Pollock v. Farmers' Loan & Trust Co.

157 U.S. 429, 15 S. Ct. 673, 39 L. Ed. 759, 1895 U.S. LEXIS 2215, 3 A.F.T.R. (P-H) 2557

• Court: Supreme Court of the United States
• Decided: April 8, 1895
• Docket: 893
• Status: Published

Opinions

Mr. Chief Justice Fuller,

after stating the case as above reported, delivered the opinion of the court:

The jurisdiction of a court of equity to prevent any threatened breach of trust in the misapplication or diversion of the funds of a corporation by illegal payments out of its capital or profits has been frequently sustained. Dodge v. Woolsey, 18 How. 331; Hhawes v. Oakland, 104 U. S. 450.

As in Dodge v. Woolsey, this bill proceeds on the ground that the defendants would be guilty of such breach of trust or duty in voluntarily making returns for the imposition of, and paying, an unconstitutional tax; and also on allegations of threatened multiplicity of suits and irreparable injury.

The objection of adequate remedy at law was not raised below, nor is it now raised by appellees, if it could be entertained at all at this stage of the proceedings; and, so far as it was within the power of the government to do so, the question of jurisdiction, for the purposes of the case, was explicitly waived on the argument. The relief sought was in respect of- voluntary action by the defendant company, and not in respect of the assessment and collection themselves. Under these circumstances, we should not be justified in. declining to proceed to judgment upon the merits. Pelton v. National Bank, 101 U. S. 143,148; Cummings v. National Bank, 101 U. S. 153, 157; Reynes v. Dumont, 130 U. S. 354.

Since the opinion in Marbury v. Madison, 1 Cranch, 137, 177, was delivered, it has not been cloubted that it is within judicial competency, by express provisions of the Constitution or by necessary inference and implication, to determine whether a given law of the United States is or.is’ not made in pursuance of the Constitution, and to hold it valid or void accordingly. “If,” said Chief Justice Marshall, “both the law and the Constitution apply to a particular case, so that the court must either decide that case conformably to the law, disregarding the Constitution; or conformably^ to the Constitution, disregarding the law ; the court must determine which of these conflicting rules governs the case. This is of the very essence of judicial duty.” And the Chief Justice added that the doctrine “ that courts must close their eyes on the Constitution, and see only the law,” “ would subvert the very foundation of all written constitutions.” Necessarily the power to declare a law unconstitutional is always exercised with reluctance; but the duty to do so, in a proper case, cannot be declined, and must be discharged in accordance with the deliberate judgment of the tribunal in which the validity of the enactment is directly drawn in question.

The contention of the complainant is :

First. That the law in question, in imposing a tax on- the income or rents of real estate, imposes a tax upon the real estate itself; and in imposing a tax on the interest or other income of bonds or other personal property held for the purposes of income or ordinarily yielding income, .imposes a tax upon the personal estate itself; that such tax is a direct tax, and void because imposed without regard to the rule of apportionment ; and that by reason thereof the whole law is invalidated.

Second. That the law is invalid, because imposing indirect taxes in violation of the constitutional requirement of uniformity ; and therein also in violation of the implied limitation upon taxation that all tax laws must apply equally, impartially, and uniformly to all similarly, situated. Under the second head it is contended that the rule of uniformity is violated in that the law taxes the income of certain corporations, companies, and associations, no matter how created or organized, at a higher rate than the incomes of individuals or partnerships derived from precisely similar property or business ; in that it exempts from the operation of the act and from the burden of taxation, numerous corporations, companies, and associations having similar property and carrying on similar business to those expressly taxed ; in that it denies to individuals deriving their income from shares in certain corporations, companies, and associations the benefit of the exemption of $4000 granted to other persons interested in similar property and business; in the exemption of $4000; in the exemption of building and loan associations, savings banks, mutual life, fire, marine, and accident insurance companies, existing solely for the pecuniary profit of their members ; these and other exemptions being alleged to be purely arbitrary and capricious, justified by no public purpose, and of such magnitude as to invalidate the entire enactment; and in other particulars.

Third. That the law is invalid so far as imposing a tax upon income received from state and municipal bonds.

The Constitution provides that representatives and direct taxes shall be apportioned among the several States according to numbers, and that no direct tax shall be laid except according to the enumeration provided for; and also that all duties, imposts aijd excises shall be uniform throughout the United States.

The men who framed and adopted that instrument had just emerged from the struggle for independence whose rallying cry had been that “ taxation and representation go together.”

The mother country had taught the colonists, in the contests waged to establish that taxes could not be imposed by the sovereign except as they were granted by the representatives of the realm, that self-taxation constituted the main security against oppression. As Burke declared, in his speech on Conciliation with America, the defenders of the excellence of the English constitution “ took infinite pains to inculcate, as a fundamental principle, that, in all monarchies, the people must, in effect, themselves, mediately or immediately, possess the power of granting their own money, or no shadow of liberty could subsist.” The principle was that the consent of those who were expected to pay it was essential to the validity of any tax.

The States were about, for all national purposes embraced in the Constitution, to become one, united under the same sovereign authority, and governed by the same laws. But as they still retained their jurisdiction over all persons and things within their territorial limits, except where surrendered to'the general government or restrained by the Constitution, they were careful to see to it that taxation and representation should go together, so tnat the sovereignty reserved should not be impaired, and that when Congress, and especially the House of Representatives, where it 'was specifically provided that all revenue bills must originate, voted a tax upon property, it should be with the consciousness, and under- the responsibility, that in so doing the tax so voted would proportionately fall upon the immediate constituents of those who imposed it.

More than this, by the Constitution the States not only gave to the Nation'the poncurrent power to tax persons and property directly, but they surrendered their own. power to levy taxes on imports and to regulate commerce. All the thirteen were seaboard States, but they varied in maritime importance, and differences existed between them in population, in wealth, in the character of .property and of business interests. Moreover, they looked forward to the coming of new States from the great West into the vast empire of their anticipations. So when the wealthier States as between themselves and their less favored associates, and all as between themselves and those who were to come, gave up for the common good the great sources of revenue derived through commerce, they did so in reliance on the protection afforded by restrictions on the grant of power.

Thus, in the matter of taxation, the Constitution recognizes the two great classes of direct and indirect tax.es, and lays down two rules by which their imposition must be governed, namely: The rule of apportionment as to direct taxes, and the rule .of uniformity as to duties, imposts and .excises.

The rule of uniformity was not prescribed to the exercise of the power granted by the first paragraph of section eight, to lay and collect taxes, because the rule of apportionment as to taxes had already been laid down in the third paragraph uf the second section.

And this view was expressed by Mr. Chief Justice Chase in The License Tax Cases, 5 Wall. 462, 471, when he said: “It is true that the power of Congress' to tax is a very extensive power. It is given in the Constitution, with <?nly one exception and only two qualifications. Congress cannot tax exports, and it must impose direct taxes by the rule of apportionment, and indirect taxes by the rule of uniformity. Tims limited, and thus only, it reaches every subject, and may be exercised at discretion.”

And although there have been from time to time intimations that there might be some tax which was not a direct tax nor included under the words “ duties, imposts and excises,” such a tax for more than one hundred years of national existence has as yet remained undiscovered, notwithstanding the stress of particular circumstances has invited thorough investigation into sources of revenue.

The first question to be considered is whether a tax on the rents or income of real estate is a direct tax within the meaning of the Constitution. Ordinarily all taxes paid primarily by persons who can shift the burden upon some one else, or who are under no legal compulsion to pay them, are considered indirect taxes; but a tax upon property holders in respect of their estates, whether real or personal, or of the income yielded by such estates, and the payment of which cannot be avoided, are direct taxes. Nevertheless, it may be admitted that although this definition of direct taxes is prima facie correct, and to be applied in the consideration of the question before us, yet that .the Constitution may bear a different meaning, and that such different meaning must be recognized. But in arriving at any conclusion upon this point, we are at liberty to refer to the historical circumstances attending the framing and adoption of the Constitution as well as the entire frame and scheme of the instrument, and the consequences naturally attendant upon the one construction or the other.

"We inquire, therefore, what, at the time the Constitution was framed and adopted, were recognized as direct taxes? What did those who framed and adopted it understand the terms to designate and include?

We must remember that the fifty-five members of the constitutional convention were men of great sagacity, fully conversant with governmental problems, deeply conscious of the nature of their task, and profoundly convinced that they were laying the foundations of a vast future empire. “ To many in the assembly the work of the great French magistrate on the £ Spirit of Laws,’ of which Washington with his own hand had copied an abstract by Madison, was the favorite manual; some of them had made an analysis of all federal governments in. ancient and modern times, and a few were well versed in the .best English, Swiss, and Dutch writers on government. They had immediately before them the example of Great Britain; and they had a still better school of political wisdom in the republican constitutions of their several States, which many of them had assisted to frame.” 2 Bancroft’s Hist. Const. 9.

The Federalist demonstrates the value attached by Hamilton, Madison, and Jay to historical experience, and shows that they had made a careful study of many forms of government. Many of the framers were particularly versed in the literature of the period, Franklin, Wilson, and Hamilton for example. Turgot had published in 1764 his work on taxation,, and in 1766 his essay on “The Formation and Distribution of Wealth,” while Adam Smith’s “Wealth of Nations” was published in 1776. Franklin in 1766 had said upon his examination before the House of Commons- that: “ An external tax is a duty laid on commodities imported; that duty is added to the first cost and other charges on the commodity, and, when it is offered to sale makes a part of the price. If the people do not like it at that price, they- refuse it; they are not obliged to pay it. But an internal tax is forced from the people without their consent, if not laid by their own representatives. The stamp act says, we shall-have no. commerce, make no exchange of property with each other, neither purchase nor grant, nor recover debts.; we shall neither marry nor make our wills, unless we pay such and such sums; and thus it is intended to extort our money from us, or ruin us by the consequences of refusing to pay.” 16 Parl. Hist. 144.

■ They were, of course, familiar with the modes of taxation pursued in the several States. From the report of Oliver Wolcott, when Secretary of the Treasury, on direct taxes, to the House of ^Representatives, December 14, 1796, his most important state paper, (Am. State Papers, 1 Finance, 431,) and the various state laws then existing, it appears that prior to the' adoption of the Constitution nearly all the States imposed a poll tax, taxes on, land, on cattle of all kinds, and various kinds of personal property, and that, in addition, Massachusetts, Connecticut, Pennsylvania, Delaware, New Jersey,. Yirginia, and South Carolina assessed their citizens upon their profits from professions, trades, and employments.

Congress under the articles of confederation had no actual operative power of taxation. It could call upon the States for their respective contributions or quotas as previously determined on; but in case of the failure or omission of the States to furnish such contribution, there were no means of compulsion, as Congress had no power whatever to lay any tax upon individuals. This imperatively demanded a remedy ; hut the opposition to granting the power of direct taxation in addition to the substantially exclusive power of laying imposts and duties was so strong that it required the convention, in securing effective powers of taxation to the Federal government, to use the utmost care and skill to so harmonize conflicting interests that the ratification of the instrument could be obtained.

The situation and the result are thus described by Mr. Chief Justice Chase in Lane County v. Oregon, 7 Wall. 71, 76: “The people of the United States constitute one nation, under one government, and this government, within the scope of the powers with which it is invested, is supreme. On the other hand, the people of each State compose a State, having its own government, and endowed with all the functions essential to separate and independent existence. The States disunited might continue to exist. Without'the States in union there could be no such political body as the United States.' Both the States and the United States existed before the Constitution. The people, through that instrument, established a more perfect union by substituting a national government, acting, with ample power, directly upon the citizens, instead of the confederate government, which acted with powers, greatly restricted, only upon the States. But in many articles of the Constitution the necessary existence of the States, and, within their proper spheres, the independent authority of the States, is distinctly recognized. To them nearly the whole charge of interior regulation is committed or left; to them and to the people all powers not expressly delegated to the national governnient are reserved. The general condition was well stated by Mr. Madison in the Federalist, thus: ‘ The Federal and state governments are in fact but different agents and trustees of the people, constituted with different powers and designated for different purposes.’ Now, to the existence of the States; "'themselves necessary to the existence of the United States, the power of taxation is indispensable. It is an essential function of government. It was exercised by the colonies; and when the colonies became States, both before and after the formation of the confederation, it was exercised by the new governments. Under the Articles of Confederation the government of the United States was limited in the exercise of this power to requisitions upon the States, while the whole power of direct and indirect taxation of persons and property, whether by taxes on polls, or duties oil imports, or duties on internal production, manufacture, or use, was acknowledged to belong exclusively to the States, without any other limitation than that of non-interference with certain treaties made by Congress. The Constitution, it is true, greatly changed this condition of things. It gave the power to tax, both directly and indirectly, to the national government, and, subject to thé one prohibition of any tax upon exports and to the conditions of uniformity in respect to indirect and of proportion in respect to direct taxes, the power was given without any express reservation. On the other hand, no power to tax exports, or imports except for a single purpose and to an insignificant extent, or to lay any duty on tonnage, was permitted to the States. In respect, however, to property, business, and persons, within their respective limits, their power of taxation remained and .remains entire. It is indeed a concurrent power, and iq the case of a tax on the same subject by both governments, the claim of the United States, as the supreme authority, must be preferred; but with this qualification it is absolute. The extent to which it shall be exercised, the subjects upon which it shall be exercised, and the mode in which it shall be exercised, are all equally within the discretion of the legislatures to which the States commit the exercise of the power. That discretion is restrained only by the will of the people expressed in the state constitutions or through elections, and by the condition that it must not be so used as to burden or embarrass the operations of the national government. There is nothing in the Constitution which contemplates or authorizes any direct abridgment of this power by national legislation. To the extent just indicated it is as complete in the States as the like power, within the limits of the Constitution, is complete in Congress.”

On May 29, 1787, Charles Pinckney presented his draft of a proposed constitution, which provided that the proportion of direct taxes should be regulated by the whole number of inhabitants of every description, taken in the manner prescribed by the legislature; and that no tax should be paid on articles exported from the United- States. 1 Elliot, 147, 148.

Mr. Kandolph’s plan declared “ that the right of suffrage, in the national legislature, ought to be proportioned to the quotas of- contribution, or to the number of free inhabitants, as the one or the other may seem best, in different cases.” 1 Elliot, 148.

On June 15,'Mr. Paterson submitted several resolutions, among which was one proposing that the United States in Congress should be authorized to make requisitions in proportion to the whole number of white and other free citizens and inhabitants, including those bound to servitude for a term of years, and three-fifths of all other persons, except Indians not taxed. 1 Elliot, 175, 176.

On the ninth of July the proposition that the legislature.be authorized to regulate the number of representatives according to wealth and inhabitants was approved, and on the eleventh it was voted that “ in order to ascertain the alterations that may happen in the population and wealth of the several States, a census shall be taken ; ” although the resolution of which this formed a part was defeated. 5 Elliot (Madison Papers)’, 288, 295; 1 Elliot, 200.

On July 12, Goiiverneur Morris moved to add to the clause empowering the legislature to vary the representation according to. the-amount of wealth and number of the inhabitants, a proviso that taxation should be in proportion to representation, and, admitting that some objections lay against his proposition, which would be removed by limiting it to direct taxation,-since “ with regard to indirect taxes on exports and imports, and on consumption, the rule would be inapplicable,” varied his motion by inserting the word “ direct,” whereupon it passed as follows: “ Provided, always, that direct taxation ought to be proportioned to representation.” 5 Elliot (Madison Papers), 302.

Amendments were proposed, by Mr. Ellsworth and Mr. Wilson to the effect that the rule of contribution by direct taxation should be according to the number of white inhabitants and three-fifths of every other description, and that in order to ascertain the alterations in the direct taxation which might be required from time to time a census should be taken; the word wealth was struck out of the clause, on motion of Mr. Randolph; and the whole proposition, proportionate representation to direct taxation, and both to the white and' three-fifths of the colored inhabitants, and requiring a census, was adopted.

In the course of the debates, and after the motion of Mr. Ellsworth that the first census be taken in three years after the meeting of Congress had been adopted, Mr. Madison records : “ Mr. King asked what was the precise meaning of direct taxation. No one answered.” But Mr. Gerry immediately moved to amend by the insertion of the clause that “ from the first meeting of the legislature of the United States until a census shall be taken, all moneys for supplying the public treasury by direct taxation, shall be raised from the several States according to the number of their representatives respectively in the first branch.” This left for the time the' matter of collection to the States. Mr. Langdon objected that this would bear unreasonably hard against New Hampshire, and-Mr. Martin said that direct taxation should not be used but in cases of absolute necessity, and then the States would be the best judges of the mode. 5 Elliot (Madison Papers), 451, 453.

Thus was accomplished one of the great compromises of the Constitution, resting on the doctrine that the right of represen-, tation ought to be conceded to every community on which a tax is to be imposed, but crystallizing it in such form as. to allay jealousies in respect of the future balance of power; to reconcile conflicting views in respect of the enumeration of slaves; and to remove the objection that, in adjusting a system of representation between the States, regard should be had to their relative wealth, since those who were to be most heavily taxed ought to have a proportionate influence in the government.

The compromise, in embracing the power of direct taxation, consisted not simply in including part of the slaves in the enumeration of population, but in providing that as between State and State such taxation should be proportioned to representation. The establishment of the same rule for the apportionment of taxes as for regulating the proportion of representatives, observed Mr. Madison in No. 54 of the Federalist, was by no means founded on the same principle, for as to the former it had reference to the proportion of wealth, and although in respect of- that it was in ordinary cases a very unfit measure, it “ had too recently obtained the general sanction of America, not to have found a ready preference with the convention,” while the opposite interests of the States, balancing each other, would produce impartiality in enumeration. By prescribing this rule, Hamilton wrote (Federalist, No. 36) that the door was shut “ to partiality or oppression,” and “the abuse of this power of taxation to have been provided against with guarded circumspection ; ” and obviously the operation of direct taxation on every State tended to prevent resort to that mode of supply except under pressure of necessity and to promote prudence and economy in expenditure.

We repeat that the right of the Federal government to directly assess and collect its own taxes, at least until after requisitions upon the States had been made and failed, was one of the chief points of conflict, and Massachusetts, in ratifying, recommended the adoption of an amendment in these words: “ That Congress do not lay direct taxes but when the moneys arising from the impost and excise are insufficient for the public exigencies, nor then .until Congress shall have first made a requisition upon the States to assess, levy, and pay, their respective proportions of such requisition, agreeably to the census fixed in the said Constitution, in such way and manner as the legislatures of the States shall think best.” 1 Elliot, 322. And in this South Carolina, New York, New Hampshire, and Rhode Island concurred. Id. 325, 326, 329, 336.

Luther Martin, in his well-known communication to the legislature of Maryland in January, 1788, expressed-his views thus : ‘‘ By the power to lay and collect taxes, they may proceed to direct taxation on every individual, either by a capitation tax on their heads, or an assessment on their property. . . . Many of the members, and myself in the number, thought that states were much better judges of the cirT cumstances of their citizens, and what sum of money'could be collected from them by direct taxation, and of the manner in which it could be raised with the greatest ease and convenience to their citizens, than the general govérnment could be; and that the general government ought not to have the power of laying direct taxes in any case but in that of the delinquency of a State.” 1 Elliot, 344, 368, 369.

Ellsworth and Sherman' wrote the governor of Connecticut, September 26, 1787, that it wras probable “ that the principal branch of revenue will be duties on imports. What may be necessary to be raised by direct taxation is to be apportioned, on the several States, according to the.number of their inhabitants ; and although Congress may raise the money by their own authority, if necessary, yet that authority-need not be exercised, if each State will furnish its quota.” 1 Elliot, 492.

And Ellsworth, in the Connecticut convention, in discussing the power of Congress to lay taxes, pointed out that all sources of revenue, excepting the impost, still lay open to, the States, and insisted that it was “ necessary that the power of the general legislature should extend to all ■ the objects of taxation, that government should be able to command all the resources of the country; because no man can tell what our exigencies may be. Wars have now become rather wars of the purse than of the sword. Government must therefore be able to command the whole power of the purse. . . . Direct taxation can go but little way towards raising a revenue. To raise money in this way, people must be provident; they must constantly be laying up money to answer the demands of the collector. But you cannot make people thus provident. If you would do anything to the purpose, you must come in when they are spending, and take a part with them. . . , All nations have seen the necessity and propriety of raising a revenue by indirect taxation, by duties upon articles .of consumption. . ■ . . In England, the whole public revenue is about twelve millions sterling per annum.' The land tax amounts to about two millions; the window and some other taxes, to about two millions more. The other eight millions are raised upon articles of consumption. . . . This Constitution defines the extent of the powers of the general government. If the general legislature should at any time overleap their limits, the judicial department is a constitutional check. If the United States go beyond their powers, if they make a law which the Constitution does not authorize, it is void; and the judicial power, the national judges, who, to secure their impartiality, are- to Jae made independent, will declare it to be void.” 2 Elliot, 191, 192, 196.

In the convention of 'Massachusetts by which the Constitution was ratified, the^second section of article I being under consideration, Mr. King said: “ It is a principle of this Constitution,. that representation and taxation should go hand in hand. . . . By this rule are representation and taxation to be apportioned. And it was adopted, because it was the language of ail America. According to the confederation, ratified in 1781, the Sums for the general welfare and defence should be apportioned according to the surveyed lands, and improvements thereon, in the several States; but that it hath never been in the power of Congress to follow that rule, the returns from the several States being so very imperfect:*’ 2 Elliot, 36.

Theophilus Parsons observed : “ Congress have only a concurrent right with each State, in laying direct taxes, not an exclusive right; and the right of each State to direct taxation is equalty extensive and perfect as the right of Congress.” Id. 93. And John Adams, Dawes,. Sumner, King, and Sedgwick all agreed that a direct tax would be the last source of revenue resorted to by Congress.

In the New York convention, Chancellor Livingston pointed, out that when the imposts diminished and the expenses of the government increased, “ they must have recourse to direct taxes; that is, taxes on land, and- specific duties.” 2 Elliot, 341. And Mr. Jay, in reference to an amendment that direct taxes should not be imposed until requisition, had been made and proved fruitless, argued that the amendment would involve great difficulties, and that it ought to be considered that direct taxes were of two kinds, general and specific. Id. 380, 381.

In Yirginia, Mr. John Marshall said: “ The objects of direct taxes ate well understood; they are but few; what are,they? Lands, slaves, stock of all kinds, and a few other articles of domestic property. . . . They will have the benefit of the knowledge and experience of the state legislature. They wilt see in what manner the legislature of Yirginia collects its. taxes. . . . Cannot Congress regulate the taxes so as to-be equal on all parts of the community? Where is the absurdity of having thirteen revenues? Will-they clash with, or injure, each other? If not, why cannot Congress make thirteen distinct laws, and impose the taxes on the general objects, of taxation in each State, so-as that all persons of the society shall pay equally, as they ought ? ” 3 Elliot, 229, 235. At that time, in Yirginia, lands were taxed, and specific taxes assessed on certain specified objects. These objects were stated by Secretary Wolcott to be taxes on lands, houses in. towns, slaves, stud horses, jackasses, other horses and mules, billiard tables, four-wheel riding carriages, phaetons, stage-wagons, and riding carriages with two wheels; and it was; undoubtedly to these objects that the future Chief Justice referred.

Mr. Randolph said.: “Butin this new Constitution, there is a more just and equitable rule fixed — a limitation beyond which they cannot gó. Representatives and taxes go hand in hand; according to the one will the other be regulated. The number of representatives is determined by the number of inhabitants ; they have nothing to do but to lay taxes accordingly.” 3 Elliot, 121.

Mr. George Nicholas said : “ the proportion of taxes is fixed by the number of inhabitants, and not regulated by the extent of territory, or fertility of soil. . . . Each State will know, from its population, its proportion of any general tax. As it was.justly observed by the gentleman over the way, (Mr. Randolph), .they cannot possibly exceed that proportion ; they are limited and restrained expressly to it. The state legislatures have no check of this kind. Their power is uncontrolled.” 3 Elliot, 243, 244.

Mr. Madison remarked that “ they will be limited to fix the proportion of each State, and they must raise it in the most convenient and satisfactory manner to the public.” 3 Elliot, 255.

From .these references, and they might be extended indefinitely, it is clear that the rule to govern each of the great classes-into which taxes were divided was prescribed in view of the commonly accepted distinction between them .and of the taxes directly levied under the systems of the States. And that the difference between direct and indirect taxation was fully appreciated is supported by the congressional debates after the government was organized.

In the debates in the House of Representatives preceding the .passage of the act of Congress to lay “ duties upon carriages for the conveyance of persons,” approved June 5, 1794, (1 Stat. 373, c. 45,) Mr. Sedgwick said that “ a capitation-tax, and taxes on land and on property and income generally, were direct charges, as well in the immediate as ultimate sources of contribution. He had considered those, and those only, as direct taxes in their operation and effects. On the other hand, a tax imposed on a specific article of personal property, and- particularly if objects of luxury, as in the case under consideration, he had never supposed had been considered a direct tax, within the meaning of the Constitution.”

Mr. Dexter observed that his colleague “had stated the meaning of direct taxes to be a capitation tax, or a general tax on all the taxable property of the citizens; and that a gentleman from Virginia (Mr. Nicholas) thought the meaning was, that all taxes are direct which are paid by the citizen without, being recompensed by the consumer ; but that, where the tax was only advanced and repaid by the consumer, the tax was indirect. He thought that both opinions were just, and not inconsistent, though the gentlemen had differed about them. He thought that a general tax on all taxable property was a direct tax, because it was paid without being recompensed by the consumer.”. Annals 3d Congress, 644, 646.

At a subsequent day of the debate, Mr. Madison objected to the tax on carriages as “ an unconstitutional tax,” but Fisher Ames declared that he had satisfied himself that it was not a direct tax, as “ the duty falls not on the possession but on the use.” Apnals-, 730.

Mr. Madison wrote to Jefferson on May 11, 1794: “And the tax on carriages succeeded, in spite of the Constitution, by a majority of twenty, the advocates for the principle being reinforced by the adversaries to luxuries.” “ Sopie of the motives which they decoyed to their support ought to premonish them of the danger. By breaking down the barriers of the Constitution, and giving sanction to the idea of sumptuary regulations, wealth may find a precarious defence in the shield of justice. If luxury, as such, is to be taxed, the greatest of all luxuries, says Paine, is a great estate. Even on the present occasion, it has been found prudent to yield to a tax on transfers of stock in the funds and in the banks.” 2 Madison’s Writings, 14.

But Albert Gallatin in his “ Sketch of the Finances of the United States,” published in November, 1796, said: “ The most generally received opinion, however, is, that by direct taxes in the Constitution, those are meant which are raised on the capital or revenue of the people; by indirect, such as are raised on their expense. As that opinion is in itself rational, and conformable to the decision which has taken place on the subject of the carriage tax, and as it appears important, for the sake of preventing future controversies, which may be not more fatal to the revenue than to the tranquility of the Union, that a fixed interpretation should be generally adopted, it will not be improper to corroborate it by quoting the author from whom the idea seems to have been borrowed.” He then quotes from Smith’s Wealth of Nations, and- continues: “ The remarkable coincidence of the clause of the Constitution with this passage in using the word ‘capitation ’ as a generic expression, including the different species of direct taxes, an acceptation of the word peculiar, it is believed, to Dr. Smith, leaves little doubt that the framers of the one had the other in view at the time, and that they, as well as he, by direct taxes, meant those paid directly from and falling immediately on the revenue; and by indirect, those which are paid indirectly out of the revenue by falling immediately upon the expense.” 3 Gallatin’s Writings, (Adams’s ed.) 74, 75.

The act provided in its first section “ that there shall be levied, collected, and paid upon all carriages for the conveyance of persons, which shall be kept by or for any person for his or her own use, or to be let out to hire or for the conveyance of passengers, th.e several duties and rates following,” and then followed a fixed yearly rate on every coach ; chariot; phaeton and coachee; every four-wheel and every two-wheel top carriage ; and upon every other two-wheel carriage; varying according to the vehicle.

In Hylton v. United States, 3 Dall. 171, decided in March, 1796, this court held the act to be constitutional, because not laying a direct tax. Chief Justice Ellsworth and’Mr. Justice Cushing took no part in the decision, and Mr. Justice Wilson gave no reasons.

Mr. Justice Chase said that he was inclined to think, but of this he did not. “give a, judicial opinion,” that “the direct taxes contemplated by the Constitution, are only two, to wit, a capitation, or poll tax, simply; without regard to property, profession, -or any other circumstance; and a tax on land;-” and that he doubted “ whether a tax, by a general assessment of personal property, within the United States, is included within the term direct tax.” But he thought that “an annual tax on carriages for the conveyance of persons, may be considered as within the power granted to Congress to lay duties. The term duty, is the most comprehensive next to the generical term tax; and practically in Great Britain, (whence we take our general ideas-of taxes, duties, imposts, excises, customs, etc.,) embraces taxes on stamps, tolls for passage, etc., and is not confined to taxes on importation only. It seems to me, that a tax on expense is an indirect tax ; and I think, an annual tax on a carriage for the conveyance of persons, is of that kind; because a carriage is a consumable commodity; and such annual tax on it, is on the expense of the owner.”

Mr. Justice Paterson said that “ the Constitution declares, that a capitation tax is a direct tax; and, both in theory and practice, a tax on land is deeméd to be a direct tax. . . . It is not necessary to determine, whether a tax on the product of land be a direct or indirect tax. Perhaps, the immediate product of land, in its original and crude state, ought to be considered as the land itself; it makes part of it; or else the provision made against taxing exports would be easily eluded. Land, independently of its produce, is of no value. . . . Whether direct taxes, in the sense of the Constitution, comprehend any other tax than a capitation tax, and taxes on land, is a questionable point. . . . But as it is not before the court, it would be improper to give any decisive opinion upon it.” And he concluded: “ All taxes on expenses or consumption are indirect taxes. A tax on carriages is of this kind, and of course is not a direct tax.” This conclusion he fortified by reading extracts from Adam Smith on the taxation of consumable commodities.

Mr. Justice Iredell said: “There is no necessfiw, or propriety, in determining what is or is not, a direct, or indirect, tax in all cases. Some difficulties may occur which we do not at present foresee. Perhaps a direct tax, in the sense of the Constitution, can mean nothing but a tax on something in-' separably annexed to the soil; something capable of apportionment under all such circumstances. A land or a poll tax may be considered of this description. ... In regard to other articles, there may possibly be considerable doubt. It is sufficient, on the present occasion, for the court to be satisfied, that this is not a direct tax contemplated by the Constitution, in order to affirm the present judgment.”

It will be perceived that each of the justices, while suggesting doubt whether anything but a capitation or a land tax was a direct tax within the meaning of the Constitution, distinctly avoided expressing an opinion upon that question or laying down a comprehensive definition, but confined his opinion to the case before the court.

The general line of observation was obviously influenced by Mr. Hamilton’s brief for the government, in which he said: “ The following are presumed to be the only direct taxes: Capitation or poll taxes, taxes on lands and buildings, general assessments, whether on the whole property of individuals, or on their whole real or personal estate. All else must of necessity be considered as indirect taxes.” 7 Hamilton’s Works, (Lodge’s ed.) 332.

Mr. Hamilton also argued: “ If the meaning of the word ‘ excise ’ is to be sought in a British statute, it will be found to include the duty on carriages, which is there considered as an ‘ excise.’ . . . An argument results from this, though not perhaps a conclusive one, yet, where so important a distinction in the Constitution is to be realized, it is fair to seek the meaning of terms in the statutory language of that country from which our jurisprudence is derived.” Id. 333.

If the question had related to an income tax, the reference would have been fatal, as such taxes have been always classed by the law of Great Britain as direct taxes.

The above act was. to be enforced for two years, but before it expired was repealed as was the similar act of May 28,1796, c. 37, which expired August 31, 1801, 1 Stat. 478, 482.

By the act of July 14, 1798, when a war with France was supposed to be impending, a direct tax of two millions of dollars was apportioned to the States respectively, in the manner prescribed, which tax was to be collected by officers of the United States and assessed upon “dwelling houses,iands, and slaves,” according to the valuations and enumerations to be made pursuant to the act of July 9, 1798, entitled “An act to provide for the valuation of lands and dwelling hpus.es and the enumeration of slaves within the United States.” 1 Stat. 597, c. 75 ; Id. 580, c. 70. Under these acts every dwelling house was assessed according to a prescribed value, and the sum of fifty cents upon every slave enumerated, and the residue of the sum apportioned was directed to be assessed upon the lands within each State according to the valuation made pursuant to the .prior act and at such rate per centum as would be sufficient to produce said remainder. By the act of August 2, 1813, a direct tax of three millions of dollars was laid and apportioned to the States respectively, and reference had to the prior act of July 22, 1813, which provided, that whenever a direct tax should be laid by the authority of the United States the same should be assessed' and laid “ on the value of all lands, lots of ground with their improvements, dwelling houses, and slaves, which several articles subject to taxation shall be enumerated and valued by the respective assessors at the rate each of them is worth in money.” 3 Stat. 53, c. 37; Id. 22, c. 16. The act of January 9, 1815, laid a direct tax of six millions of dollars, which was apportioned, assessed, and laid as in the prior act on all lands, lots of grounds with their improvements, dwelling houses, and slaves. These acts are attributable to the war of 1812.

The act of August 5,1861, (12 Stat. 292, 294, c. 45,) imposed a tax of twenty millions of dollars, which was apportioned and to be levied wholly on real estate, and also levied taxes on incomes whether derived from property or profession, trade, or vocation, (12 Stat. 309,) and this was followed by the acts of July 1, 1862, (12 Stat. 432, 473, c. 119 ;) March 3, 1863, (12 Stat. 713, 723, c. 74;) June 30,1864, (13 Stat. 223, 281, c. 173 ;) March 3, 1865, (13 Stat. 469, 479, c. 78 ;) March 10, 1866, (14 Stat. 4, c. 15 ;) July 13, 1866, (14 Stat. 98,137, c. 184;) March 2, 1867, (14 Stat. 471, 477, c. 169;) and July 14, 1870, (16 Stat. 256, c. 255). The differences between the latter acts and that 'of August 15, 1894, call for no remark in this connection. These acts grew out of the war of. the rebellion, and were, to use the language of Mr. Justice Miller, “part of the system of taxing incomes, earnings, and profits adopted during the late war, and abandoned as soon after that "war was ended as it could be.done safely.” Railroad Company v. Collector, 100 U. S. 595, 598.

From the foregoing it is apparent: 1. That the distinction between direct and indirect taxation was well understood by the framers of the Constitution and those who adopted it. 2. That under the state systems of taxation all taxes on real estate or personal property or the rents or income thereof were regarded as direct taxes. 3. That the rules of apportionment and of uniformity were adopted in view of that distinction and those- systems. 4. That whether the tax on carriages was direct or indirect was disputed, but the tax was sustained as a tax on the use and an excise. 5. That the original expectation was that the power of direct taxation would be exercised only in extraordinary exigencies, and down to August 15, 1894, this expectation has been realized. The act of that date was passed in a time of profound peace, and if we assume that no special exigency called for unusual legislation, and that resort to this mode of taxation is to become an ordinary and usual means of supply, that fact furnishes an additional reason for circumspection and care in disposing of the case.

We proceed then to examine certain decisions of this court under the acts of 1861 and following years, in which it is claimed that this court has heretofore adjudicated that taxes like those under consideration are not direct taxes and subject to the rule of apportionment, and that we are bound to accept the rulings thus asserted to have been made as conclusive in the premises. Is this contention well founded as respects the question now under examination ? Doubtless the doctrine of stare decisis is a salutary one, and to be adhered to on all proper occasions, but it only arises in respect of decisions directly upon the points in issue.

The language of Chief Justice Marshall, in Cohens v. Virginia, 6 Wheat. 264, 399, may profitably again be quoted: “ It is a maxim not to be disregarded, that general expressions, in every opinion, are to be taken in connection with the case in which those expressions are used. If they go beyond the case, they may be respected, but ought not to control the judgment in a subsequent suit when the very point is presented for decision. The reason of this maxim is obvious.. The question actually before the court is investigated with care, and considered in its full extent. Other principles which may serve to illustrate it, are considered in their relation to the case decided, but their possible bearing on all other cases is seldom completely investigated.”

So in Carroll v. Lessee of Carroll, 16 How. 275, 286, when a statute of the State of Maryland came under review, Mr Justice Curtis said: “ If the construction put by the court oi a State upon one of its statutes was not a matter in judgment, if it might have been decided either way without affecting, any right brought into question, then, according to the principies of the common law, an opinion on such a question is not a decision. To make it so, there must have been an application of the judicial mind to the precise question necessary to be determined to fix the rights of the parties and decide to whom the property in contestation belongs. And therefore this court, and other courts organized under the common law, has never held itself bound by any part of an opinion, in any case, which was not needful to the ascertainment of the right or title in question between the parties.”

Nor is the language of Mr. Chief Justice Taney inapposite, as expressed in The Genesee Chief, 12 How. 443, 455, wherein it was held that the lakes and navigable waters connecting them are within thé scope of admiralty and maritime jurisdiction as known and understood in the United States when the Constitution was adopted, and the preceding case of The Thomas Jefferson, 10 Wheat. 428, was overruled. The Chief Justice said: “It was under the .influence of these precedents and this usage, that the case of The Thomas Jefferson, 10 Wheat. 428, was decided in this court; and the jurisdiction of the court's of admiralty of the United States declared to be limited to the ebb and flow of the tide. The Steamboat Orleans v. Phoebus, 11 Pet. 175, afterwards followed this case, merely as a point decided. It is the decision in- the case of The Thomas Jefferson which mainly embarrasses the court in the present inquiry. We are sensible of the great weight to which it is entitled. But at the same time we are convinced that, if we follow it, we follow an erroneous decision into which the court fell, when the great importance of the question as it now presents itself could not be foreseen; and the subject did not therefore receive that deliberate consideration which at this time would have been given to it by the eminent men who presided here when that case was decided. For the decision was made in 1825, when the commerce on the rivers of the West and on the Lakes was in its infancy, and of little importance, and but little regarded compared with that of the present day. Moreover, the nature of the questions concerning the extent of the admiralty jurisdiction, which have arisen in this court, were not calculated to call its attention particularly to the one we are now considering.”

Manifestly, as this court is clothed with the power, and entrusted with the duty, to maintain the fundamental law of the Constitution, the discharge of that duty requires it not to extend any decision upon a constitutional question if it is convinced that error in principle might supervene.

Let us examine the cases referred to in the .light of these observations.

In Pacific Insurance Co. v. Soule, 7 Wall. 433, the validity of a tax which was described as “upon the business of an insurance company ” was sustained on the ground that it was a duty or excise,” and came within the decision in Hylton’s case. The arguments for the insurance company were elaborate and took a wide range, but the decision rested on narrow ground, and turned on the distinction between an excise duty and a tax strictly so termed, regarding the former a charge for a privilege, or on the transaction of business, without any necessary reference to the amount of propei’ty belonging to those on whom the charge might fall, although it might be increased or diminished by the extent to which the privilege was exercised or the business done. This was in accordance with Society for Savings v. Coite, 6 Wall. 594; Provident Institution v. Massachusetts, 6 Wall. 611; and Hamilton Company v. Massachusetts, 6 Wall. 632; in which cases there was a difference of opinion on the question • whether the tax under consideration was a tax on the property and not upon the franchise or privilege. And see Van Allen v. The Assessors, 3 Wall. 573; Home Insurance Co. v. New York, 134 U. S. 594; Pullman Co. v. Pennsylvania, 141 U. S. 18.

In Veazie Bank v. Fenno, 8 Wall. 533, 544, 546, a tax was laid on the circulation of state banks or national banks paying out the notes of individuals or state banks, and it was held that it might well be classed under the head of duties, and as falling within the same category as Soule’s case, 8 Wall. 547. It was declared to be of the same nature as excise taxation on freight receipts, bills of lading, and passenger tickets issued by a railroad company. Referring to the discussions in the convention which framed the Constitution, Mr. Chief Justice Chase observed that what was said there “ doubtless shows uncertainty as to the true meaning of the term direct tax; but it indicates also an understanding that direct taxes were such as may be levied by capitation, and on lands and appurtenances; or, perhaps, by valuation and assessment of personal property upon general lists. For these were the subjects from which the States at that time usually raised their principal supplies.” And in respect of the opinions in Hylton's case, the Chief Justice said: “It may further be taken as established upon the testimony of Paterson, that the words direct taxes, as used in the Constitution, comprehended only capitation taxes and taxes on land, and perhaps taxes on personal property by general valuation and assessment of the various descriptions possessed within the several States.”

In National Bank v. United States, 101 U. S. 1, involving the constitutionality of § 3413 of the Revised Statutes, enacting that “ every national banking association, state bank, or banker, or association, shall pay a tax of ten per centum on the amount of notes of any town, city, or municipal corporation, paid out by them,” Veazie Bank v. Fenno was cited with approval to the point that Congress, having undertaken to provide a currency for the whole country, might, to secure the benefit of it to the people, restrain, by suitable enactments, the circulation as money of any notes not issued under its authority; and Mr. Chief Justice Waite, speaking for the court, said: “ The tax thus laid is not on the obligation, but on its use in a particular way.”

Scholey v. Rew, 23 Wall. 331, was the case of a succession tax which the court held to be “ plainly an excise tax or duty ” upon the devolution of the estate or the right to become beneficially entitled to the same, or the income thereof, in possession or expectancy.” It was like the succession tax of a State, held constitutional in Mager v. Grima, 8 How. 490; and the distinction between the power of a State and the power of the United States to regulate the succession of prop: erty was not referred to, and does not appear to have been 'in the mind of the court. The opinion stated that the act of Parliament, from' which the particular provision under conisideration was borrowed, had received substantially the same •construction, and cases under that act hold that a succession ■duty is not a tax upon income or upon property, but on the actual benefit derived by the individual, determined as prescribed. • In re Elwes, 3 H. & N. 719; Attorney-General v. Sefton, 2 H. & C. 362; S. C. (H. L.) 3 H. & C. 1023; 11 H, L. Cas. 257.

In Railroad Company v. Collector, 100 U. S. 595, 596, the validity of a tax collected of a corporation upon the interest paid by it upon its bonds was held to be “ essentially an excise on the business of the class of corporations mentioned in the statute.” And Mr. Justice Miller, in delivering the opinion, said : “ As the sum involved in this suit is small, and the law under which the tax in question was collected has long since been repealed, the case is of little consequence as regards any principle involved in it as a rule of future action.” ■

All these cases are distinguishable from that in hand, and :'this brings us to consider that of Springer v. United States, 102 U. S. 586, 602, chiefly relied on and urged upon us as ■.decisive.

That was an action of ejectment brought on a tax deed issued to the United States on sale of defendant’s real estate for income taxes. The. defendant contended that the deed was void because the tax was a direct tax, not levied in accordance with the Constitution. Unless the tax were wholly invalid, the defence failed.

The statement of the case in the report shows that Springer returned a certain amount as his net income for the particular year, but does not give the details of what his income, gains, .and profits consisted in.

The original record discloses that the income was not derived in any degree from real estate but was in part professional as attorney-at-law and the rest interest on United States bonds. It would seem probable that the court did not feel called upon to advert to the distinction between the latter and the former source of income, as the validity of the tax as to either would sustain the action.

The opinion thus concludes: “ Our conclusions are, that direct taxes, within the meaning of the Constitution, are only capitation taxes, as expressed in that instrument, and taxes on real estate; and that the tax of which the plaintiff in error complains is within the category of an excise or duty.”

While this language is broad enough to cover the interest as well as the professional earnings, the case would have been more significant as a precedent if the distinction' had been brought out in the report and commented on in arriving at judgment,- for a tax on professional receipts might be treated as an 'excise or duty, and therefore indirect, when a tax on the income of personalty might be held to be direct.

Be this as it may, it is conceded in all these cases, from that of Hylton to that of Springer, that taxes on land are direct taxes, and in none of them is it determined that taxes on rents or income derived from land are not taxes on land.

We admit that it may not unreasonably be said that logically, If taxes on the rents, issues and profits of real estate are equivalent to taxes on real estate, and are therefore direct taxes, taxes on thq income of personal property as such are equivalent to taxes on such property, and therefore direct taxes. But we are considering the rule stare decisis, and we must decline to hold ourselves'bound to extend the scope of decisions — none of which discussed the question whether a tax on the income from personalty is equivalent to a tax on that personalty, but all of which held real estate liable to direct taxation only — so as to sustain a tax on the income of realty on the ground of being an excise or duty.

As no capitation, or other direct, tax was to be laid otherwise than in proportion to the population, some other direct tax than a capitation tax (and it might well enough be argued some other tax of the same kind as a capitation tax) must be referred to, and it has always been considered that a tax upon real estate eo nomine or upon its owners in respect thereof is a direct tax within the meaning of the Constitution. But is there any distinction between the real estate itself or its owners in respect of it and the rents or income of the real estate coming to the owners as the natural and ordinary incident of their ownership ?

If the Constitution had provided that Congress should not levy any tax upon the real estate of any citizen of any State, could it be contended that Congress could put an annual tax for five or any other number of years upon the rent or income of the real estate? And if, as the Constitution now reads, no unapportioned tax.can be imposed- upon real estate, can Congress without apportionment nevertheless impose taxes upon such real estate under the guise of an annual tax upon its rents or income ?

As according to the feudal law, the whole beneficial interest in the land consisted in the right to take the rents and profits, the general rule has always been, in the language of Coke, •that “ if a man seized of land in fee by his deed granteth to another the profits of those lands, to have and to hold to him and his heirs, and maketh livery secundum formam chartoe, the whole land itself doth pass. For what is the land but the profits thereof ? ” Co. Lit. 45. And that a devise of the rents and profits or of the income of lands passes the land itself both at law and in equity. 1 Jarm. on Wills, (5th ed.,) *798 and cases cited.

The requirement of the Constitution is that no. direct tax shall be laid otherwise than by apportionment — the prohibition' is not against direct taxes on land,- from which the implication is sought to be drawn that indirect taxes on land would be constitutional, but it is against all direct taxes — and, it is admitted that a tax on real estate is a direct tax. Unless, therefore, a tax upon rents or income issuing out of lands is intrinsically so different from a tax on the land itself that it belongs to a wholly different class of taxes, such taxes must be regarded as falling within the same category as a tax on real estate eo nomine. The name of the tax is unimportant. The real question is, is there any basis upon which to rest the contention that real estate belongs to one of the two great classes of taxes, and the rent or income which is the incident of its ownership belongs to. the other? We are unable to perceive any ground for the alleged distinction. An annual tax upon the annual value or annual user of real estate appears to us the same in substance as an annual tax on the real estate, which would be paid out of the rent or income. This law taxes the income received from land and the growth or produce of the land. Mr. Justice Paterson observed in Hylton's case, “ land, independently of its produce, is of no value ; ” and certainly had no thought that direct taxes were confined to unproductive land.

If it be true that by varying the form the substance may be changed, it is not easy to see that anything would remain of thé limitations of the Constitution, or of the rule of taxation and representation, so carefully recognized and guarded in favor of the citizens of each State. But constitutional provisions cannot be thus evaded. It is the substance and not the form which controls, as'has indeed been established by repeated decisions of this court. Thus in Brown v. Maryland, 12 Wheat. 419, 444, it was held that the tax on the occupation of an importer was the same as a tax on imports and therefore void. And Chief Justice Marshall said: “It is impossible to conceal from ourselves, that this is varying the form, without varying the substance. It is treating a prohibition which is general, as if it were confined to a particular mode of doing the .forbidden thing. All must perceive, that a tax oh the sale of an article, imported only for sale, is a tax'on the article itself.”

In Weston v. Charleston, 2 Pet. 449, it was held that a tax on the income of United States securities was a tax on the securities themselves, and equally inadmissible. The ordinance of the city of Charleston involved in that case was exceedingly obscure; but the opinions Of Mr. Justice Thompson and Mr. Justice Johnson, who dissented, make it clear that the levy was upon the interest of the bonds and not upon the bonds, and they held that it was an-income tax, and as such sustainable; but the majority of the court, Chief Justice Marshall delivering the opinion, overruled that contention.

So in Dobbins v. Commissioners, 16 Pet. 435, it was decided that the income from an official position could not be taxed if the office itself was exempt.

In Almy v. California, 24 How. 169, it was held that a duty on a bill of lading was the same thing as a duty on the article which it represented; in Railroad Co. v. Jackson, 7 Wall. 262, that a tax upon the interest payable on bonds was a tax not upon the debtor, but upon the security; and in Cook v. Pennsylvania, 97 U. S. 566, that a tax upon the amount of sales of goods made by an auctioneer was a tax upon the goods sold.

In Philadelphia Steamship Co. v. Pennsylvania, 122 U. S. 326, and Leloup v. Mobile, 127 U. S. 640, it was held that a tax on income received from interstate commerce was a tax upon the commerce itself, and therefore unauthorized. And so, although it is thoroughly settled that where by way of duties laid on the transportation of the subjects of interstate commerce, and on the receipts derived therefrom, or on the occupation or business of carrying it on, a tax is levied by a State on interstate commerce, such taxation amounts to a regulation of such commerce, and. cannot be sustained, yet the property in a State belonging to a corporation, whether foreign or domestic, engaged in foreign or domestic commerce, may be taxed, and when the tax is substantially a mere tax on property and not one imposed on the privilege of doing interstate commerce, the exaction may be sustained. “ The substance, and not the shadow, determines the validity of the exercise of the power.” Postal Telegraph Co. v. Adams, 155 U. S. 688, 698.

■ Nothing can be clearer than that what the Constitution intended to guard against was the exercise by the general government of the power of - directly taxing persons and property within any State through a majority made up from the other States. It is true that the effect of requiring direct taxes to be apportioned among the States in proportion to their population is necessarily that the amount of taxes on the individual taxpayer in a State having the taxable subject-matter to a larger extent in proportion to its population than another State has, would be less than in such other State, but this inequality must be held to have been contemplated, and was manifestly designed to operate to restrain the exercise of the power of direct taxation to extraordinary emergencies, and to prevent an. attack, upon accumulated property by mere force of numbers.

It is not doubted that property owners ought to contribute-in just measure.to the expenses of the government. As to the; States and their municipalities, this is reached largely through the imposition of direct taxes. As to the Federal government, it is attained in part through excises and indirect taxes upon luxuries and consumption generally, to which direct taxation may be added to the extent the rule of apportionment allows. And through one mode or the other, the entire wealth of the-country, real and personal, may be made, as it should be, to» contribute to the common defence and general welfare.

But the acceptance of the rule of apportionment was one of the compromises which made the adoption of the Constitution possible, and secured the creation of that dual form of government, so elastic and so strong, which has thus far survived in unabated vigor. If, by calling a tax indirect when it is essentially direct, the rule of pi-otection could be frittered away, one of the great landmarks defining the boundary between the Nation and the States of which it is composed, would have disappeared, and with it one of the bulwarks of private rights and private propertjc

We are of opinion that the law in question, so far as it levies a tax on the rents or income of real estate, is in violations of the Constitution, and is invalid. .

Another question is directly presented by the record as to the validity of the tax levied by the act upon the income derived from municipal bonds. The averment in the bill is that the defendant company owns two millions of the municipal bonds of the city of New York, from which it derives an annual income of $60,000, and that the directors of the company intend to return and pay the taxes on the income so derived.

The Constitution contemplates the independent exercise by the Nation and the State, severally, of their constitutional powers.

As the States cannot tax the powers, the operations, or the property of the United States, nor the means which they employ to carry their powers into execution, so it has been held that the United States have no power under the Constitution to tax either the instrumentalities or the property of a State.

A municipal corporation is' the representative of the State and one of the instrumentalities of the state government. It was long ago determined that the property and revenues of municipal corporations are not subjects of Federal taxation. Collector v. Day, 11 Wall. 113, 124; United States v. Railroad Company, 17 Wall. 322, 332. In Collector v. Day, it was adjudged that Congress had no power, even by an act taxing all incomes, to levy a tax upon the salaries of judicial officers of a State, for reasons similar to those on which it had been held in Dobbins v. Commissioners, 16 Pet. 435, that a State could not tax. the salaries of officers of the United States. Mr. Justice Nelson, in delivering judgment, said : “ The general government, and the States, although both exist within the same territorial limits, are separate and distinct sovereignties, acting separately and independently of each other, within their respective spheres. The former in its appropriate sphere is supreme ; but the States within the limits of their powers not granted, or, in the language of the tenth amendment, ‘ reserved,’ are as independent of the general government as that government within its sphere is independent of the States.”

This is quoted in Van Brocklin v. Tennessee, 117 U. S. 151, 178, and the opinion continues : “ Applying the same principles, this court, in United States v. Railroad Company, 17 Wall. 322, held that a municipal corporation within a State could not be taxed by the United States on the dividends or interest of stock or bonds held by it in a railroad or canal company, because the municipal corporation was a representative of the State, created by the State to exercise a limited portion of its powers of government, and therefore its revenues, like those of the State itself, were not taxable by the United States. The revenues thus adjudged to be exempt from Federal taxátion were not themselves appropriated to any specific public use, nor derived from property held by the State or by the municipal corporation for any specific public use, but were part of the general income of that corporation, held for the public use in no Qther sense than all property and income, belonging to it in its municipal character, must be so held. The reasons for exempting all the property and income of a State, or of a municipal corporation, which is a political division of the State, from Federal taxation, equally require the exemption of all the property and income of the national government from state taxation.”

In Mercantile Bank v. New York, 121 U. S. 138, 162, this ■court .said: “Bonds issued by the State of New York, or under its authority by its public municipal bodies, are means for carrying on the work of the government, and are not taxable even by the United States', and it is not a part of the policy'of the government which issues them to subject them to taxation for its .own purposes.”

The question in Bonaparte v. Tax Court, 104 U. S. 592, was whether the registered public debt of one State, exempt from taxation by that State or actually taxed there, was taxable by another State when owned by a citizen of the latter, and it was held that there was no provision of the Constitution of the United States which prohibited such taxation. The States had not covenanted that this could not be done, whereas, under the fundamental law, as to the power to borrow money, neither the United States on the one hand, nor the States on the other, can interfere with that power as possessed by each and an essential element of the sovereignty of each.

The law under consideration provides “ that nothing herein contained shall apply to States, counties or municipalities.” It is contended that although the property or revenues of the .States or their instrumentalities cannot be taxed, nevertheless "the income derived from state, county, and municipal securities can be taxed. But we think' the same want of power to tax the property or revenues of the States or their instrumentalities exists in relation to a tax on the income from their securities, and for the same reason, and that reason is given by Chief Justice Marshall in Weston v. Charleston, 2 Pet. 449, 468, where he said : “ The right to tax the contract to any extent, when made, must operate upon the power to borrow before it is exercised, and have a sensible influence on the contract. The extent of this influence, depends on the will of a distinct government. To any extent, however inconsiderable, it is a burthen on the operations of government. It may be carried to an extent which shall arrest them entirely. . . . The tax on government stock is thought by this court to be a tax on the contract, a tax on the power to borrow money on the credit of the United States, and consequently to be repugnant to the Constitution.” Applying this language to these municipal securities, it is obvious that taxation on the interest therefrom would operate on the power to borrow before it is exercised, and would have a sensible influence on the contract, and that the tax in question is a tax on the power of the States'and their instrumentalities to borrow money, and consequently repugnant to the Constitution.

Upon each of the other questions argued at the bar, to wit, 1, "Whether the void provisions as to rents and income from real estate invalidated the whole act? 2, Whether as to the income from personal property as such, the act is unconstitutional as laying direct taxes? '3, Whether any part of the tax, if not considered as a direct tax, is invalid for want of uniformity on either of the grounds suggested? — the justices who heard the argument are equally divided, and, therefore, no opinion is expressed.

The result is that the decree of the Circuit Court is reversed and the cause remanded with directions to enter a decree in favor of the complainant in respect only of the voluntary payment of the tax. on the rents and income of the real estate of the defendant company, and of that which it holds in trust, and on the income from the municipal bonds owned or so held' by it.

Mr. Justice Field.

I also desire to place my opinion on record upon some of the important questions discussed in relation to the direct and indirect tases proposed by the income tax law of 1894.

Several suits have been instituted in state and Federal courts, both at law and in equity, to test the validity of the provisions of the law, the determination of which will necessitate careful and extended consideration.

The subject of taxation in, the new government which was to be established created great interest in the convention which framed the Constitution, and was the cause of much difference of opinion among its members and earnest contention between the States. The great , source of weakness of the confederation was its inability to levy taxes of any kind for the support of its government: To raise revenue it was obliged to make requisitions upon the States, which were respected or disregarded at their pleasure. Great embarrassments followed the consequent inability to obtain the necessary funds to carry on the’government. One of the principal objects of the proposed new government was to obviate this defect of the confederacy by conferring authority upon the new government by which taxes could be directly laid whenever desired. Great difficulty in accomplishing this object was found to exist. The States bordering on the ocean were unwilling to give up their right to lay duties upon imports which were their chief source of revenue. The other States, on the other hand, were unwilling to make any agreement for the levying of taxes directly uppn real and personal property, the smaller States fearing that they would be overborne by unequal burdens forced upon them by the action of the larger States. In this condition of things great embarrassment was felt by the members of the convention. It was feared at times that the effort to form a new government would fail. But happily a compromise was effected by an agreement that direct taxes should be laid by Congress by apportioning them among the States according to their representation. In return for this concession by some of the States, the other States bordering on navigable waters consented to relinquish to the new government the control of duties, imposts, and excises, and the regulation of commerce, with the condition that the duties, imposts, and excises should be uniform throughout the United States. So that, on the one hand,-anything like oppression, or undue advantage of any one State over the others would be prevented by the apportionment of the direct taxes among the States according to their representation, and, on the other hand, anything like oppression or hardship in the levying of duties, imposts, and excises would be avoided by the provision that they should be uniform throughout the United States. This compromise was essential to the continued union and harmony of the States. It protected every State from being controlled in its taxation by the superior numbers of one or more other States.

The Constitution accordingly, when completed, divided the taxes which might be levied under the authority of Congress into those which were direct and those which were indirect. Direct taxes, in a general and large sense, may be described as taxes derived immediately from the person, or from real or personal property, without any recourse therefrom to other sources for reimbursement. In a more restricted sense, they have sometimes been confined to taxes on real property, including the rents and income derived therefrom. Such taxes are conceded to be direct taxes, however taxes on other property are designated, and they are to be apportioned among the States of the Union according to their respective numbers. The second section of article I of the Constitution declares that representatives and direct taxes shall be thus apportioned. It had been a favorite doctrine in England and in the colonies, before the adoption of the Constitution, that taxation and representation should go together. The Constitution prescribes such apportionment among the several States according to their respective numbers, to be determined by adding to the whole number of free persons, including those bound to service for a term of years, and excluding Indians not taxed, three-fifths of all other persons.

Some decisions of this court have qualified or thrown doubts upon the exact meaning of the words “ direct taxes.” Thus in Springer v. United States, 102 U. S. 586, it was held that a tax upon gains, profits, and income was an excise or duty and .nota direct tax within the meaning.of the Constitution, and that its imposition was not therefore unconstitutional. And in Pacific Insurance Co. v. Soule, 7 Wall. 433, it was held that an income tax or duty upon the amounts insured, renewed or continued by insurance companies, upon the gross amounts of premiums received by them and upon assessments made by them, and upon dividends and undistributed sums, was not a direct tax but a duty or excise.

In the discussions on the subject of direct taxes in the British Parliament an income tax has been generally designated as a direct tax, differing in that respect from the decision of this court in Springer v. United States. But whether the. latter can be accepted as correct or otherwise, it does not affect the tax upon real property and its rents and income as a direct tax. Such a tax is by universal consent recognized to be a direct tax.

As stated, the rents and income of real property are included in the designation of direct taxes as part of the real property. Such has been the law in England for centuries, and in this country from the early settlement of the colonies; and it is strange that any member of the legal profession should, at this day, question a doctrine which has always been thus accepted by common-law lawyers. It is so declared in approved treatises upon real property and in accepted authorities on particular branches of real estate law, and has been so announced in decisions in the English courts and our own courts without number. Thus, in Washburn on Real Property, it is said that “ a devise of the rents and -profits of land, or the income of land, is equivalent to a devise of the land itself, and will be for life or in fee, according to the limitation expressed in the devise.” Vol. 2, p. 695, § 30.

In Jarman on Wills, Vol. 1, page 740, it is laid down that “ a devise of the rents and profits or of the income of land passes the land itself both at law and in equity ; a rule, it is said, founded on the feudal law, according to which the whole beneficial interest in the land consisted in the right to take the rents and profits. And since the act 1 Yict. c. 26, such a devise carries the fee simple; but before that act it carried no more than an estate for life unless words of inheritance were added.” Mr. Jarman cites numerous authorities in support of his statement. South v. Alleine, 1 Salk. 228; Doe d. Goldin v. Lakeman, 2 B. & Ad. 30, 42; Johnson v. Arnold, 1 Ves. Sen. 171; Baines v. Dixon, 1 Ves. Sen. 42; Mannox v. Greener, L. R. 14 Eq. 456; Blann v. Bell, 2 De G., M. & G. 781; Plenty v. West, 6 C. B. 201.

Coke upon Littleton says : “ If a man seised of lands in fee by his deed granteth to another the profit of those lands, to have and to hold to him and his heires, and maketh livery secundum for mam chartae, the whole land itselfe, doth passe; for. what is the land but the profits thereof ? ” Lib. 1, cap. 1, § 1, p. 4b.

In Doe d. Goldin v. Lakeman, Lord Tenterden, Chief Justice of the Court of King’s Bench, to the same effect said : “It is an established rule that a devise of the rents and profits is a devise of the land.” And in Johnson v. Arnold, Lord Chancellor Hardwicke reiterated the doctrine that a “devise of the profits of lands is a devise of the lands themselves.”

The same rule is announced in this country; the Court of Errors of New York in Paterson v. Ellis, 11 Wend. 259, 298, holding that the “ devise of the interest or of the rents and profits is a devise of the thing itself, out of which that interest or those rents and profits may issue;” and the Supreme Court of Massachusetts, in Reed v. Reed, 9 Mass. 372, 374, that “ a devise of the income of lands is the same in its effect as a devise of the lands.” The same view of the law was expressed in Anderson v. Greble, 1 Ashmead (Penn.) 136, 138, King, the president of the court, stating : “ I take it to be a well-settled rule of law, that by a devise of the rent, profits, and income of land, the land itself passes.” Similar adjudications might be repeated almost indefinitely. One may have the reports of the English courts examined for several centuries without finding a single decision or even a dictum of their judges in conflict with them. And what answer do we receive to these adjudications ? Those rejecting them furnish no proof that the framers of the Constitution did not follow them, as the great body of the people of the country then did: An incident which occurred in this court and room twenty years ago, may have become a precedent. To a powerful argument then being made by a distinguished counsel, on a public question,-one of the judges exclaimed that there was a conclusive answer to his position and that was that the court was of a different opinion. Those who decline to recognize the adjudications cited may likewise consider that they have a conclusive answer to them in the fact that they also are of a different opinion. I do not think so. The law as expounded for centuries cannot be set aside or disregarded because some of the judges are now of a different opinion from those who, a century ago, followed it in framing our Constitution.

Hamilton, speaking on the subject, asks : “ What, in fact, is property but a fiction, without the beneficial use of it?” And adds: “ In many cases, indeed, the income or annuity is the property itself.” 3 Hamilton’s Works, Putnam’s ed. 34.

It must be conceded that whatever affects any element that gives an article its value, in the eye of the law affects the article itself.

In Brown v. Maryland, 12 Wheat. 419, 444, it was held that a tax on the occupation of an importer is the same as a tax on his imports, and as such was invalid. It was contended that the State might tax occupations and that this was nothing more, but the court said, by Chief Justice Marshall (p. 444): “ It is impossibly to conceal from ourselves, that this is varying the form without varying’ the substance. It is treating a prohibition, which is general, as if it were confined to a particular mode of doing the forbidden thing. All must perceive, that a tax on the sale of an article, imported only for sale, is a tax on the article itself.”

In Weston v. Charleston, 2 Pet. 449, it was held that a tax upon stock issued for loans to the United States was a tax upon the loans themselves and equally invalid. In Dobbins v. Commissioners, 16 Pet. 435, it was held that the salary of an officer of the United States could not be taxed, if the office was itself exempt. In Almy v. California, 24 How. 169, it was held that a duty on a bill of lading was the same' thing as a duty on the article transported. In Cook v. Pennsylvania, 97 U. S. 566, it was held that a tax upon the amount of sales of goods made by an auctioneer was a tax upon the goods sold. In Philadelphia & Southern Steamship Co. v. Pennsylvania, 122 U. S. 326, and Leloup v. Mobile, 127 U. S. 640, 648, it was held that a tax upon the income received from interstate commerce was a tax upon the commerce itself,, and equally unauthorized. The same doctrine was held in People v. Commissioners of Taxes, 90 N. Y. 63; State Freight Tax, 15 Wall. 232, 274; Welton v. Missouri, 91 U. S. 275, 278, and in Fargo v. Michigan, 121 U. S. 230.

The law, so far as it imposes a tax upon land by taxation of the rents and income thereof, must therefore fail, as it does not' follow the rule of apportionment. The Constitution is imperative in its directions on this subject, and admits of no departure from them.

But the law is not invalid merely in its disregard of the rule of apportionment of the direct tax levied. There is another and an equally cogent objection to it. In taxing incomes other than rents and profits of real estate it disregards the rule of uniformity which is prescribed in such cases by the Constitution. The eighth section of the first article of the Constitution declares that “ the Congress shall have power to lay and collect taxes, duties, imposts, and excises, to pay the debts and provide for the common defence and general welfare of the United States; but all duties, imposts, and excises shall be uniform throughout the United States.” Excises are a species of tax consisting generally of duties laid upon the' manufacture, sale, or consumption of commodities within the country, or upon certain callings or occupations, often taking the form of exactions for licenses to pursue them. The taxes created by the law under consideration as applied to savings banks, insurance companies,’ whether of fire, life, or marine, to building or other associations, or to the conduct of any other kind of business, are excise taxes, and fall within the requirement, so far as they are laid by Congress, that they must be uniform throughout the United States.

The uniformity thus required is the uniformity throughout the United States of the duty, impost, and excise levied. That is, the tax levied cannot be one sum upon an article at one place and a different sura upon the same article at another place. The duty received must be the same at all places throughout the United States, proportioned to the quantity of the article disposed of or the extent of the business done. If, for instance, one. kind of wine or grain or produce has a certain duty laid upon it proportioned to its quantity ,in New York, it must have a like duty proportioned to its quantity when imported at Charleston or San Francisco, or if a tax be laid upon a certain kind of business proportioned to its extent at one place, it must be a like tax on the same kind of business proportioned to its extent at another place. In that sense the duty must be uniform throughout the United States.

It is contended by the government that the Constitution only requires an uniformity geographical in its character. That position would be satisfied if the same duty were laid in all the States, however variant .it might be in different places of the same State. But it could not be sustained in the latter case without defeating the .equality, which is an essential element of the uniformity required, so far as the same is practicable.

In United States v. Singer, 15 Wall. 111, 121, a tax was imposed upon a distiller, in the nature of an excise, and the question arose whether in its imposition upon different distillers the uniformity of the tax wa^ preserved, and the court said : “ The law is not in our judgment subject to any constitutional objection. The tax imposed upon the distiller is in. the nature of an excise, and the only limitation upon the power Of Congress in the imposition of taxes of this character is that they shall be ‘ uniform throughout the United States.’ The tax here is uniform in its operation; that is, it is assessed equally uyoon all manufacturers of spirits wherever they are. The law 'does not establish one rule for one distiller and a different rule for another, but the same rule for all alike.”

In the Head Money Cases, 112 U. S. 580, 594, a tax was imposed upon the owners of steam vessels for each passenger landed at New York from' a foreign port, and it was objected that the tax was not levied by any rule of uniformity, but the court, by Justice Miller, replied : “The tax is uniform when it operates with the same force and effect in every place where the subject of it is found. The tax in this case, which, as far as it can be called a tax, is an excise duty on the business of bringing passengers from foreign countries into this, by ocean navigation, is uniform and operates precisely alike in every port of the United States where such passengers can be landed.” In the decision in that case, in the Circuit Court, 18 Fed. Rep.-135, 139, Mr. Justice Blatchford, in addition to pointing out that “ the act was not passed in the exercise of the power'of laying taxes,” but was a regulation of commerce, used the following language : “Aside from this, the tax applies uniformly to all steam and sail vessels coming to all ports in sthe United States, from all foreign ports,' with all alien passengers. The tax being a license tax on the business, the rule of uniformity is sufficiently observed if the tax extends to all persons of the class selected by Congress; that is, to all owners of such vessels. Congress has the exclusive power of selecting the class. It has regulated that particular branch of commerce which concerns the bringing of alien passengers,” and that taxes shall be levied upon such property as shall be prescribed by law. The object of this provision was to prevent unjust discriminations. It prevents property from being classified and taxed .as classed, by different rules. All kinds of property must be taxed uniformly, or be entirely exempt. The uniformity must be coextensive with the territory to which the tax applies.

Mr. Justice Miller, in his lectures on the Constitution, (N. Y. T891) pp. 240, 241, said of taxes levied by Congress: “ The tax must be uniform on the particular article; and it is uniform, within the meaning of the constitutional requirement, if it is made to bear the same percentage over all the United States.' That is manifestly the meaning of this word, as used in this clause. The framers of the Constitution could not have meant to say that the government, in raising its revenues, should not be allowed to discriminate between the articles which it should tax.” In discussing generally the requirement of uniformity found in state constitutions, he said: ‘-‘The difficulties in the- way of this construction have, however, been very largely obviated by the meaning of the word ‘ uniform,’ which has been adopted, holding that the uniformity-must refer to articles of the same class. That is, different articles may be taxed at different amounts, provided the rate is uniform on the same class everywhere, with all people, and at all times.”

One of the learned counsel puts it very clearly when he says that the correct meaning of the provisions requiring duties, imposts, and excises to be “uniform throughout the United States ” is, that the law imposing them should “ have an equal and uniform application in every part of the Union.”

If there were any doubt as to the intention of the States to make the grant of the right to impose indirect taxes subject to the condition that such taxes shall be in all respects uniform and impartial, that doubt, as said by counsel, should be resolved in the interest of justice, in favor of the taxpayer.

Exemptions from the operation of a tax always create inequalities. Those not exempted must, in the end, bear an additional burden or pay more than their share. A law containing arbitrary exemptions can in no just sense be termed uniform. In my judgment, Congress has rightfully no power, at the expense of others, owning property of a like character, to sustain private trading corporations, such as building and loan associations, savings banks, and mutual life, fire, marine, and accident insurance companies, formed under the laws of the various States, which advance no national purpose or public interest and exist solely for the pecuniary profit of their members.

"Where property is exempt from taxation, the exemption, as has been justly stated, must be supported by some consideration that the public, and not private, interests will be advanced by it. Private corporations and private enterprises cannot be aided under the pretence that it is the exercise of the discretion of the legislature to exempt them. Loan Association v. Topeka, 20 Wall. 655; Parkersburg v. Brown, 106 U. S. 487; Barbour v. Louisville Board of Trade, 82 Kentucky, 645, 654, 655; Lexington v. McQuillan's Heirs, 9 Dana, 513, 516, 517; and Sutton's Heirs v. Louisville, 5 Dana, 28, 31.

Cooley, in his treatise on Taxation, ( 2d ed. 215,) justly observes that: “ It is difficult to conceive of a justifiable exemption law which should select single individuals or corporations, or single articles of property, and, taking them out of the class to which they belong, make them the subject of capricious legislative favor. Such favoritism could make no pretence to equality; it would lack the semblance of legitimate tax legislation.”

The income tax law under consideratioii is marked by discriminating features which affect the whole law. It discriminates between those who receive an income of four thousand dollars and those who do not. It thus vitiates, in my judgment, by this arbitrary discrimination, the whole legislation. Hamilton says in one of his papers, (the Continentalist,) “ the genius of liberty reprobates everything arbitrary or .discretionary in taxation. It exacts that every man, by a definite and general rule, should know what proportion of his property the State demands; whatever liberty we may boast of in theory, it cannot exist in fact while [arbitrary] assessments continue.” 1 Hamilton’s Works, ed. 1885, 270. The legislation} in the discrimination it makes, is class legislation. Whenever a distinction is made in the burdens a law imposes or in the benefits it confers on any citizens by reason of their birth, or wealth, or religion, it is class legislation, and leads inevitably to oppression and abuses, and to general unrest and disturbance in society. It was hoped and believed that the great amendments to the Constitution which followed the late civil war had rendered such legislation impossible for all future time. But the objectionable legislation reappears in the act under consideration. It is the same in essential character as that of the English income statute of 1691, which taxed Protestants at a certain rate, Catholics, as a class, at double the rate of Protestants, and Jews at another and separate rate. Under wise and constitutional legislation every citizen should contribute his proportion, -however small the sum, to the support of the government, and it is no kindness to urge- any of our citizens to escape from that obligation. If he contributes the smallest mite of his earnings to that purpose he will have a greater regard for the government and more self-respect for himself feeling that though he is poor in fact, he is not a pauper of his government. And it is to be hoped that, whatever woes and embarrassments may betide our people, they may never lose their manliness'' and self-respect. Those qualities preserved, they will ultimately triumph over all reverses of fortune.

There is nothing in the nature of the corporations or associations exempted in the present act, or in their method of doing business, which can be claimed to be of a public or benevolent nature. They differ in no essential characteristic in their business from “ all other corporations, companies, or associations doing business for profit in the United States.” Act of August 15, 1894, c. 349, § 32.

A few words as to some of them, the extent of their capital and business, and of the exceptions made to their taxations

1st. As to mutual savings banks. — Under income tax law's prior to 1870, these institutions were specifically taxed. Under the new law, certain institutions of this class are exempt, provided the shareholders do not participate in the profits, and interest and dividends are only paid to the depositors. No limit is fixed to the property and'income thus exempted —it may be $100,000 or $100,000,000. One of the counsel engaged in this case read to us during the argument from the report of the Comptroller of the Currency, sent by the President to Congress December 3, 1894, a statement to the effect that the total number of mutual savings banks exempted was 646, and the total number of stock savings banks was 378, and showed that they did the same character of business and took in the money of depositors for the purpose of making it bear interest, with profit upon it in the same way; and yet the 646 are exempt and the 378 are taxed. He also showed that the total deposits in savings banks were $1,748,000,000.

2d. As to mutual insurance corporations. — : These companies were taxed under previous income tax laws. They do business somewrhat differently from other companies; but they conduct a strictly private business in which the public has no interest, and have been often held not to be benevolent or

The sole condition for exempting them under the present law is declared to be that they make loans to or divide their profits among their members, or depositors or policy-holders. Every corporation is carried on,'however, for the benefit of its members, whether stockholders, or depositors, or policyholders. If it is carried on for the benefit of its shareholders, every dollar of income is taxed; if it is carried on for the benefit of its policy-holders or depositors, who are but another class of shareholders, it is wholly exempted. In the State of New York the act exempts the income from over $1,000,000,000 of property of these companies. The leading mutual life insurance company has property exceeding $204,000,000 in value, the income of which is wholly exempted.- The insertion of the exemption is stated by counsel to have saved that institution fully $200,000 a year over other insurance companies and associations, having similar property and carrying on the-same business, simply because such other companies or associations divide their profits among their shareholders instead of their policy-holders.

3d. As to building and loan associations. — The property of these'institutions is exempted from taxation to the extent of millions. They are in no sense benevolent or charitable institutions, and are conducted, solely'for the pecuniary profit of their members. Their assets exceed the capital stock of the national banks of the country. One, in Dayton, Ohio, has a capital of $10,000,000, and Pennsylvania has $65,000,000 invested in these associations. The census report submitted' to Congress by the President, May 1, 1894, shows that their property in the United States amounts to over $628,000,000. "Why should these institutions and their immense accumulations of property be singled out for the special favor of Congress and be freed from their just, equal, and proportionate share of taxation when others engaged under different names, in similar business, are subjected to taxation by this law ? The aggregate amount of the saving to these associations, by reason of their exemption, is over $600,000 a year. If this statement of the exemptions of corporations under the law of Congress, taken from the carefully prepared briefs of counsel and from reports to Congress, will not satisfy parties interested in this case that the act in question disregards, in almost every line and provision, the rule of uniformity required by the Constitution, then “ neither will they be persuaded, though one rose from the dead.” That there should be any question or any doubt on the subject surpasses my comprehension. Take the case of mutual savings banks and stock savings banks. They do the same character of business, and in the same way use the money of depositors, loaning it at interest for profit, yet 646 of them, under the law before us, are exempt from taxation on their income and 378 are taxed upon it. How the tax on the income of one kind of these banks can be said to be laid upon any principle of uniformity, when the other is exempt from all taxation, I repeat, surpasses my comprehension.

But there are other considerations against the law which are equally decisive. They relate to the uniformity and equality required in all taxation, national and State; to the invalidity of taxation by the United States of the income of the bonds and securities of the. States and of otheir municipal bodies; and the invalidity of the taxation of the salaries of the judges of the United States courts.

As stated by counsel: “ There is no such thing in the theory of our national government as unlimited power of taxation in Congress. There are limitations,” as he justly observes, “ of its powers arising out of the essential nature of all free governments; there are reservations of individual rights, without which society could not exist, and which are respected by every government. The right of taxation is subject to these limitations.” Loan Association v. Topeka, 20 Wall. 655, and Parkersburg v. Brown, 106 U. S. 487.

The inherent and fundamental nature and character of a tax is that of a contribution to the support of the government, levied upon the principle of equal and uniform apportionment among the persons taxed, and any other exaction does not come within the legal definition of a tax.

' This inherent limitation upon the taxing power forbids the imposition of taxes which are unequal in their operation upon similar kinds of property, and necessarily strikes down the gross and arbitrary distinctions in the income law as passed by Congress. The law, as we have seen, distinguishes in the taxation between corporations by exempting the property of some of them from taxation and levying the tax on the property of others when "the corporations do not materially differ from one another in the character of their business or in the protection required by the government. Trifling differences in their modes of business, but not in their results, are made the ground and occasion of the greatest possible differences in the amount of taxes levied upon their income, showing that the action of the legislative power upon them has been arbitrary and capricious and sometimes merely fanciful.

There was another position taken in this case which is not the least surprising to me of the many advanced by the upholders of the law, and that is, that if this court shall declare that the exemptions and exceptions from taxation, extended to the various corporations mentioned, fire, life, and marine insurance companies, and to mutual savings banks, building, and loan associations, violate the requirement of uniformity, and are therefore void, the tax as to such corporations can be enforced, and that the law will stand as though the exemptions had never been inserted. This position does not, in my judgment, rest upon any solid foundation of law or principle. The abrogation or repeal of an unconstitutional or illegal provision does not operate to .create and give force to any enactment or part of an enactment which Congress has not sanctioned and promulgated. Seeming support of this singular position is attributed to the decision of this court in Huntington v. Worthen, 120 U. S. 97. But the examination of that case will show that it does not give the slightest sanction to such a doctrine. There the constitution of Arkansas had provided that all property subject to taxation should be taxed according to its value, to be ascertained in such manner as the general assembly should direct, making the same equal and uniform throughout the State, and certain public property was declared by statute to be exempt from taxation, which statute was subsequently held to be unconstitutional. The court decided that the unconstitutional part of the enactment, which was separable from the remainder, could be omitted and the remainder enforced; a •doctrine undoubtedly sound, and which, has never, that I am aware of, been questioned. But that is entirely different from' the position here taken, that exempted things can be taxed by striking out their exemption.

The law of 1894 says there shall be assessed, levied, and collected, “except as herein otherwise provided,” two per •centum of the amount, etc. If the exceptions are stricken out there is nothing to be assessed and collected except what Congress has otherwise affirmatively ordered. Nothing less can have the force of law. This court is impotent to pass any law on the subject: It has no legislative power. I am unable, therefore, to see how we can, by declaring an exemption dr •exception invalid, thereby give effect to provisions as though they were never exempted. The court by declaring the exemptions invalid cannot by any conceivable ingenuity give operative force as enacting clauses to the exempting provisions. That result is not within the power of man.

The law is also invalid in its provisions authorizing the taxation of the bonds and securities of the ■ States and of their municipal bodies. It is objected that the cases pending before us do not allege any threatened attempt to tax the bonds or securities of the State, but only of municipal bodies of the States. The law applies to both kinds of bonds and securities, those of the States as well as those of municipal bodies, and the law of Congress, we are examining, being of a public nature', affecting the whole community, having been brought before us and assailed as unconstitutional in some of its provisions, we are at liberty, and I think it is our duty to refer to other unconstitutional features brought to our notice in examining the law, though the particular points of their objection may not have been mentioned by counsel. These bonds and securities are as important to the performance of the duties of the State as like bonds and securities of the United States are important to the performance of their duties, and are as exempt from the taxation of the United States as the former are exempt from the taxation of the States. As stated by Judge Cooley in his work on the principles of constitutional law: “The power to tax, whether by the United States.or by the States, is to be construed in the light of, and limited by, the fact, that the . States and the Union are inseparable, and that the Constitution contemplates the perpetual maintenance of each with all its constitutional powers, unembarrassed and unimpaired by any action of the other. The taxing power of the Federal government doés not therefore extend to the means or agencies through or by the employment of which the States perform their essential functions, since, if these were within its reach, they might be embarrassed, and perhaps wholly paralyzed, by the burdens it should impose. ‘ That the power to tax involves the power to destroy ; that the power to destroy may defeat and render useless the power- to create; that there is a plain repugnance in conferring on one government a power to control the constitutional measures of another, which other, in respect to those very measures, is declared to be supreme over that which exerts the control, — are propositions not to-be denied.’ It is true that .taxation does not necessarily and unavoidably destroy, and that to carry it to the ¿xcess of destruction would be an abuse not to be anticipated; but the very power would take from the States a portion of their intended liberty of independent action within the sphere of their powers, and would constitute to the State a perpetual, danger of embarrassment and possible annihilation. The Constitution contemplates no such shackles upon state powers, and by implication forbids them.”

The Internal Kevenue Act of June 30, 1864, in section 122,. provided that railroad and certain other companies specified, indebted for money for which bonds had been issued, upon which interest was stipulated to be paid, should be subject to-pay a tax of five per cent on the amount of all such interest, to be .paid by the corporations and by them deducted from the interest payable to the holders of such bond's; and the question arose in United States v. Railroad Co., 17 Wall. 322, 327, whether the tax imposed could be thus collected from the: revenues of a city owning such bonds. This court answered the question as follows: .“ There is- no dispute about the general rules of the law applicable to this subject. The power of taxation by the Federal government upon the subjects and in the manner prescribed by the act we are considering, is undoubted. There are, however, certain departments which are excepted from the general power. The right of the. States to administer their own affairs through their legislative, executive, and judicial departments, in their own manner through their own agencies, is conceded by the uniform decisions of this court, and by the practice of the Federal government from its organization. This carries with it an exemption of those agencies and instruments from the taxing power of the Federal government. If they may be taxed lightly, they may be taxed heavily; if justly, oppressively. Their operation may be impeded and may be destroyed, if any interference is permitted. Hence, the beginning of such taxation is not allowed on the one side, is not claimed on the other.”

And again: “ A municipal corporation like the city of Baltimore is a representative not only of -the State, but it is a portion of its governmental power. It is one of its creatures, made for a specific purpose, to exercise within a limited sphere the powers of the State. The State may withdraw these local powers of government at pleasure, and may, through its legislature or other appointed channels, govern the local territory as it governs the State at large. It may enlarge or contract its powers or destroy its existence. As a portion of the State in the exercise of a limited portion of the powers of the State, its revenues, like those of the State, are not subject to taxation.”

In Collector v. Day, 11 Wall. 113, 124, the court, speaking by .Mr. Justice Nelson, said: “ The general government, and the States, although both exist within the same territorial "limits, are separate and distinct sovereignties, acting separately and independently of each other, within their respective spheres. The’former in its appropriate sphere is supreme; but. the States within the limits of their powers not granted, or, in the language of the tenth amendment, ‘ reserved,’ are as independent of the general government .as that government within its sphere is independent of the States.”

According to the' census reports tbe bonds and securities of the States amount to the sum of $1,243,268,000, on which the income or interest exceeds the sum of $65,000,000 per annum, and the annual tax of two per cent upon this income or interest would be $1,300,000.

The law of Congress is also invalid in that it authorizes a tax upon the salaries of the judges of the courts of the United States, against the declaration of the Constitution that their compensation shall not be diminished during their continuance in office. The law declares that a tax of two per cent shall be assessed, levied, and collected and paid annually upon the gains, profits, and income received in the preceding calendar year, by every citizen of the United States, whether said gains, profits, or income be derived from any kind of property, rents, interest, dividends, or salaries, or from any profession, trade, employment, or vocation, carried on within the United States or elsewhere, or from any source whatever. The annual salary of a justice of the Supreme Court of the United States is ten thousand dollars, and this act levies a tax of two per cent on six thousand dollars of this amount, and imposes a penalty upon those who do not make the payment, or return the amount for taxation.

The same objection, as presented to a consideration of the objection to the taxation of the bonds and securities of the States, as not being specially taken in the cases before us, is urged here to a consideration of the objection to the taxation by the law of the salaries of the judges of the courts of the United States. The answer given to that objection may be also given to the present one. The law of Congress being of a public nature, affecting the interests of the whole community, and attacked for its unconstitutionality in certain particulars, may be considered with reference to other unconstitutional provisions called to our attention upon examining the law, though not specifically noticed in the objections taken in the records or briefs of counsel, that the Constitution may not be ■violated from the carelessness or oversight of counsel in any particular. See O'Neil v. Vermont, 144 U. S. 323, 359.

Besides, there is a duty which this court owes to the one hundred other United. States judges who have small salaries, and who having their compensation reduced by the tax may be seriously affected by the law. .

The Constitution of the United States provides in the first section of article III that: “The judicial power of the United States, shall be vested in one Supreme Court, and in such inferior courts as the Congress may from time to time ordain and establish. The judges, both of the Supreme and inferior courts, shall hold their offices during good behavior, and shall, at stated times, receive for their services, a compensation, which shall not he diminished during their continua/nce i/n, office.'’’’ The act of Congress under discussion imposes, as said, a tax on six thousand dollars of this compensation, and therefore diminishes, each year, the compensation provided for every justice. How a similar law of Congress was regarded thirty years ago may be shown by the following incident in which the justices of this court were assessed at three percent upon their salaries. Against this Chief Justice Taney protested in a letter to Mr. Chase, then Secretary of the Treasury, appealing to the above' article in the Constitution, and adding: “If it [his salary] can-'be diminished to that extent by the means of a tax, it may, in the same way, be reduced from time to time, at the pleasure of the legislature.” He explained in his letter the object of the constitutional inhibition thus: —

“ The judiciary is one of the three great departments of the government created and established by the Constitution. . Its duties and powers are specifically set forth, and are of a character that require it to be perfectly independent of the other departments. And in order to place it beyond the reach, and above even the suspicion, of any such influence, the power to reduce their compensation is expressly withheld from Congress and excepted from their powers of legislation.

“ Language could not be more plain than- that used in the Constitution. It is, moreover, one of its most' important and essential provisions. For the articles which limit the powers •of the legislative and executive branches of the government, and those which provide safeguards for the protection of the citizen in his person and property, would be of little value-without a judiciary to uphold and maintain them which was free from every influence, direct or indirect, that might by possibility, in times of political excitement, warp their judgment.

“ Upon these grounds I regard an act of Congress retaining in the Treasury a portion of the compensation of the judges as unconstitutional and void.”

This letter of Chief Justice Taney was addressed to Mr. Chase, then Secretary of the Treasury and afterwards the successor of Mr. Taney as Chief Justice. It was dated February 16, 1863, but as no notice was taken of it, on the 10th of March following, at the request of the Chief Justice, the Court ordered that his letter to the Secretary of the Treasury be entered on the records of the court, and it was so entered. See Appendix, post, 701. And in the Memoir of the Chief Justice it is stated that the letter was, by this order, preserved “to testify to future ages that in war, no.less than in peace, Chief Justice Taney strove to protect the Constitution from violation.”

Subsequently, in 1869, and during the administration of President Grant, when Mr. Boutwell was Secretary of the Treasury and Mr. Hoar, of Massachusetts, was Attorney General, there were in several of the statutes of the United States, for the assessment and collection of internal revenue, provisions for taxing the salaries of all civil officers of the United States, which included, in their literal application, the salaries of the President and of the judges of the United States. The question arose whether the law which imposed such a tax upon them was constitutional. The opinion of the Attorney General thereon was requested by the Secretary of the Treasury. The Attorney General, in reply, gave an elaborate opinion advising the Secretary of the Treasury that no income tax could be lawfully assessed ánd collected upon the salaries of those officers who were in office at the time the statute imposing the tax was passed, holding on this subject the views expressed by Chief Justice Taney. His opinion is published in volume XIII of the Opinions of the Attorneys .General, at page 161. I am informed that it has been followed ever since without question by the department supervising or directing the collection of the public revenue.

Here I close my opinion. I could not say less in. view of questions of such gravity that go down to the very foundation of the government. If the provisions of the Constitution can. be set aside by an act of Congress, where is the course of usurpation to end ? The present assault upon capital is but the beginning. It will be but the stepping-stone to others, larger and more sweeping, till our political contests will become a war of the poor against the rich ; a war constantly growing in intensity and bitterness.

“If the court sanctions the power.of discriminating taxation, and nullifies the uniformity mandate of the Constitution,” as said by one who has been all his life a student of our institutions, “ it will mark the hour when the sure decadence of our present government will commence.” If the purely arbitrary limitation of $4000 in the present law can be sustained, none having less than that amount of income being assessed or taxed for the support of the government, the limitation of future Congresses may be fixed at a much larger sum, at five or ten or twenty thousand dollars, parties possessing an income of that amount alone being bound to bear the burdens of government; or the limitation may be designated at such an amount as a 'board of “ walking delegates ” may deem necessary. There is no safety in allowing the limitation to be adjusted except in strict compliance with the mandates of the Constitution which require its taxation, if imposed by direct taxes, to be apportioned among the States according to their representation, and if imposed by indirect taxes, to be uniform in operation and, so far as practicable, in proportion to their property, equal- upon all citizens. Unless the rule of the Constitution governs, a majority may fix the limitation at such rate as will not include any of their own number.

I am of opinion that the whole law of 1894 should be declared void and without any binding force — that part which relates to the tax on the rents, profits or income from real estate, that is, so much as constitutes part of the direct tax, because, not imposed by the rule of apportionment according-to the representation of the States, as prescribed by the Constitution — and that part which imposes a tax upon the bonds. and securities of the several States, and upon the bonds and securities of their municipal bodies, and upon the salaries of judges of the courts of the United States, as being beyond the power of Congress; and that part which lays duties, imposts, and excises, as void in not providing for the uniformity required by the Constitution in such cases.