and we do not understand it to be controverted-† No one ever doubted that a debt of one thousand dollars, contracted before 1834, could be paid by one hundred eagles coined after that year, though they contained .no more gold than ninety-four eagles such as were coined when the contract .was made, and this, not because of the intrinsic value of the coin, but because of its legal value. The eagles coined after 1834,' were not money until they were authorized by law, and had they been coined before, without a law fixing their legal value, they could, no more have.paid a debt than uncoined bullion, or cotton, or wheat. Every contract for the payment of money, simply, is necessarily subject to the constitutional power of the government over the currency, whatever that power may be, and the obligation of the parties is, therefore, assumed with reference to that power. Nor is this singular. A covenant for quiet-enjoyment is not broken, nor is its obligation impaired by the government’s taking the land granted in virtue, of -its right of eminent domain.. The expectation of the covenantee may be disappointed.- lie may not enjoy all he anticipated, but the grant was made and.the covenant undertaken in subordination to the paramount right of the government.* We have been asked whether Congress can declare that a contract to deliver a quantity of grain may be satisfied by the tender of a less quantity. Undoubtedly not. But this is a false analogy. There is a wide distinction between .a tender of quantities, or of specific articles, and a tender of legal values. Contracts for the delivery of specific articles belong exclusively to the domain of State legislation, while contracts for the payment of money are subject to the authority of Congress, at least so far as relates to the means of payment. They are engagements to pay with lawful money of the. United States, and Congress is empowered to regulate that money. It cannot, therefore, be maintained that the legal tender acts impaired the obligation of contracts.

Nor can it be truly asserted that Congress may- not, by its action, indirectly impair the obligation of contracts, if by the expression be meant -rendering contrasts fruitless, or partially fruitless. Directly it may, confessedly, by passing, a bankrupt act, embracing past as well as future transactions. This is obliterating contracts entirely. So it may relieve parties from their apparent obligations indirectly in a multitude of ways. It inay-declare war, or, even in peace, pass non-intercourse acts, or direct an einbargo. . All such measures may,, and must operate seriously upon existing contracts, and may not merely hinder, but relieve the parties to such contracts entirely from performance. It is, then, clear that the powers of Congress may be exerted, though the effect of such exertion may be in one case to annul, and in other cases to -impair the obligation of contracts. Aud it is no sufficient answer to this to say it is true only when the powers exerted were expressly granted. There is no ground for any such distinction. It has no warrant in the Constitution, or in any of the docisions-of this court. We are accustomed to speak for mere convenience of the express and implied powers conferred upon Congress. But in fact the auxiliary powers, those necessary and appropriate to the execution of other pow.ers singly described, are as expressly given as .is the power to declare'war, or to establish uniform laws on tho subject of bankruptcy. They are hot catalogued, no list of them is made, but they are grouped in the last cluse of section eight of the first article, and granted in the same words in which all other powers are granted to Congress. And this court has recognized no such distinction'' as is now attempted. An embargo suspends many contracts and renders performance of others impossible, yet the power to enforce it has been declared constitutional.* The power to enact a law directing an embargo is one of the auxiliary powers, existing only because appropriate in time of peace to regulate commerce, or appropriate to carrying on war. Though not conferred as a substantive power, it has not been thought to be in conflict with the'Constitution; because it impairs indirectly the obligation of contracts. That discovery calls for a new reading of the Constitution.

If, then, the legal tender acts were justly chargeable with impairing contract obligations, they would not, for that reason, be forbidden, unless a different rule is to be applied to them from that which has hitherto prevailed in the construction of other powers granted by the fundamental law. But, as already "intimated, the objection misapprehends the nature and extent of the contract obligation spoken of in the Constitution.. As in a state of civil society property of a citizen or subject is ownership, subject to the lawful demands of the sovereign, so contracts must be understood as madq. in reference to the possible exercise of the,rightful authority of the government, and no obligation of a contract can extend to the defeat of legitimate government authority.

Closely allied to the objection we have just been considering is the argument' pressed upon us that the legal tender acts were prohibited by the spirit of the fifth amendment, which forbids taking private^property for public use without just compensation or due process'd" law. That provision has always been understood as referring only to a direct appropriation, and not to consequential injuries resulting from the exercise of lawful power. It has never been supposed to have any bearing upon, ór to inhibit laws that indirectly work harm and loss to individuals. ' A new tariff", an embargo, a draft, or a Avar may inevitably bring upon individuals great lpsses; may, indeed, render .valuable property ■ almost .valueless. They may destroy the worth of contracts. But whoever supposed that, because of this, a tariff" could not be changed, or a non-intercourse act, or an embargo be enacted, or a war be declared ? - By the act of June 28,1834, a new regulation of the Aveight and value of gold coin Avas adopted, and about six per cent. Avas taken from the Aveight of each dollar. The effect of this Avas that all creditors were subjected to a- corresponding loss. The debts then due became solvable with six per cent, less gold than Avas required to pay them before. The result was thus precisely what it is contended the legal tender acts worked. But was it ever imagined this was taking private property without compensation or without due process of laAV ? Was the idea ever advanced that the new regulation of gold coin was against the spirit of the fifth amendment? And has any one in good faith avowed his belief that even a law debasing the current coin, by increasing the alloy, would be taking private property? It might be impolitic and unjust, but co.uld its constitutionality be doubted? Other statutes have, from time to time, reduced the quantity of silver in silver coin without any question of their constitutionality. It is said, however, now, that the act of 1884 only brought the legal value of gold coin more nearly into correspondence with its actual value in the market, or its relative value to silver. But we do not perceive that this varies the case or diminishes its force as an illustration. The creditor who had a thousand dollars due him on the 31st day of July, 1834 (the day before .the act took effect), was entitled to a thousand dollars of coined gold of the weight and fineness of the then existing coinage. The day after, he was entitled only to a sum six per cent, less in weight and in market value, or to' a smaller number of silver dollars. Yet he .would have been a bold man who had asserted that, because of th-is, the obligation of the contract was impaired, or that private property ivas taken without compensation or without duo process of law. No such assertion, so far as we know, was ever made. Admit it was a hardship, but it is not every hardship that is unjust, much less that.is unconstitutional; and certainly it would be an anomaly for us to hold an act of Congress invalid merely because we might think its provisions harsh and unjust.

We arc nob aware of anything else which has been advanced in support of the proposition that the legal tender acts wore forbidden by either the letter or the spirit of the Constitution. If, therefore, they were, what we have endeavored to show, appropriate means for legitimate ends, they were not transgressive of the authority vested in Congress.

Hero we riiight stop; but we will notice briefly an argument presented in support of the position that the unit of money value must possess intrinsic value. The argument is derived from assimilating the constitutional provision respecting a standard of weights and measures to that, conferring the power to coin money and regulate its value. It is said there can bo no uniform standard of weights without weight, or of measure without length or space, and wo are asked how anything can be made a uniform standard of value which has itself no value? This is a question foreign to the subject before us. The legal tender acts do not attempt to make paper a standard of value. "We do not rest their validity upon the assertion that their emission is coinage, or any regulation of the value of money; nor do we assert that Congress may make anything which has no value money. What we do assert is, that Congress has power to enact that the government’s promises to pay money shall be, for the time being, equivalent in value to the representative of value determined by the coinage acts, or to multiples thereof. It is hardly correct to speak of a standard of value. The Constitution does not speak of it. It contemplates a •standard for that which has gravity or extension; but value is an ideal thing. ' The coinage acts-fix its unit as a dollar; but the gold or silver thing we call a dollar is, in no sense, a standard of a dollar. It io a representative of it. There might never have been a piece of money of the denomination of a dollar. There never was a pound sterling coined until 1815, if we except a few coins struck in the reign of Henry VIII, almost immediately debased, yet it has been the unit of British currency for many generations. It is, then, a mistake to regard the legal tender acts as either fixing a standard of value or regulating money values, or 'making that money which has-no intrinsic value.

But, without extending our remarks further, it will be seen that we hold the acts of Congress .constitutional as applied to contracts tnade either before or after their passage. In so holding, Ave overrule so much of Avhat was decided in Hepburn v. Griswold,* as ruled the acts unwarranted by the Constitution so far as they apply to contracts made before their enactment. That casehvas decided by a divided court, and by a court having a less number of judges than the law then in existence provided this court shall have. These cases have been heard before a full court, and they have , received our most careful consideration. The questions involved are constitutional questions of the most vital importance to the government and to the public at large. We have been in the habit of treating eases involving a consideration of constitutional power differently from those which concern merely private right.* We are not accustomed to hear them in the absence of a full court, if it can be avoided. Even in cases involving only private rights, if convinced we had. made a.mistake, we would hear another argument and cor- ' rect our error. And if is no unprecedented thing in courts of last resort, both in this country and in England, to overrule decisions previously made. We agree this should not be done inconsiderately, but in a case of such far-reachiug consequences as the present, thoroughly convinced as we are that Congress has not transgressed its powers, we regard it as our duty so to decide and to affirm both these judgments.

The other questions raised in the case of Knox v. Lee were substantially decided in Texas v. White.†

Judgment in each case aeeirmed.

4 Binney, 123.

6 Crunch, 87.

1 Wheaton, 326.

4 Id. 405.

6 Wheaton, 414.

9 Howard, 560.

4 Wheaton, 416.

Fisher v. Blight, 2 Cranch, 358.

2 Cranch, 358.

8 Wallace. 603.

8 Wallace, 533.

United States v. Marigold, 9 Howard, 560.

Apsden v. Austin, 5 Adolphus & Ellis, N. S. 671; Dunn v. Sayles, Ib. 685; Coffin v. Landis, 10 Wright, 426.

Davies, 28; Barrington v. Potter, Dyer, 81, b., fol. 67; Faw v. Marsteller, 2 Cranch, 29.

Dobbins v. Brown, 2 Jones (Pennsylvania), 75; Workman v. Miffrin, 6 Casey, 362.

Gibbons v. Ogden, 9 Wheaton, 1.

8 Wallace, 603.

Briscoe v. Bank of Kentucky, 8 Peters, 118.

7 Wallace, 700.

Hepburn v. Griswold, 8 Wallace, 632.