MAINE SUPREME JUDICIAL COURT Reporter of Decisions Decision: 2025 ME 44 Docket: Cum-24-122 Submitted On Briefs: September 25, 2024 Decided: May 22, 2025
Panel: STANFILL, C.J., and MEAD, HORTON, CONNORS, and LAWRENCE, JJ.
SOKUNTHIM NOU
v.
ROTANAK HUOT
HORTON, J.
[¶1] Sokunthim Nou appeals from a divorce judgment entered by the
District Court (Portland, Nofsinger, J.) in which the court allocated property
between her and Rotanak Huot and awarded shared parental rights and
responsibilities and shared residency of their children. Sokunthim1 appeals the
court’s property determinations on multiple grounds,2 and we reject all but one
of her contentions. We conclude that the court’s finding regarding Sokunthim’s
income is unsupported by the evidence. Because this finding may have
1 We refer to the parties by first name, rather than by surname, in keeping with their preference
and custom.
2 Sokunthim does not challenge the custody determination. 2
influenced other financial aspects of the judgment, we vacate the division of
property and child support award and remand for further proceedings.
I. BACKGROUND
[¶2] The following facts are drawn from the procedural record and the
court’s findings of fact, which are supported by the record unless otherwise
indicated. See Sullivan v. George, 2018 ME 115, ¶ 2, 191 A.3d 1168.
[¶3] Rotanak and Sokunthim met after immigrating to the United States
from Cambodia in 2004 and 2007, respectively. They were married in 2016
and have twin daughters. Before and during the marriage, the parties ran
multiple businesses together.
[¶4] In February 2019, they formed a limited liability company (LLC),
Punky’s LLC, to own and operate Punky’s, a convenience store and food
establishment in Portland. In April 2019, they formed another LLC, Banha
Huot, LLC, to own and operate a multiunit rental property in Portland. Banha
Huot, LLC, was later renamed Panyah LLC. Sokunthim was the only named
member of the two LLCs, but both parties were involved in the operation of the
convenience store and the rental property. The parties also own a home in
Scarborough that was purchased in December 2019 in Sokunthim’s name only. 3
The purchases of the real properties were funded, in part, through substantial
gifts of money made by Sokunthim’s parents to both parties.
[¶5] The parties separated in 2020, shortly after Sokunthim suffered a
medical event in February 2020, resulting in a brain injury that affected her
ability to recall events. Rotanak ceased his involvement in the operation of the
convenience store when the parties separated. He now works as a cook in a
restaurant. Sokunthim continues to work at Punky’s and treats the income
from the business as her own.
[¶6] Sokunthim filed for divorce on July 24, 2020. Over the next three
years, the parties engaged in two unsuccessful mediations and the court
(Cadwallader, M.) appointed a guardian ad litem at Sokunthim’s request.
Because English is not either party’s first language, both parties requested that
interpreter services be provided at court events. However, an interpreter was
not available at three status conferences scheduled in 2022 and 2023. Two of
the conferences did not proceed because of the lack of an interpreter, but the
third conference went forward. Sokunthim was not represented by counsel at
that conference, and it is not clear whether she objected when the court held
the conference without an interpreter present. The record is unclear as to
whether an interpreter was present at a fourth status conference. 4
[¶7] On April 25, 2023, Sokunthim, with the assistance of the Volunteer
Lawyers Project, filed a motion seeking an enlargement of time for discovery.
After a conference on the motion, the court ordered that “[i]f Plaintiff seeks
discovery[,] she shall serve [any] discovery request prior to the next court
event.” At the next court conference on August 24, 2023, Sokunthim requested
to take discovery, and the court denied the request on the basis that it should
have been made earlier.
[¶8] The court (Nofsinger, J.) held a trial on December 15, 2023, and
January 3, 2024, with both parties represented by counsel and two interpreters
present each day. At the outset, the court stated, “My understanding is that the
parties understand English well enough so that they’ll just be asking for
interpretation when necessary, is that correct?” Sokunthim responded, “Yes,
your Honor.” The court heard testimony from the parties, a real estate broker,
Sokunthim’s accountant, and Sokunthim’s father. On the first day of the trial,
the court announced that the second day of the trial, although originally
scheduled for an entire day, would be reduced to a half-day due to scheduling
issues. The court assured the parties that if more time proved necessary, it
would be provided, and neither party objected. Near the end of the scheduled
time for the second day, Sokunthim’s attorney requested a short break before 5
calling Sokunthim for rebuttal, but the court stressed the need to end on time,
and Sokunthim’s attorney replied, “Okay. Well, we’ll just start then.”
[¶9] The court entered a comprehensive divorce judgment on
January 30, 2024. In the portions of the judgment relevant to this appeal, the
court determined that all the parties’ assets were marital because they were
acquired during the marriage, through significant effort by both parties, and
because Sokunthim had not met her burden to prove that any of their value
should be deemed nonmarital. Accordingly, based on its finding that the net
value of the parties’ properties was $1,709,376, the court allocated $885,433,
or just over half, to Sokunthim and the remainder to Rotanak. The court’s
judgment awarded Panyah LLC to Rotanak and implicitly awarded Punky’s LLC
to Sokunthim.3 The court also found Sokunthim’s income to be $435,598, based
largely on Rotanak’s testimony that Punky’s had sales between $2,500 and
$3,000 daily while he had worked there, half through credit card purchases and
half through cash purchases. The court assumed Punky’s was open at least
300 days a year, calculated annual gross sales at $750,000, and subtracted the
cost of goods and services to derive Sokunthim’s annual income.
3 In the table listing the parties’ assets and debts, Punky’s LLC is listed in the column for
Sokunthim. However, the portion of the judgment allocating property omits mention of Punky’s LLC, although it allocates Panyah LLC to Rotanak. On remand, the court may clarify its intent to award Punky’s LLC to Sokunthim. 6
[¶10] Sokunthim timely filed a motion for additional findings of fact and
conclusions of law pursuant to M.R. Civ. P. 52 and a motion for a new trial
pursuant to M.R. Civ. P. 59. In the Rule 52 motion, Sokunthim proposed twenty
findings of fact and four conclusions of law.4 The proposed findings and
conclusions relevant to the issues on appeal are as follows:
The three parcels of real estate were purchased primarily with Sokunthim’s nonmarital funds;
Rotanak had engaged in economic misconduct during the marriage; and
Sokunthim’s income was accurately reported in her personal income tax returns.
[¶11] In the Rule 59 motion, Sokunthim contended that she was not
provided sufficient time at trial. She noted that the trial “was originally
scheduled for a full, two-day trial” but the second day “was limited to half a day
due to the Court’s scheduling constraints.” In support of her contention,
Sokunthim noted that (1) both parties needed interpreters, which slowed the
trial; and (2) she had “repeatedly brought to the Court’s attention the impact
that her brain injury has on the speed at which she can process information.”
4 The topics covered by the proposed findings were wide-ranging and included Rotanak’s contact
with the children, the nature of the gifts from Sokunthim’s parents, economic misconduct by Rotanak, Rotanak’s abuse of Sokunthim, and the accuracy of Sokunthim’s annual income on her tax returns. As such, many of the proposed findings are not relevant to this appeal and will not be discussed further. 7
[¶12] The trial court denied both motions. In denying the Rule 52
motion, the court found that it had made sufficient findings. In denying the
Rule 59 motion, the court pointed out that it had provided additional trial time
when requested; that its decision was not affected by time constraints; and that
Sokunthim had failed to object on the record to the amount of trial time, request
additional trial time as an accommodation, or identify evidence that she could
not present.
[¶13] Sokunthim filed a timely notice of appeal. See M.R.
App. P. 2B(c)(2).
II. DISCUSSION
[¶14] Sokunthim raises three issues on appeal. First, she asserts that the
court erred in deciding that her income was $435,598, an amount more than
ten times the gross income figures on her recent tax returns. Next, she argues
that the court erred in determining that all the real property was marital and
that the court abused its discretion in distributing the property by awarding
Rotanak just under half of the net value of assets. Finally, she contends that her
due process rights were violated by the court’s failure to provide her with
interpreter assistance at status conferences and by the court’s reduction of trial
time from two days to one and a half days. 8
[¶15] The trial court “has a duty to make findings sufficient to inform the
parties of the reasoning underlying its conclusions and to provide for effective
appellate review.” Bayley v. Bayley, 602 A.2d 1152, 1153-54 (Me. 1992). When
“an affected party timely moves for findings pursuant to M.R. Civ. P. 52, the trial
court must ensure that the judgment is supported by express factual findings
that are based on record evidence, are sufficient to support the result, and are
sufficient to inform the parties and any reviewing court of the basis for the
decision.” Ehret v. Ehret, 2016 ME 43, ¶ 9, 135 A.3d 101 (footnote omitted).
Upon the denial of a timely filed Rule 52 motion, “we cannot infer findings from
the evidence in the record” regarding areas covered in the motion’s proposed
findings. Id. (quotation marks omitted). “In these circumstances, if the
judgment does not include specific findings that are sufficient to support the
result, appellate review is impossible and the order denying findings must be
vacated.” Id.
A. Determination of Sokunthim’s Income
[¶16] “A court’s determination of a party’s income in a divorce
proceeding is a factual finding that we review for clear error.” Payne v. Payne,
2006 ME 73, ¶ 7, 899 A.2d 793. “A court’s determination of a party’s income is
clearly erroneous only if there is no competent evidence in the record to 9
support it.” Howard v. White, 2024 ME 9, ¶ 7, 308 A.3d 213 (quotation marks
omitted).
[¶17] Sokunthim argues that the trial court erred both in finding that she
treats Punky’s income as her own and in valuing the income from Punky’s.
Because her Rule 52 motion for findings included a proposed finding that her
personal income tax returns accurately reflect her income, we cannot infer that
the court made findings sufficient to support its determination.
[¶18] The court explicitly found, with support in the record, that
Sokunthim treats the income from Punky’s as her own, and the court therefore
allocated the profits from Punky’s to Sokunthim in determining Sokunthim’s
annual income. Sokunthim’s tax returns, which Sokunthim and her accountant
testified were accurate, indicate that Punky’s gross sales and net profits were
$334,165 and $18,969 respectively in 2022, $357,749 and $30,610 in 2021, and
$335,748 and $34,876 in 2020. However, the court found that Punky’s annual
gross sales are $750,000, more than twice the amounts shown in the tax
returns; this finding was based on Rotanak’s testimony that in 2019 and 2020
Punky’s had daily sales of $2,500 to $3,000, half in cash and half in credit card
purchases, and an estimate by the court that Punky’s is open 300 days a year.
Although the court relied on Rotanak’s testimony in developing the $750,000 10
gross income figure, it relied on Sokunthim’s tax returns to determine Punky’s
expenses. From the $750,000 figure, the court subtracted $314,402,
representing the average amount of expenses reported in Sokunthim’s tax
returns, yielding an annual income figure of $435,598—more than ten times
the figures shown in the tax returns. The only way to reconcile the $435,598
figure with the tax returns is if Sokunthim failed to declare approximately
$400,000 in income from Punky’s in her annual tax returns.
[¶19] The court’s finding that Punky’s was open 300 days a year may be
reasonable, but it is not supported in the evidence; none of the witnesses gave
testimony on how many days per week or days per year the store was open.
There was evidence supporting the court’s findings that half of Punky’s gross
receipts were in the form of cash rather than credit card payments and that the
parties retained an unquantified amount of cash rather than depositing it into
a bank account. However, Rotanak’s testimony about Punky’s income did not
support the court’s findings regarding Sokunthim’s income: his testimony was
stale and speculative because he had no involvement in the business after early
2020 and had no specific knowledge of the nature or amount of Punky’s
receipts, cash or otherwise, after that. There was no testimony or other
evidence that Sokunthim failed to declare any of Punky’s cash receipts for tax 11
purposes or that Punky’s gross sales and profits were not accurately reported
on the tax returns, and the court made no such findings.
[¶20] Because the court’s finding as to Sokunthim’s income is
unsupported by the evidence and the court’s award of child support is based on
that erroneous finding, see 19-A M.R.S. § 2006(1) (2025), the court’s child
support award and underlying income determination must be vacated. See
Whitmore v. Whitmore, 2023 ME 3, ¶ 12, 288 A.3d 799.
B. Property Distribution
[¶21] Title 19-A M.R.S. § 953 (2020)5 “establishes the three-step process
that a court must use when disposing of property in a divorce judgment. The
court must (1) determine what of the parties’ property is marital and
non-marital, (2) set apart each spouse’s non-marital property, and (3) divide
the marital property between them in such proportion as the court deems just.”
Miliano v. Miliano, 2012 ME 100, ¶ 14, 50 A.3d 534 (citation and quotation
marks omitted).
5Title 19-A M.R.S. § 953 has since been amended. See P.L. 2023, ch. 646, § C-3 (emergency, effective Apr. 22, 2024) (codified at 19-A M.R.S. § 953(1)(D) (2025)); P.L. 2021, ch. 122, § 3 (effective Oct. 18, 2021) (codified as subsequently amended at 19-A M.R.S. § 953(1)(D) (2025)). 12
1. Classification of Property as Marital
[¶22] “In a divorce proceeding, the party claiming that a piece of
property is nonmarital bears the burden of proof on that issue at trial. When a
party has the burden of proof at trial, we will reverse a ruling against that party
only if the evidence compelled the court to find in that party’s favor.” Findlen v.
Findlen, 1997 ME 130, ¶ 6, 695 A.2d 1216 (alteration, citation, and quotation
marks omitted). “We defer to the trial court’s determination of witnesses’
credibility and its resolution of conflicts in testimony.” Gordon v. Cheskin, 2013
ME 113, ¶ 12, 82 A.3d 1221.
[¶23] Property acquired during a marriage is statutorily presumed to be
marital property. 19-A M.R.S. § 953(3). “This statutory presumption is
overcome if the party claiming the nonmarital status of the property
demonstrates that the property is one of the exceptions set forth in
19-A M.R.S.[ ] § 953(2).” Spooner v. Spooner, 2004 ME 69, ¶ 8, 850 A.2d 354.
“Property acquired by gift, bequest, devise or descent,” 19-A M.R.S. § 953(2)(A),
and “[p]roperty acquired in exchange for property acquired prior to the
marriage or in exchange for property acquired by gift, bequest, devise or
descent,” id. § 953(2)(B), is nonmarital. 13
[¶24] The Punky’s store and the multi-unit rental property were owned
by Punky’s LLC and Panyah LLC respectively, and the marital home was in
Sokunthim’s name. Sokunthim contends that the trial court erred in finding
that the two LLCs and the home were marital property. Because her Rule 52
motion for findings included a proposed finding that all three were acquired
and funded primarily with nonmarital funds, we cannot infer findings that are
not contained in the court’s judgment.
[¶25] The court did not err in finding that both LLCs and the home were
entirely marital because Sokunthim failed to overcome the presumption. All
three properties were acquired during the marriage. Despite Sokunthim’s
contention that the gifts from her parents that enabled the acquisition of the
three properties were to her only, the court found that “the money gifted by
Mrs. Sokunthim’s parents (whatever amount that might have been) was a gift
to both parties and their new family and not just to Mrs. Sokunthim.” These
express findings were supported by Rotanak’s testimony and other competent
evidence in the record. The court did not err in determining that the parties’
real properties were marital. 14
2. Disposition of Property
[¶26] Sokunthim argues that in dividing the parties’ property the court
abused its discretion by failing to (1) credit her allegations regarding economic
misconduct by Rotanak during the marriage, (2) consider all relevant factors,
and (3) distribute property in an equitable manner.6
[¶27] We review a trial court’s distribution of marital property for an
abuse of discretion. Hutt v. Hanson, 2016 ME 128, ¶ 15, 147 A.3d 352. “A just
distribution is not synonymous with an equal distribution; the court is required
to make the division fair and just considering all the circumstances.” Sears v.
Sears, 2023 ME 45, ¶ 20, 299 A.3d 15. The court must consider all relevant
factors, including:
A. The contribution of each spouse to the acquisition of the marital property, including the contribution of a spouse as homemaker;
B. The value of the property set apart to each spouse; and
C. The economic circumstances of each spouse at the time the division of property is to become effective, including the desirability of awarding the family home or the right to live in the home for reasonable periods to the spouse having custody of the children.
6 Sokunthim further argues that the trial court abused its discretion in distributing the marital
property because, she claims (as discussed above), some of the property was nonmarital. Because Sokunthim did not meet her burden of establishing that the property had a nonmarital component, we need not consider her additional arguments. 15
19-A M.R.S. § 953(1).7
[¶28] The court made no findings as to Rotanak committing economic
misconduct during the marriage. At trial, Sokunthim alleged that Rotanak
loaned a third party $15,000 from the Punky’s LLC bank account without her
consent and despite not being an authorized signer on the account. However,
Rotanak testified that Sokunthim consented to the loan and wrote the checks
herself, that the money had been returned to the parties, and that Rotanak was
authorized to sign for the account. The court did not appear to find Sokunthim’s
allegations credible and made no findings related to the loan or economic
misconduct on the part of either party.
[¶29] The trial court considered the relevant factors, including the
party’s preferences, and divided the party’s assets accordingly. In distributing
7 After the divorce complaint was filed but before the entry of judgment, 19-A M.R.S. § 953(1) was
amended to add “economic abuse by a spouse” as a relevant factor for courts to consider in allocating property. See P.L. 2021, ch. 122, § 3 (effective Oct. 18, 2021) (codified as subsequently amended at 19-A M.R.S. § 953(1)(D) (2025)). The amendment incorporates the definition of “economic abuse” contained in the protection from abuse statute, 19-A M.R.S. § 4102(5) (2025). See P.L. 2023, ch. 646, § C-3 (emergency, effective Apr. 22, 2024) (codified at 19-A M.R.S. § 953(1)(D) (2025)). In enacting the amendment, the Legislature did not provide for it to apply to cases pending at the time of enactment. See P.L. 2021, ch. 122, § 3 (effective Oct. 18, 2021) (codified as subsequently amended at 19-A M.R.S. § 953(1)(D) (2025)). It therefore does not apply to this case. See 1 M.R.S. § 302 (2025) (“Actions and proceedings pending at the time of the passage, amendment or repeal of an Act or ordinance are not affected thereby.”); MacImage of Maine, LLC v. Androscoggin Cnty., 2012 ME 44, ¶ 22, 40 A.3d 975 (“The general rule of statutory construction set forth in section 302 may be overcome, however, by legislation expressly citing section 302, or explicitly stating an intent to apply a provision to pending proceedings.” (alteration and quotation marks omitted)). Moreover, Sokunthim does not argue that the amendment applies, so we do not consider it further. 16
the marital property, the court relied on the “significant amount of labor and
time” that both parties invested in Punky’s. The court also considered
Rotanak’s efforts “to keep their business afloat, all while caring for the children
as best as he was able” throughout Sokunthim’s illness. Notably, the court also
declined to credit Sokunthim for her parents’ support in the division of
property.
[¶30] Importantly, however, “the court must consider [the parties’]
income in crafting an equitable distribution of the parties’ assets and liabilities.”
Sears, 2023 ME 45, ¶ 23, 299 A.3d 15; see 19-A M.R.S. § 953(1)(C). Although the
court’s distribution of property appears reasonable, we must vacate it because
the court’s finding as to Sokunthim’s income is unsupported by the evidence,
and the court’s distribution of property may have been influenced by that
erroneous finding.
C. Denial of the Motion for New Trial
[¶31] Sokunthim argues that the trial court abused its discretion by
denying her motion for a new trial because “there were numerous and ongoing
due process violations throughout the pendency of the case.” Sokunthim
specifically argues she was entitled to a new trial because the court failed to
(1) act on her request for accommodations, (2) provide an interpreter at all 17
status conferences, and (3) provide adequate trial time. The first two grounds
were not mentioned in Sokunthim’s motion for new trial or otherwise raised in
the trial court, so we review them under the obvious error standard. 8
[¶32] “The fundamental requirement of due process is the opportunity
to be heard at a meaningful time and in a meaningful manner.” Mathews v.
Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 333 (1976) (quotation marks omitted). “It is a flexible
concept that ‘calls for such procedural protections as the particular situation
demands.’” In re A.M., 2012 ME 118, ¶ 15, 55 A.3d 463 (quoting Mathews,
424 U.S. at 334).
1. Accommodations Request
[¶33] Sokunthim contends that she submitted a request for
accommodation of a medical disability, in the form of a letter from her medical
provider, and that the trial court never acted on her request.
[¶34] The Judicial Branch requires that accommodation requests be
made on the Disability Accommodation Request Form to the Court Access
Coordinator, the appropriate clerk’s office, or the presiding judge in the case.
8 To be preserved for appeal, “the issue must first be presented to the trial court so that the trial court has the opportunity to assess and act on the point to which the objection is directed.” In re Anthony R., 2010 ME 4, ¶ 8, 987 A.2d 532. “When an unpreserved error is asserted to implicate constitutional rights, the error may be regarded as ‘obvious’ if it worked a substantial injustice or affected the appellant’s substantial rights.” Id. ¶ 9. We review alleged but unpreserved constitutional violations for obvious error. See, e.g., In re Children of Destiny H., 2024 ME 66, ¶ 18, 322 A.3d 1183. 18
See State of Maine Judicial Branch, Form OTH-011: Disability Accommodation
Request Form, https://www.courts.maine.gov/forms/pdf/misc/
accommodation-request.pdf [https://perma.cc/68W6-W2W7]. Notably, the
Judicial Branch requests that medical information not be attached to submitted
forms. Id.
[¶35] The record reflects that on March 21, 2023, Sokunthim filed with
the clerk a letter from her medical provider.9 The letter was not filed using the
Disability Accommodation Request Form. The letter indicated that Sokunthim
“[h]as a past medical history of an intraventricular hemorrhage from an AVM
which . . . has affected Sokunthim’s memory and cognition” and requested that
she “have time and space to answer any questions in court and provide
interpretation services as needed.” The record contains no indication that
Sokunthim, despite being represented by counsel, ever asked for an
accommodation during the trial. Because we will not assume that the court
would have ignored either the letter or an oral request for accommodation if
either had been brought to the court’s attention, we deem the issue
unpreserved and see no obvious error.
9 The docket entry reads: “OTHER FILING – OTHER DOCUMENT FILED ON 03/21/2023 PLAINTIFF’S MEDICAL INFORMATION.” The letter was dated October 22, 2020. 19
2. Interpreter Issues
[¶36] Sokunthim contends that, because two status conferences
proceeded without interpreters, she was precluded from conducting any
discovery because she has limited English proficiency (LEP). The record does
not indicate that she raised this issue in the trial court, so again our review is
for obvious error.
[¶37] An administrative order issued by the Maine Supreme Judicial
Court provides that “Maine’s State Courts will provide all LEP individuals who
are parties or witnesses in any type of court case . . . with an interpreter in all
court proceedings, at the State’s expense.” Guidelines for Court-Appointed
Interpretation and Translation Services, Me. Admin. Order JB-06-3 (as
amended by A. 3-22) (effective Mar. 11, 2022). There is no dispute that
Sokunthim was entitled to have interpreter services at all court proceedings,
including the status conferences, and that an interpreter was not provided at
the May 2023 status conference that proceeded regardless. The parties
dispute—and the record is unclear—whether an interpreter was present at the
February 2023 conference that proceeded.
[¶38] Although Sokunthim claims to have been unable to propound
discovery due to her lack of proficiency in English, the record contradicts her 20
contention in several ways. She was represented by attorneys at various times
during the period when discovery could be pursued. Interpreters were present
at other status conferences and other court events at which she could have
made discovery requests. At a pretrial conference in August 2023 at which she
was again unrepresented, Sokunthim requested leave to propound discovery,
and her request was denied on the ground that she could have made the request
earlier and that at various points in the case she had been represented by
attorneys who also could have propounded discovery on her behalf. At a trial
management conference in November 2023, Sokunthim was once again
represented by counsel, and the court indicated that “[t]he parties are ready to
proceed to trial” in December 2023. The trial transcript reflects that Sokunthim
told the court that she did not need an interpreter to translate questions
presented to her and would ask the interpreter for assistance as needed. As
with her contention regarding accommodation, we see no obvious error.
3. Reduced Trial Time
[¶39] Sokunthim contends that the court abused its discretion in denying
her Rule 59 motion because the reduced trial time prejudiced her due process
rights. “We review the denial of a motion for a new trial deferentially for a clear
and manifest abuse of discretion.’” In re Kaylianna C., 2017 ME 135, ¶ 8, 166 21
A.3d 976 (alteration and quotation marks omitted). “When due process is
implicated, we review such procedural rulings to determine whether the
process struck a balance between competing concerns that was fundamentally
fair.” In re A.M., 2012 ME 118, ¶ 14, 55 A.3d 463 (quotation marks omitted).
[¶40] Due process fundamentally requires that “notice and opportunity
for a hearing must be granted at a meaningful time and in a meaningful
manner.” Bank of Am., N.A. v. Camire, 2017 ME 20, ¶ 8, 155 A.3d 416 (quotation
marks omitted). “Procedural due process requires an opportunity to be heard,
not an optimal opportunity to be heard.” Id. “The trial court has discretion to
reasonably manage time during evidentiary hearings.” Id. When a party
“receive[s] ample notice of time constraints, appear[s] at trial, and ha[s] an
opportunity to present his [case],” no due process violation occurs, especially
when the party “fails to explain what evidence, if any, [the party] would have
presented to the court with additional time.” Id. ¶¶ 9-10.
[¶41] The trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying Sokunthim’s
motion for a new trial on the ground that the hearing was reduced from a
two-day hearing to a one-and-a-half-day hearing. Sokunthim made no
objection at the hearing as to reduced trial time, nor was there any indication
that Sokunthim was unable to present evidence because of the time constraint. 22
Sokunthim’s contention regarding trial time was first presented to the court in
Sokunthim’s motion for a new trial. As the court aptly noted in denying the
Rule 59 motion, Sokunthim never objected to the length of the trial and did not
explain what evidence she was unable to present.
[¶42] For all of these reasons, we conclude that the trial court did not
abuse its discretion in denying Sokunthim’s motion for a new trial.
III. CONCLUSION
[¶43] Among the many issues Sokunthim raises in this appeal, we agree
only with her objection to the court’s finding as to her income because there
was a lack of support for the finding in the evidence. Because the court’s income
finding may have affected the provisions of the judgment relating to child
support and property distribution, we vacate those portions of the judgment
and remand for further proceedings. In all other respects, we affirm the
judgment.
The entry is:
Judgment vacated as to the property distribution and child support. Judgment affirmed in all other respects. Remanded to the District Court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. 23
Christa Vo, Esq., and Erika Connolly, Esq., Legal-Ease, LLC P.A., South Portland, for appellant Sokunthim Nou
Jeremy W. Dean, Esq., Portland, for appellee Rotanak Huot
Portland District Court docket number FM-2020-457 FOR CLERK REFERENCE ONLY