Mr. Justice Brewer,
after making the foregoing statement, delivered the opinion of the court.
The important question in this case is, whether persons who are selling liquor are relieved from liability for the internal revenue tax by the. fact that they have no interest in the profits of the business and are simply the agents of a State which, in the exercise of its sovereign power, has taken charge of the business of selling intoxicating liquors. It is true a further question is made whether the act of Congress is broad enough to include such persons. But upon this we have little doubt. Section 3232 Rev. Stat provides:
. “No person shall be engaged in nor carry on any trade or business hereinafter mentioned until he has paid a special tax therefor in the manner hereinafter provided.”
Section 3244, contains these words of description:
“Every person who sells, or offers for sale .foreign or domestic distilled spirits or wines, in less quantities than five wine gallons at the same time, shall be regarded as a retail dealer in liquors.”
“Person” is also defined:
[448]*448. “Sec. 3140.' . . . Where not otherwise, distinctly expressed or manifestly incompatible with the intent thereof, the .word ‘person/ as used in this title, shall be construed to mean and include a partnership, association, company, or corporation, as well as a natural person.”
Now, the dispensers were persons who sold liquors. They .applied for and received the licenses. True they were acting simply as agents of the State, but if the fact that the State was the principal creates no exemption from Federal taxation then the statute reaches them because they were the actual sellers.
We pass, therefore, to the vital question in the case, and it is one of far-reaching significance. We have in this Republic a dual system of government, National and state, each operating within the same territory and upon the same persons; and yet working .without collision, because their functions are different. There are certain matters over which the National Government has absolute control and no action of the State can interfere therewith, and there are others in which the State is supreme, and in respect to them the National Government is powerless. To preserve the even balance between these two governments and hold each in its separate sphere'is the peculiar duty of all .courts, .preeminently of this — a duty oftentimes óf great delicacy and difficulty.
Two propositions in our constitutional jurisprudence are no longer debatable. One is that the National Government is one of enumerated powers, and the other that a power . enumerated, and delegated b_y the Constitution to Congress is comprehensive and complete, without other limitations than those found in the Constitution itself.
The Constitution is a written instrument. As such its ' meaning does not alter. That which it meant when adopted it means now. . Being .a grant of powers to a government its language is general, arid as changes come in social and political life it embraces in its grasp all new conditions wMch are within the'scope of the powers in Terms conferred.- ‘ In other words, [449]*449while the powers granted do not change, they apply from generation to generation to all things to which they ale in their nature applicable. This in no manner abridges the fact of its changeless nature and meaning. Those things which are within its grants of power, as those grants were understood when made, are still within them, and those things not within them remain still excluded. As said by Mr. Chief Justice Taney in Dred Scott v. Sandford, 19 How. 393, 426:
. “It is not only the same in words, but the same in meaning, and delegates the same powers to the Government, and, reserves and secures the same rights and privileges to the citizens; and as long as it continues to exist in its present form, it speaks not only in the same words, but with the same meaning and intent with which it spoke when it came from the hands of its framers, and was voted on and adopted by the people of the' United States. Any other rule of construction would abrogate the judicial character of this court, and make it the mere reflex of the popular opinion or passion of the day.”
It must also be remembered that the framers of the Constitution were not mere visionaries, toying with speculations or theories, but practical men, dealing with the facts of political life as they understood them, putting into form the government they were creating, and prescribing in language clear and intelligible’the powers that government was to take. Mr. Chief Justice Marshall,’ in Gibbons v. Ogden, 9 Wheat. 1, 188, well declared:
“As men whose intentions require no concealment, generally employ the words which most directly and aptly express the ideas they intend to convey, the enlightened patriots who framed our Constitution, and the people who adopted it, must' be understood to have employed words in their natural sense, and to have intended what they have said.”
One other fact must'be borne in mind, and that is that in interpreting the Constitution.we must have recourse to the common law. As said'by Mr. Justice Matthews in Smith v. Alabama, 124 U. S. 465, 478:
[450]*450“The interpretation of the Constitution of the United States is necessarily influenced by the fact that its provisions are framed in the language of the English common law, and are to be read in the light of its history.”
And by Mr. Justice Gray in United States v. Wong Kim Ark. 169 U. S. 649, 654:
“In this, as in other respects, it must be interpreted in the light of the common law, the principles and history of'which were familiarly known to the framers of the Constitution. Minor v. Happersett, 21 Wall. 162; Ex parte Wilson, 114 U. S. 417, 422; Boyd v. United States, 116 U. S. 616, 624, 625; Smith v. Alabama, 124 U. S. 465. The language of the Constitution, as has.been well said, could not be understood without reference to the. common law. 1 Kent Com. 336; Bradley, J., in Moore v. United States, 91 U. S. 270, 274.”
To determine the extent of the grants of power we must, therefore, place ourselves (in the position of the men who framed and adopted the Constitution, and inquire what they must have understood to be the meaning and scope of those1 grants.
.. By the first clause of section 8 of Article I of the Constitution, Congress is given the “power to lay and. collect taxes, duties, imposts and excises, to pay the debts and provide for the common defense and general welfare of the United States; but all duties, imposts and excises shall be uniform throughout the .United States.”
By this clause the grant is limited in two ways: The revenue must be collected foi public purposes, and all duties, imposts and excises must be uniform .throughout the United States.
The fourth, fifth.and sixth clauses of section 9 of Article I are:
. “4. No capitation, or other direct, tax shall be laid, unless in proportion to the census or enumeration herein before directed to be taken.
“5; No tax or duty shall be laid on articles exported from any State.
“6. No preference shall be given by any regulatidn of.com[451]*451merce or revenue to the ports of one State over those of an- ' other: nor shall vessels bound to, or from, one State, be obliged to enter, clear, or pay duties in another.”
Article Y of the Amendments provides that no one shall be deprived of “life, liberty' or property, without due process of law.”
These are all the constitutional provisions that bear directly upon the subject. It will be seen that the only qualifications of the absolute, untrammeled power to lay and collect excises are that they shall be for public purposes, and that they shall be uniform throughout the United States. All other limitations named in the Constitution relate to taxes, duties and imposts. If, therefore, we confine our inquiry to the express provisions of the Constitution there is disclosed no limitation on the power of the General Government to collect license taxes.
But it is undoubtedly true that that which is implied is as much a part of the Constitution as that which is expressed. As said by Mr. Justice Miller in Ex parte Yarbrough, 110 U. S. 651, 658:
“The proposition that it has no such power is supported by the old argument- often heard, often repeated, and in this court never assented to, that when a question of the power of Congress arises the advocate of the power must be able to place his finger on words which expressly grant it. The brief of counsel before us, though directed to the authority of that body to pass criminal laws, uses the same language. Because there is no express power to provide for preventing violence exercised on the voter as a means of controlling his vote, no such law can be enacted. It destroys at one blow, in construing the Constitution of the United States, the doctrine universally applied to all instruments of writing, that what is implied is as much a part of the instrument as what is expressed.”
Among those matters which are implied, though not expressed, is that the Nation may not, in the exercise of its powers, prevent a State from discharging the ordinary functions of government, just as it follows from the second clause of Arti[452]*452ele VI of the Constitution', that no State can interfere with the free and unembarrassed exercise by the National Government . of all the powers conferred upon it.
“This Constitution, and the laws of the..United-States which' shall be made in pursuance thereof; and all treaties made, or which shall be made, under the authority of the United States, shall be the supreme law of the land; and the judges in. every State shall be bound thereby, anything in the constitution or laws of any State to the contrary notwithstanding.”
In other words, the two governments, National and- state, are each to exercise their power so as not to interfere with the free and full exercise by the other of its powers. This proposition, so far as the Nation is concerned, was affirmed at an early day in the great case of M’Culloch v. Maryland, 4 Wheat. 316, in which it was held that the State had no power to pass a law imposing a tax upon the operations of a national bank. The case is familiar and needs not to be quoted from. No answer has ever been made to the argument of Mr. Chief Justice Marshall, and the propositions there laid down have become fundamental in our constitutional jurisprudence. Osborn v. Bank of United States, 9 Wheat. 738; Weston v. City Council of Charleston, 2 Pet. 449; Bank of Commerce v. New York, 2 Black, 620; Bank Tax Case, 2 Wall. 200; The Banks v. The Mayor, 7 Wall. 16.
The limitations on the powers of the States, to tax national banks are founded upon the doctrines laid down in that case. So also the immunity of national property from state taxation. It is true that, in most of the enabling acts for the admission of new States there is express provision that the property of the Nation shall be free from state taxation, but as shown by Mr. Justice Gray, delivering the opinion of the court in Van Brocklin v. Tennessee, 117 U. S. 151, this provision is- merely declaratory and unnecessary to establish the exemption of national property from state taxation. See also Dobbins v. Commissioners of Erie County, 16 Pet. 435, as. to taxation by a State of an officer of the United States for his office or its emoluments.
[453]*453■ The converse of this proposition has also been declared by the. decisions of this court. In Texas v. White, 7 Wall. 700, 725, Mr Chief Justice Chase, speaking for the court, declared:
“Not'only, therefore, Can there be no loss of separate and independent - autonomy to the States, through their union under the Constitution, but it may be not unreasonably said, that the'preservation of the States, and the maintenance of their governments, are as much within the design and care of the Constitution as the preservation of the Union and the maintenance of the National Government. The Constitution, in all its provisions, looks to an indestructible Union, composed of indestructible States.”
In The Collector v. Day, 11 Wall. 113, it was held that it was not competent for Congress to impose a tax upon the salary of a judicial officer of a State. In the opinion of the court, delivered by Mr. Justice Nelson, it was said (p. 127):
“It is admitted that there is ho express provision in the Constitution that prohibits the General Government from taxing the means and instrumentalities of the States, nor is there any prohibiting the States from taxing the means ami instrumentalities of that Government. In both cases the-exemption rests upon necessary - implication, and is upheld by the great law of self-preservation; as any government, whose means employed in conducting its operations, if subject to the control of another and distinct government, can exist only at the mercy of that government. Of what avail are these means if another power may tax them at discretion?”
See also United States v. Railroad Company, 17 Wall. 322; Pollock v. Farmers’ Loan & Trust Co., 157 U. S. 429, 584.
Upon this proposition counsel for plaintiff in error rely. There being no constitutional limit as to the amount of a license tax, arid the power to tax being the power to. destroy, if Congress can enforce such a tax against a State it may destroy this effort of the. State in the exercise of its police power to control the sale of liquor. It cannot be doubted that the regulation of the sale of liquor comes within the scope of the [454]*454police power, and equally true that the police power is in its fullest and broadest sense reserved to the States; that the mode of exercising that power is left to their discretion, and is not subject to National supervision. But if Congress may tax the agents of the State charged with the duty of selling intoxicating liquors, it in effect assumes a certain control over this police power, and thus may embarrass and even thwart the attempt of the State to carry on this mode of regulation.
We are not insensible to the force of this argument, and appreciate the difficulties, which it presents, but let us see to what it leads. ” Each State is subject only to the limitations prescribed by the Constitution and within its own territory is otherwise supreme. Its internal affairs are matters of its own ■discretion. The Constitution provides that “ the United States shall guarantee to every State in this Union a republican form .of government.” Art. IV, sec. 4. That expresses the full limit of National control over the internal affairs of a State.
The right of South Carolina to control the sale of liquor by the dispensary system has been sustained. Vance v. W. A. Vandercook Co., No. 1, 170 U. S. 438. The profits from the business in the year 1901, as appears from the findings of fact, were over half a million of dollars. Mingling, the thought of profit with the necessity of regulation may induce the State to take possession, in like manner, of tobacco, oleomargarine, and all other objects of internal revenue tax. If one State finds it thus profitable other States may follow,' and the whole body of internal reveime tax be thus stricken dowm.
More than this. There is a large and growing movement in the country in favor of the acquisition and management by the public of what are termed public utilities, including not merely therein the supply of gas and water, but also the entire railroad system. Would the State by taking into possession these public utilities lose its republican form of government?
We may go even a step further. There are some insisting that the State shall become the owner of all prope-rty and the manager of all business. Of course, this is an extreme view, [455]*455but its advocates are earnestly contending that thereby the best interests of ah citizens will be subserved. If this changé should be- made in any. State, how much would that State, contribute to the revenue of the Nation? If this extreme action is not to be -counted among the probabilities, consider the result of one much less so; Suppose a State assumes under its police power the control of all those matters subject to the internal revenue tax and also engages in the business of importing all foreign goods. The same argument which would exempt the sale by a State of liquor, tobacco, etc., from a license tax would exempt the importation of merchandise by a State from import duty. While the State might not prohibit importations, as it can the sale of liquor, by private individuals,' yet paying no import dixty it could xxndersell all individuals and so monopolize the importation and sale of foreign goods.
Obviously, if the power of the State is. carried to the extent suggested,' and with it is relief from all Federal taxation, the National Government would be largely crippled in its revenues. Indeed, if all the States should concur in exercising their powers to the full extent, it would be1 almost impossible.' for the Nation to collect any revenues. In other words, in this indirect way it would be within the competency of the States to practically destroy the efficiency of the National Governmeixt. If it be said that the States can be trusted not to resort to any such extreme measures, because of the resulting interference with the efficiency of the National Goveru.ment, we may turn to the opinion of Mr. Chief Justice Marshall in M’Culloch v. Maryland, supra (p. 431), for a complete answer :
“But is this a case of confidence? Would tlxe people of aixy one State trust those of another with--a power to control the most insignificant operations of their state government? We know they would xxot. Why, then, should we suppose that the people of any one State should be willing to trust those of aixother with the power to control the operations of a government to which they ha^e-^onfided their most- important and [456]*456most valuable interests? In the legislature of the Union alone, are all represented. The legislature of the Union alone, therefore, can be trusted by the people with the power Of controlling measures which, concern all, in the confidence that it will, not be abused.”
In other words, we are to find in the Constitution itself the' full protection to the Nation, and not to rest its sufficiency on either the generosity or the neglect of any State.'
There is something of a conflict between the full power of' the Nation in respect to taxation and the exemption of the State from Federal taxation in respect to its property and a discharge of all its functions. Where and how shall the line between them be drawn? We have seen that the full power of collecting license taxes is in terms granted to the National. Government with only the limitations of uniformity and the public benefit. The exemption-of the State’s property and its functions from Federal taxation is implied from the dual character of our Federal system and the necessity of preserving the State in all its efficiency. In order to determine to what extent that implication will go we must turn to the condition of tilings at the time the Constitution' was framed. What, in the-light of that condition, did the framers of the convention intend should be exempt? Certain is it that modern notions as to the extent- to which the functions of a State may be carried had then no hold. Whatever Utopian theories may have been presented by any writers were regarded as mere creations of fancy, and had no practical recognition. It is true that monopolies in respect to certain commodities were known to have been granted by absolute monarchs, but they were not regarded as consistent with Anglo-Saxon ideas of government. The opposition to the Constitution came. not from any apprehension of danger from the extent of power reserved to the States, but, on the other hand, entirely through fear of what might result from the exercise of the powers granted to the central government. While many believed that the liberty of the people depended on the preservation of the rights [457]*457of the States, they had no thought that those States would extend their functions beyond their then recognized scope, or so as to imperil the life of the Nation. As well said by Chief Justice Nott, delivering the opinion of the Court of Claims in this case (39 C. Cl. 284):
“Moreover, at the time of the adoption of the Constitution there probably was not dne person in the country who seri- • ously contemplated the possibility of government, whether State or National, ever descending from its primitive plant of a body politic to take up the work of the individual or body corporate. The public suspicion associated government with patents of nobility, with an established church, with standing armies, and distrusted all governments. Even in the high intelligence of the convention there were men who trembled at the power given to the President, who trembled at the power' which the Senate might usurp, who feared that the life tenure of the judiciary might imperil the liberties of the people. Certain it is that if the possibility of a government usurping the ordinary business of individuals, driving them out of the market, and maintaining place and power by means of wha.t would have been called, in the heated invective of the time, ‘a legion of mercenaries,’ had been in the public mind, the Constitution would not have been adopted, or an inhibition of such power would have been placed among Madison’s Amendments.”
Looking, therefore, at the Constitution in the light of the conditions surrounding at the time of its adoption, it is obvious that the framers in granting full power over license'taxes to the National Government meant that that power should be complete, and never thought that the States by extending their functions could practically destroy it.
If we look upon the Constitution in the light of the common law we are led to the same conclusion. All the avenues of trade were open to the individual. The Government did not attempt to exclude him from any. Whatever restraints were put upon him were mere police regulations to control his conduct in the [458]*458business and not to exclude him therefrom. The Government was no competitor, nor did it assume to carry on any .business which ordinarily is carried on by individuals. Indeed, every attempt at monopoly' was odious in the eyes of the common law, and it mattered not how that monopoly arose, whether from grant of the sovereign or otherwise. The framers of the Constitution were not anticipating that a State would attempt to monopolize any business heretofore carried on by individuals.
Further, it may be noticed that the tax is not imposed on any property belonging to the State, but is a charge on a business before any profits are realized therefrom. In this it is not unlike the taxes sustained in United States v. Perkins, 163 U. S. 625, and Snyder v. Bettman, 190 U. S. 249. In the former case a succession tax of the State of New. íork wás sustained, although the property charged therewith was bequeathed by will to the United States, the court holding that the latter acquired no property until after the state' charges for transmission had been paid, saying (p. 629) :
‘ ‘ ‘ This, therefore, is not a tax upon the property itself, but is merely the price exacted by the State for the privilege accorded in permitting property so situated to be- transferred by will or by descent or distribution.’ ”•
In Snyder v. Bettman, the succession tax required by the laws of Congress was sustained, although the bequest was to the city of Springfield, Ohio. This is almost a converse to the Perkins case. It was held that while the power to regulate inheritances and testamentary dispositions was one belonging to the State, and therefore subject to such conditions as the State might see fit to impose (as held in the Perkins case), .yet the power to impose a succession tax was vested in Congress, that it could be exercised upon a bequest made to a municipality or a State, and was not to be considered as a tax upon the property bequeathed, the court saying (p. 254):
“Having determined, then, that Congress has the power to tax successions; that the States have the same power, and that such power extends to bequests to the United States, it would [459]*459seem to follow logically that Congress has the same power to tax the transmission qf property by legacy to States, or their municipalities, and that the exercise of that power in neither case conflicts with the proposition that neither the Federal nor the state government can tax the property or agencies of the other, since, as repeatedly held, the taxes imposed are not upon property, .but upon the right to succeed to property.”
So here the charge is not upon the property of the State, but upon the means by which that property is acquired, and before it is acquired.
It is also worthy of remark that the cases in which the invalidity of a Federal tax has been affirmed were those in which the tax was attempted to be levied upon property belonging to the State, or one of its municipalities, or was a charge upon the means and instrumentalities employed by the State, in the discharge of its ordinary functions as a government.
In Veazie Bank v. Fenno, 8 Wall. 533, in which a National tax of ten per cent' on the amount of notes of any person, state bank, or banking association, used for circulation, was sustained, the court thus stated the limits of the power of National taxation over state agencies (p. 547):
“It may be admitted that the reserved rights of the States, such as the right to pass laws, to give effect to laws through executive action, to administer justice through the courts, and to employ all necessary agencies for legitimate purposes of state government, are not proper subjects of the taxing power of Congress.”.
In The Collector v. Day, 11 Wall. 113, cited sufra, in the argument in favor of the exemption of the salary of a state judge from National taxation, is this language (p. 125) •
“It would seem to follow, as a reasonable, if not a necessary consequence, that the means and instrumentalities employed for carrying on the operations of their governments, for preserving their existence, and fulfilling the high and responsible duties assigned to them in the Constitution, should be left free and unimpaired, should not be liable to be crippled, much less [460]*460defeated by the taxing power of another government, which power acknowledges no limits but the will of the legislative body imposing the tax. And, more especially, those means and instrumentalities which are the creation of their sovereign and reserved rights, one of which is the establishment of the judicial department, and the appointment of officers to administer their laws: Without this power, and the exercise of. it, we risk nothing in saying that no one of the States under the form of government guaranteed by the Constitution could long preserve its existence.”
In United States v. Railroad Company, 17 Wall. 322, an attempt was made to collect a tax on money due from a railroad company to the city of Baltimore. It was held that the city was a portion of the State in the exercise of a limited portion of the powers of the State, and the court said (p, 327):
“The right.of the States to administer their own affairs through their legislative, executive, and judicial departments, in their own manner through their own agencies, is conceded by the uniform decisions of this court and by the practice of the Federal Government from its organization. This carries with it an exemption of those agencies and instruments from the taxing power qf the Federal Government.”
Arid again (p. 332):
“We admit the proposition of the counsel that the revenue must' be municipal in its nature to entitle it to the exemption" claimed; Thus, if an individual should make the city of Baltimore his agent and trustee to receive funds, and to distribute them in aid of science, literature, or the fine arts, or even for the relief of the destitute and infirm, it is quite possible- that such revenues would be subject to taxation. The corporation would therein depart from its municipal character, and assume the position of a private trustee. It would occupy a place which an individual could occupy with equal propriety. It would not in that action be am auxiliary or servant of the State, but of ,the individual creating the trusty There is nothing of a governmental charácter in such a position.”
[461]*461In Ambrosini v. United States, 187 U. S. 1, in which the Federal war revenue tax act, providing for stamp taxes on bonds, was held inapplicable' to bonds required from licensees under the dram shop act of Illinois, the court dec! ..red (p. 8): •
_ “The question is whether the bonds were taken in the exercise of a function strictly belonging to the State and citj 1 in their ordinary governmental capacity, and we are of he opinion that they-were, and that they were exempted as1 no more taxable than the licenses.” \ ;
These decisions, while not controlling the question before j is, indicate that the thought has been that the exemption of stí te agencies and instrumentalities from National taxation is limit id to those which are of a strictly governmental character,, a: id does not extend to those which are used by the State in tie carrying on of an ordinary private business.
In this connection may be noticed the well-established distinction between the duties of a public character cast upen municipal corporations and those which relate to what may be considered their private business, and the different responsibility resulting in case of negligence in respect to the discharge of those duties. The Supreme Court of Massachusetts, speaking by Mr. Justice Gray (afterwards an Associate Justice of this court), in Oliver v. Worcester, 102 Massachusetts, 489, 499, 500, observed:
“The distinction is well established between the responsibilities of towns and cities for acts done in their public capacity, in the discharge of duties imposed upon them by the legislature for the public benefit, and for acts done in what may be called their private character, in the management of property or rights voluntarily held by them for their own immediate profit or advantage as a corporation, although inuring, of course, ultimately to the benefit of the public.-
“To render municipal corporations hable to private actions for omission or neglect to perform a corporate dúty imposed by general law on all towns and cities alike, and -from the per[462]*462formance of which they derive no compensatioji or benefit in their corporate capacity, an express statute is doubtless necessary. ■...”
“But this rule does not exempt towns and cities from the Hiability to which other corporations are subjéct, for negligence in managing or dealing with property or rights held by them for their own advantage or emolument.”
J In Lloyd v. Mayor &c. of New York, 5 N. Y. 369, 374, the court said:
“The corporation of the city of New York possesses two kinds of powers, one governmental and public, and, to the extent they are held and exercised, is clothed with sovereignty— the other private, and to the extent they are held and exercised, is a legal individual. The former are given and used for public purposes, the latter for private purposes. While in the exercise of the former, the corporation is a municipal .government, and while in the exercise of the latter, is a corporate, legal individual.”
See also Maximilian v. Mayor, 62 N. Y. 160, 164; Brown v. Vinalhaven, 65 Maine, 402; Mead v. City of New Haven, 40 Connecticut, 72; City of Petersburg v. Applegarth’s Administrator, 28 Gratt. 321, 343; Eastman v. Meredith, 36 N. H. 285; Western Saving Fund Society v. City of Philadelphia, 31 Pa. St. 175. In this case it was held that a city supplying gas 'to the inhabitants acts as a private corporation, and is subject to the sainé liabilities and disabilities. In the opinion the court declared (p. 183):
“Such contracts are not made by the municipal corporation, by virtue of its powers of local sovereignty, but in its capacity of a private corporation. The supply of gaslight is ho more a duty of sovereignty than ■ the supply of water. ■ Both these objects may be accomplished through the agency of individuals or private corporations, and in very many instances they are accomplished by those means. If this power is granted to a borough or a city, it is a special private franchise, made as well for the private emolument and advantage of the city as for the [463]*463public-'good. The whole investment is the private property of the city, as much so as the lands and houses belonging to it. Blending the two powers in one grant, does not destroy the clear and wellrsettled distinction, and the process of separation is not rendered impossible by the confusion. In separate ing them, regard must be had to the object of the legislature in conferring them.- If granted for public purposes exclusively, they belong to the corporate body' in its public, political, or municipal character. But if the. grant was for purposes of private advantage and emolument, though- the public may derive a common benefit therefrom, the corporation quoad hoc is to be regarded as a private company. It stands on' the ■ same footing as would any individual or body of persons,, upon whom the like special franchises had been conferred.”
See further a subsequent case betwéen the same parties, in the. same volume (pp. 185, 189): Bailey v. The Mayor &c., 3 Hill, 531; 1 Dillon, Mun. Corp., 4th ed., sec. 66.
Now, if it be well established; as these authorities say, that there .is a clear distinction as respects responsibility for negligence between the powers granted to a corporation for governmental purposes and those in aid of private business, a like distinction may be recognized when we are asked to limit the full-power of imposing .excises granted to the National Government' by an implied inability to impede or embarrass a State in the discharge of its functions. It is reasonable, to hold that while the former may do nothing by taxation in any form to prevént'the full discharge by the latter of its governmental functions, yet whenever' a State engages in a business which is of a private nature that business is not withdrawn from the taxing power of the Nation.
For'these reasons we think that the license taxes charged by the Federal Government upon persons selling liquor is not invalidated by the fact that they are the agents of the State which has itself engaged in that business.
.The judgment of the Court of Claims is
Affirmed.